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ABSTRACT 
We t a l k  as though t h e r e  a r e  numbers.  The view I 
d e f e n d ,  t h e  " p o p u l a r n  view, h a s  i t  t h a t  t h e r e  - a r e  numbers.  
However, s i n c e  t h e y  c l e a r l y  a r e  n o t  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s ,  
we r e a s o n  t h a t  t h e y  must be  a b s t r a c t  o n e s .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  
a r e a l m  o f  n o n - s p a t i a l  non-temporal  o b j e c t s  s t a n d i n g  
i n  n u m e r i c a l  r e l a t i o n s ;  a r i t h m e t i c  knowledge i s  t h e n  
knowledge o f  t h i s  r e a l m .  But how do s p a t i o ~ t e m p o r a l  
c r e a t u r e s  l i k e  o u r s e l v e s  come t o  have  knowledge o f  t h i s  
r e a l m ?  
The problem ( " B e n a c e r r a f l s  probleni") c a n  be avo ided  
by a r g u i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  are no numbers.  I n  "What Numbers 
Could Not Bew B e n a c e r r a f  h i m s e l f  t o o k  such  a  r o u t e .  I n  
c h a p t e r  one ,  I d i s c u s s  t h r e e  o f  B e n a c e r r a f l s  a rguments ,  
showing t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  i s  c i r c u l a r ,  t h a t  t h e  second i n v o l v e s  
a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h a t  c a n  b e  e x p l a i n e d  by l e s s  d r a s t i c  
means t h a n  s u p p o s i n g  t h e r e  a r e  no numbers,  and t h a t  t h e  
t h i r d  would, i f  s u c c e s s f u l ,  show t h a t  n e i t h e r  s e t s  n o r  
e x p r e s s i o n s  e x i s t  e i t h e r .  
Yet d e s p i t e  t h e  l a c k  o f  s u c c e s s  o f  a rguments  p u r p o r t i n g  
t o  show t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no  numbers,  a c c o u n t s  o f  a r i t h m e t i c  
which make no r e f e r e n c e  t o  numbers might  b e  though t  
p r e f e r a b l e  t o  t h e  p o p u l a r  view on t h e  ground t h a t  t h e y  
manage t o  a v o i d  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  problem. Accord ing ly ,  
i n  c h a p t e r  two I examine t h r e e  q u a s i - f o r m a l i s t  a c c o u n t s  
t h a t  l l r e d u c e n  number t a l k  t o  t a l k  a b o u t  o t h e r  s o r t s  o f  
o b j e c t s ,  t o  see whe the r  t h i s  i s  s o .  I show t h a t  e a c h  o f  
then1 i n v o l v e s  commitments t o  o t h e r  f a m i l i a r  m a t h e m a t i c a l  
o b j e c t s ,  and hence  makes no headway on t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  
problem. 
I n  v iew o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  q u a s i - f o r m a l i s t  p o s i t i o n s ,  
t h e  n e x t  l o g i c a l  s t e p  f o r  someone a n x i o u s  t o  a v o i d  t h e  
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  problem by d e n y i n g  t h e r e  a r e  numbers i s  t o  
r e t r e a t  t; f u l l - b l o o d e d  fo rmal i sm,  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  
a r e  no m a t h e m a t i c a l  e n t i t i e s ,  o n l y  l i n g u i s t i c  o n e s .  The 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  h e r e  seems t o  be t h a t  u n l i k e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  
e n t i t i e s ,  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  " a c c e s s i b l e "  
(and t h e r e f o r e  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  p rob lem. )  
By way o f  j u s t i f y i n g  t h e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ,  I b e l i e v e  t h a t  
a f o r m a l i s t  would adva-nce t h e  f c l l o w l n g  g r o u n d s :  
(1) E x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  c o n c r e t e  whereas m a t h e m a t i c a l  e n t i t i e s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  numbers, a r e  n o t ,  
( 2 )  Even i f  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s ,  w e  can  
know a b o u t  them on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  t o k e n s ,  which 
a r e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ;  b u t  s i n c e  numbers have no 
-
t o k e n s ,  t h i s  s o r t  of  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  
I n  s e c t i o n  one o f  c h a p t e r  t h r e e  I examine ( I ) ,  siiowing 
t h a t  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  c o n c r e t e  i s  j u s t  n o t  
t e n a b l e ,  Then I examine ( 2 ) ,  a r g u i n g  t h a t  i t ,  t o o ,  i s  
false,  b e c a u s e  i n  wha tever  s e n s e  we c a n  know abou t  
e x p r e s s i o n s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  i n t e r a c t i n g  w i t h  t h e i r  t o k e n s ,  
we can  know abou t  numbers, t o o ,  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  i n t e r a c t i n g  
w i t h  p a i r s ,  t r i o s ,  q u a d r u p l e s ,  e t c .  
T h e s i s  S u p e r v i s o r :  R ichard  L, C a r t w r i g h t  
T i t l e :  P r o f e s s o r  o f  Ph i losophy  
A plurality is not an instance of num- 
ber, but of some particular number. A 
trio of men, for example, is aninstanoe 
of the number 3.. . . This point may seem 
elementary and scarcely worth mention- 
ing; yet it has proved too subtle for 
the philosophers, with few exceptions. 
--Bertrand Russell 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
My c o n c e r n  i s  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  a r e  numbers ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
n a t u r a l  numbers.  I b e l i e v e  t h ~ t  p o p u l a r  o p i n i o n ,  n o t  
o n l y  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c  ( i f  i n t r o d u c t o r y  p h i l o s o p h y  s t u d e n t s  
a r e  any  g u i d e ) ,  b u t  w i t h  m a t h e m a t i c i a n s  and p r o b a b l y  
s c i e n t i s t s  as w e l l ,  h a s  i t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  numbers.  Monk,' 
f o r  example,  has e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  wor ld  i s  
p o p u l a t e d  with  65% p l a t o n i s t s ,  30% f o r m a l i s t s ,  and 5 %  
i n t u i t i o n i s t s . '  T h e r e  seems l i t t l e  d o u b t  t h a t  we t a l k  as 
though  t h e r e  a r e  numbers.  Why t h e n  am I conce rned  w i t h  
w h e t h e r  t h e r e  a r e  numbers? Why n o t  j u s t  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e ?  Because  the  p o p u l a r  v iew may r u n ,  i n t o  
i n s u p e r a b l e  epistemological d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
d e t a i l e d  by B e n a c e r r a f  i n  "Mathemat i ca l  T r u t h t ' .  2 
Here i s  how t h o s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  migh t  be s e e n  t o  
a r i s e .  To t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  u n i n i t i a t e d  i t  i s  n a t u r a l  
t o  suppose  n o t  o n l y  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  numbers ,  b u t  a l s o  t h a t  
we are q u i t e  familiar  w i t h  a t  l e a s t  some o f  them. Every- 
one c a n  add and d i v i d e  them ( a l t h o u g h  n o t  always t o o  
w e l l ) ;  q u a n t i t i e s  h a v i n g  nuaber  a r e  a l l  a round  u s ,  The 
more m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  among u s  can  p rove  
1. J .  Donald Monk, Mathemat i ca l  Logic (New York: S p r i n g e r -  
V e r l a g ,  1 9 7 6 )  p .  3 .  
2 ,  J o u r n a l  o f  P h i l o s o p h y  70 (1973) :  661-679. 
e s o t e r i c  t r u t h s  a b o u t  them. But when a s k e d :  what - i s  a  
number? t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  n o v i c e  i s  l i k e l y  t o  p o i n t  t o  
numera l s .  Ah, b u t  numbers canno t  b e  i d e n t i c a l  t o  numera l s ,  
i t  w i l l  be  s a i d ,  because  a l t h o u g h  5 + 7 = 1 2 ,  f o r  example,  
i t  i s  n o t  t r u e  t h a t  ' 5  + 7 '  = ' 1 2 ' .  So numerals  must 
r e f e r  - t o numbers. 
T h i s  r o u t i n e  i n i t i a t i o n  i n t o  ph i losophy  l e a d s  t o  
what I w i l l  c a l l  t h e  p o p u l a r  view. According t o  i t ,  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  s o r t  o f  p r o c e d u r e  i s  u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l .  Suppose 
a b a r e  u n i n t e r p r e t e d  number c a l c u l u s  i s  g i v e n ,  u s i n g  t h e  
symbols l o ' ,  ' S f ,  e t c .  where t h e  u s u a l  c o n c a t e n a t i o n  r u l e s  
a r e  employed, s o  we c a n  g e t  t h e  sequence  l o 1 ,  'SO1,  lSSO1, . . .  
The s e m a n t i c s  c a n  t h e n  b e  g i v e n  i n  t h e  . fo1,lowing , t e r m s :  
' 0 '  r e f e r s  t o  0, 'SO1 r e f e r s  t o  1, lSSO1 r e f e r s  t o  2 ,  and 
i n  g e n e r a l  ' 0 '  p receded  by n  - l S W s r e f e r s  t o  t h e  number - n .  
If it i s  a s k e d :  what d o e s  ' 2 '  r e f e r  t o ,  though ,  o r  l t w o l ,  
o r  ' s e v e n t e e n 1 ?  t h e  answer would b e :  why, t h e  numbers two,  
two, and s e v e n t e e n ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  of  c o u r s e .  
The b a s i c  i d e a  behind t h i s  view i s  t h a t  t h e  mathe- 
m a t i c a l  t e r m s  i n  q u e s t i o n  a r e  a l r e a d y  a  p a r t  o f  E n g l i s h ,  
which i s  a n  i n t e r p r e t e d  l anguage .  Hence t h e s e  t e rms  a l r e a d y  
r e f e r .  To what?  To numbers.  What 's  t h e  problem? 
So f a r  t h e r e  i s  no problem,  When q u e r i e d  a s  t o  t h e  
o n t o l o g i c a l  s t a t u s  o f  numbers,  a n  a d v o c a t e  o f  t h e  view 
I am c o n s i d e r i n g  w i l l  s a y :  numbers a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  
Having t r a i p s e d  t h i s  f a r  i n t o  r e a l i s t  t e r r i t o r y ,  when 
p r e s s e d  f o r  f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  he o r  s h e  may s a y :  numbers a r e  
n o n - s p a t i a l  and non-temporal ;  t h e y  a r e  members of  a p l a t o n i c  
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realm of mathematical objects that stand in mathematical 
relations to each other. It is a realm of mathematical 
facts, as it were, whereby every mathematical statement is 
either truo or false. The mathematician's task is to go 
out there and, not invent, but discover the principles, or 
laws, we could even say, governing this realm. So numbers 
are to the arithmetician what animals are to the zoologist, 
after all. 
Now given this picture, whic.h is really a picture 
of what it is for a mathematical proposition to be true, 
Benacerraf argues that "It will be impossible to account 
for how anyone knows any properly number-theoretical 
 proposition^.^' because llIf, for example, numbers are the 
kinds of entities they are normally taken to be, then the 
connection between the truth corlditions for the statements 
of number theory and any relevant events connected with 
the people who are supposed to have mathematical knowledge 
cannot be made outew3 In short, since we are spatio-temporal 
objects, and numbers are not, we can never causally interact 
with them or an-{ part of the abstract realm of mathematical 
entities whereby arithmetical propositions are true -- but 
interaction is necessary for us to be able to know such 
propositions non-innately. Where and how does the 
mathematician do his/her field work? (G6del attempted to 
Ibid, p. 673. 3. -
answer t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  b u t  h i s  answer i s  g e n e r a l l y  though t  
t o  be  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . ) .  
Thus it a p p e a r s  t h a t  i n  t h e  absence  o f  a  p l a u s i b l e  
accoun t  of  how m a t h e m a t i c a l  knowledge i s  o b t a i n e d  on t h i s  
view, we must r e j e c t  t h e  p o p u l a r  v iew,  on t h e  ground t h a t  
i t  l e a d s  t o  insurmountab le  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
The main t h e s e s  o f  what I am c a l l i n g  " t h e  p o p ~ l a r  view1' 
a r e  t h a t  
( I )  There  are numbers. 
and 
( 1 1 )  Numbers a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  
These e n t a i l ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
(111)  There  are m a t h e m a t i c a l  e n t i t i e s .  
' ,  
and 
( I V )  There  a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  
O f  c o u r s e  t h e  v iew p r e s u p p o s e s  t h a t  m a t h e m a t i c a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
are,  i n  t h e  main, e i t h e r  t r u e  o r  f a l s e :  i n   particular^, 
t h a t  
(V) A r i t h m e t i c  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  t r u e  o r  f a l s e .  
So i n  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  p o p u l a r  view, one must deny sorne o r  a l l  
o f  t h e  above t h e s e s .  
But b e f o r e  we c o n s i d e r  any r e j e c t i o n s ,  l e t  u s  f i r s t  
t a k e  n o t e  o f  t h e  f a c t ,  as I s e e  i t ,  t h a t  were i t  n o t  f o r  
t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i t  seems t o  i n v o l v e ,  t h e  
p o p u l a r  v iew would win hands  down; it i s  p o p u l a r  w i t h  good 
r e a s o n .  The good r e a s o n  i s  t h a t  i t  b e s t  a c c o r d s  w i t h  u s a g e .  
That  i s ,  we t a l k  as though t h e r e  a r e  numbers,  s o  of c o u r s e  
--- -
t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  numbers a c c o r d s  v e r y  w e l l  w i t h  
t h i s  f a c t .  While i t  i s  h a r d  t o  make p r e c i s e  t h e  s e n s e  i n  
which t h e  i t a l i c i z e d  c l a i m  i s  t r u e ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o i n t s  
may h e l p  t o  a m p l i f y  t h e  c l a i m ,  
I n  " O n t o l o g i c a l  R e l a t i v i t y 1 '  Q u i n e  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  a s  
' ' t h e r e  i s  no f a c t  o f  t h e  m a t t e r f 1 ,  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e f e r e n c e  
c a n  be  a p p l i e d  n o t  o n l y  t o  remote  bushmen, b u t  t o  o u r  
n e i g h b o r s ,  and even t o  o u r s e l v e s .  But t h e n  
We seem t o  be  maneuvering o u r s e l v e s  i n t o  t h e  
a b s u r d  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  
on any terms, i n t e r l i n g u i s t i c  o r  i n t r a l i n g u i s t i c ,  
o b j e c t i v e  o r  s u b j e c t i v e ,  between r e f e r r i n g  
t o  r a b b i t s  and r e f e r r i n g  t o  r a b b i t  p a r t s  o r  
s t a g e s ;  o r  between r e f e r r i n g  t o  fo rmulas  and 
r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e i r  GBdel numbers.  S u r e l y  t h i s  
i s  a b s u r d . . .  5 
I 
He d e f e n d s  h i m s e l f  a g a i n s t  t h i s  c h a r g e  by s a y i n g :  
Toward r e s o l v i n g  t h i s  quandary ,  b e g i n  by 
p i c t u r i n g  u s  a t  home i n  o u r  l a n g u a g e ,  w i t h  all 
i t s  p r e d i c a t e s  and a u x i l i a r y  d e v i c e s .  T h i s  
v o c a b u l a r y  i n c l u d e s  ' r a b b i t 1 ,  ' r a b b i t  p a r t 1 ,  
' r a b b i t  s t a g e 1 ,  ' f o r m u l a 1 ,  ' number1 ,  , . . ;  
a l s o  t h e  two-place p r e d i c a t e s  o f  i d e n t i t y  and 
d i f f e r e n c e ,  and o t h e r  l o g i c a l  p a r t i c l e s .  I n  
t h e s e  t e r m s  we c a n  s a y  i n  s o  many words t h a t  
t h i s  i s  a f o r m u l a  and t h a t  a  number, t h i s  a  
r a b b i t  and t h a t  a r a b b i t  p a r t .  ... T h i s  netwollk 
o f  t e r m s  and p r e d i c a t e s  and a u x i l i a r y  d e v i c e s  
i s ,  i n  r e l a t i v i t y  j a r g o n ,  o u r  frame of r e f e r e n c e ,  
o r  c o o r d i n a t e  sys tem.  R e l a t i v e  t o  it we c a n  
and do t a l k  m e a n i n g f u l l y  and d i s f l n c t i c l x ? f  
--- - - 
r a b b i t s  - and p a r t s ,  numbers - and f o r m u l a s  . 6  
4. O n t o l o g i c a l  R e l a t i v i t y  And O t h e r  Essays (New York: 
Columbia U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1969)  p .  4 7 .  
5 .  - Idem. 
6 .   bid ., p .  48, my i t a l i c s .  
Not o n l y  do  we b e g i n  a t  home i n  t h e  c o o r d i n a t e  sys tem o f  
o u r  own language ,  f o r  Q u i n e ,  -- where 'numbert  r e f e r s  t o  
numbers j u s t  as s u r e l y  as ' r a b b i t 1  r e f e r s  t o  r a b b i t s t 7  --- 
b u t  we wind 9 t h e r e  a f t e r  hav ing  t r i e d  t o  s c r u t i n i z e  
r e f e r e n c e  f o r  a  w h i l e :  
It i s  m e a n i n g l e s s  t o  a s k  whe the r ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  
o u r  t e rms  ' r a b b i t ' ,  ' r a b b i t  p a r t 1 ,  ' number1 ,  
e t c . ,  r e a l l y  r e f e r  r e s p e c t i v e l y  t o  r a b b i t s ,  
r a b b i t  p a r t s ,  numbers,  e t c . ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  
some i n g e n i o u s l y  premuted d e n o t a t i o n s .  It i s  
mean ing less  t o  a s k  t h i s  a b s o l u t e l y ;  we c a n  
m e a n i n g f u l l y  a s k  i t  o n l y  r e l a t i v e  t o  some back- 
ground l anguage .  When we a s k ,  "Does ' r a b b i t T  
r e a l l y  r e f e r  t o  r a b b i t s ? "  someone can  c o u n t e r  
w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n :  "Refe r  t o  r a b b i t s  i n  what 
s e n s e  o f  ' r a b b i t s ' ? "  t h u s  l a u n c h i n g  a  r e g r e s s ;  
and we need t h e  background l anguage  t o  r e g r e s s  
i n t o .  ... Are we i n v o l v e d  now i n  an  i n f i n i t e  
r e g r e s s ?  ... [ I ] n  p r a c t i c e  we end t h e  r e g r e s s  
o f  background l a n g u a g e s ,  i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  
r e f e r e n c e ,  & a c q u i e s c i n g  our mo h e r  tongue 
7 
4- and t a k i n g  i t s  words at f a c e  v a l u e .  
I t h i n k  it would be  f a i r  t o  s a y  t h a t  Quine  t h i n k s  
t h a t  o u r  mother  tongue  o r  t h e  t h e o r y  embedded t h e r e i n  commits 
u s  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  numbers ( a t  l e a s t  s o  l o n g  a s  we a r e  
s p e a k i n g  i t ) .  And we know what o n t o l o g i c a l  commitment 
amounts t o  f o r  Q u i n e .  So,  a p p a r e n t l y  he t h i n k s  t h a t  
( V I )  We q u a n t i f y  o v e r  numbers,  
No doub t  w e  do. A n i c e  example i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ,  e x t r a c t e d  
7 ,  T h i s  emerged d u r i n g  a  l e c t u r e  he gave  a t  P r i n c e t o n  i n  
- 
February  1981: C f .  ~ h e o r i e s  and Things  (Cambridge, Mass : 
Belknap P r e s s  of  Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1981)  p .  2 0 .  
8. Ontol g i c a l  R e l a t i v i b y  And Other  E s s a y s ,  p .  4 9 ,  my i t a l i c s .  
from t h e  p r o g r a m f b i p l e y f s  B e l i e v e  It O r   NO^: 
For  some number 2, t h e r e  i s  a  famous p e r s o n  who 
was n  y e a r s  o l d  t h e  y e a r  t h e  King Jamesf v e r s i o n  
of  t E e  B i b l e  was w r i t t e r i ,  and ,  some b e l i e v e ,  
h e l p e d  w r i t e  t h a t  B i b l e ;  because  i f  you c o n c a t e -  
n a t e  t h e  n t h  word o f  t h e  n t h  Psalm o f  t h e  King 
Jamesf  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  ~ i b i e  w i t h  t h e  nth-from- 
t h e - l a s t  word ( o f  t h e  l a s t  s e n  e n c e )  of t h a t  
same Psalm, you have h i s  name. b 
B e s i d e s  q u a n t i f y i n g  o v e r  them, t h e r e  seem t o  b e  o t h e r  
r e s p e c t s  i n  which we t a l k  as though t h e r e  a r e  numbers.  
I n  s t a t e m e n t s  such  as 
(S1) Two i s  a  pr ime number. 
and 
' t w o f  and ' 2 '  a p p e a r  t o  b e  u n i q u e l y  r e f e r r i n g  s i n g u l a r  
t e r m s ,  n o t  p r e d i c a t e s ,  f u n c t o r s ,  o r  r e l a t i o n a l  e x p r e s s i o n s .  
On t h e  p o p u l a r  view, t h e y  a r e  - names -- names of  a b s t r a c t  
o b j e c t s .  Thus s e v e r a l  f u 2 t h e r  t h e s e s  might  be  s t a t e d ,  a s  
e v i d e n c e  f o r  t h e  view: 
( V I I )  Numerals l i k e  ' 2 '  and number words l i k e  ' t w o f  i n  
such  s t a t e m e n t s  as ( S 2 )  and (S1) r e s p e c t i v e l y  a r e  
s i n g u l  erms .. 
( V I I I )  The s u r f a c e  structures on (S1) and ( S 2 )  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  
t o  t h e i r  l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s , '  
( I X )  The a p p r o p r i a t e  s e m a n t i c s  f o r  ( S l )  and ( S 2 )  a r e  
r e f e r e n t i a l  s e m a n t i c s .  
9 .  ; i s  46.  The w r i t e r  i n  q u e s t i o n  i s  S h a k e s p e a r e .  
S i n c e  t h e  p o p u l a r  view i n v o l v e s  t h e s e s  ( I )  - ( I X ) ,  
i n  r e j e c t i n g  i t ,  one must deny one o r  more o f  t h e s e  t h e s e s .  
And i n d e e d ,  d e n i a l s  have abounded. I n  t h e  l a s t  c e n t u r y ,  
M i l l  d e n i e d  ( I I ) ,  a r g u i n g  t h a t  numbers a r e  p r o p e r t i e s  of  
o b j e c t s .  lo While n e a t l y  s i d e s t e p p i n g  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  
problems o f  t h e  p o p u l a r  view, i t  i s  l e s s  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  
o t h e r  r e s p e c t s ,  r e s p e c t s  t h a t  F rege  was q u i c k  t o  p o i n t  o u t .  11 
Though Frege  i s  u s u a l l y  t a k e n  t o  have l t b u r i e d l '  M i l l ,  r e c e n t  
e f f o r t s  have done much t o  r e s u r r e c t  h i s  o u t l o o k .  C h a r l e s  
Lambr4os, f o r  example,  h a s  a r g u e d  t h a t  F r e g e l s  a t t a c k  on 
Mill's " p r e d i c a t i v e  view o f  number words, '1 -- which proceeded 
p a r t l y  v i a  ( V I I )  -- i s  far  from c o n c l u s i v e .  la And Glenn 
K e s s l e r  h a s  p r e s e n t e d  a t h e o r y  where in  numbers a r e  r e l a t i o n s  
I .  
between a g g r e g a t e s  and p r o p e r t i e s .  1 3  
O f  c o u r s e  Frege  h i m s e l f ,  and R u s s e l l  and Quine  
a f t e r  him h o l d  v e r s i o n s  o f  t h e  p o p u l a r  v iew.  They s u b s c r i b e  
t o  ( I )  and (11) through ,  t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  numbells a r e  s e t s ,  
o r  c l a s s e s .  I n  "What Numbers Could Not Be'' Pau l  Benacer ra f  
10. John S t u a r t  M i l l ,  A System o f  Logic (New York: Longman, 
Green & Co., 1936)  Book 11, Chap te r  V I ,  S e c .  2 .  
11. G o t t l o b  F r e g e ,  The Founda t ions  o f  A r i t h m e t i c ,  r e p r i n t e d  
and t r a n s l a t e d  by J . L .  A u s t i n  (Evans ton ,  11: Northwestern  
U n i v e r s i t y  press, 1980)  s e c t i o n s  7 ,  8 ,  9 and  25. 
1 2 .  "Are N m b e r s  P r o p e r t i e s  o f  O b j e c t s ? ,  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  
S t u d i e s  29 (1976):381-389. 
1 3 .  "Frege ,  M i l l ,  and t h e  Founda t ions  of  Mathemat ics ,"  
J o u r n a l  o f  Ph i losophy  77 (1980):65-79.  
mounts a  v i g o r o u s  a t t a c k  on t h i s  l a t t e r  t h e s i s .  l4 I n  t h e  
p r o c e s s  he  d o e s  n o t  mere ly  deny ( I )  and ( I I ) ,  b u t  a r g u e s  
f o r  t h e  v e r y  s t r o n g  r e s u l t  t h a t  numbers c o u l d  n o t  be o b j e c t s  
--
a t  a l l .  For  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  c h a p t e r  one o f  my d i s s e r t a t i o n  
-- 
(which b e g i n s  s h o r t l y  be low)  i s  a n  examina t ion  o f  how 
s u c c e s s f u l  h i s  a t t a c k  i s .  I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  Benacer ra f  seems 
t o  t h i n k  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  numbers do n o t  e x i s t , 1 5  o t h e r  s o r t s  
o f  m a t h e m a t i c a l  e n t i t i e s ,  l i k e  s e t s ,  do .  He a p p e a r s  t o  
s u b s c r i b e  t o  (111), (IV)  and ( V ) .  T h i s  l e a v e s  him open t o  
h i s  own c r i t i c i s m ,  ment ioned ea r l i e r ,  t h a t  such  a p o s i t i o n  
i s  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  u n t e n a b l e .  
Hence some v e r s i o n  o f  fo rmal i sm,  C u r r y ' s  o r  H i l b e r t l s  16 
1 4 .  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Review 74 (1965)  : 47-73. When t h i s  article i s  
r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  c h a p t e r  one ,  below, page  numbers w i l l  b e  i n c l u d e d  
p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y  i n  t h e  t e x t ;  i n  l a t e r  c h a p t e r s  l W N C N B t  w i l l  
b e  appended.  
1 5 .  So f a r  as I am aware ,  B e n a c e r r a f  d o e s  n o t  c l a i m  t o  have 
shown "numbers do n o t  e x i s t v  per s e .  U s u a l l y  h i s  c l a i m  i s  
t h a t  l1numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  alln. Although t h e  two 
might  b e  t h o u g h t  e q u i v a l e n t ,  t h e y  a r e  n c t .  Because t h e  
fo rmer  d o e s  n o t  e n t a i l  t h e  l a t t e r  u n l e s s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s  t r u e :  
(S3) If numbers e x i s t ,  t h e y  a r e  o b j e c t s .  
And t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  immediate  abou t  ( S  ) ;  numbers might  e x i s t  
b u t  as p r o p e r t i e s  o r  r e l a t i o n s ,  as t h e  i i l l i a n s  c l a i m .  How- 
e v e r  I s h a l l  u s e  "numbers do n o t  e x i s t u  and llnumbers a r e  n o t  
o b j e c t s  a t  a l l1 '  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y  when d i s c u s s i n g  B e n a c e r r a f l s  
a r t i c l e ,  b e c a u s e  he g i v e s  no e v i d e n c e  t h a t  he t h i n k s  numbers 
might  b e  p r o p e r t i e s  o r  r e l a t i o n s ,  I n  f a c t ,  he spends  a  good 
d e a l  o f  time c r i t i c i z i n g  t h e  view t h a t  number words a r e  
p r e d i c a t e s  (pp ,  5c -61) ,  and c o n c l u d e s  t h e  a r t i c l e  by s a y i n g  
' ' . . . i f  t h e  t r u t h  be known, t h e r e  a r e  no such  t h i n g s  a s  
numbers . . . "  ( p .  7 3 ) .  
1 6 .  H a s k e l l  Curry ,  O u t l i n e s  o f  a  F o r m a l i s t  Ph i losophy  o f  
Mathemat ics  ,(Amsterdam: North-Holland,  1 9 5 0 ) .  F o r  H i l b e r t l s  
view see, e . g . ,  "On t h e  I n f i n i t e , "  i n  Benacer ra f  and Putnamls  
Ph i losophy  o f  Mathematics  (Englewood C l i f f s ,  N . J . :  P r e n t i c e  
Hall ,  1964)  134-151. 
f o r  example,  might  be  t h o u g h t  p r e f e r a b l e ,  i n v o l v i n g  a s  t h e y  
d o  d e n i a l s  of (111). Yet n e i t h z r  o f  t h e  f o r m a l i s t s  c i t e d  
r e j e c t  ( I V ) ;  Curry i s  committed t o  f o r m a l  s y s t e m s ,  and 
H i l b e r t ,  t o  s imple  s i g n s  ( a t  l e a s t ) .  Even t h i s  commitment 
i s  t o o  u n - n o m i n a l i s t i c  f o r  H a r t r y  F i e l d ,  who wants  t o  deny 
e v e r y  one o f  ( I )  - (v) .17  However, u n l i k e  most o f  t h e  
o t h e r  writers whose p o s i t i o n s  i n v o l v e  n o t  o n l y  r e j e c t i o n s  
o f  one  o r  more o f  ( I )  - ( V )  b u t  a l s o  one o r  more o f  ( V I )  - 
(1x)18,  it i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  F i e l d  would d i s p u t e  t h e  c l a i m  
t h a t  we t a l k  as though t h e r e  a r e  numbers -- i . e . ,  deny any 
of ( V I )  - ( I X ) .  Nor i s  he s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  we revamp o u r  
s p e e c h  h a b i t s  t o  a c c o r d  w i t h  nominal ism. H i s  p o i n t  a p p e a r s  
t o  be  t h a t  'lone c a n  a lways  r e a x i o m a t i z e  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s  
' <  
s o  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no r e f e r e n c e  t o  o r  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o v e r  
m a t h e m a t i c a l  e n t i t i e s  i n  t h e  r e a x i o r n a t i z a t i o n . . .  1 1 1 9  But 
whether  he  s u c c e s s f u l l y  d o e s  away w i t h  all a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s  
and t h e  consequen t  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  problems,  a s  he  seems 
t o  want t o ,  i s  a n o t h e r  m a t t e r .  
A s  c a n  be s e e n ,  t h e r e  i s  q u i t e  a  r a n g e  o f  views t h a t  
r e j e c t  t h e  p o p u l a r  view, from Mill 's r e j e c t i o n  o f  (11) 
17 .  S c i e n c e  Without  Numbers ( P r i n c e t o n ,  N.J.: P r i n c e t o n  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 0 ) .  
1 8 .  U s u a l l y  n o t  (IX). Even t h e  i n t u i t i o n i s t s  a r e  p r o b a b l y  
b e t t e r  u n d e r s t o o d  a s  deny ing  ( V I I I ) , t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  l o g i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  a n  a r i t h m e t i c a l  s t a t e m e n t  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o ' i t s  
s u r f a c e  s t r u c t u r e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  deny ing  r e f e r e n t i a l  s e m a n t i c s .  
t o  F i e l d ' s  r e j e c t i o n  o f  (I) t h r o u g h  ( V ) .  In l a t e r  c h a p t e r s ,  
I d e a l  w i t h  a  number o f  t h e s e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  mainly  w i t h  an 
eye  towards  s e e i n g  whether  t h e y  s o l v e  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  
problem t h a t  a p p e a r s  t o  be a consequence  o f  t h e  p o p u l a r  
view. But f i r s t ,  I s h a l l  c o n c e r n  mysel f  a t  some l e n g t h  
w i t h  t h e  arguments  g i v e n  by Benacer ra f  i n  !?What Numbers 
Could Not Be." That  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  c h a p t e r  one ,  which 
compr i ses  t h e  remainder  o f  what f o l l o w s .  
CHAPTER I : BENACERRAF 
1. Benacerraf's First Argument 
Judging from the flurry of articles it generated, 
What Numbers Could Not Be" is one of the most important 
pieces written in recent years on the question of whether 
there are numbers. So a critical examination of the 
arguments contained therein seems called for. 
Benacerraf addresses the question of whether there 
are numbers head on. No, he says, there are no numbers. 
His - main argument has two conclusions. The first is that 
numbers are not sets, and the second is that numbers are 
L _ -  -
not - objects -- at all. An abbreviati~n of the argument that 
numbers are not sets is the folldwing: 
(1) Peano Arithmetic (P.A.) has infinitely many models 
in set theory. For example, all the theorems of P.A. come 
out true if we let 0 = 0, and n + 1 = [n], or alternatively, 
if we let n + 1 = n U [n]. Moreover, infinitely many of 
these accounts satisfy whatever constraints (like recur- 
siveness) we find necessary to impose with regard to 
"numberhoodl' (based, perhaps, on considerations involving 
counting and measurement). This is illustrated by the 
cases of Ernie and Johnny, one of whom is taught that the 
Zermelo numbers are - the numbers, and the other of whom is 
taught that the Von Neumann numbers are - the numbers. 
(2) Therefore, either 
(a) None of the accounts are correct; or, 
(b) Exactly one of them is correct; or 
(c) More than one, perhaps all, are correct. 
(3) (c) is defeated by the following argument. If, say, 
Ernie's and Johnny's accounts are - both correct, then it 
follows that [O, [@I, [@ ,  [@]]I = 3 = [[[@111. But this 
is clearly false. 20 
( 4 )  Benacerrafls argument against (b) is that if exactly 
one account is correct, then we should be able to give rea- 
sons for preferring one account over all the others. The 
position that it is an unknowable truth that, e.g., 3 = 
*--[[[@]]I (rather than [ , ,  ] is untenable. Because 
We do not know what a proof of that could look 
like. The notion of "correct account" is 
breakin-Toosefromits moorin s ii we a-dmit 
-+ d o m e ~ s t e n c e  o un~ustifiable 
but correct answers to questions such as 
this. To take seriously the question "is 3 = 
[[[O]]]?" - tout court (and not elliptically 
20. I think this argument is perfectly straightforward, 
that one need not appeal to such statements asl'If numbers 
are sets, then they are particular sets'' the way Kitcher 
does in "The Plight of the Platonist" Nous 12 (1978): 119- 
136, p. 120, when discussing ~enacerra-article. Kitcher 
seems to think that the assumption that if numbers are sets 
then they are particular sets, is required, and that Quine 
thinks it false. If so, then it is up to Quine to show 
how numbers are sets, but not particular sets. And I don't 
think that Quine would be willing to want to show this. 
He probably doesn't think the claim makes sense, without 
further qualifications. He usually says things like: 
any progression (of a certain sort) will do as the numbers. 
That is very different from c l a i m i n g ~ t ~ u c h  progressions 
are the numbers. 
-
f o r  I f i n  E r n i e ' s  a c c o u n t ? " ) ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  
. - 
o f  any way o f  s e t t l i n g  i t ,  i s  t o  l o s e  o n e l s  
b e a r i n g s  c o m p l e t e l y .  ( p .  58 ,  my italics.) 
However w e  canno t  g i v e  r e a s o n s  f o r  p r e f e r r i n g  one accoun t  
o v e r  a l l  t h e  o t h e r s .  Although,  f o r  example, F r e g e l s  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  number 3 w i t h  t h e  c l a s s  of a l l  c l a s s e s  
e q u i v a l e n t  w i t h  a g i v e n  (3-membered) c l a s s  i s  I1 . . .an  
a p p e a l i n g  n o t i o n ,  t h e r e  seems l i t t l e  t o  recommend i t  o v e r ,  
s a y ,  E r n i e ' s t 1  ( p *  5 8 ) .  So t h a t  
R e l a t i v e  t o  o u r  p u r p o s e s  i n  g i v i n g  a n  accoun t  
o f  t h e s e  m a t t e r s ,  one w i l l  do  as w e l l  a s  a n o t  
s t y l i s t i c  p r e f e r e n c e s  a s i d e ,  There i s  no way 
connec ted  w i t h  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  o f  number words 
t h a t  w i l l  a l l o w  u s  t o  choose  among them, - f o r  
t h e  a c c o u n t s  d i f f e r  g& p l a c e s  where t h e r e  is 
-
no c o n n e c t i o n  wha tever  between f e a t u r e s  o f  
-
t h e  a c c o u n t s  and o u r  u s e s  of words 
q u e s t i o n * m ) -  - 
h e r ,  
( 5 )  T h e r e f o r e  w e  a r e  l e f t  w i t h  ( a ) ,  t h a t  none o f  t h e  s e t -  
t h e o r e t i c  a c c o u n t s  i s  t h e  c o r r e c t  one ,  and s o  numbers a r e  
n o t  s e t s  a t  a l l ,  
I am i n c l i n e d  t o  a g r e e  w i t h  B e n a c e r r a f l s  argument 
s o  f a r ,  i . e . ,  up t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  s e t s ,  
i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  vagueness  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  metaphors  
" l o s e  o n e ' s  b e a r i n g s  c o m p l e t e l y "  and "b reak  l o o s e  from i t s  
moorings".  It d o e s  seem t h a t  i t  would be  c o m p l e t e l y  
a r b i t r a r y  and hence  u n j u s t i f i e d  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  numbers w i t h  
one s e t  p r o g r e s s i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n o t h e r ,  And t h i s  i s  a  
t e l l i n g  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  view t h a t  numbers a r e  s e t s .  
It might  be  wor thwhi le  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t o  d i s c u s s  
what t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  s e t s ,  o r  a r e  no t  t o  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  s e t s ,  amounts t o ,  s o  as t o  p r e v e ~ t  any 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  It i s  not meant t h a t  numbers canno t  be  
i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  s e t s  - f o r  c e r t a i n  p u r p o s e s .  Bu t ,  r a t h e r ,  
t h a t  t h e y  ought  n o t  t o  be  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  s e t s  once and f o r  
a l l ,  as i t  were -- i . e . ,  i n  a more fundamenta l ,  o n t o l o g i c a l  
s e n s e .  B e n a c e r r a f  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  a s  one between 
e x p l i c a t i o n  and r e d u c t i o n :  
I n  p u t t i n g  f o r t h  an e x p l i c a t i o n  o f  number, a 
p h i l o s o p h e r  may have a s  p a r t  o f  h i s  e x p l i c a t i o n  
t h e  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  3 = [ [ [ f l ] ] ] .  Does i t  
f o l l o w  t h a t  h e  i s  making t h e  k i n d  o f  m i s t a k e  
o f  which I accused  F r e g e ?  I t h i n k  n o t .  For  
t h e r e  i s  a d i f f e r e n c e  between a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  
3 i s  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  t r i p l e t s  and i d e n t i f y i n  
3 a t h  t h a t  s e t ,  which l as t  i s  what, might b: done 
i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  some e x p l i c a t i o n .  I c e r t a i n l y  
d o  n o t  wish  what I am a r g u i n g  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  t o  
m i l i t a t e  a g a i n s t  i d e n t i f y i n g  3 w i t h  a n y t h i n g  
you l i k e .  The d i f f e r e n c e  l i e s  i n  t h a t ,  
n o r m a l l y ,  one who i d e n t i f i e s  3 w i t h  some 
p a r t i c u l a r  set  d o e s  s o  f o r  t h e  purpose  o f  
p r e s e n t i n g  some t h e o r y  and d o e s  n o t  c l a i m  t h a t  
he h a s  d i s c o v e r e d  which o b j e c t  3 r e a l l y  i s ,  
We might  want t o  know whether  some s e t  (and 
r e l a t i o n s  and s o  f o r t h )  would do a s  number 
s u r r o g a t e s .  I n  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h i s  i t  would be 
e n t i r e l y  l e g i t i m a t e  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  making 
such  a n  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  we c a n  do w i t h  t h a t  
set  (and  t h o s e  r e l a t i o n s )  what we now do w i t h  
t h e  numbers. . .Under o u r  a n a l y s i s ,  any sys tem 
o f  o b j e c t s ,  s e t s  o r  n o t ,  t h a t  forms a  
r e c u r s i v e  p r o g r e s s i o n  must be a d e q u a t e .  I t  
i s  t h e r e f o r e  obv ious  t h a t  t o  d i s c o v e r  t h a t  
a sys tem w i l l  do canno t  be t o  d i s c o v e r  which 
o b j e c t s  t h e  numbers a r e .  ( p p .  67-68) 
L i k e  B e n a c e r r a f ,  I am i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  answers  
t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  !'Are t h e r e  numbers?" and "If  s o ,  what a r e  
t h e y ? "  as t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  unders tood  i n  t h e  r e d u c t i v e  
s e n s e  d e s c r i b e d  above.  Unl ike  him, however,  I s h a l l  speak of  
whether  we a r e  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  numbers w i t h  t h i s  o r  t h a t  
p r o g r e s s i o n  (when t h e  i s s u e  i s  t h a t  o f  what t h e  numbers 
r e a l l y  a r e ,  as opposed t o  what w i l l  do  as a n  e x p l i c a t i o n . 2 1 )  
Another  p o i n t  t h a t  s h o u l d  be made e x p l i c i t l y  b e f o r e  
we c o n t i n u e  i s  t h i s .  Throughout  I assume t h a t ,  whatever  
numbers are, t h e y  are a l l  t h e  same s o r t  o f  t h i n g  -- t h a t  i f  
some are sets ,  s a y ,  t h e n  a l l  are.  And so I move c o m f o r t a b l y  
back  and f o r t h  between such  s t a t e m e n t s  as :  
Numbers a r e  n o t  s e t s .  
and : 
The n a t u r a l  number p r o g r e s s i o n  i s  n o t  a s e t - t h e o r e t i c  
p r o g r e s s i o n .  
T h i s  a s sumpt ion  seems innocuous  enough t o  me. It might  seem 
t o  need d e f e n d i n g ,  though ,  i n  v iew o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Benacer ra f  
a p p e a r s  n o t  t o  make i t  sometimes.  For  example,  i n  ( 4 )  on p .  1 2  
above,  B e n a c e r r a f  i s  quo ted  as s a y i n g :  
To t a k e  s e r i o u s l y  t h e  q u e s t i o n  "Is 3 = [ [ [ g ] ] ] ? "  
t o u t  c o u r t  (and n o t  e l l i p t i c a l l y  f o r  ' ' in  E r n i e ' s  
-
accou'nt?"r, i n  t h e  absence  o f  any way o f  s e t t l i n g  
i t ,  i s  t o  l o s e  o n e l s  b e a r i n g s  c o m p l e t e l y .  ( p .  5 8 )  
But t h i s  i s  m i s l e a d i n g .  The assumpt ion  i n  q u e s t i o n  seems t o  
be  o p e r a t i v e  i n  h i s  c o n c l u d i n g  remarks  a b o u t  3 :  
21. Although t h i s  i s  a t  odds w i t h  B e n a c e r r a f l s  u s e  o f  t h e  
term I f i d e n t i f y "  ("you c a n  i d e n t i f y  3 w i t h  a n y t h i n g  you l i k e u )  
I t h i n k  my usage  i s  j u s t i f i e d  because  we want t o  d i s c o v e r  
which p r o g r e s s i o n  o u t  o f  a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  p r o g r e s s i o n s  t h a t  
" w i l l  dou as t h e  numbers i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  n u m b e ~ s .  Then 
we can  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers a r e ,  o r  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  
t o ,  t h a t  p r o g r e s s i o n  -- and n o t  r e l a t i v e  t o  scme purpose  o r  
o t h e r .  
... any  f e a t u r e  o f  a n  accoun t  t h a t  i d e n t i f i e s  
3 w i t h  a  set i s  a  s u p e r f l u o u s  one -- and t h a t  
t h e r e f o r e  3 ,  and i t s  f e l l o w  numbers,  c o u l d  
n o t  be  s e t s  a t  a l l .  (p., my i t a l i c s )  
I b e l i e v e  t h a t  he j u s t  wants  t o  emphasize t h e  l a c k  o f  
r a t i o n a l e  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  numbers as ,  s a y ,  s e t s ,  and t h a t  
t h i s  i s  more r e a d i l y  a p p a r e n t  when i n d i v i d u a l  numbers and 
sets  a r e  i n v o l v e d  t h a n  whole p r o g r e s s i o n s .  
The same remarks  a p p l y  t o  t h e  second c o n c l u s i o n  
of what I have been c a l l i n g  l1the main argument1' -- t h a t  
numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l .  B e n a c e r r a f  c l a i m s  t h a t  t h i s  
i s  a r r i v e d  a t  by a n  " e x t e n s i o n "  o f  t h e  argument which I 
have  summarized by (1) t o  ( 5 )  above.  H i s  r e a s o n  f o r  
t h i n k i n g  s o  i s  t h a t  " . . . t h e r e  i s  no more r e a s o n  t o  i d e n t i f y  
any i n d i v i d u a l  number w i t h  any one  p a r t i c u l a r  o b j e c t  t h a n  
w i t h  any o t h e r  ( n o t  a l r e a d y  known t o  be  a number) ' ' .  ( p .  6 9 )  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  he  d o e s  n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  g i v e  t h e  
e x t e n s i o n .  Using (1) t o  ( 5 )  a s  a model,  p e r h a p s  i t  would 
l o o k  l i k e  t h i s :  
( 1 ' )  P.A. h a s  many models even o u t s i d e  o f  s e t  t h e o r y .  
( 2 I )  T h e r e f o r e  e i t h e r  none o f  t h e  models i s  t h e  r i g h t  
one;  e x a c t l y  one o f  them i s ;  o r ,  more t h a n  one i s .  
( 3 ' )  Not more t h a n  one can  be c o r r e c t  because  t h e y  a r e  
n o t  e x t e n s i o n a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t .  ( I n  one,  f o r  example,  
t h e  number 3 might  be J u l i u s  C a e s a r ,  w h i l e  i n  a n o t h e r ,  
3 might  be  Marc Antony. C l e a r l y  C a ~ s a r  i s  n o t  
Ant ony . ) 
( 4 ' )  If one accoun t  i s  t h e  c o r r e c t  one ,  t h e n  we shou ld  be 
a b l e  t o  s p e c i f y  why t h i s  i s  s o .  But we c a n n o t .  One 
w i l l  do as w e l l  as a n o t h e r .  
(5') T h e r e f o r e ,  numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l .  
I f  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  argument worked, t h e n  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  
t h a t  B e n a c e r r a f  u r g e s  would ( o f  c o u r s e )  be  fo r thcoming .  But 
i t  seems f u l l  o f  g a p s ,  a t  l e a s t  as i t  s t a n d s .  For  s t a r t e r s ,  
we can  a s k  abou t  (1 ') .  Everyone knows t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  models 
o f  P.A. i n  s e t  t h e o r y .  But ( I 1 )  c l a i m s  t h e r e  a r e  models 
o f  P.A. o u t s i d e  o f  set  t h e o r y .  Where? w e  may a s k .  It might  
be  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers themse lves  p r o v i d e  
many examples.  For example,  t h e  odd numbers,  w i t h  s u c c e s s o r ,  
a d d i t i o n ,  and m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  p r o p e r l y  defin,ed,  c o n s t i t u t e  
a model f o r  P.A. So d o  t h e  numbers w i t h o u t  0 ,  t h e  numbers 
w i t h o u t  0 and 1, t h e  numbers w i t h o u t  0 ,  1, and 2 ,  and e t c .  
I n  s h o r t ,  any r e c u r s i v e  p r o g r e s s i o n  composed o f  n a t u r a l  
numbers c o n s t i t u t e s  a model f o r  P.A. There  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  
many models  o f  P.A. t o  be  o o t a i n e d  from t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers 
t h e m s e l v e s .  So i t  might  be  though t  t h a t  a s u c c e s s f u l  
e x t e n s i o n  o f  (1) t o  ( 5 )  -- u n l i k e  t h e  u n s u c c e s s f u l  (1 ' )  t o  
( 5 ' )  -- might  l o o k  l i k e  t h i s :  
(1" )  P.A. h a s  i n f i n i t e l y  many models  w i t h i n  t h e  n a t u r a l  
numbers t h e m s e l v e s .  For  example,  t h e r e  i s  a  model 
whose domain i s  j u s t  t h e  odd numbers,  and a n o t h e r  
whose domain i s  j u s t  t h e  e v e n s .  
( 2 " )  T h e i e f o r e  e i t h e r  more t h a n  one model i s  t h e  c o r r e c t  
one ,  one o f  them i s ,  o r  none a r e .  
(3 ' ' )  Not more t h a n  one c a n  be  c o r r e c t ,  because  t h e y  a r e  n o t  
e x t e n s i o n a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t .  I n  t h e  odd model,  2 I s  5 ,  
s o  t o  s p e a k ,  w h i l e  i n  t h e  even model 2 i s  4 .  But a s  
we a l l  know, 4  # 5 .  
(4" )  There  i s  no r e a s o n  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  one model a s  t h e  
c o r r e c t  one o v e r  a l l  t h e  o t h e r s ;  one w i l l  do a s  w e l l  
as a n o t h e r .  
( 5 " )  T h e r e f o r e  numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l .  
C l e a r l y  t h e  above argument  i s  f a l l a c i o u s .  ( 4 " )  i s  
j u s t  f a l se ,  Because i f  i t  i s  n a t u r a l  numbers we a r e  t a l k i n g  
abou t  when we s a y  l o d d s l  and ' e v e n s f  t h e n  o f  c o u r s e  one 
I 
model t o  b e  p r e f e r r e d  o v e r  a l l  t h e  o t h e r s  -- v i z , ,  t h e  
s t a n d a r d  model.  It i s  e a s i l y  enough s p e c i f i e d ,  g i v e n  t h e  
terms a t  hand; i t  i s  s imply  t h e  one whose domain c o n s i s t s  
o f  odds and evens  t o g e t h e r  (all t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers) w i t h  
t h e  s u c c e s s o r  f u n c t i o n ,  a d d i t i o n ,  and m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  a s  t h e y  
a r e  u s u a l l y  u n d e r s t o o d .  S i n c e  (411)  i s  f a l s e ,  we do n o t  
g e t  ( 5 " )  a t  a l l .  
Cons ide r  anyhow i f  we had o b t a i n e d  ( 5 n ) .  ( 5 " )  i m p l i e s  
t h a t  t h e r e  are no n a t u r a l  numbers. If t h a t  were s o ,  t h e n  
t h e r e  would b e  no models o f  number t h e o r y  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
n a t u r a l  numbers,  and s o  (1") would be  fa lse .  Thus we cannot  
u s e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  m u l t i p l e  models  of  P . A .  w i t h i n  
t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers t h e m s e l v e s  t o  d i s c r e d i t  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  
t h a t  numbers e x i s t .  
Perhaps  it s h o u l d  be mentioned t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  
v a r i a n t  o f  t h e  l as t  argument t h a t  e l u d e s  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  t o  
( 4 " )  mentioned above.  Let  ( 2 " ) ,  (311), and ( 4 " )  remain  a s  
t h e y  a r e ,  b u t  r e p l a c e  (1") b y :  
( 1  ) There  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many p r o p e r  s u b s e t s  o f  t h e  
n a t u r a l  numbers t h a t  p r o v i d e  models  o f  P.A. 
Now ( 4 " )  w i l l  be t r u e ,  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  w i l l  be no r e a s o n  
f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers w i t h  any p r o p e r  s u b s e t  
o f  them. But we canno t  c o n c l u d e  ( 5 " )  from t h i s ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  
numbers are n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l .  For  j u s t  a s  (1) t o  ( 4 )  
o n l y  show ( 5 ) ,  t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  s e t s ,  s o  t h i s  v a r i a n t  
o f  (1" )  t o  (411) o n l y  shows 
(5111) The n a t u r a l  number s e r i e s  i s  n o t  t o  be i d e n t i f i e d  
w i t h  a p r o p e r  s u b s e t  o f  i t s e l f .  
So i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  f o r  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  (1) t o  ( 5 )  
t o  work ( i n  such  f a s h i o n  as w i l l  n o t  r u l e  o u t  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n )  
we must f i n d  models  o f  P.A. whose domains c o n t a i n  n e i t h e r  
numbers n o r  s e t s .  I n  view o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  numbers and s e t s  
a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s ,  one might  be tempted t o  l o o k  t o  t h e  
r e a l m  o f  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  f o r  a  model.  B e n a c e r r a f  d i s c u s s e s  
t h e  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  v J u l i u s  Caesar  i s  t h e  number 
43. '  ( a l t h o u g h  he  l a t e r  comes t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
s t a t e m e n t  i s  non-semant ica l ,  o r ,  a t  b e s t ,  f a l s e ) ,  But t h e r e  
i s  no whol ly  s a t i s f a c t , o r y  way t o  e n s u r e  o u r s e l v e s  o f  an  
i n f i n i t e  domain o f  ( d i s c r e t e )  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s .  O f  c o u r s e ,  
i t  depends  upon j u s t  what c o n s t i t u t e s  a p h y s i c a l  o b d e c t ,  
b u t  suppose  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  s m a l l e r  t h a n  
a q u a r k  ( o r  a g l u o n ,  o r  wha tever  s o r t  o f  p a r t i c l e  you l i k e ) .  
C l e a r l y  a t  any g i v e n  time t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  a  f i n i t e  number of 
s u c h  t h i n g s .  However, i f  w e  d o n ' t  mind h a v i n g  o u r  numbers 
s p r e a d  o u t  i n  t i m e ,  t h e n  ( s i n c e  t h e  u n i v e r s e  had a b e g i n n i n g )  
i f  we assume t h a t  t h e  u n i v e r s e  h a s  no end ,  p e r h a p s  we might  
o b t a i n  a n  i n f i n i t e  number o f  quark-s ized  t h i n g s .  But 
assuming t h e  u n i v e r s e  h a s  no end i s  a  s t r o n g ,  and p robab ly  
f a l s e ,  p h y s i c a l  a s sumpt ion .  Pe rhaps  a p h y s i c a l  model o f  a  
p r o g r e s s i o n  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  edge o f  my d e s k ,  d i v i d e d  i n t o  
segments  l i k e  s o :  t h e  f i r s t  segment i s  h a l f  t h e  edge ;  t h e  
second segment i s  t h e  q u a r t e r  a f t e r  t h a t ;  t h e  t h i r d  i s  t h e  
e i g h t h  a f t e r  t h a t ; a n d  s o  on .  But t h i s  seems t o  p resuppose  
t h a t  t h e  edge o f  my d e s k  i s  i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e  -- which 
i s  a n o t h e r  s t r o n g  e m p i r i c a l  a s sumpt ion .  
I do n o t  wish  t o  p u r s u e  f u r t h e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
whe the r  t h e r e  - i s  a p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t  model o f  a  p r o g r e s s i o n ,  
a t  l e a s t  n o t  h e r e ,  Because i t  seems l i k e l y  t o  me t h a t  i f  
t h e r e  i s  one ,  t h e r e  i s  bound t o  be more t h a n  one .  If t h e  
edge  o f  my d e s k  i s  i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e  ( t h u s  p r o v i d i n g  
u s  w i t h a p h y s i c a l  model o f  a p r o g r e s s i o n )  s o  i s  t h e  edge o f  
y o u r  d e s k ,  n o t  t o  ment ion  a l i g h t  r a y  from h e r e  t o  Alpha 
C e n t a u r i ,  and s o  f o r t h ,  And i f  t h e r e  i s  more t h a n  one ,  
t h e n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  any good argument showing of one of 
them t h a t  it compr i ses  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers,  we can c o n s t r u c t  
the following Benacerrafean argument, and agree with the 
conclusion : 
4 (1 ) There are many physical models of number theory. 
4 (2 ) Either more than one is correct, exactly one is, or 
none are. 
4 ( 3  ) Not more than one can be correct, since they are not 
extensionally equivalent. 
4 (4 ) There is no reason to identify one model over all 
the others as the natural numbers. 
4 (5 ) Therefore, numbers are not physical objects at all. 
In casting about for models of arithmetic that are 
not composed of numbers, sets, or physical objects, we 
come upon expressions. Benacerraf himself ,favors expressions:. 
... the sequence of number words is just that -- 
a sequence of words or expressions with certain 
properties. There are not two kinds of things, 
numbers and number words, but just one, the 
words themselves. Most languages contain such 
a sequence, and any such sequence (of words 
or terms) will serve the purposes for which 
we have ours, provided it is recursive in the 
relevant respect. (p. 71) 
Appropriate progressions of expressions constitute models 
for P.A.  Examples include the following progressions : 
lone, 'two, ' 'three,! ... 
lone,' 'three,' ... 
'two, 'four, l 'six, ... 
However one may individuate expressions, surely 'two1 is 
d i f f e r e n t  from ' z w e i l ,  and from ' t h r e e t ,  and hence  t h e  
procgressions mentioned above a r e  j u s t  a  few o f  i n f i n i t e l y  
many d i f f e r e n t  ones .  So we know t h a t  
5 (1 ) There  a r e  many d i f f e r e n t  models  o f  P .A.  c o n s i s t i n g  
o f  e x p r e s s i o n s .  
5 ( 2  ) So e i t h e r  more t h a n  one i s  c o r r e c t ,  e x a c t l y  one i s ,  
o r  none a r e .  
5 ( 3  ) . Not more t h a n  one c a n  be c o r r e c t ,  s i n c e  t h e y  a r e  n o t  
e x t e n s i o n a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t .  
5 ( 4  ) If e x a c t l y  one p r o g r e s s i o n  i s  n a t u r a l  numbers,  
t h e n  we s h o u l d  be a b l e  t o  g i v e  r e a s o n s  why t h i s  i s  
s o ,  But w e  c a n n o t .  
5  ( 5  ) T h e r e f o r e ,  numbers are n o t  e x p r e s s i o n s  a t  a l l ,  
B e n a c e r r a f  h i m s e l f  u r g e s  t h a t  ws d i s p e n s e  w i t h  
numbers i n  f a v o r  o f  number words.  So he might  o b j e c t  t o  
( 4 5 )  on t h e  ground t h a t  we - can  i d e n t i f y  t h e  n a t u r a l  number 
p r o g r e s s i o n  w i t h  some one p a r t i c u l a r  p r o g r e s s i o n  of 
e x p r e s s i o n s .  (Another  wzy o f  r e a d i n g  B e n a c e r r a f  d o e s  n o t  
have  him i d e n t i f y i n g  numbers w i t h  e x p r e s s i o n s .  T h i s  w i l l  
be i n v e s t i g a t e d  l a t e r .  For  t h e  n e x t  few p a g e s ,  I s h a l l  
o n l y  be c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t h e  numbers a r e  t o  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  e x p r e s s i o n s .  ) 
The f o l l o w i n g  remarks  s u g g e s t  t h a t  he  t h i n k s  t h e r e  
i s  one p a r t i c u l a r  p r o g r e s s i o n  t h a t  may be s i n g l e d  o u t :  
Although any sequence  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  w i t h  t h e  
p r o p e r  s t r u c t u r e  would do t h e  j o b  f o r  which we 
employ o u r  p r e s e n t  number words,  t h e r e  i s  
s t i l l  some r e a s o n  f o r  hav ing  one, r e l a t i v e l y  
uniform n o t a t i o n :  o r d i n a r y  communicat ion.  
(pp .  7 1 f ,  my i t a l i c s . ) .  
Which sequence  i s  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  one?  There  a p p e a r s  t o  be  
some l e g i t i m a c y  t o  p r e f e r r i n g  t h e  p r o g r e s s i o n  ' o n e , '  ' t w o , '  
' t h r e e , '  ... o v e r :  ' t w o , '  ' f o u r , '  ' s i x , '  ... o r :  ' o n e , '  
' t h r e e , '  ' f i v e , '  ... But it seems p a t e n t l y  u n f a i r  t o  t h e  
Germans t o  p r e f e r  i t  o v e r :  ' e i n s , '  ' z w e i Y 1  ' d r e i , '  ... 
Suppose i n s t e a d  t h a t  we i d e n t i f y  t h e  numbers w i t h  
t h e  numera l s :  '1,' ' 2 , '  ' 3 , '  ... t h e r e b y  c u t t i n g  o u t  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  c u l t u r a l  b i a s ,  as b o t h  g r o q s  r e c o g n i z e  t h i s  
p r o g r e s s i o n .  ** Note t h a t  we canno t  i d e n t i f y  t h e  p r o g r e s s i o n :  
' o n e , '  ' two , '  ' t h r e e , '  ... w i t h  t h e  p r o g r e s s i o n :  '1,' l 2 , '  
' 3 , '  ... on t h e  grounds  t h a t  t h e y  are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
when r e a d  a l o u d  by u s ,  because  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
from t h e  p r o g r e s s i o n :  ' e i n s l ,  ' z w e i l ,  ' d r e w ' ,  ... 
when r e a d  a l o u d  by Germans, and,  as we have a l r e a d y  n o t e d ,  
' o n e ' ,  ' t w o t ,  ' t h r e e ' ,  ,.. 
i s  a d i f f e r e n t  p r o g r e s s i o n  from 
' e i n s l ,  ' z w e i ' , .  ' d r e i l ,  ... 
But t h e n  it a p p e a r s  t h a t  we have j u s t  r e p l a c e d  one 
c u l t u r a l  b i a s  by a n o t h e r ,  t h i s  t i m e  a g a i n s t  t h o s e  g roups  
who do n o t  employ a r a b i c  numera l s ,  b u t  i n s t e a d  u s e  b i n a r y  
n o t a t i o n ,  o r  Roman numera l s ,  t o  name a  few o f  t h e  
-- -p 
22. But i s  i t  a p r o g r e s s i o n  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s ?  Only i f  
numerals  a r e  e x p r e s s i o n s .  For  t h o s e  who reckon  n o t ,  s k i p  
t o  t h e  n e x t  p a r a g r a p h .  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  The f o l l o w i n g  p a s s a g e s  o f  B e n a c e r r a f l s ,  
however,  s u g g e s t  a d i f f e r e n t  view, one which d o e s  n o t  i n s i s t  
upon t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  one sequence  ,f e x p r e s s i o n s  a s  
t h e  numbers: 
-
Most l a n g u a g e s  c o n t a i n  such  a sequence .  ( p ,  7 1 )  
The u s u a l  o b j e c t i o n  t o  [ t h e  a c c o u n t  t h a t  t h e r e  
are no numbers,  o n l y  number words] -- t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between numbers and 
number words which it f a i l s  t o  make w i l l ,  I 
t h i n k ,  n o t  do. It i s  made on t h e  grounds  
t h a t  ' t w o 1 ,  ' z w e i ' ,  ' d e u x T ,  ' 2 ' ,  a r e  a l l  
supposed t o  " s t a n d  f o r "  t h e  same number b u t  
y e t  are d i f f e r e n t  words (one  o f  them n o t  a  
word a t  a l l ) .  One can mark t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
among t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  and t h e  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  as we l l ,  w i t h o u t  c o n j u r i n g  up 
some e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c  o b j e c t s  f o r  them t o  
name. One need o n l y  p o i n t  t o  t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  
o f  f u n c t i o n :  w i t h i n  any numbering sys tem,  
what w i l l  b e  i m p o r t a n t  w i l l  b e  what' p l a c e  i n  
t h e  sys tem any p a r t i c u l a r  e x p r e s s i o n  i s  used 
t o  mark. ( p .  7 2 ) .  
Perhaps ,  t h e n ,  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  t o  be drawn from 
t h i s  i s  n o t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  one p r e f e r r e d  sequence  o f  
e x p r e s s i o n s ,  b u t  - one per l a n g u a g e .  And t h a t  we ought  t o  
a c q u i e s c e  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  most l anguages  have t h e i r  own 
r e c u r s i v e  sequence  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s .  O f  c o u r s e  t h i s  
s u g g e s t i o n  immedia te ly  r u n s  i n t o  t r o u b l e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
l a n g u a g e s  w i t h  more t h a n  one such  sequence  and no r e a s o n  
t o  s i n g l e  o u t  one as l ' p r e f e r r e d l l .  But b e s i d e s  t h a t  i t  
seems t o  me t h a t  t h e  above s u g g e s t i o n  v i o l a t e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
p r i n c i p l e :  
If x  = y  and x  = z, t h e n  y = z .  
That  i s ,  i f  we i d e n t i f y  t h e  sequence  o f  n a t u r a l  numbers a s  
t h e  sequence :  ' o n e t ,  ' t w o 1 ,  ' t h r e e 1 ,  ... 
and  w e  i d e n t i f y  i t  w i t h  t h e  sequence:  l e i n s t ,  ' z w e i l ,  
d r e  . t h e n  we would have t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  former  
sequence  w i t h  t h e  l a t t e r .  But t h i s  canno t  be done ,  as we 
have a l r e a d y  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  sequences  O F  
e x p r e s s i o n s .  
It might  be o b j e c t e d  t h a t ,  as s p e a k e r s  o f  E n g l i s h ,  
we canno t  i d e n t i f y  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers w i t h  t h e  sequence  
' e i n s l ,  ' z w e i ' ,  ' d r e i l ,  ... because  t h e y  a r e  n o t  terms o f  
E n g l i s h ;  t h e y  a r e  u n a v a i l a b l e  t o  u s  f o r  u s e .  Only t h e  
Germans can  s o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  numbers. But why? What i s  t o  
s t o p  me from s a y i n g :  . , 
( S )  The sequence  one ,  two, t h r e e ,  ... i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  
sequence  ' e i n s t ,  ' z w e i l ,  I d r e i t ,  ,.. 
Nothing,  might  be t h e  r e s p o n s e ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  ( S )  i s  f a l s e ,  
because  t h e  E n g l i s h  number words r e f e r  t o  E n g l i s h  words,  
n o t  German words.  ' O n e t ,  f o r  example,  r e f e r s  t o  a c e r t a i n  
t h r e e - l e t t e r e d  word o f  E n g l i s h  s p e l l e d  ' 0 '  - I n 1  - ' e l ,  
and t h i s  word i s  n o t  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  l e i n s . '  O f  c o u r s e ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  we a r e  e n t e r t a i n i n g ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
i s  a  t r u e  German s e n t e n c e :  
( S f )  Die Fo lge  e i n s ,  zwei ,  d r e i ,  ... i s t  m i t  d e r  Fo lge  
' e i n s l ,  ' z w e i ' ,  ' d r e i l ,  ... i d e n t i s c h .  
T h i s  maneuver h a s  t h e  u n p a l a t a b l e  consequence  o f  r e n d e r i n g  
(St) n o t  a  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  ( S ) .  (However queasy  one f e e l s  
abou t  meaning, i t  s h o u l d  be  n o t e d  t h a t  even Quine  i n s i s t s  
t h a t  a p r o p e r  t r a n s l a t i o n  p r e s e r v e  t r u t h  v a l u e . ) .  The 
Germans would mean one t h i n g  b y  "numbert1 and we would mean 
something d i f f e r e n t .  There  would be German a r i t h m e t i c ,  
E n g l i s h  a r i t h m e t i c ,  -- i n  f a c t ,  as many d i f f e r e n t  a r i t h m e t i c s  
as t h e r e  are n a t u r a l  l anguages  p o s s e s s i n g  a  r e c u r s i v e  number 
word p r o g r e s s i o n .  But f o r  mathemat ics  t o  r e t a i n  i t s  s t a t u s  
a s  a u n i v e r s a l  s c i e n c e ,  and n o t  become s o  many d i f f e r e n t  
p r o v i n c i a l  s c i e n c e s ,  we would have  t o  f o r m u l a t e  what i t  
i s  t h a t  German a r i t h m e t i c  and E n g l i s h  a r i t h m e t i c  and s o  on 
have  i n  common. T h i s  f o r m u l a t i o n ,  I suspec t ,would  b e a r  a 
s t r i k i n g  resemblance  t o  a r i t h m e t i c  as we now know i t .  But 
t h e n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  o n t o l o g y  o f  t h i s  l a t t e r  t h e o r y  
would a r i s e ,  and  we would be back where we s t a r t e d ,  on page 
one above.  
5  It a p p e a r s  t h e n  t h a t  ( 4  ) s t a n d s  u n r e f u t e d ,  a l t h o u g h  
5 n o t  u n c h a l l e n g e d .  And i f  ( 4  ) s t a n d s ,  s o  d o e s  ( 5 ~ ~ 1 ,  t h e  
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  numbers c o u l d  n o t  be  e x p r e s s i o n s  a t  a l l .  
A t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  l e t  u s  t a k e  s t o c k  o f  what we were 
t r y i n g  t o  do,  and what we have done ,  We were t r y i n g  t o  s e e  
how t o  e x t e n d  (1) t o  ( 5 ) ,  (which showed t h a t  numbers a r e  
n o t  sets) s o  as t o  conc lude  t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  
a l l ;  i , e . ,  t h a t  no p r o g r e s s i o n  o f  o b j e c t s  i s  t o  be  
i d e n t i f i e d  as t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers.  From (1"') t o  ( 4 ' " )  
w e  concluded t h a t  t h e  n a t u r a l  number p r o g r e s s i o n  i s  n o t  a 
p r o g r e s s i o n  composed o f  l e s s  t h a n  a l l  o f  t h e  numbers.  From 
4  4 (1 ) t o  ( 4  ) we conc luded  t h a t  t h e  n a t u r a l  number p r o g r e s s i o n  
5 i s  n o t  a p r o g r e s s i o n  o f  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s .  And from (1 ) 
5 t o  ( 4  ) we concluded t h a t ,  B e n a c e r r a f  ( p o s s i b l y )  t o  t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers a r e  n o t  e x p r e s s i o n s .  
What t h i s  s u g g e s t s  i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  The o n l y  way of  
l l ex tend ing l l  (1) t o  ( 5 )  s o  as t o  show t h a t  numbers are n o t  
o b j e c t s  a t  a l l  would be t o  produce  a c o l l e c t i o n  o f  a rguments .  
F i r s t  we would have t o  make a n  e x h a u s t i v e  l i s t  o f  a l l  t h e  
k i n d s  o f  t h i n g s  t h e r e  are -- a  g rand  p a r t i t i o n  o f  t h e  whole 
u n i v e r s e  o f  e n t i t i e s .  23 For  example,  one such  l i s t  might  be : 
' s e t s ,  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s 1 .  Then f o r  e a c h  
s o r t  of o b j e c t  0  on o u r  l i s t ,  we must g i v e  a n  argument 
t h a t  shows t h a t  numbers are n o t  O1s, i , e . ,  a r e  n o t  t o  be  
i d e n t i f i e d  as o l s .  Taken a l l  t o g e t h e r ,  t h e s e  arguments  
show t h a t  numbers are  n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l .  O f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  a rguments  might  v a r y ,  one t o  t h e  n e x t .  They 
might  p a r a l l e l  ( 1 )  t o  ( 5 )  t h e  way t h e  argument c o n s i s t i n g  
of  (1" )  t o  ( 5 " )  d o e s .  That  i s ,  a n  argument showing t h a t  
numbers a r e  n o t  0  l s might  be  o f  t h e  form: 
i (1 ) There  are ( a t  l e a s t )  s e v e r a l  0 - p r o g r e s s i o n s  t h a t  
a r e  models  f o r  P.A., and c o u l d  s e r v e  a s  t h e  b a s i s  
23. Not e v e r y  s o r t  o f  p a r t i t i o n  w i l l  do .  Someone who 
t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e r e  were o n l y  numbers and p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  
c o u l d  e x h a u s t i v e l y  s p e c i f y  h i s  o r  h e r  u n i v e r s e  w i t h  t h e  
l i s t :  ' e v e n  numbers,  odd numbers,  ph s i c a l  o h j e c t s l ,  and I t h e n ,  u s i n g  arguments  o f  t h e  form (1 ) t o  ( 5 i )  p e r h a p s  show 
t h a t  numbers d o n ' t  e x i s t .  T h i s  o b v i o u s l y  won ' t  do .  There-  
f o r e ,  t h e  l i s t  must be s u b j e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  s o r t s  of 
r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  b u t  I w i l l  n o t  t r y  t o  s p e c i f y  them, a s  i t  
would b e  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t ,  and I do n o t  t h i n k  a n y t h i n g  i m p o r t a n t  
h i n g e s  on it f o r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s .  
f o r  a n  accoun t  o f  n a t u r a l  number. 
i ( 2  ) E i t h e r  more t h a n  one i s  co??ec t ,  e x a c t l y  one i s ,  
o r  none a r e ,  
i ( 3  ) It canno t  be  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  more t h a n  one i s  c o r r e c t .  
i ( 4  ) There  i s  no r e a s o n  t o  i d e n t i f y  one o - p r o g r e s s i o n  a s  
t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers o v e r  a l l  t h e  o t h e r s ,  
-
i ( 5  ) T h e r e f o r e ,  numbers a r e  n o t  O1s a t  a l l .  
But t h a t  i s  n o t  t h e  o n l y  t y p e  o f  argument t h a t  would show 
t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  0 ' s .  I f ,  f o r  example,  one c o u l d  show 
t h a t  t h e r e  are no mgdels  o f  P . A .  composed o n l y  o f  0 ls -- 
s a y ,  because  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  a f i n i t e  number o f  O1s -- t h e n  
t h a t  t o o  would s u f f i c e  t o  show t h a t  numbers are  n o t  0 ' s .  
Taken a l l  t o g e t h e r ,  t h e n ,  such  a c o l l e c t i o n  o f  arguments  
would, i f  sound,  j u s t i f y  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  numbers a r e  
n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l ,  t h a t  t h e y  do n o t  e x i s t  -- s i n c e  t h e r e  
i s  no k i n d  of  o b j e c t  0 t h a t  t h e y  are.  However, t h e  s u c c e s s  
o f  t h e  o v e r a l l  argument i s  c o n t i n g e n t  upon t h e  i n i t i a l  
l i s t .  For  example, i f  t h a t  l i s t  i s :  ' se t s ,  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s ,  
4 4 and e x p r e s s i o n s 1 ,  t h e n  (1) t o  ( 5 ) ,  (1 ) t o  ( 5  ) ,  and (15) 
5 t o  ( 5  ) t o g e t h e r  show t h a t  numbers do  n o t  e x i s t .  But if 
t h e  i n i t i a l  l i s t  i n c l u d e s  ' numbers1 ,  t h e n  t h e  above s o r t  
o f  argument w i l l  n o t  work. Because t h e r e  -- i s  no argument t h a t  
can  show t h a t  numbers are n o t  numbers.  The a b s u r d i t y  o f  
--- -7
i i 
any s u c h  argument  o f  t h e  form (1 ) t o  ( 5  ) was i n d i c a t e d  
above,  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  (1") t o  ( 5 " ) .  So t o  show t h a t  
numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s ,  when we l i s t  t h e  s o r t s  o f  t h i n g s  
that we think there are, we could not put 'numbers' on that list. 
The upshot, then, is this. If we assume there are 
no numbers, we can prove as much, by employing a coLlection 
of arguments in the manner dzscribed above, and in the 
process make it seem as thouga we have genuinely proved 
there are no numbers. And I believe this is what Benacerraf 
has, in effect, done. So his main argument that there are 
no numbers fails, since it begs the question. But he does 
buttress the main argument with subsidiary arguments and 
considerations, which appear to discredit the thesis. 
Sections 2 and 3 below will be concerned with these. 
2. Benacerraf's Second Argumemt 
. I 
It is natural to suppose that if numbers are objects, 
then in our non-philosophical capacity we can readily render 
a verdict on the truth or falsity of t43 = Julius Caesar' 
(or, if you like, 'Forty three is identical to Julius 
Caesart> and '3 = [[[@]I]'. Yet we are reluctant to. This 
is puzzling because it is not as though we lack historical 
information about Julius Caesar, or mathematical information 
about 43, so that when the facts are available we will 
unhesitatingly render a verdict of 'true' or 'false'. All 
the relevant facts are before us. Only someone ignorant 
of the facts would seriously ask, in a non-philosophical 
context, whether 43 is Julius Caesar. Also, as Benacerraf 
notes, "we do not know what a proof of [ 3  = [ [ [ m ] ] ]  could 
look like," (p.58) nor of 43 = Julius Caesar. "...[N]ormally, 
one who i d e n t i f i e s  3 w i t h  some p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  does  s o  f o r  
t h e  purpose  o f  p r e s e n t i n g  some t h e o r y  and d o e s  n o t  c l a i m  
t h a t  he has d i s c o v e r e d  which o b j e c t  3 r e a l l y  i s "  ( p .  6 8 ) .  
Indeed ,  it would be  v e r y  odd f o r  someone t o  c l a i m  t h a t  
4 3  # J u l i u s  Caesar. 
How c a n  we a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e s e  f a c t s ?  And do t h e y  
d i s c o n f i r m  t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  numbers a r e  o b j e c t s ?  
F i r s t ,  we s h o u l d  n o t e  t h a t  ' 4 3  = J u l i u s  C a e s a r 1  i s  
e i t h e r  t r u e ,  f a l s e ,  o r  n e i t h e r .  And s e c o n d l y ,  t h a t  it 
4 canno t  be  t r u e ,  because ,  a s  we concluded e a r l i e r ,  ( ( 5  ) ) ,  
numbers are n o t  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s .  
B e n a c e r r a f l s  own accoun t  has i t  t h a t  ' 4 3  = J u l i u s  
Caesar1 i s  u n s e m a n t i c a l ,  and t h e r e f o r e  (p resumably)  n e i t h e r  
t r u e  n o r  false. One might  t h i n k  t h a t  he would g i v e  as 
h i s  g rounds  f o r  t h i s  t h a t  numbers are n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l ,  
and hence  number words (and  e x p r e s s i o n s )  do n o t  r e f e r ,  
and  s o  s t a t e m e n t s  c o n t a i n i n g  them a r e  n e i t h e r  t r u e  n o r  
false.  But no ,  n o t  a t  a l l ,  Because he d o e s  want t o  h o l d  
t h a t  many i d e n t i t y  s t a t e m e n t s  c o n t a i n i n g  number e x p r e s s i o n s  
a r e  s e m a n t i c a l .  So t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s :  how d o e s  he d i s t i n g u i s h  
-
t h e  s e m a n t i c a l  from t h e  u n s e m a n t i c a l ?  (We might  a l s o  a s k  
'IWhy?" b u t  I w o n ' t ,  because  a s  t h e  r e a d e r  w i l l  s e e ,  we 
w i l l  n o t  g e t  t o  t h a t ,  s i n c e  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i t s e l f  t e n d s  
t o  undermine t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  some i d e n t i t y  s t a t e m e n t s  
\ 
c o n t a i n i n g  number e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  u n s e m a n t i c a l . ) .  
The classification is this. 
There are three kinds of identity statements 
[of the form tn = sfr where n is a number 
expression] corresponding to the three kinds 
of expressions that can appear on the right: 
(a) with some arithmetic expression on 
the right as well as on the left (for example, 
'I2 = 4,892," and so forth; 
(b) with an expression designating a number, 
but not in a standard arithmetical way, as 
"the number of apples in the pot,ll or 'Ithe 
number of F1sll (for example, 7 = the number 
of the dwarfs); 
(c) with a referring expression on the 
right which is of neither of the above sorts, 
such as "Julius Caesar," ll[[B]]fl (for 
example, 17 = [[C%I11). ( p a  63). 
Benacerraf proposes discarding all identities of type (c), 
as they are "senseless and unsemanticall'. (p. 64) 
' #  
Following Richard L. Cartwright, we may simplify 
Benacerrafls classification as follows: 
Identities of the form ln = s f ,  where n is an 
arithmetical expression, may be divided into one of three 
types : 
(a) those wheresis an arithmetjcal expression; 
(b) those where s is a non-arithmetical 
expression, but designates a number;. and 
(c) those where s is neither an arithmetical 
expression, nor an expression that designates 
a number. more those where s 
- 
does not designate a number. 
-- - 
So Benacerrafls claim boils down to this: identities 
containing only expressions which designate numbers are 
semant ica l ,  bu t  t h o s e  where t h e  exp res s ion  on one s i d e  of  
t h e  i d e n t i t y  s i g n  des ign - t e s  a  num?er, and t h a t  on t h e  o t h e r  
s i d e  does  n o t ,  a r e  unsemant ica l .  Now, Car twr igh t  would 
a rgue ,  i f  n  - d e s i g n a t e s  - a number, and g does  n o t ,  t hen  s u r e l y  
t h e r e  i s  no q u e s t i o n  bu t  t h a t  t h e  t h i n g s  des igna t ed  (if s  
d e s i g n a t e s  something) a r e  no t  i d e n t i c a l .  And s o  t h e  i d e n t i t y  
s ta tement  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t hey  are must be f a l s e .  
' 43  = J u l i u s  Caesar t  f o r  example, i s  an  i n s t a n c e  of  type  
( c ) ;  '43 '  d e s i g n a t e s  a number and ' J u l i u s  Caesa r t  does n o t .  
Therefore  t hey  a r e  not  i d e n t i c a l  -- 43 and J u l i u s  Caesar ,  
t h a t  i s  -- and hence t h e  s ta tement  t h a t  t hey  a r e  i s  s i m p l y  
f a l s e .  
Although h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  does  not  L . suppor t  h i s  
c l a im  t h a t  ' 4 3  = J u l i u s  Caesar1 and ' 3  = CC[01llt  a r e  
meaningless ,  i n s t e a d  of f a l s e ,  we can s e e  more c l e a r l y  what 
Benacerraf  i s  i n t e n t  upon from t h e  fo l lowing  remark:  
( 6 )  If an e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  form ' x  = y 1  i s  t o  have 
a sense ,  it can be on ly  i n  c o n t e x t s  where i t  i s  
c l e a r  t h a t  bo th  x  and y a r e  of  some kind o r  
ca t ego ry  C ,  and t h a t  it  i s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  which 
i n d i v i d u a t e  t h i n g s  ---- as t h e  same C which a r e  
o p e r a t i v e  and de te rmine  i t s  t r u t h  v a l u e .  ( p p .  64-5) 
A s  s t a t e d ,  it i s  u n c l e a r  whether t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  he re  i s  
t h a t  t h e  terms f l a n k i n g  t h e  i d e n t i t y  s i g n  be from t h e  same 
ca t ego ry  o f  exp res s ions  ( b o t h  number-words, o r  s e t - r e f e r r i n g  
exp res s ions ,  o r  names o f  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s ,  t o  name a  few 
such c a t e g o r i e s )  o r  whether t h e  t h i n g s  r e f e r r e d  - t o  by 
t h e  terms f l a n k i n g  t h e  i d e n t i t y  s i g n  must be o f  t h e  same 
ca t ego ry  (numbers, s e t s ,  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s ,  s a y ) ,  o r  
something e l s e .  It matters, because  t h e  second i n t e r -  
? r e t a t i o n  seems t o  p resuppose  t h a t  t h e  terms do indeed  
r e f e r ,  i n  o r d e r  f o r  such i d e n t i t i e s  t o  be m e a n i n g f u l .  
But we know from R u s s e l l  t h a t  t h e y  need n o t ;  ' S c o t t  = t h e  
p r e s e n t  k i n g  o f  F r a n c e 1 ,  f o r  example,  i s  s e n s i c a l  even 
though  l S c o t t l  and ' t h e  p r e s e n t  k i n g  o f  F r a n c e 1  do n o t  
r e f e r  t o  t h i n g s  i n  t h e  same c a t e g o r y ,  because  one o f  them 
does  n o t  refer a t  a l l .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  f i rs t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  would 
s u g g e s t ,  m i s t a k e n l y ,  t h a t  we are d i s c u s s i n g  i n d i v i d u a t i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r ,  s a y ,  number words,  r a t h e r  t h a n  numbers. 
T h e r e f o r e ,  I t h i n k  t h a t  he  had t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s o r t  of  
c l a i m  i n  mind, and I s h a l l  h e n c e f o r t h  c o n s t r u e  ( 6 )  t h i s  way: 
If  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  form l x  = y 1  i s  t o  have 
a s e n s e ,  it can  be  o n l y  i n  c o n t e x t s  where i t  
i s  c l e a r  t h a t  b o t h  x and y a r e  t e r m s  t h a t  
o s t e n s i b l e  ( o r ,  P t h e y  r e f e r  -- a t  a l l )  r e f e r  t o  
o b j e c t s  o f  some k i n d  o r  c a t e g o r y  C ,  and  t h a t  
i t -  i s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  which i n d i v i d u a t e  t h i n g s  
as t h e  same C which a r e  o p e r a t i v e  and d e t e r m i n e  
i t s  t r u t h  v a l u e .  
A t  f i rst  b l u s h  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h i s  f a i l s  t o  have 
t h e  consequence t h a t  ' 4 3  = J u l i u s  C a e s a r 1  i s  m e a n i n g l e s s ,  
s i n c e  we can c o n s t r u e  t h a t  as ' 4 3  i s  t h e  same e n t i t y ,  o r  
o b j e c t ,  as J u l i u s  Caesar1 t h e r e b y  b r i n g i n g  b o t h  43 and 
J u l i u s  Caesar under  t h e  u m b r e l l a  o f  t h e  c a t e g o r y  l l e n t i t y r l .  
But t h i s  i s  no good a c c o r d i n g  t o  B e n a c e r r a f ;  l l l E n t i t y l  i s  
t o o  broad".  He a l s o  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  I1C must be a  'we l l -  
e n t r e n c h e d 1  p r e d i c a t e r 1  ( p .  6 5 ) .  Presumably t h i s  l a s t  
c o n d i t i o n  r u l e s  o u t  s t a t e m e n t s  employing i m a g i n a t i v e l y  
invented  te rms ,  l i k e  lnumero-physical  o b j e c t ' ,  which a r e  
meant t o  apply  t o  bo th  numbers - and p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s ,  t h u s  
r e n d e r i n g  '43  = J u l i u s  Caesar1 meaningful .  
( 6 )  i s  a consequence of  B e n a c e r r a f ' s  o v e r a l l  view 
o f  i d e n t i t y  and objecthood.  H e  " . . . a g r e e s  w i t h  Frege t h a t  
i d e n t i t y  i s  unambiguous, always meaning sameness of  o b j e c t ,  
bu t  t h a t  (contra-Frege now) t h e  n o t i o n  o f  an o b j e c t  v a r i e s  
from t h e o r y  t o  t h e o r y ,  ca tegory  t o  c a t e g o r y . . , "  ( p .  6 6 ) .  
This  i s  no t  t h e  p l a c e  t o  a t t empt  an  in-depth a p p r a i s a l  o f  
B e n a c e r r a f l s  metaphysics  over  t h o s e  o f ,  s ay ,  F r e g e ' s .  But 
I b e l i e v e  a number o f  c r i t i c i s m s  and remarks a r e  i n  o r d e r ,  
some d i r e c t e d  towards Benace r r a f ' s  arguments f o r  ( 6 ) ,  and 
o t h e r s  q u e s t i o n i n g  t h e  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  ( 6 )  w i t h  o t h e r  
c l a ims  he makes i n  t h e  a r t i c l e .  
F i r s t ,  Benacerraf  c i t e s  as evidence t h a t  l l con tex t s  
of t h e  form ' t h e  same GI abound. . . l1 whereas 
Very r a r e  i n  t h e  language a r e  c o n t e x t s  open 
t o  ( s a t i s f i a b l e  by) any kind of  " t h i n g v  what- 
soever .  There are  some -- f o r  example, llSam 
r e f e r r e d  t o . .  . ," "Helen thought o f . .  . I 1  -- 
and i t  seems p e r f e c t l y  a l l  r i g h t  t o  ask i f  
what Sam r e f e r r e d  t o  on some occas ion  was what 
Helen thought  o f .  But t h e s e  a r e  very few, 
a n d ' t h e y  a l l  seem t o  be i n t e n s i o n a l ,  which 
c a s t s  a r e f e r e n t i a l l y  opaque shadow over t h e  
r o l e  t h a t  i d e n t i t y  p l a y s  i n  them. ( p ,  66) 
Michael Resnik has  po in ted  ou t  i n  connec t ion  w i t h  
t h i s  c l a im  t h a t  t h e  p r e d i c a t e s  ' i s  t h e  t h i r d  member of some 
s e r i e s '  and 'be longs  t o  a s e t 1  a r e  non- in tens iona l  and 
" s a t i s f i a b l e  by any kind of  t h i n g  whatsoeverl l .  That i s ,  
a p p l i e d  s e t  t h e o r y  and number t h e o r y  presuppose t h e  
u n i v e r s a l i t y  o f  i d e n t i t y .  2 4  And t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  Benacerraf  would f i n d  t h e s e  p r e d i c a t e s  u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e ;  
he s a y s  t h a t  " . . . any  o b j e c t  can be t h e  t h i r d  element; i n  
some progress ion1 '  ( p .  T O ) ,  and i n  c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  has  s a i d  
t h a t  he t h i n k s  t h e r e  a r e  s e t s  ( a n  i n f e r e n c e  s u r e l y  j u s t i f i e d  
by t h e  a r t i c l e ,  anyway). 
Secondly,  it i s  n o t  as though B e n a c e r r a f l s  approach 
i s  t h e  on ly  one t o  account  f o r  t h e  o d d i t y  (among o t h e r  
t h i n g s )  o f  e i t h e r  c la iming  t h a t  43 = J u l i u s  Caesar ,  o r  
c l a iming  t h a t  43 # J u l i u s  Caesar .  He can account  f o r  t h e i r  
o d d i t y  on t h e  grounds t h a t  t h e y  a r e  meaningless  -- so  o f  
cou r se  no one would be tempted t o  ;hem. A r i v a l .  
a ccoun t ,  proposed t o  me by George Boolos,  h a s  i t  t h a t  
i d e n t i t i e s  o f  t h e  s o r t  under c o n s j l e r a t i o n  ( l i k e  ' 4 3  = 
J u l i u s  Caesar1  and ' 3  = [ [ [ 0 ] ] ] 1 )  make -sense  bu t  a r e  f a l s e ;  
t h a t  t h e i r  n e g a t i o n s  a r e  t r u e ;  and t h a t  t h e  o d d i t y  of  
making such c l a ims  i s  b e s t  exp l a ined  v i a  pragmat ic  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  
A f i rs t  approximat ion o f  an account  might run as 
f o l l o w s .  They z r e  odd, because t h e r e  i s  v i r t u a l l y  no 
c i rcumstance  i n  t h e  o r d i n a r y  (and non-phi losophica l )  course  
of  t h i n g s  i n  which a person  might want t o  make such 
c l a ims .  No one would c l a im  ' 4 3  = J u l i u s  Caesar1  because ,  
l i k e  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  i t  i s  s o  p a t e n t l y  f a l s e .  The 
24.  Frege and t h e  Philosophy o f  Mathematics, ( I t h a c a :  
Corne l l  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1980) ,  p. 196.  
i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  pronounce i t  m e a n i n g l e s s  ( i n  t h e  absence  
of  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s )  can  be  s e e n  a s  t h e  same one 
t h a t  prompts i n t r o d u c t o r y  p h i l o s o p h y  s t u d e n t s  t o  pronounce 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  m e a n i n g l e s s .  (No doub t  t h i s  l a t t e r  f a c t  i s  
a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  i n t r o d u c t o r y  s t u d e n t ' s  l a c k  o f  l o n g  
+ , r a i n i n g  i n  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  among a b s u r d i t i e s  . ) . 
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  43 # J u l i u s  C a e s a r ,  w h i l e  t r u e ,  
i s  n e v e r  c l a imed  because  t o  do  s o  would s u g g e s t  t h a t  one 
t h o u g h t  o n e ' s  l i s t e n e r  ( o r  r e a d e r )  needed i n f o r m i n g  a s  t o  
t h i s  o b v l o u s  f a c t  -- a s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  would be w a r r a n t e d  
by t h e  a ~ s u m p t i o n  t h a t  you a r e  n o t  v i o l a t i n g  t h e  Gr icean  
maxim t o  "make your  c o n t r i b u t i o n  a s  i n f o r m a t i v e  a s  i s  
r e q u i r e d f f a 5 .  Anybody who u n d e r s t o o d  t h e  s e n t e n c e  would 
know it t o  be  t r u e ,  s o  i t  c o u l d n ' t  be i n f o r m a t i v e  f o r  any 
one, 
Now i t  might  be t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h i s  argument  a l s o  
J u b t i f i e s  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t a u t o l o g i e s  ( and  such  
s t a t e m e n t s  a s  ' A l l  b a c h e l o r s  a r e  u n m a r r i e d 1 )  a r e  n e v e r  
u s e d ,  e i t h e r ,  b e c a u s e  anybody who u n d e r s t o o d  them would 
know them t o  be t r u e .  And t h i s  would r e f u t e  t h e  argument ,  
b e c a u s e  of c o u r s e  t a u t o l o g i e s  - a r e  u s e d .  B u t ,  f i r s t ,  t h i s  
i s  n o t  t h e  c a s e  f o r  complex t a u t o l o g i e s .  And second ,  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  s i m p l e  and obv ious  t a u t o l o g i e s  f o r  which 
i t  - i s  t h e  c a s e  ( t h a t  anybody who u n d e r s t o o d  them would know 
them t o  b e  t r u e ) ,  we c a n  make a rough d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
25. "Logic and C o n v e r s a t i o n n ,  The Logic o f  Grammar e d i t e d  b y  
G i l b e r t  Harman and Donald Davidson (Enc ino ,  C a l . :  Dickenson 
P u b l i s h i n g  Co., 1975)  p.  6 7 .  
two s o r t s  o f  u se s  o f  such s e n t e n c e s .  ( i)  They can be 
used t o  draw t h e  l i s t e n e r ' s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  some p a r t i c u l a r  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s en t ence  i s  prima f a c i e  I n  t h e  c a s e  
of  ' I t  i s  no t  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  Adam begat Se th  and Adam d i d  
no t  beget  S e t h ' ,  f o r  example, i t  i s  a f a c t  " abou tu ,  among 
o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  Adam and Se th .  I n  t h e  ca se  of  ' / F  = ;/m, 
f o r  some n a t u r a l  numbers - n and m_, o r  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  case  
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  11 and g such t h a t  &- = ;/fi it  i s  a f a c t  
about ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  c. (ii) They can be used t o  
draw t h e  l i s t e n e r ' s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  some o t h e r  p o i n t ,  g e n e r a l l y  
by a seeming-viola t ion o f  t h e  Gricean maxim c i t e d  above. 
For example, 'It i s  no t  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  Adam begat  S e t h  and 
Adam d i d  no t  beget  S e t h 1  might be used t o  4raw t h e  l i s t e n e r ' s  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  Law of  C o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  by way o f  g i v i n g  an  
example -- because t h e  e m p i r i c a l  c l a im  i t s e l f ,  about  Adam 
and S e t h ,  i s  t o o  t r i v i a l  t o  be i n f o r m a t i v e ,  s o  t h e  l i s t e n e r  
would be l i k e l y  t o  l a t c h  on to  something e l s e  a s  t h e  po in t  
o f  t h e  remark, on t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  speaker  i s  not  
v i o l a t i n g  s Gricean maxim. I n  t h e s e  c a s e s  i t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  
because t h e s e  s en t ences  a r e  t r i v i a l l y  t r u e  and hence 
un informat ive  t h a t ,  by means of t h e  Gricean maxim, t hey  
can be used t o  convey in fo rma t ion .  
I may be s u f f e r i n g  from a l a c k  of imagina t ion ,  but  
i t  seems t o  me t h a t  s imple  and obvious  t a u t o l o g i e s  used 
i n  t h e  s t y l e  o f  (1) above on ly  occur  i n  mathemat ical  
c o n t e x t s  and t h e n  no t  as t h e  conc lus ion ,  but  on ly  a s  s t e p s  
i n  t h e  p r o o f .  A s  f o r  ' 43  # J u l i u s  C a e s a r 1 ,  i t  i s  hard  t o  
see how t h e  f a c t  t h a t  43 # J u l i u s  Caesa r  would need a p p e a l i n g  
t o  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  p r o v i n g  an  i n t e r e s t i n g  mathemat ica l  
theorem,  T h i s  would seem t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  ba re - faced  
c l a i m  t h a t  43 # J u l i u s  Caesa r  i s  u s e l e s s .  And it i s  s c a r c e l y  
easier t o  imagine a t y p e - ( i i )  u s e  f o r  ' 4 3  Z J u l i u s  C a e s a r 1 .  
If t h e  speake r  wanted t o  a l e r t  t h e  l i s t e n e r  t o  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s ,  he o r  she  would 
p robab ly  no t  do s o  by means o f  t h e  i n s t a n c e  ' 43  # J u l i u s  
Caesa r1  bu t  by u t t e r i n g  t h e  e q u a l l y  s h o r t  and more t o  t h e  
p o i n t :  'Numbers a r e  n o t  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s 1 .  It cou ld  happen 
t h a t  ' Is  t h e  number 43 d i f f e r e n t  from J u l i u s  Caesa r ? '  comes 
t o  be used f o r  t h e  same purpose  as '1s t h e , P o p e  C a t h o l i c ? l  
i s  used  now, But I doubt  i t  w i l l .  
None o f  which i s  t o  s ay  t h a t  t h e r e  can  b e  no u s e  
whatever  f o r  ' 4 3  # J u l i u s  Caesart, b u t  o n l y  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  
i s ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be  a n  " i n d i r e c t r 1 ,  i . e . ,  t y p e - ( i i )  s o r t  
o f  u s e  ( and  even t h i s  seems a remote  p o s s i b i l i t y ) .  The 
s e n t e n c e  canno t  be used i n  a t y p e - ( i )  s o r t  o f  way because  
anyone who u n d e r s t a n d s  ' 4 3  # J u l i u s  Caesar1 i s  t ho rough ly  
enough a c q u a i n t e d  w i t h  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  scheme t h a t  unde rp in s  
o u r  l anguage  t o  know t h a t  43 i s  a number and J u l i u s  Caesar  
i s  a pe r son ,  and a s  t h e y  a r e  n o t  even t h e  same s o r t  o f  
t h i n g ,  t h e y  are o f  c o u r s e  d i f f e r e n t  t h i n g s .  And t h a t  everyone 
knows t h i s ,  and hence no one needs  t o  be t o l d  i t .  
Thus, as I see i t ,  i t  i s  t h e  p e c u l i a r  i n a b i l i t y  o f  
' 43  # J u l i u s  Caesar1 t o  convey u s e f u l  i n fo rma t ion ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
i n  i t s  t y p e - ( i )  usage,  t h a t  e x p l a i n s  why we t h i n k  a  c l a im  
t o  t h a t  e f f e c t  s o  odd, and, f o r  s i m i l a r  r e a s o n s ,  why w e  
a r e  ( a t  f i r s t )  r e l u c t a n t  t o  a s s i g n  t r u t h  v a l u e s  t o  i t ,  o r  
t o  i t s  nega t ion .  The main p o i n t  t o  b e  d e r i v e d  from t h i s ,  
however, i s  t h a t  we can  e x p l a i n ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h a t  
43 # J u l i u s  Caesar i s  a n  odd c l a im  t o  make, and y e t  ma in t a in  
t h a t  such  s e n t e n c e s  as ' 4 3  # J u l i u s  Caesar1 and ' 3  = [[[fll]]' 
make -sense ,  which the,y c e r t a i n l y  seem t o .  T h i s  i s  one 
impor tan t  advantage t h e  p r e s e n t  approach has  o v e r  
B e n a c e r r a f ' s .  
Another advantage i s  t h a t  if Benacerraf  t h i n k s  
1 ,  
t h a t  'Ronald Reagan = t h e  Great  S p i r a l  Galaxy1 makes s ense ,  
presumabl i t  i s  because  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  b o t h  t e rms ,  i f  
t h e y  r e f e r ,  r e f e r  t o  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s .  But it seems t o  be 
e q u a l l y  c l e a r  t h a t  bo th  ' 3 '  and f [ [ C B ] ] ] l ,  i f  t h e y  r e f e r ,  
r e f e r  t o  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  And t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  ' 3  = [ [ [ B ] ] ] '  
h a s  j u s t  as good grounds t o  be cons ide red  s e n s i a a l  ( a l t hough  
o f  cou r se  f a l s e )  as 'Ronald Reagan = t h e  Grea t  S p i r a l  
Galaxyt  does .  
Benacerraf  might r e p l y  t h a t  'Ronald Reagan = t h e  
Great  S p i r a l  Galaxy' can be known t o  be f a l s e ,  whereas " i t  
w i l l  be j u s t  as hard t o  e x p l a i n  how one knows t h a t L 1 4 3  = 
J u l i u s  Caesa r f  and ' 3  = [[[8]]111 a r e  f a l s e  a s  i t  would b e  
t o  e x p l a i n  how one knows tha t  t hey  a r e  s e n ~ e l e s s . . . ~ ~  ( p .  6 7 )  
Not a t  a l l .  B e n a c e r r a f l s  own argument, (1) t o  ( 5 )  above, 
--- 
shows t h a t  numbers a r e  no t  s e t s ,  which e n t a i l s  t h a t  
3 # [[[BII], and hence t h a t  I3  = [ [ [B] ] ] '  i s  f a l s e .  
Benacer rs f  seems t o  t h i n k  i t  i s  con f i rma t ion  f o r  t h e  
n o n s e n s i c a l i t y  o f  ' 3  = [[[@I I ] '  t h a t  from t h e  vantage p o i n t  
o f  one who s e r i o u s l y  e n t e r t a i n s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  3 i s  
i d e n t i c a l  t o  [ [ [B]] ] ,  t h e r e  appears  t o  be no method of  
de t e rmin ing  whether i t  i s  t r u e  o r  f a l s e ,  No doubt t h e r e  
i s n ' t .  But t h i s  need no t  be seen  as r e f l e c t i n g  on t h e  
s e n s i c a l i t y  o f  ' 3  = [ [ [B]]] ' .  I n  go ing  so  fa r  as t o  e n t e r t a i n  
t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  one h a s  " l o s t  one ' s  b e a r i n g s f f ,  t o  use  a  
ph ra se  of B e n a c e r r a f ' s ,  j u s t  as s u r e l y  as i f  one were t o  
s e r i o u s l y  e n t e r t a i n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  Ronald Reagan i s  
i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  Great  S p i r a l  Galaxy, o r  t h a t  S o c r a t e s  bo th  
was Greek and wasn ' t  Greek. Such musings a r e  o u t s i d e  t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t s  of  t h e  conceptua l  s heme t h a t  we o p e r a t e  w i t h i n .  
Benacerraf  r a i s e s  s k e p t i c a l  doubts  about t h e  r e f e r e n c e  of 
number words, t h e n  t r i e s  t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  wi th  a  
brand of  r e f e r e n t i a l  p o s i t i v i s m .  But t h i s  u s o l u t i o n w  
( t h a t  ' 43  = J u l i u s  Caesart, e t c . ,  a r e  meaningless )  i s  a t  
v a r i a n c e  w i t h  o t h e r  c la ims  he makes i n  t h e  a r t i c l e  -- e * g *  , 
t h a t  numbers a r e  not  s e t s .  Presumably t h i s  c l a im  makes 
s e n s e  t o  him. Employing t h e  obvious  symbols, it  might be 
r e p r e s e n t e d  as:  
( 7 )  ( x )  (Nx + -Sx) 
o r ,  what i s  l o g i c a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t ,  as: 
( 8 )  -ExEy (Nx & Sy & x = y ) .  
But ( 8 )  does  no t  make sense ,  by B e n a c e r r a f l s  s t a n d a r d s ,  
because s u r e l y  i f  l 3  = [ [ [ B ] ] ] l  does  n o t ,  on t h e  grounds 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no ca t ego ry  C which i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  
r e f e r e n t s  o f  t h e  terms ( i f  such t h e r e  be)  belong t o ,  then  
n e i t h e r  can ( 8 ) .  Lest  t h e r e  be any doubt as t o  t h i s  o b j e c t i o n ,  
l e t  me r e c a s t  i t  as an o b j e c t i o n  t o  B e n a c e r r a f l s  c la lm t h a t  
what c o n s t i t u t e s  an  o b j e c t  i s  theo ry  dependent ,  and t h a t ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  ' 43  = J u l i u s  Caesa r1 ,  f o r  example, i s  s e n s e l e s s .  
This  i s  j u s t  t o  assume t h a t  no ( r e a s o n a b l e )  t heo ry  has  bo th  
numbers an.d p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  i n  i t s  u n i v e r s e  of  d i s c o u r s e .  
But d o e s n l t  s c i e n t i f i c  t heo ry  have both? A t  l e a s t  on t h e  
f a c e  o f  i t .  
A l l  t h i n g s ' c o n s i d e r e d ,  I t h i n k  t h e  view I have been 
urg ing ,  t h a t  s en t ences  l i k e  '43  = J u l i u s  Caesar1 and ' 3  = 
[[[B]]]' are fa lse ,  f a r e s  b e t t e r  t han  B e n a c e r r a f f s ,  a t  l e a s t  
w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  he adduces f o r  i t  (no t  
t o  mention be ing  more c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  ocher  c l a ims  he 
makes i n  t h e  a r t i c l e . ) .  It might no t  seem t o  m a t t e r ,  any- 
way, s i n c e  Benacerraf  s a y s  he i s  u . , . c e r t a i n l y  happy wi th  
t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  a l l  i d e n t i t i e s  o f  t ype  ( c )  a r e  e i t h e r  
s e n s e l e s s  - o r  f a l s e . l l  ( p .  6 7 ,  my i t a l i c s ) .  But I hope t h e  
preced ing  d i s c u s s i o n  has  ( i )  d i sposed  o f  whatever doubt 
t h e  r e a d e r  might have had concern ing  t h e  c l a im  t h a t  numbers 
a r e  o b j e c t s ,  based on t h e  f a c t s  c i t e d  on pp. 2 2 - 2 3  above,  
e . g , ,  t h a t  i t  would be very odd f o r  someone t o  c la im t h a t  
43 f Julius Caesar. This was mainly accomplished, if it 
was, by refuting the alternative presented by Benacerraf. 
And (ii), that it has thrown some light on Benacerraf's 
peculiar attitude towards numbers as abstract objects, 
which I shall now attend to more specifically. 
3. Benacerraf's Third Argument 
As we have seen, Benacerraf's main argument does 
not work. He summarized it as: 
... numbers could not be objects at all; for 
there is no more reason to identify any indiv- 
iduak number with any one particular object 
than with any other (not already known to be 
a number). (p.69) 
To see at a glance that the argument is fallacious, follow 
Richard Cartwright's suggestion: substitute !peopleg 
throughout for 'number'. It is true that "there is no more 
reason to identify any individual person with any one par- 
ticular object than with any other (not already known to 
be a person),'I Yet one would not conclude from this that 
people are not objects. Benacerraf certainly would not 
have advanced the "people'l argument. He must believe that 
there are independent reasons for thinking that numbers 
don't exist, reasons that do not apply to people. What 
might those reasons be? I think the answer may be gleaned 
from the following passage; (I have taken the liberty of 
numbering the sentences for future reference): 
(9) For arithmetical purposes the properties 
of Tnumbers which do not stem from the 
relations they bear to one another in virtue 
of being arranged in a progression are 
of  no consequence whatsoever.  ( 1 0 )  But 
it would be o n l y  these  p r o p e r t i e s  tha t  
would s i n g l e  ou t  a number as t h i s  o b j e c t  
o r  t h a t .  
(11) Therefore  numbers are no t  o b j e c t s  
a t  a l l ,  because i n  g i v i n g  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  
( t h a t  i s ,  neces sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t )  o f  
numbers you merely c h a r a c t e r i z e  an  
a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  -- and t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  
l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  "elementsf1 
of  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  have no p r o p e r t i e s  o t h e r  
t h a n  t h o s e  r e l a t i n g  them t o  o t h e r  
"elements1' o f  t h e  same s t r u c t u r e .  ( 1 2 )  I f  
we i d e n t i f y  an a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  w i t h  a  
system o f  r e l a t i o n s  ( i n  i n t e n s i o n ,  o f  
course ,  o r  e l s e  wi th  t h e  s e t  of  a l l  
r e l a t i o n s  i n  e x t e n s i o n  isomorphic t o  a  
g iven  system of  r e l a t i o n s ) ,  we g e t  a r i t h m e t i c  
e l a b o r a t i n g  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  "less- 
thanf f  r e l a t i o n ,  o r  o f  a l l  systems of  o b j e c t s  
( t h a t  i s ,  c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s )  e x h i b i t i n g  
t h a t  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e .  ( 1 3 )  That a 
system o f  o b j e c t s  e x h i b i t s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e  i n t e g e r s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  e lements  
of t h a t  system have some p r o p e r t i e s  not  
dependent on s t r u c t u r e .  ( 1 4 )  It must be 
p o s s i b l e  t o  i n d i v i d u a t e  t h o s e  o b j e c t s  
independent ly  of t h e  r o l e  t hey  p l ay  i n  
t h a t  s t r u c t u r e .  (15)  But t h i s  i s  
p r e c i s e l y  what cannot be done wi th  t h e  
numbers, , , . ( 1 6 )  To be t h e  number 4 i s  
no more and no l e s s  t h a n  t o  be preceded 
by 3 ,  2 ,  1, and p o s s i b l y  0,  and t o  be 
fol lowed by [5, 6 ,  and s o  f o r t h  1. ... (17 )  Ar i thmet ic  i s  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  s c i e n c e  
t h a t  e l a b o r a t e s  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  
a l l  p r o g r e s s i o n s  have i n  common m e r e l y  i n  
v i r t u e  o f  be ing  p r o g r e s s i o n s .  It i s  not  
a s c i e n c e  concerned wi th  p a r t i c u l - a r  
o b j e c t s  -- t h e  numbers. (pp .  69-70). 
Sen tences  ( 9 )  and (10 )  e n t a i l :  
(18)  Only t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  numbers which stem from t h e  
r e l a t i o n s  t hey  bear t o  one ano the r  i n  v i r t u e  of being 
a r ranged  i n  a p rog res s ion  could  s i n g l e  ou t  a  number 
as t h i s  o r  t h a t  o b j e c t .  
Sen,tences (13) through (16) entail: 
(19) It is possible to individuate numbers indepen- 
dently of the role they play in the "abstract 
structurev'. 
This notion of an abstract structure is not without 
difficulties, and I shall attend to them shortly. (181, 
though, and (19) as I understand it, are both false. 1 
I can individuate 4 as: the number of Jupiter's Gali- 
lean satellites. Similarly sentence (11) might be 
read as implying: 
(20) The "elements" of the abstract structure (here 
I ,  
the numbers, presumably) have no properties . :- r 
other than those relating them. to other 
numbers. 
Again, false. 4 has the property of being the number 
o f  Jupiter's Galilean satellites. 
The fact that (18), (19) and (20) can readily 
be seen to be false suggests that something else is 
involved. And in fact, viewed from the perspective 
of pure, abstract, unapplied number theory the passage 
makes much more sense. Each of (181, (19) and (20) 
look (to me, at least) not implausible, when viewed 
from that perspective. To the number theorist, 4 
just - is, as Benacerraf puts it at (161, no more and no 
less than to be preceded by 3, 2, 1 and possibly 0, and 
t o  be fol lowed by 5 ,  6 ,  and s o  f o r t h .  It seems as though 
i t  i s  no t  p o s s i b l e  t o  i n d i v i d u a t e  numbers independent ly  
of t h e  r o l e  t h e y  p l a y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  one a n o t h e r .  Quine  
was w r i t i n g  from t h a t  van tage  p o i n t  when he s a i d :  "It i s  
i n  t h i s  s e n s e  t r u e  t o  s ay ,  as mathemat ic ians  o f t e n  do ,  
t h a t  a r i t h m e t i c  i s  a l l  t h e r e  i s  t o  number . . , t he re  i s  no 
s a y i n g  a b s o l u t e l y  what t h e  numbers a r e ;  t h e r e  i s  only  
a r i t h m e t i c .  11 2 6 
But one cannot conclude from t h i s ,  as Benacerraf  
does  i n  ( l l ) ,  t h a t  numbers do n o t  e x i s t .  One could  j u s t  
as r ea sonab ly  conclude t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no i d ,  no ego,  and 
no superego.  Because from t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  pu re  psycho- 
a n a l y t i c  t h e o r y  t h e s e  e lements  o f  t h e  mind have no 
p r o p e r t i e s  no t  dependent on s t r u c t u r e ,  on r e l a t i o n s  t hey  
b e a r  t o  one ano the r .  Benacer ra f  might r e j e c t  t h e  ana logy ,  
perhaps  on t h e  grounds t h a t  t h e  " r i g h t "  ( o r ,  t h e  l 1 p r e f e r r e d U ,  
o r ,  t h e  ;only " l e g i t i m a t e t 1 )  p e r s p e c t i v e  on t h e  numbers i s  
from t h a t  o f  a b s t r a c t  number t h e o r y ;  bu t  t h e  I t r i gh t "  
p sychoana ly t i c  p e r s p e c t i v e  on t h e  mind i s  from t h a t  o f  
a p p l i e d  p sychoana ly t i c  t h e o r y .  And maybe t h e s e  c l a ims  ( o r  
o t h e r s  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  ana logy)  could  be made ou t  more 
adequa t e ly  and defended.  But an  analogy t h a t  cannot be 
r e j e c t e d  i s  one w i th  s e t  t h e o r y .  Anyone who bought ( 9 )  
1 
2 6 ,  I n  f a c t ,  Quine  r e f e r s  t o  B e n a c e r r a f l s  a r t l c l e  a s  
I tdeveloping t h i s  p o i n t t t .  p.  45, l lOnto log ica l  R e l a t i v i t y u .  
through (17)  would be ob l iged  t o  buy t h e  s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l  
v e r s i o n ,  ( 9 ' )  th rough  ( 1 7 ' )  (which I w r i t e  o u t  f o r  t h e  
convenience o f  t h e  r e a d e r ) :  
( 9 ' )  For s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l  purposes  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  
o f  s e t s  which do no t  stem from t h e  r e l a t i o n s  
t hey  bea r  t o  one ano the r  i n  v i r t u e  of  be ing  
a r ranged  i n  a s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l  h i e r a r c h y  a r e  of  
no consequence whatsoever.  ( 1 0 ' )  But i t  would 
be only  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  would s i n g l e  ou t  
a  s e t  as t h i s  o b j e c t  o r  t h a t .  (11') Therefore  
s e t s  a r e  n c t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l ,  because i n  g i v i n g  
t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  ( t h a t  i s ,  neces sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t )  
of  s e t s  you merely c h a r a c t e r i z e  an a b s t r a c t  
s t r u c t u r e  -- and t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  "elements" of  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  have no 
p r o p e r t i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  r e l a t i n g  them t o  
o t h e r  "elements" of t h e  same s t r u c t u r e .  
( 1 2 ' )  If we i d e n t i f y  an  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  w i t h  
a  system of  r e l a t i o n s  ( i n  i n t e n s i o n ,  of cou r se ,  
o r  e l s e  w i t h  t h e  set of a l l  r e l a t i o n s  i n  
e x t e n s i o n  isomorphic t o  a g iven  syptem of 
r e l a t i o n s ) ,  we g e t  s e t  t h e o r y  e l a b o r a t i n g  t h e  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  !'is a  member of1' r e l a t i o n ,  
o r  o f  a l l  systems of  o b j e c t s  ( t h a t  i s ,  c o n c r e t e  
s t r u c t u r e s )  e x h i b i t i n g  t h a t  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e .  
( 1 3 ' )  That a system of o b j e c t s  e x h i b i t s  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l  h i e r a r c h y  
imp l i e s  t h a t  t h e  e lements  o f  t h a t  system have 
some p r o p e r t i e s  no t  dependent on s t r u c t u r e .  
( 1 4 ' )  It must be p o s s i b l e  t o  i n d i v i d u a t e  t h o s e  
o b j e c t s  independent ly  of  t h e  r o l e  t hey  p l ay  i n  
t h a t  s t r u c t u r e .  (15') But t h i s  i s  p r e c i s e l y  
what cannot be done wi th  s e t s .  ( 1 6 ' )  To be 
[[B]] i s  no more and no l e s s  t han  t o  be the 
s e t  whose on ly  member i s  [a]. ( 1 7 ' )  Se t  
t heo ry  i s  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  s c i e n c e  t h a t  e l a b o r a t e s  
t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  a l l  s e t - t h e o r e t i c  
h i e r a r c h i e s  have i n  common. It i s  not  a  
s c i e n c e  concerned wi th  p a r t i c u l a r  o b j e c t s  -- 
t h e  s e t s .  
J u s t  as ( 9 )  t o  ( 1 7 )  e n t a i l  (18)  t o  ( 2 0 ) ,  so  ( 9 ' )  
t o  ( 1 7 ' )  e n t a i l  (18') t o  ( 2 0 ' ) :  
( 1 8 ' )  Only t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of  s e t s  which stem from t h e  
r e l a t i o n s  t hey  bear  t o  one ano the r  i n  v i r t u e  of  
be ing  a r r anged  i n  a s e t - t h e o r e t i c  h i e r a r c h y  could 
s i n g l e  o u t  a  s e t  as t h i s  o r  t h a t  o b j e c t .  
( 1 9 ' )  It i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  i n d i v i d u a t e  s e t s  independent ly  
of t h e  r o l e  t hey  i n  t h e  " a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e v .  
(20') The l lelementslT o f  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  ( h e r e  t h e  
s e t s )  have no p r o p e r t i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  r e l a t i n g  
them t o  o t h e r  s e t s .  
And, i n  similar f a s h i o n  ( 1 8 ' ) ,  c 1 9 t ) ,  and ( 2 0 ' )  appear  
f a l s e  from t h e  viewpoint  o f  a p p l i e d  s e t  t h e o r y .  S e t s  can 
be i n d i v i d u a t e d  independent ly  o f  t h e  r o l e  t h e y  p l ay  i n  t h e  
a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e .  [[B]], f o r  example, i s  t h e  s e t  whose 
o n l y  member i s  t h e  s e t  whose on ly  member i s  t h e  s e t  of  
moons of Venus. [Russe l l ]  i s  t h e  s e t  which c o n t a i n s  a 
man s u r e l y  i n  a c l a s s  by h imse l f .  
Like i t s  numer ica l  c o u n t e r p a r t ,  t h e  l o n g  inden ted  
passage  above makes more s ense  from t h e  viewpoint  of  p u r e ,  
a b s t r a c t ,  t h e o r y  -- i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  pure  s e t  t h e o r y .  But i s  
i t  - t r u e  when viewed from t h a t  p e r s p e c t i v e ?  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  
i s  what i s  c la imed i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  (numer i ca l )  passage 
t r u e ?  And even i f  some o f  t h e  c l a ims  a r e  t r u e  from t h a t  
p e r s p e c t i v e ,  l i k e  (18 )  t o  ( 2 0 ) ,  we have t o  c o n s i d e r  whether 
t h i s  wa r r an t s  t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  numbers a r e  not  o b j e c t s  
a t  a l l .  I n  a way, i t  would be very  odd i f  i t  d i d .  Imagine 
t h e  nl~mber t h e o r i s t  b u s i l y  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h e  a b s t r a c t  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  a r i t h m e t i c  and i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  
between t h e  (numberg) of  t h e  s t r u c t u r e .  He o r  
she  seems l i k e  t h e  l as t  person  t o  v o l u n t e e r  t h e  op in ion  
t h a t  numbers do n o t  e x i s t ,  engrossed  as he o r  she  i s  w i t h  
t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and i t s  e l emen t s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  w i t h  a p p l i c a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  t h e o r y .  
None the less ,  pe rhaps  t h e  passage  can be j u s t i f i e d  
from a "mixedn p e r s p e c t i v e .  I n  any even t  ( 1 8 )  th rough  
( 2 0 ) ,  i f  t r u e ,  are t r u e  from t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  of  pure  t h e o r y .  
Are t h e y  and t h e i r  s e t - t h e o r e t i c  c o u n t e r p a r t s  ( 1 8 ' )  th rough  
( 2 0 ' )  t r u e ?  It mlght be  o b j e c t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an  
asymmetry h e r e .  Consider  ( 2 0 ' ) .  It might  be thought  t o  
b e  f a l s e ,  on t h e  grounds  t h a t  fl has  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  be ing  
memberless and t h i s  p r o p e r t y  does  n o t  " r e i a t e  i t  t o  o t h e r  
s e t s u .  But t h e n  ( 2 0 )  i s  a l s o  f a l s e ,  s i n c e  t h e  p r o p e r t y  of  
0  o f  b e i n g  p r e d e c e s s o r l e s s  does  n o t  " r e l a t e  i t  t o  o t h e r  
' ,  
numbersf'. S i m i l a r l y ,  It might be thought  t h a t  ( 1 9 ' )  i s  
f a l s e  because  B c a n  be  i n d i v i d u a t e d  as:  
( ~ x )  ( y )  ( y  i s  a member o f  x * y  # y )  
And t h i s  does  n o t  mention " t h e  r o l e  6 p l a y s  i n  t h e  a b s t r a c t  
s t r u c t u r e f f .  But i f  s o ,  t h e n  (19) t o o  i s  f a l s e ,  s i n c e  0 
can be I n d i v i d u a t e d  as: 
( 7 ~ )  ( y )  - ( X  i s  t h e  succes so r  of  y )  
And s o  far  as ment ioning " t h e  r o l e  0 p l a y s  i n  t h e  a b s t r a c t  
s t r u c t u r e u  i t  d o e s n ' t ,  i f  t h e  e a r l i e r  i n d i v i d u a t i o n  of  0 
d o e s n ' t  e r r  i n  t h a t  r e g a r d .  
O f  cou r se  t h e  problem h e r e  i s  w i t h  what c o u n t s ,  
f o r  Benace r r a f ,  a s  a p r o p e r t y  t h a t  r e l a t e s  x t o  o t h e r  
l f e lementsn  o f  t h e  l l a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e " ,  and how t o  i n t e r p r e t  
" i n d i v i d u a t e  x  independen t ly  of  t h e  r o l e  x  p l a y s  i n  t h e  
' a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e f v .  These d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t u r n  seem t o  
r e s t  on what an " a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e u  i s .  So l e t  us  look 
a t  what Benacerraf  has  t o  say  about a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e s .  
Benacerraf  t e l l s  us i n  ( 1 2 )  t h a t  an a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  
can be i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  e i t h e r  (1) a system of  r e l a t i o n s  
i n  i n t e n s i o n ;  o r  (ii) t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  r e l a t i o n s  i n  ex t ens ion  
isomorphic t o  a g iven  system of  r e l a t i o n s .  F u r t h e r ,  we 
can i n f e r  from t h e  s c a r e  quo te s  i n  (11) t h a t  e i t h e r  a b s t r a c t  
s t r u c t u r e s  do no t  have e lements ,  o r  e l s e  t h a t  t h e i r  e lements  
a r e  second-class  c i t i z e n s ,  ob jec t -wise .  "The d i s t i n c t i o n u  
mentioned i n  (ll), presumably between a b s t r a c t  and conc re t e  
s t r u c t u r e s  " l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  !e lements f  of  t h e  
a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  have no p r o p e r t i e s  o t h e r  t han  those  
r e l a t i n g  them t o  o t h e r  ' e l emen t s f  of t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e u ,  
whereas t h e  e lements  of t h e  c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e ,  I t a k e  i t ,  
do have p r o p e r t i e s  o t h e r  t han  t h o s e  r e l a t i n g  them t o  t h e i r  
-
f e l l o w  elements .  Also, c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  "systems 
of  o b j e c t s t f ,  and they  " e x h i b i t f f  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e s  (from 
(12)). 
A t y p i c a l  mode l - theo re t i ca l  account of a  s t r u c t u r e  
i s  t h a t  a s t r u c t u r e  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  nonempty s e t  o f  e lements  
( t h e  domain), a family  of r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  e lements  
bea r  t o  one a n o t h e r ,  a family  o f  f u n c t i o n s ,  and a  s e t  of 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  e lements .  27 So a  n a t u r a l  way t o  view what 
2 7 .  Thi s  f ' t y p i c a l  accountu  i s  taken  from Gerald Sack ' s  
S a t u r a t e d  Model Theory (Reading,  Mass . :  W.A.Benjamin, Inc . ,  
1976) p p  Ilf. 
an  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  i s  i s  a s  a s t r u c t u r e  i n  t h e  above 
s ense ,  bu t  one whose domain c o n s i s t s  o f  a b s t r a c t  r a t h e r  t han  
c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  S ince  i n  one use  o f  ' a b s t r a c t 1  numbers -- 
and a l l  mathemat ical  o b j e c t s  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r  -- a r e  a b s t r a c t  
o b j e c t s ,  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers i s  
simply t h e  so -ca l l ed  s t a n d a r d  model o f  a r i t h m e t i c !  The 
members o f  i t s  dona in ,  0 ,  1, 2 ,  e t c . ,  would e x i s t  j u s t  a s  
s u r e l y  as t h e  s t r u c t u r e  does .  Concrete  s t r u c t u r e s  can be 
s a i d  t o  " e x h i b i t n  i t  i n  t h b t  t hey  a r e  isomorphic w i t h  i t  
b u t  c o n s i s t  o f  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  
While t h i s  n o t i o n  of s t r u c t u r e  may be a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
B e n a c e r r a f ' s  c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s ,  i t  i s  no t  a p p r o p r i a t e  
f o r  h i s  n o t i o n  o f  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e ,  f o r  i t  i s  pa t en t :  y 
incompat ib le  w i th  h i s  c l a im  t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  
a t  a l l .  
I n  a n o t h e r  u se  o f  I a b s t r a c t 1 ,  some models ( s t r u c t u r e s )  
o f  s e t  t h e o r y  a r e  s a i d  :o be a b s t r a c t ,  whi le  o t h e r s  a r e  
I s a i d  t o  be c o n c r e t e .  Although i t  may be t h a t  t h e  domains 
o f  t h e  a b s t r a c t  models a r e  n o t  p rope r  s e t s ,  and hence t h e  
a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e s  themse lves  a r e  no t  mathemat ical  o b J e c t s ,  
n o n e t h e l e s s  (most o f )  che  e lements  o f  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e s  -- 
s e t s  -- e x i s t  j u s t  as s u r e l y  ae do those  of  t h e  c o n c r e t e  
s t r u c t u r e s  -- a l s o  s e t s .  And having t h e  e lements  o f  bo th  
a b s t r a c t  and c c n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  e x i s t  on a  par  i s  one 
t h i n g  Benacerraf  c l e a r l y  wants t o  avo id .  
A uniform account  o f  s t r u c t u r e  i s  no t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
t o  b e  e x p e c t e d  anyway. S i n c e  c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  
sys tems  o f  o b j e c t s ,  whereas  B e n a c e r r a f  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  a b s t r a c t  
s t r u c t u r e s  as sys tems  o f  r e l a t i o n s ,  i n  i n t e n s i o n  -- a  
d i f f i c u l t  n o t i o n  t h a t  s u r e l y  r e q u i r e s  e l a b o r a t i o n .  He g i v e s  
as a n  a l t e r n a t e  accoun t  o f  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  i t  i s  
" t h e  se t  o f  r e l a t i o n s  i n  e x t e n s i o n  i somorph ic  t o  a  g i v e n  
sys tem o f  r e l ~ t i o n s ~ ~  (at ( 1 2 ) ) .  That  p h r a s e ,  ' s y s t e m  of 
r e l a t i o n s 1 ,  a g a i n .  I do n o t  know what a sys tem i s  supposed 
t o  be,  b u t  I imagine  t h a t  what he  means by a ' r e l a t i o n  i n  
e x t e n s i o n 1  i s  a s e t ,  o r  p o s s i b l y  c l a s s ,  o f  o r d e r e d  p a i r s .  
If s o ,  he h a s  t o  face t h e  c h a r g e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no o r d e r e d  
p a i r s  -- c n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a n  argument he i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s u s c e p t i b l e  t o .  Here i s  t h e  argument .  
6 (1 ) We have many s e t - t h e o r e t i c  a c c o u n t s  o f  what i t  
i s  t o  b e  a n  o r d e r e d  p a i r ,  a l l  o f  which s a t i s f y  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c o n t a i n i n g  a p a i r  such  t h a t  if 
<x ,y>  = <z,w>, t h e n  x  = z ,  and y = w. For  example,  
i <x,y>  = {{XI ,  { x , y ) )  ( K u r a t o w s k i ) ;  o r  cx ,y>  = { E x ) ,  i f l , y ) )  
(Weiner ) ;  o r ,  cx,y> = { { X I ,  { { % I ,  y l l ;  o r  e t c .  
6 ( 2  ) T h e r e f o r e  e i t h e r  more t h a n  one accoun t  i s  c o r r e c t ,  
e x a c t l y  one  i s ,  o r  none are.  
6 ( 3  ) Not more t h a n  one c a n  be  c o r r e c t ,  because  t h e y  a r e  
n o t  e x t e n s i o n a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t .  
6 ( 4  ) There  i s  no r e a s o n  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  one accoun t  a s  t h e  
c o r r e c t  one ,  o v e r  a l l  t h e  o t h e r s ;  one w i l l  do  a s  
w e l l  as a n o t h e r .  
6 ( 5  ) Therefore  o rdered  p a i r s  a r e  n o t  s e t s .  
b (6  ) And by a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  above argument, t hey  a r e  
no t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l .  
Of cou r se ,  Benacerraf  might w e l l  have r e p u d i a t e d  t h i s  s o r t  
i i 
of  ( 1  ) t o  ( 6  ) argument by now, even f o r  t h e  numbers ( i n  
f a c t ,  he h a s ) ,  Hence a n  ap2ea l  t o  t h e  n o t i o n  of a  r e l a t i o n  
as a s e t  o f  o rdered  p a i r s  i s  one t h a t ,  pe rhaps ,  he can 
l e g i t i m a t e l y  make. Yet under t h i s  c o n s t r u a l  a r z l a t i o n  i s  
a s o r t  of  o b j e c t ;  s o  a system o f  r e l a t i o n s  would t hen  j u s t  
be a system of  o b j e c t s ,  and t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between a b s t r a c t  
and c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  c o l l a p s e s .  28 
Perhaps t h e  m a t t e r  can be c l e a r e d  up by looking  
i n s t e a d  a t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a "conc re t e  s t r u c t u r e v ,  and 
' , 
r e f l e c t i n g  on what a c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e  cou ld  "exh ib i t1 ' .  
A s  systems o f  o b j e c t s  c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  seem somehow 
less p r o b l e m a t i c a l  t h a n  a b s t r a c t  ones .  I n  t h e  l e a s t ,  each 
c o n s i s t s  o f  a domain o f  o b j e c t s  which a r e  r e l a t e d ,  maybe 
even o rde red ,  i n  c e r t a i n  ways. And presumably t h e s e  o b j e c t s  
are c o n c r e t e .  But what does  " conc re t e  o b j e c t u  amount t o ?  
Benacer ra f  seems t o  be assuming throughout  t h e  a r t i c l e  
t h a t  sets  e x i s t .  Are s e t s  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ?  I n  mathemat ics ,  
i t  i s  common t o  s e e  s e t s  c a t e g o r i z e d  as c o n c r e t e  -- u n l i k e  
groups ,  f o r  example, which a r e  s a i d  t o  be a b s t r a c t .  But 
Benacer ra f  cannot  be r e l y i n g  upon t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  because 
i t  p l a c e s  numbers s q u a r e l y  i n  t h e  "concrete1 '  c a t ego ry  a l s o ,  
Perhaps he  h a s  o t h e r  r e a s o n s  f o r  r e g a r d i n g  s e t s  a s  c o n c r e t e .  
-- - 
28. Lon Berk po in t ed  t h i s  ou t  t o  me. 
But I wonder how p r i n c i p l e d  t h e y  c o u l d  b e .  Because what- 
e v e r  consequences  ( 9 )  t h r o u g h  ( 1 7 )  have f o r  numbers,  ( 9 ' )  
t h r o u g h  ( 1 7 ' )  have f o r  s e t s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i f  numbers a r e  
n o t  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ,  n e i t h e r  a r e  s e t s .  If numbers d o  n o t  
e x i s t ,  n e i t h e r  do s e t s .  
P h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  might  b e  t h o u g h t  good c a n d i d a t e s  
f o r  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ,  as it i s  h a r d  t o  imagine  how t h e y  c o u l d  
be c a t e g o r i z e d  as " a b s t r a c t f 1  ( a t  l e a s t  w i t h  s e n s e  d a t a  
nowhere i n  s i g h t ) .  But a r e  t h e r e  enough o f  them t o  c o n s t i t u t e  
t h e  donlain o f  a c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  one t h a t  
e x h i b i t s  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a r i t h m e t i c ?  That  i s ,  
a r e  t h e r e  I n f i n i t e l y  many p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s ?  (It  goes  
w i t h o u t  s a y  t h a t  any s t r u c t u r e  which i s  t o  . model a a r i t h m e t i c  
must have  a domain c o n t a i n i n g  i n f i n i t e l y  many o b j e c t s ,  i n  
o r d e r  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  axioms:  0 i s  a number; t h e  s u c c e s s o r  
o f  any number i s  a number; no two numbers have t h e  same 
s u c c e s s o r ;  and ,  0 i s  n o t  t h e  s u c c e s s o r  o f  any number . ) .  
Without  i n f i n i t e l y  many p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  ( a n d ,  i n  
t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  o t h e r  s o r t s  o f  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s )  a r i t h m e t i c  
w i l l  have no c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  t o  e x h i b i t  i t s  a b s t r a c t  
s t r u c t u r e ,  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  as I i n d i c a t e d  on pages  15-16 
above,  some p r e t t y  s t r o n g  e m p i r i c a l  a s s u m p t i o n s  a p p e a r  t o  
b e  needed i n  o r d e r  t o  conc lude  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  
many p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s .  The r e a s o n  i s  -- t o  r e c a p  t h e  main 
argument p r e s e n t e d  above -- t h a t  i f  space- t ime i s  f i n i t e ,  
t h e n  g i v e n  any p o s i t i v e  r e a l  v a l u e  v ,  no m a t t e r  how t i n y ,  
i f  we r e g a r d  t h e  whole p h y s i c a l  u n i v e r s e  as b e i n g  d i v i d e d  
up i n t o  space- t ime volumes o f  s i z e  v  ( q u a d r u b i c  inch-seconds ,  
o r  wha tever  t h e  u n i t  would b e ) ,  t h e r e  s t i l l  w i l l  n o t  b e  
i n f i n i t e l y  many p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  ( i . e . ,  space- t ime vo lumes) .  
So it l o o k s  a s  though we have  no good r e a s o n  t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  enough p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  
a c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e .  There  would seem t o  be  enough 
e x p r e s s i o n s  however.  But ( I  hope t o  show) n o t  f o r  B e n a c e r r a f ,  
What a r e  e x p r e s s i o n s ?  Q u i n e  h a s  a n  i l l u m i n a t i n g  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  m a t t e r  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  h i s  t h e s i s  t h a t  
o n t o l o g y  i s  t h e o r y - r e l a t i v e .  He a s k s  u s  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
c a s e  o f  t h e  t h o u g h t f u l  p r o t o s y n t s c t  i c i a n ,  working w i t h  a  
f o r m a l i z e d  s y s t e m  o f  f i r s t - o r d e r  p r o o f  t h e o r y .  The u n i v e r s e  
o f  t h i s  t h e o r y  o f  p r o t o s y n t a x  i s  meant t o  be  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  Not e x p r e s s i o n  t o k e n s ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  
f i n i t e l y  many o f  t h e s e  (hence  n o t  enough) ,  b u t  e x p r e s s i o n  
t y p e s .  What a r e  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ?  I d e n t i f y i n g  a t y p e  w i t h  
the s e t  o f  i t s  t o k e n s  i n v o l v e s  a s e r i o u s  danger  o f  v i o l a t i n g  
t h e  law o f  p r o t o s y n t a x  which s a y s  t h a t  x  = z whenever x 
c o n c a t e n a t e d  w i t h  y  = z  c o n c a t e n a t e d  w i t h  y .  I t  may be 
t h a t  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  x, y ,  and z  have t o k e n s ,  and x  # z, 
b u t  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  x  c o n c a t e n a t e d  w i t h  y ,  and z c o n c a t e n a t e d  
w i t h  y have  no t o k e n s ,  and hence  a r e  b o t h  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  
n u l l  se t .  The n e x t  t h i n g  ( s ) h e  might  t r y  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  
e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  w i t h  sequences  o f  s i n g l e  s i g n s .  ( A  s i n g l e  
s i g n  c a n  be  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  s e t  o f  i t s  t o k e n s ,  s i n c e  
t h e s e  p r i m i t i v e s  w i l l  no doub t  have t o k e n s . ) .  But what 
are sequences?  A familiar c o n s t r u a l  o f  them i s  as mappings 
o f  t h i n g s  on numbers. So e x p r e s s i o n s  t u r n  o u t  t o  be  f i n i t e  
sets  o f  p a i r s  o f  s i g n s  and numbers. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  ( s ) h e  
cou ld  have s tar ted  by Ggdel-numbering t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  and 
g o t t e n  by on a u n i v e r s e  o f  j u s t  numbers. Quine  conc ludes  
from t h i s  t h a t  l l . . . i n  b o t h  c o n s t r u c t i o n s  we were a r t i f i c i a l l y  
d e v i s i n g  models t o  s a t i s f y  laws tha t  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  an  
u n e x p l i c a t e d  s e n s e  had been meant t o  s a t i s f y v 1 ,  2 9  
So i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e r e  are s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  
a c c o u n t s  o f  what a n  e x p r e s s i o n  cou ld  b e .  No two of which 
are e x t e n s i o n a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t .  Oh d e a r .  I gues s  e x p r e s s i o n s  
llcould n o t  be  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l .  l1 GI won' t  bore  t h e  r e a d e r  
i by w r i t i n g  o u t  a (1 ) t o  ( 6 i ) - t yye  a rgwnep t . ) .  But ,  aa  1 
mentioned ear l ier ,  Benace r r a f  h a s  r e p u d i a t e d  t h i s  s o r t  o f  
i i (1 ) t o  ( 6  )-argument,  s o  l e t  u s  i g n o r e  i t  and j u s t  
c o n c e n t r a t e  on  which account  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  Benacer ra f  
c o u l d  choose.  
The p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a r e  t o  t a k e  e x p r e s s i o n s  
( i )  as sequences  o f  s i n g l e  s i g n s ;  o r ,  
( i i )  as se ts  o f  p a i r s  o f  s i g n s  and numbers; o r ,  
( i i i )  as numbers; o r ,  
( i v )  i n  a n  u n e x p l i c a t e d  s e n s e ,  i . e . ,  a s  p r i m i t i v e s .  
Obviously (ii) and (iii) a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  someone who 
i s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  countenance  numbers, and unab l e  t o  
29.  W.V. Qu ine :  v O n t o l o g i c a l  R e l a t i v i t y t t ,  O n t o l o g i c a l  
R e l a t i v i t y  and Other  Essays ,  pp.  41-43. 
countenance sets .  Then (i) perhaps?  Needless t o  s ay ,  a  
6 6 t r i v i a l  mod i f i ca t ion  of (1 ) t o  ( 6  ) -- t h e  argument t h a t  
o rde red  p a i r s  cou ld  no t  be o b j e c t s  a t  a l l  -- would have 
t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  sequences could not  be o b j e c t s  e i t h e r .  
(Again, I won't bore  t h e  r e a d e r  by producing i t . ) .  But 
tha t  a s i d e ,  t a k i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s  as sequences o f  s i g n s  
n e c e s s i t a t e s  countenancing sequences i n  some unexp l i ca t ed  
sense  -- o r  a t  l e a s t ,  no t  e x p l i c a t e d  by means o f  numbers 
and/or s e t s .  I f  numbers and se t s  have been axed,  why 
should sequences be spared?  I apo log ize  f o r  going on t o  
anyone f o r  whom t h e  p o i n t  i s  obvious .  I s h a l l  m e r e l y  t r y  
t o  e n u n c i a t e  my r easons  f o r  f i n d i n g  it obvious .  
For one t h i n g ,  t h e  n o t i o n  of  a sequence f a i r l y  
screams t ha t a f  number. And t r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  sequences have 
been reduced t o  numbers, o r  t o  s e t s .  For a n o t h e r ,  s e t s  
have proved very  u s e f u l ,  more u s e f u l  t h a n  sequences ,  a t  
l e a s t  i n  p rov id ing  a " founda t ion  f o r  mathematics1'.  
Cons ide ra t ions  o f  mathemat ical  u t i l i t y  t h e r e f o r e  would 
have u s  d i spense  witth sequences ( i n  an unexp l i ca t ed  s e n s e )  
sooner  t h a n  wi th  numbers o r  s e t s .  
Someone might conce ivab ly  u rge ,  however, t h a t  
sequences a r e  t o  be p r e f e r r e d  on o t h e r  grounds,  They might 
emphasize t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  o f  c e r t a i n  
s o r t s  o f  sequences .  A f t e r  a l l ,  s o  many a s p e c t s  of ou r  
d a i l y  l i v e s  a r e  o rde red .  F i r s t  we t u r n  o f f  t h e  a la rm,  
t h e n  we g e t  ou t  of bed, t h e n  we put  t h e  c o f f e e  on, t h e n  , . .  
The t h i n g s  we do b e f o r e  g e t t i n g  t o  work a r e  done i n  a  i 
sequence.  Every l i n e  -- of  people  i n  a  supermarket ,  o r  
w a i t i n g  f o r  a bus -- i s  a s o r t  o f  f i n i t e  sequence.  S t a r t i n g  
n e a r e s t  t o  t h e  sun,  t h e  first p l a n e t  i n  t h e  sequence of 
p l a n e t s  i n  ou r  s o l a r  system i s  Mercury, and t h e  n i n t h  and 
p o s s i b l y  l as t  i s  P l u t o .  
I t h i n k  t h e s e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  - do suppor t  t h e  c l a im  
t h a t  some sequences  a t  l e a s t  a r e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  
a c c e s s i b l e .  But no more t h a n  t h e y  do f o r  numbers and s e t s ,  
Because we can a l s o  count t h e  number o f  people  i n  l i n e ,  
p l a n e t s  going around t h e  sun,  o r  t h i n g s  we d i d  be fo re  
g e t t i n g  t o  work. And we can  form s e t s  o u t  o f  them, t o o  -- 
t h e  s e t  o f  p l a n e t s  i n  our  s o l a r  sys tem,  fpr  example -- a s  
e a s i l y  as r e g a r d  them as s e q u e n t i a l l y  a r r a n g e d ,  
Perhaps t h e s e  p o i n t s  do n o t  s u f f i c e  t o  show, as  I 
b e l i e v e  t h e y  do,  t h a t  i t  would be a  very  t h i n  o n t o l o g i c a l  
s t o r y  indeed t h a t  countenanced sequences  bu t  n e i t h e r  numbers 
no r  sets .  Yet t h e y  seem s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e n a b l e  u s  t o  
conclude that any r ea sonab le  d i v i s i o n  of o b j e c t s  i n t o  
"concre te"  and " a b s t r a c t "  t h a t  Benacerraf  might employ 
would n o t  p l a c e  sequences  i n  t h e  c o n c r e t e  ca t ego ry  whi le  
p l a c i n g  numbers (and s e t s )  i n  t h e  a b s t r a c t  c a t e g o r y .  
S ince  under ou r  p r e s e n t  c o n s t r u a l  an e x p r e s s i o n  i s  
j u s t  a s o r t  o f  sequence,  and s i n c e  sequences  a r e  no t  
c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  (because  numbers a r e  n o t ) ,  n e i t h e r  a r e  
e x p r e s s i o n s .  And i f  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  no t  conc re t e  o b j e c t s  , 
t h e y  cannot form c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  and the reby  " e x h i b i t  
the abstract structure of arithmeticu. 
It remains to be seen whether Benacerraf can afford 
to countenance expressions in an unexplicated sense, and 
not as sequences of signs. He certainly requires that 
there be expressions; he advocates that number wordd Itdo 
the jobf1 of the numbers. What this thesis amounts to and 
how it fares will be gone into later. Note for the moment 
4 
its emphasis on linguistic entities standing in for 
mathematical ones. In keeping with this formalistic spirit 
let us return then to our protosyntactician and his/her 
formalized system of first-order proof theory, whose 
universe we shall take to be expressions. Here, an expression 
is just a fqnitely longUstringl1 of single signs. (In a 
' .  
sense this is an explication,, as it construes some expressions 
in terms of others; but these latter are primitively 
adopted. Also, the notion of a "string1,, is problematical 
since it is usually explicated as merely a sequence, and 
we have already seen that Benacerraf cannot countenance 
sequences. But let us assume, for the moment at least, 
that the notion of a string is one that is available to 
him.). The single signs will typically include variables, 
and logical and non-logical constants. These expressions 
of length one can be concatenated to form longer expressiqns. 
Depending upon the arrangement of their single signs, 
some longer strings will be formulae, and some formulae 
will be sentences. The proof theorist will be concerned 
with some of the relations that occur among these expressions, 
o r  s e t s  o f  them -- r e l a t i o n s  l i k e  I1x i s  d e r i v a b l e  from yI1 -- 
and f u n c t i o n s  on t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  -- l i k e  " t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
s u b s t i t u t i n g  x  f o r  a l l  occu r r ences  o f  y i n  zI1. But ( s ) h e  
w i l l  n o t  be concerned w i t h  any p r o p e r t i e s  e x p r e s s i o n s  might 
have beyond t h o s e  r e l a t i n g  them t o  o t h e r  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( o r  
s e t s  t h e r e o f ) .  The vexp re s s ions"  o f  l e n g t h  one,  t h e  " s i n g l e  
s i g n s f 1 ,  cou ld  be any th inq ,  and,  s u b j e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  
r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  f l conca tena t ionu  cou ld  be any o p e r a t i o n .  The 
r e s u l t a n t  l o n g e r  e x p r e s s i o n s  would be i n f e c t e d  w i th  t h e  
same s o r t  o f  i n d e t e r m i n a t e n e s s ,  s i n c e  t h e y  would merely be 
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  vconca t ena t ionn  o p e r a t i o n  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  
l l s i n g l e  s ignsv1 .  I n  f a c t ,  i t  i s  very  popula r  t o  t a k e  
 expression^^^ t o  be numbers. One j u s t  p i c k s  some numbers 
a r b i t r a r i l y  t o  be t h e  " s i n g l e  s igns" .  l fConcatenat ionl l  o f  
t h e  " s i n g l e  s i g n s "  nl,  ..., nk may be d e f i n e d  so  as t o  
y i e l d  a I f longer  e x p r e ~ s i o n ~ ~  m as fo l l ows  : 
(where pl,  ..., pk a r e  t h e  f i rs t  k  p r imes ) .  
Bear ing t h e s e  f a c t s  i n  mind, c o n s i d e r  t h e  fo l l owing  
passage  : 
(911) For p r o o f - t h e o r e t i c a l  purposes  t h e  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  which do no t  stem 
from t h e  r e l a t i o n s  t h e y  bea r  t o  one a n o t h e r  i n  
v i r t u e  o f  be ing  conca tena ted  w i t h  each o t h e r  
' and d e r i v a b l e  from one ano the r  a r e  of  no 
consequence whatsoever .  (1011) But it would be 
on ly  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  would s i n g l e  ou t  an 
e x p r e s s i o n  as t h i s  o b j e c t  o r  t h a t .  ( 1 1 1 1 )  There- 
f o r e  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l ,  because 
i n  g i v i n g  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  ( t h a t  i s ,  n e c e s s a w  
and s u f f i c i e n t )  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  you merely 
c h a r a c t e r i z e  a n  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  -- and 
t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
"elements1I o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  have no p r o p e r t i e s  
o t h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  r e l a t i n g  them t o  o t h e r  
l le lements"  o f  t h e  same s t r u c t u r e .  (13" )  That  
a sys tem o f  o b j e c t s  e x h i b i t s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
e l a b o r a t e d  by p roo f  t h e o r y  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  
e l emen t s  o f  t h e  sys tem have some p r o p e r t i e s  
n o t  dependent  on s t r u c t u r e .  ( 1 4 " )  It must 
be p o s s i b l e  t o  i n d i v i d u a t . e  t h o s e  o b j e c t s  
i ndependen t l y  o f  t h e  r o l e  t h e y  p l a y  i n  t h a t  
s t r u c t u r e .  (15" )  But t h i s  i s  p r e c i s e l y  what 
cannot  be done w i t h  e x p r e s s i o n s .  (16" )  To be 
t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  ' ( x )  ( F X ) ~  i s  no more and no 
less  t h a n  t o  be t h e  r e s u l t  o f  c o n c a t e n a t i n g  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  t h e  o r d e r  
p r e s e n t e d :  ' ( l ,  I x 1 ,  l l ? l , l x l , l ) l .  
(1711) Proof t h e o r y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  s c i e n c e  
t h a t  e l a b o r a t e s  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  
t h a t  a l l  models o f  p roof  t h e o r y  have i n  
common. It i s  n o t  a  s c i e n c e  concerned w i t h  
p a r t i c u l a r  o b j e c t s  -- e x p r e s s i o n s .  
I t h i n k  it i s  p r e t t y  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  a d u l t e r a t i o n  of 
' #  
B e n a c e r r a f l s  ( 9 )  t o  ( 17 )  shows t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  do  n o t  
e x i s t ,  i f  ( 9 )  t o  ( 1 7 )  shows t h a t  numbers do n o t  e x i s t ,  
A c t u a l l y ,  t o  pu t  t h e  matter more c a r e f u l l y ,  ( 9 " )  t o  ( l 7 I1 )  
show t h a t  p r o o f - t h e o r e t i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n s  do n o t  e x i s t ,  
i f  ( 9 )  t o  ( 17 )  show t h a t  n a t u r a l  numbers do n o t  e x i s t .  
And f o r  p r e s e n t  pu rpose s ,  we can  a l s o  conc lude  t h a t  
e x p r e s s i o n s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  p r o o f - t h e o r e t i c a l  ones ,  a r e  no 
more "concre teI1  t h a n  n a t u r a l  numbers o r  se ts ,  and s o  a r e  
n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  comprise  t h e  domain o f  a  c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e  
t h a t  would e x h i b i t  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a r i t h m e t i c .  
It may be a rgued  t h a t  (i) th rough  ( i v )  on p .  51  above do 
n o t  exhaus t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  what e x p r e s s i o n s  can  b e .  
But i t  would s u r p r i s e  m e  a g r e a t  d e a l  i f  t h e r e  was some 
o t h e r  account  of  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  and under t h i s  account 
exp res s ions  t u r n  ou t  t o  be c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ,  and t h e r e  a r e  
enough o f  them t o  e x h i b i t  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  of 
ari thmetic.  
Consider,  f o r  example, t h e  exp res s ions  of a  n a t u r a l  
language,  of  Eng l i sh ,  more s p e c i f i c a l l y .  There i s ,  f i r s t  
of  a l l ,  t h e  problem o f  whether t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many 
o f  them. Most l i n g u i s t s  t h i n k  there  are,  bu t  t h e  m a t t e r  
i s  not  e n t i r e l y  s e t t l e d .  30 Second, i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  whether 
l i n g u i s t s  o r  ph i lo sophe r s  w i l l  p rov ide  an  account of 
e x p r e s s i o n s  d i f f e r e n t  from one of  ( i)  - ( i v ) .  Emmon Bach, 
f o r  example, i n  S y n t a c t i c  Theory s a y s :  
... we w i l l  t a k e  a  language t o  be 2 set of 
s e n t e n c e s  and a grammar t o  be some e x p l i c i t  
account  of  (among o t h e r  t h i n g s )  t h e  s en t ences  
o f  t h e  language,  We c o n s i d e r  each sen tence  
t o  be  a s t r i n g  o r  sequence of ze ro  o r  more 
e lements  pu t  t o g e t h e r  by a n  o p e r a t i o n  of 
conca t ena t ion  ( l i t e r a l l y  "cha in ing  t o g e t h e r " ) .  
The e lements  might be any th ing  whatsoever;  
i n  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  n a t u r a l  languages  
we may t h j n k  of  them a s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
d i s t i n c t i v e  sounds (phcnemes) o r  o t h e r  
l i n g u i s t i c  e lements  (words, morphemes), 
depending on t h e  focus  of our  d i s c u s s i o n .  
We c a l l  t h e  s e t  o f  b a s i c  e lements  t h e  
( t e r m i n a l )  a lphabe t  o r  vocabulary of t h e  31 
language (and i t s  grammar). (my i t a l i c s ) .  
30. For arauments t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  s e e  Cha r l e s  F. H o c k e t t l s  
The S t a t e  OF t h e  A r t  (The Hague, i g 6 8 ) ,  Peter  R e i c h r s  ''The 
F i n i t e n e s s  of  Na tu ra l  Language", i n  Language 45:831-843 
(19691, and D . L .  Olmsted's  "On Some Axioms about  Sentence 
. - - . -  
Lengt hn  i n  Language 43:303-305 
31. S y n t a c t i c  Theory (New York: H o l t ,  R inehar t  and Winston, 
1974) p .  26. 
T h i s  p a s s a g e  a g a i n  raises t h e  q u e s t i o n :  i s  a  s t r i n g  a  
sequence ,  and i f  n o t  what i s  i t ?  Perhaps  arguments  s i m i l a r  
t o  t h o s e  showing t h a t  by B e n a c e r r a f l s  l i g h t s  sequences  
canno t  e x i s t  would show t h a t  s t r i n g s  do n o t  e i t h e r .  
A f u l l e r  comparison o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  w i t h  numbers 
w i l l  a p p e a r  i n  c h a p t e r  t h r e e  below. For  now, i t  i s  
enough t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  Imagine a  f i n i s h e d  
s y n t a c t i c  t h e o r y  T  o f  E n g l i s h  e x p r e s s i o n s  -- n o t  o f  t h e  
E n g l i s h  l anguage  w i t h  a l l  i t s  h i s t o r y ,  b u t  mere ly  a  t h e o r y  
t h a t  g i v e s  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  ( s y n t a c t i c )  
g r o p e r t i e s  o f  E n g l i s h  e x p r e s s i o n s .  ( I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  
r e s t r i c t  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  t o  j u s t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  
o n e s ,  b e c a u s e  B e n a c e r r a f  r e s t r i c t e d  it t q  j u s t  t h e s e  i n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  numbers, i n  ( l l ) . ) .  The e x p r e s s i o n s  themse lves  
would j u s t  be  s e n t e n c e s  and words,  and maybe l e t t e r s  and 
phonemes, Along w i t h  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  t h e y  
would be a r r a n g e d  i n  a s o r t  o f  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e .  That 
i s ,  t h e  t h e o r y  w i l l  d e s c r i b e  t h e  v a r i o u s  r e l a t i o n s  t h e s e  
a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s  b e a r  t o  one a n o t h e r  ( s u c h  a s  " i s  composed 
o f u  and "has  t h e  deep s t r u c t u r e  o f 1 ' )  and t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  
t h a t  s tem from t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s ,  b u t  i t  w i l l  n o t  r e f e r  t o  
any o t h e r ,  " e x t e r n a l t 1 ,  o r  u n n e c e s s a r y  p r o p e r t i e s  ( s u c h  a s  
''was said by Nixon'', o r  "was commonly s a i d  i n  1 9 7 4 " ) .  To 
be  a g i v e n  s e n t e n c e ,  f o r  example,  'There  was a c h i l d  found 
i n  t h e  b u l l r u s h e s ' ,  i s  no more and no l e s s  t h a n  t o  be t h e  
s t r i n g  o f  words:  ' t h e r e 1 ,  'was1, ' a 1 ,  ' c h i l d 1 ,  ' f o u n d 1  
' i n 1 ,  ' t h e 1 ,  l b u l l r u s h e s l .  To be  t h e  word ' t h e r e 1 ,  i n  
t u r n ,  i s  no more and no l e s s  t h a n  t o  be t h e  s t r i n g  o f  l e t t e r s :  
t ,  h ,  e ,  r ,  e .  ( A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i t  could be 
i d e n t i f i e d  wi th  a c e r t a i n  s t r i n g  o f  phonemes. But i t  
cannot be i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  bo th  a  s t r i n g  of  l e t t e r s ,  - and a  
s t r i n g  o f  phonemes, because t h e s e  s t r i n g s  w i l l  normally 
no t  be i d e n t i c a l  t o  each  o t h e r .  We could conclude from 
t h e  f a c t  o f  t h e s e  m u l t i p l e  p o s s i b l e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s ,  l a  
Benacer ra f ,  t h a t  words a r e  no t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l .  O r  we could 
conclude t h a t  words a r e  "composed ofw1 l e t t e r s ,  and words 
a r e  "composed o fqw phonemes bu t  t h e  composit ion r e l a t i o n  i s  
more complex t h a n  one would have though t ,  I n  any e v e n t ,  
f o r  ou r  immediate purposes ,  i t  i s  immater ia l  whether we 
i d e n t i f y  a word as a s t r i n g  o f  l e t t e r s ,  ? s t r i n g  of phonemes, 
o r  a s t r i n g  'wcomposed o f v  e i t h e r .  The po in t  cernains t h a t  
t h e s e  t h i n g s  a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s  s t a n d i n g  i n  c e r t a i n  
r e l a t i o n s .  Th i s  goes f o r  phonsmes, t oo .  I have been t o l d  
by James Harris t h a t  [a] c u r r e n t  phonemic theo ry  has  i t  
t h a t  phonemes are s e t s ,  o r  sequences ,  o f  f e a t u r e s .  To 
s i m p l i f y  m a t t e r s  t h e n ,  I s h a l l  assume o u r  t heo ry  i d e n t i f i e s  
a word wi th  a s t r i n g  o f  l e t t e r s . ) .  
So acco rd ing  t o  ou r  t h e o r y  sen t ences  a r e  s t r i n g s  o f  
words, and have deep s t r u c t u r e ,  and words a r e  s t r i n g s  of  
l e t t e r s .  But what a r e  l e t t e r s ?  They may w e l l  j u s t  be  
g iven  i n  a  l i s t ,  t h e  " t e rmina l  a lphabe t f1 ,  as :  l a w ,  I b f ,  
c ,  . x ,  y ,  z .  And t h i s  may be done, because 
f u r t h e r  r e d u c t i o n  might be deemed unnecessary (everyone 
knows what t h e  l e t t e r s  of t h e  a lphabe t  a r e ,  j u s t  a s  everyone 
knows what t h e  ( n a t u r a l )  n u m b e ~ s  a r e ) .  O r ,  t o o ,  because  
f u r 8 t h e r  r e d u c t i o n  might  be deemed i m p o s s i b l e .  The l e t t e r  
l o '  f o r  example,  canno t  be  i c e n t i f i r d  w i t h  any one  s o r t  o f  
p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t  because  t h e  l e t t e r  l o 1  i s  n e u t r a l  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  i t s  modes o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n :  i n  p r i n t ,  a  c i r c l e ;  
i n  Morse c o d e ,  two d o t s ;  i n  B r a i l e ,  a  c h a r a . c t e r  o f  r a i s e d  
I) d o t s  a r r a n g e d  s o  . . ; I n  t h e  code t h ~ t  Anne S u l l i v a n  
t a u g h t  Helen K e l l e r ,  a c e r t a i n  hand con:iguration; n c t  t o  
ment ion  f l a g  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  smoke s i g n a l s ,  and s o  on .  
Again, we c o u l d  conc lude  Prom t h e  f a c t  o f  m u l t i p l e  p o s s i b l e  
r e d u c t i o n s ,  l a  B e n a c e r r a f ,  t h a t  l e t t e r s  a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  
a t  a l l  -- a l t h o u g h  of c o u r s e  we w o n ' t .  But we canno t  s a y  
a b o u t  l e t t e r s  a n y t h i n g  a n a l o g o u s  t o  v;hat we s a i d  a b o u t  
words a t  t h i s  p o i n t  because ,  ~ c o m p o s i t i o n s ~  a s i d e ,  i t  
w i l l  a lways  be  ~ o s s i b l e  t o  come up w i t h  a new encoding of  
t h e  a l p h a b e t .  So i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  o u r  t h e o r y  T t o  
I 
s p e c i f y  a d i s j u n c t i o n  t h a t  c a p t u r e s  a l l  t h e  modes of  
r e p r e s e n t , t i o n  o f  a g i v e n  l e t t e r ,  th~1.s i d e n t i f y i n g  it i n  
ternis o f  p r o p e r t i e s  n o t  stemming frm t h e  r e i a t i o n s  i t  
b e a r s  t o  o t h e r  l e t t e r s ,  words,  and s e n t e n c e s .  Of c o u r s e ,  
i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  a l e i t c r  by means of a  c o n t i n g e n t  
p r o p e r t y  i t  h a s  -- such  as "be ing  t h e  f i r s t  l e t t e r  o f  t h e  
second  ward o f  t h e  t h i r d  l i n e  on t h i s  page",  j u s t  a s  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  a number as " b e i n g  t h e  number of t h e  
A p o s t l e s " .  But o u r  t h e o r y  T x i 1 1  n o t  concern  i t s r l f  
w i t h  auch p r o p e r t i e s ,  
H ~ n c e  we may conc lude  t h a t  l e t t e r s  a r e  p r i m i t i v e l y  
adopted e lements  o f  t h e  t h e o r y ,  s p e c i f i e d  by a f i n i t e  l i s t .  
The impor tan t  t h i n g  w i l l  be how t h e  a l p h a b e t  composes words 
and sen t ences ,  no t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  l e t t e m  themse lves ,  
Taking what Emmon Bach said about  t h e  e lements  t h a t  comprise 
s e n t e n c e - s t r i n g s  a s t e p  f u r t h e r ,  t h e  l e t t e r  l o 1  i t s e l f  
may be t aken  t o  be any th ing  a t  a l l  f o r  t h e  purposes  of  t h e  
t h e o r y ,  j u s t  s o  l o n g  as t h e  r e l a t i o n s  between l e t t e r s ,  
words, s e n t e n c e s ,  deep s t r u c t u r e s ,  e t c .  ( i f  t h e r e  i s  any 
c e t e r a )  ho ld .  
Bear ing  a l l  t h i s  i n  mind, t hen ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  fo l l owing  
passage .  
( g l l l )  For T-theory purposes ,  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  
e x p r e s s i o n s  (and o t h e r  items o f  s x n t a x )  which 
do no t  s tem from t h e  r e l a t i o n s  t h e y  'bear t o  one 
a n o t h e r  a r e  o f  no consequences wfiatsoever. ( l o f i  ' )  There fo re ,  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  not  o b j e c t s  
a t  a l l ,  because  i n  g i v i n g  t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s  ( t h a t  
i s ,  neces sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t )  you m e r e l y  
c h a r a c t e r i z e  a n  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  -- and t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  l i e s  I n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  ue lements"  
o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  have no p r o p e r t i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  
t h o s e  r e l a t i n g  them t o  o t h e r  l lelernentsu of  
t h e  same s t r u c t u r e .  ( 13" ' )  That a system of 
o b j e c t s  e x h i b i t s  t h e  s y n t a c t i c  s t r u c t u r e  of 
sen tences ,words ,  deep s t r u c t u r e s ,  e t c , ,  i m p l i e s  
t h a t  t h e  e lements  o f  t h e  sys tem have some 
p r o p e r t i e s  n o t  dependent on s t r u c t u r e .  ( 1 4 "  ) 
It must be p o a s l b l e  t o  i n d i v i d u a t e  t h o s e  
o b j e c t s  independent ly  of  t h e  r o l e  t hey  p l ay  i n  
t h a t  s t r u c t u r e .  ( 1 5 n 1 )  But t h i s  i s  p r e c i s e l y  
what cannot be done w i th  e x p r e s s i o n s .  ( 1 6 " ' )  To 
be t h e  s en t ence  'There  was a c h i l d  found i n  
-
t h e  b u l l r u s h e s l  i s  no more and no l e s s  t han  
t o  be t h e  s t r i n g  of words: ' t h e r e 1 ,  'was1, ' a 1 ,  
' ch i lz I1 ,  f ound1 ,  ' i n 1 ,  ' t h e 1 ,  l b u l l r u s h e s l .  
( 1 7 " l )  T i s  t h e ~ e f o r e  t h e  t heo ry  t h a t  e l a b o r a t e s  
t h e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  Eng l i sh  syn t ax .  It 
i s  not  cor~cerned  wi th  p a r t i c u l a r  o b j e c t s  -- 
e x p r e s s i o n s .  
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Again, t h e  p o i n t  i s  n o t  t h a t  ( 9 " ' )  t o  ( 1 7 " ' )  a r e  
t r u e .  E x p r e s s i o n s  can  be  i n d i v i d u a t e d  b y  means of  p r o p e r t i e s  
-- -
which do n o t  s t em from t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  t o  o t h e r  items of  
s y n t a x  -- such  as "be ing  t h e  f i r s t  l e t t e r  o f  t h e  second 
word of t h e  t h i r d  l i n e  on t h i s  page1' -- j u s t  as numbers 
c a n  b e  s o  i n d i v i d u a t e d  -- e .g . ,  a s  " b e i n g  t h e  number o f  
wqrds on t h i s  page" o r  " b e i n g  t h e  number o f  t h e  a p o s t l e s t 1 .  
The p o i n t  t o  be  drawn i s  t h e  a n a l o g o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  ,passage  
( g l t l )  t o  (117111) w i t h  t h e  p a s s a g e  ( 9 )  t o  ( 1 7 ) .  O f  c o u r s e ,  
i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  T i s  n o t  a t h e o r y  c u r r e n t l y  b e i n g  s t u d i e d  
as a r i t h m e t i c  i s ;  and i t  may n e v e r  b e  more t h a n  a  g o a l .  
So t h e  p a r a l l e l  i s  n o t  p e r f e c t ,  But I b e l i e v e  t h e  ana logy  
i s  s t r o n g  enough t o  e n a b l e  u s  t o  draw t h y  f o l l o w i n g  
c o n c l u s i o n s :  ( i )  i f  ( 9 )  t o  ( 1 7 )  show t h a t  n a t u r a l  numbers 
do  n o t  e x i s t ,  (9"') t o  ( 1 7 t t ' )  show t h a t  E n g l i s h  e x p r e s s i o n s  
do  n o t  e x i s t ,  and,  ( t h e  weaker c o n c l u s i o n )  (ii) i f  n a t u r a l  
numbers are n o t  " c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s 1 '  (wha tever  t h i s  may 
amount t o )  n e i t h e r  a r e  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  E n g l i s h .  
By now t h e  r e a d e r  may have l o s t  t r a c k  o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e  argument .  So p e r h a p s  we s h o u l d  d o  some r e v i e x i n g ,  
and t a k e  s t o c k  o f  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e a c h e d  s o  f a r .  
F i r s t  we saw a p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  B e n a c e r r a f t s  argument 
t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  s e t s  -- viz., (1) t o  < 5 ) *  I n  t r y i n g  
t o  e x t e n d  t h e  argument  t o  show t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  
a t  a l l ,  as B e n a c e r r a f  c l a imed  c o u l d  be done,  we saw t h a t  
i n d e e d  numbers a r e  n e i t h e r  e x p r e s s i o n s  n o r  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s .  
But ,  s i n c e  i t  canno t  be  shown t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  numbers,  
a t  b e s t  t h i s  shows t h a t  numbers canno t  be u r e d u c e d t l  t o  
a n y t h i n g  e l s e ,  as i t  were,  and  n o t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  
a t  a l l ,  Hence B e n a c e r r a f l s  f i r s t  argument begs  t h e  
q u e s t i o n .  
We t h e n  d i s c u s s e d  whether  t h e  oddness  a t t a c h e d  t o  
c l a i m i n g  ' 4 3  # J u l i u s  C a e s a r 1 ,  f o r  example,  s h o u l d  be  t a k e n  
as e v i d e n c e  f o r  t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s .  
Because i f  numbers are o b j e c t s ,  t h e n  i t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  
i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  43 # J u l i u s  C a e s a r ,  and t h e r e  shou ld  be  
n o t h i n g  q u e e r  abou t  s a y i n g  s o .  But c l e a r l y  t h e r e  i s  some- 
t h i n g  q u e e r  abou t  such a c l a i m .  If i t  were u n s e m a n t i c a l ,  
as B e n a c e r r a f  c l a i m s ,  t h e n  t h a t  would go a  I ~ n g  way towards  
a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  t h e  oddness .  However t h i s  s o l u t i o n  i s  
' ,  
s t r i k i n g l y  a t  v a r i a n c e  w i t h  o t h e r  c l a i m s  ' ~ e n a c e r r a f  makes. 
Nor i s  i t  t h e  o n l y  s o l u t i o n ;  we saw t h e  s k e t c h  o f  a  r i v a l  
s t o r y  t h a t  a c c o u n t s  e q u a l l y  well f o r  t h e  oddness  f a c t o r ,  
b u t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  which such  s t a t e m e n t s  have t r u t h  v a l u e s .  
Another  argument  f o r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  numbers 
a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  seemed t o  be  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  p a s s a g e  I 
numbered ( 9 )  t o  ( I T ) ,  ( ll), f o r  example,  b e g i n s :  "There- 
f o r e  numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l  b e c a u ~ e , , . ~ ~ .  We n o t e d  
of t h e  c l a i m s  made t h e r e i n  t h a t  some o f  t h e  more i m p o r t a n t  
o n e s ,  l i k e  ( l a ) ,  ( l g ) ,  and ( 2 0 ) ,  were pr ima f a c i e  f a l s e ,  
b u t  seemed a t  least  somewhat p l a u s i b l e  from t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  
o f  t h e  p u r e  number8 t h e o r i s t .  I n  h i s / h e r  c a p a c i t y  a s  a  
number t h e o r i s t ,  ( s ) h e  m i g h t  r e a s o n a b l y  be concerned mere ly  
w i t h  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  t h e  numbers b e a r  t o  e a c h  o t h e r ,  and 
p r o p e r t i e s  d e r i v e d  from s u c h  r e l a t i o n s .  T h i s ,  a s  opposed 
t o  ' ' a c c i d e n t a l "  p r o p e r t i e s  of numbers t h a t  c o n c e r n ,  f o r  
example, p l a n e t a r y  s c i e n t i s t s  ( l i k e  "be ing  t h e  number o f  
moons o f  S a t u r n u ) ,  o r  even t h e  number t h e o r i s t  a c t i n g  i n  
a d i f f e r e n t  c a p a c i t y  ( l i k e  ' 'being t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  o n e ' s  
i n c m e  t h a t  may be  d e p o s i t e d  i n  a n  IRA a c c o u n t  t a x - f r e e 1 ' ) .  
I n s t e a d  o f  p r o c e e d i n g  t o  a n  e v a l u a t i o n  of  ( 9 )  - ( l 7 ) ,  
though,  we c o n s t r u c t e d  ( 9 ' )  - ( I T ' ) ,  a s e t - t h e o r e t i c  
v e r s i o n  o f  ( 9 )  - ( 1 7 ) .  It looked  as p l a u s i b l e  a s  ( 9 )  - 
( 1 7 ) .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c l a i m s  ( 1 8 : ) ,  ( l g l ) ,  
and  ( 2 0 ' )  were s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p u r e  
set t h e o r i s t  might  be concerned  s o l e l y  w i t h  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  
t h e  sets  ( s ) h e  s t u d i e s  b e a r  t o  e a c h  o t h e r ,  and p r o p e r t i e s  
' ,  
d e r i v e d  t h e r e f r o m .  L ike  t h e  number t h e o r i s t ,  ( s ) h e  i s  
n o t  concerned  w i t h  " a c c i d e n t a l 1 I  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  se ts ,  l i k e  
Ifbeing t h e  se t  o f  p l a n e t s  i n  t h e  s o l a r  sys tem beyond t h e  
o r b i t s  o f  P l u t o  and Neptunev o r  " b e i n g  khe same s i z e  a s  t h e  
- -.. 
s e t  o f  Americans who d o n ' t  own a TVn. 
Two q u e s t i o n s  t h e n  a r o s e .  F i r s t ,  a r e  ( 9 )  - ( 1 7 )  and 
( 9 ' )  - ( 1 7 ' )  d e f i n i t e l y  a n a l o g o u s ,  s o  t h a t  i f  t h e  fo rmer  
show t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s ,  t h e  l a t t e r  show t h a t  
s e t s  a r e  riot o b j e c t s ?  They a p p e a r s d  t o  be ,  b u t  t h e  m a t t e r  
seemed c o n t i n g e n t  on what ,  p r e c i s e l y ,  a n  a b s t r a c t  a s  
opposed t o  a c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e  i s ;  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  whether  
t h e r e  i s  some p r i n c i p l e d  d i s t i n c t i o n  whereby t h e  s t a n d a r d  
model of  s e t  t h e o r y  i s  a c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e  b u t  t h e  s t a n d a r d  
model o f  a r i t h m e t i c  i s  a mere a b s t r a c t  one .  Second ly ,  do 
t h e y ,  o r  d o e s  one o f  them, show t h a t  numbers and /o r  s e t s  
do n o t  e x i s t ?  T h i s  q u e s t i o n  a l s o  h i n g e s ,  even more o b v i o u s l y ,  
on what a n  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  i s .  B e n a c e r r a f  d o e s  n o t  
s a y  much a b o u t  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e s ,  and what he  d o e s  s a y  
l e a d s  t o  problems,  f o r  him, w i t h  r e l a t i o n s .  T h i s  prompted 
u s  t o  examine i n s t e a d  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e .  
One c o n s t r u a l  t h a t  looked  p r o m i s i n g  was t h a t  o r  a  s t r u c t u r e  
whose domain c o n s i s t s  o f  c c n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  While p h y s i c a l  
o b j e c t s  seem l i k e  i d e a l  c a n d i d a t e z  f o r  t h e  j o b ,  such  
c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  composed o f  them canno t  be  what 
B e n a c e r r a f  had i n  mind, s i n c e  t h e r e  a r e  n o t  enough o f  
them t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  e x h i b i t s  t h e  a b s t r a c t  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  a r i t h m e t i c .  E x p r e s s i o n s  seemed l i k e  good 
' I  
c a n d i d a t e s  t o o ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  v iew o f  B e n a c e r r a f r s  d e s i r e  
t o  l e t  " t h e  sequence  o f  number words1' pe r fo rm t h e  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h c  n a t u r a l  numbers.  But ,  even i f  B e n a c e r r a f  had 
e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  mind as c o n c l e t e  o b j e c t s ,  w e  saw t h a t  t h e y  
a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  him f o r  u s e  as s u c h .  Because some 
o f  t h e  t h i n g s  e x p r e s s i o n s  might  b e ,  such  as s e q u e n c e s ,  
c a n n o t  p l a u s i b l y  be  c o n s i d e r e d  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  i f  numbers 
1 and  s e t s  c a n n o t .  And b e c a u s e  i f  ( 9 )  - ( 1 7 )  show t h a t  
numbers a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s ,  t h e n  ( 9 " )  - (17")  and ( g 1 I 1 )  - 
( 1 7 l V 1 )  t o g e t h e r  show t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( o r  i m p o r t a n t  
v a r i e t i e s  t h e r e o f )  a r e  n o t  o b j e c t s ,  So t h e r e f o r e  i t  
canno t  r e a s o n a b l y  be  u rged  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  c o n c r e t e  
o b j e c t s .  
Hence n e i t h e r  numbers,  s e t s ,  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  no r  
e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  t h a t  could  comprise t h e  
domain f o r  a ' ' concrete  s t r u c t u r e "  t h a t  e x h i b i t s  t h e  
a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a r i t h m e t i c .  T h i s  does  no t  exhaus t  
t h e  ontological~posslbilities f o r  what could  comprise t h e  
domain of  such a s t r u c t u r e .  But i n  r u l i n g  o u t  some of  
t h e  most obvious  and d e s i r a b l e  c a n d i d a t e s ,  i t  sugges t s  
t h a t ,  whether o r  no t  c h e r e  a r e  any c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  
a t  a l l ,  t h e r e  a r e  no c o n c r e t e  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  e x h i b i t  t h e  
a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a r i t h m e t i c ,  Th i s  i n  t u r n  makes it 
seem l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e r e  could  be no n o n - t r i v i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between c o n c r e t e  and a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  would 
suppor t  ( 9 )  - (17 )  and t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  numbers a r e  
no t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l ,  But even i f  such a d i s t i n c t i o n  cou ld  
be found, i t  would probably  a l s o  suppor t  ( 9 ' )  - ( I T t ) ,  
(9" )  - ( I T u ) ,  and ( 9 l t 1 )  - ( l 7 " l ) ,  t he reby  showing t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  no s e t s  o r  e x p r e s s i o n s  e i t h e r .  
I t h i n k  it  f a i r  t o  conclude t h a t  ( 9 )  - (I?'), 
B e n a c e r r a f T s  second and l as t  e x p l i c i t  mgument i n  "What 
Number Could Not Be1' f o r  t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  numbers a r e  
n o t  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l ,  f a i l s  t o  show t h a t  numberbs a r e  no t  
I 
o b j e c t s  a t  a l l .  
CHAPTER 11: SOME RIVALS OF THE POPULAR VIEW 
After a s h o r t  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t h a t  w i l l ,  I hope,  
g i v e  u s  some p e r s p e c t i v e  on t h e  p o p u l a r  view, and i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  on a  way o f  e x t e n d i n g  i t  i n  l i g h t  o f  
c o n c l u s i o n s  r e a c h e d  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  c h a p t e r ,  I 
c o n s i d e r  a number o f  t h e  p o p u l a r  v i e w ' s  l l r i v a l s l l .  The 
r i v a l s  c o n s i d e r e d  were p u t  fo rward  by G i l b e r t  Harmsn, 
N i c h o l a s  White ,  and B e n a c e r r a f  h i m s e l f ,  l a r g e l y  i n  
r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  n e g a t i v e  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e a c h e d  I n  "What 
Numbers Could Not Be". They w i l l  be p r e s e n t e d ,  c r i t i c i z e d  
and ,  most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  compared w i t h  t h e  p o p u l a r  v iew,  
e s p e c i a l l y  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y .  
R e c a l l  t h a t  t h e  p o p u l a r  v iew c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  t h e s e s :  
(1) There3 are .numbers . 
(11) Numbers a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  
(111) There  a r e  r - a t h e m a t i c a l  e n t i t i e s .  
( I V )  * T h e r e  a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  
( V >  A r i t h m e t i c  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  t r ~ e  o r  f a l s e .  
It i s  s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  we t a l k  a s  though t h e r e  
a r e  numbers, I c l a i m e d ,  and t h a t  whatever  e l s e  t h i s  may 
i n v o l v e ,  i t  i n v o l v e s  a t  least  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h e s e s :  
(VI) We quantify over numbers. 
(VII) Numerals like '2' in ' 2  + 2 = 4' and number 
words like 'two1 in 'Two is a prime numberr are 
singular terms. 
(VIII) The surface structures of ' 2  t 2 = 4l and 'Two 
is a prime numberr are identical to their logical 
structures. 
(IX) The appropriate semantics for statements such as 
' 2  + 2 = 4 '  and 'Two is a prime number' are 
referential semantics. 
Frege took the nature of number to be problematic, 
and tried to reduce arithmetic to logic. In his account 
the number 5 turns out to be the class of all n-membered 
. 0 - 
classes. But his class theory was not consistent. 
Russellls account of natural numbar is muc? the same as 
Fregefs except that according to his type theory there 
turns out to be a different class of things that are the 
natural numbers for each type. Although apparently 
consistent, Russellls theory lacked the simplicity of 
Zermelols theory, wherein 0 = 0, and n + 1 = En], or of 
Von Neumannls, wherein n t 1 = n u [n]. 
Each of these accounts is consistent with theses 
(I) - (V); sets and classes, after all, are abstract 
objects. Thus each represents a possible extension of the 
popular view, But as Benacerraf argues, this very profusion 
of nonextensionally equivalent accounts cases suspicion 
i 
upon t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  a c c o u n t ' s  c l a i m  
t o  b e i n g  t h e  c o r r e c t  one .  The Frege-Russe l l  accoun t  h a s  
f 
a c e r t a i n  a p p e a l ,  a d m i t t e d l y ,  b u t ,  as B e n a c e r r a f  r emarks ,  
" t h e r e  seems l i t t l e  t o  recommend i t  o v e r ,  s a y ,  E r n i e ' s 1 '  
( WNCNB , p .  5 8 ) .  A f t e r  a l l ,  " E r n i e l s "  a c c o u n t  f i g u r e s  
e l e g a n t l y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  more p o p u l a r  ZF s e t  
t h e o r y  . 
So i n  showing, by (1) - ( 5 ) ,  t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  
se ts ,  B e n a c e r r a f  t e r m i n a t e d  a l o n g  t r a d i t i o n ,  one t h a t  
began w i t h  Frege  and c o n t i n u e d  t h r o u g h  t o  Q u i n e .  ( Q u i n e t s  
p o s i t i o n  w i l l  be gone i n t o  i n  t h e  c h a p t e r  on Q u i n e . )  I n  
t r y i n g  t o  e x t e n d  B e n a c e r r a f ' s  (1) - ( 5 )  argument w e  saw 
4 5  t h a t  ( 5  ) and ( 5  ) a r e  ' t r u e .  
i f  
4 ( 5  ) Numbers a r e  n o t  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s .  
5  ( 5  ) Numbers are n o t  e x p r e s s i o n s .  
These s u b c o n c l u s i o n s  do n o t  j u s t i f y  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  
B e n a c e r r a f  wanted t o  r e a c h ,  t h a t  "numbers 2ould n o t  be 
o b j e c t s  a t  a l l f1 ,  I a r g u e d ,  b e c a u s e  t a  r e a c h  t h a t  c o n c l u s i o n  
u t i l i z i n g  t h e s e  a rguments ,  one would have t o  show t h a t  
f o r  e v e r y  t y p e  o f  o b j e c t  0 t h e r e  i s ,  
i ( 5  ) Numbers are n o t  0 ' s  ( i . e . ,  no number i s  an  0 ) .  
But o f  c o u r s e  s i n c e  i t  canno t  be  shown t h a t  numbers a r e  
n o t  numbers,  t h e  argument  was u n ~ u c c e s s f u l ;  t o  work, i t  
had t o  p resuppose  t h a t  numbers do  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a  t y p e  
o f  o b j e c t  a t  a l l .  
A c t u a l l y ,  i n  view o f  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t r a d i t i o n  
from Frege  t o  Q u i n e ,  t h e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  t h a t  B e n a c e r r a f  
makes d o e s  n o t  seem t o  be  a s  p a t e n t l y  q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g  
as I have mace i t  o u t  t o  be .  S t a t e d  more g e n e r o u s l y ,  
t h e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  seems t o  be t ha t  
( 2 1 )  Numbers are n o t  - s u i  g e n e r i s .  They do n o t  
c o n s t i t u t e  a n  o n t o l o g i c a l l y  i r r e d u c i b l e  s o r t  
of o b j e c t  . If numbers are o b j e c t s  ( a s  
opposed t o  p r o p e r t i e s  o r  r e l a t i o n s )  t h e n  t h e y  
b e l o n g  t o  some " o t h e r t 1  c a t e g o r y  -- l i k e  se t s  -- 
t h a t  p r ima  f a c i e  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  them. 
The r e a l  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  B e n a c e r r a f l s  argument l a y  i n  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  ( 2 1 )  goes  unargued f o r  (as  was i n d i c a t e d  
a b o v e ) .  It i s  n o t  my i n t e n t i o n  h e r e  t o  manufac tu re  
arguments  B e n a c e r r a f  might  have produced t o  s u p p o r t  ( 2 1 )  
( p a r t i c u l a r l y  as I h a v e n ' t  a c l u e  as t o  what t h e y  might  
b e ) .  My o b j e c t  i s  t o  d e f e n d  t h e  p o p u l a r  view a g a i n s t  
t h e  arguments  B e n a c e r r a f  h a s  a c t u a l l y  produced.  I b r i n g  
up t h e  m a t t e r  s o  as t o  show i n  what d i r e c t i o n  t h e  p o p c l a r  
view may be  e x t e n d e d ,  , i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  B e n a c e r r a f l s  
a rguments  i n  "What Numbers Could Not Be", and t h e  p r e c e d i n g  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  them. The direction i s  t h i s .  We can  
s t a t e  a f u r t h e r  t h e s i s  t h a t  we may r e g a r d  as b e i n g  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  p o p u l a r  v iew:  
( 2 2 )  Numbers a r e  n e i t h e r  s e t s ,  n o r  c l a s s e s ,  n o r  
p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s ,  n o r  e x p r e s s i o n s .  
(22) may be  e x t e n d e d ,  t o o  -- e . g . ,  by t h e  words ' n o r  e v e n t s v .  
(I t  i s  f a i r l y  obv ious ,  I t h i n k ,  how t h a t  argument would 
g o . ) .  The p o i n t  i s  t o  t r y  t o  r e f i n e  t h e  p o p u l a r  view, 
even as i t  i s  b e i n g  defended.  And I am c l a i m i n g  t h a t  ( 2 2 )  
r e p r e s e n t s  a  r e a s o n a b l e  f i r s t  e x t e n s i o n .  It i s  suppor ted  
by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  R u s s e l l ,  h imse l f  an  advoca t e  o f  what 
Benacer ra f  c a l l s  " the  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  f avo red  view1' ( p .  6 2 )  
( and  hence  o f  ( 2 1 ) ) ,  f e l t  t h e  need t o  de f end  h i s  i d e n t i f i -  
c a t i o n  o f  numbers w i t h  c l a s s e s .  Witness  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
To r e g a r d  a number as a c l a s s  o f  c l a s s e s  
must appea r ,  a t  f i r s t  s i g h t ,  a  wholly 
i n d e f e n s i b l e  pa radox ,  Thus Peano 
[Formula i re  & Mathdmat i q u e s  , 1901,  
s e c .  321 remarks t h a t  I twe canno t  i d e n t i f y  
t h e  number o f  [a c l a s s ]  a w i t h  t h e  c l a s s  
o f  c l a s s e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  [ F e e ,  t h e  c l a s s  
o f  c l a s s e s  similar t o  a], f o r  the.,se 
o b j e c t s  have d i f f e r e n t  p r o p e r t i e s .  'l' He 
does  n o t  t e l l  u s  what t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  
a r e .  , , P robab ly  i t  appeared t o  him 
immedia te ly  e v i d e n t  t h a t  a number i s  
n o t  a c l a s s  o f  ~ l a s s e s . 3 ~  
Having f u r t h e r  r e f i n e d  t h e  popu l a r  view, o r ,  more 
s t r i c t l y  speaking a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p o s i t i o n  based upon 
i t ,  and no t ed  some n o n - a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  i t ,  l e t  u s  proceed 
t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  ( o r  a number o f  t hem) .  
To p r e v e n t  any mi sunde r s t and ing ,  l e t  m e  r e i t e r a t e  t h e  
basis upon which r i v a l  a c c o u n t s  w i l l  be e v a l u a t e d .  The 
charge  t h a t  i n i t i a t e d  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  was t h a t  t h e  
32. Ber t r and  R u s s e l l ,  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Mathematics  (New 
York: W . W .  Norton & Co., 1938) p.  115.  
p o p u l a r  view was u n t e n a b l e ,  because  it made i t  i m p o s s i b l e  
t o  accoun t  f o r  o u r  knowledge of a r i t l m e t i c .  The b a s i c  
i d e a  was t h a t  i f  numbers are n o n - s p a t i a l  and non-temporal  
( i . e .  a b s t r a c t )  o b j e c t s ,  w e  canno t  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  them t o  
l e a r n  abou t  them. So r i v a l  a c c o u n t s  w i l l  be  compared 
w i t h  an  e y e  towards  s e e i n g  how s u c c e s s f u l l y  t h e y  h a n d l e  
t h i s  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  problem. Other  b a s e s  o f  comparison 
a r e  p o s s i b l e ;  e , g . ,  o n e s  i n v o l v i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  
o n t o l o g i c a l  economy. That  i s ,  one might  b e  concerned  t o  
f i n d  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  number, p e r h a p s  as p a r t  o f  a  l a r g e r  
t h e o r y ,  t h a t  i n v o l v e s  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o v e r  e i t h e r :  
a )  t h e  s m a l l e s t  number o f  e n t i t i e s ,  
o r  b )  t h e  s m a l l e s t  number o f  s o r t s  o f  e n t i t i e s ;  
w h i l s t  conforming t o :  
c )  phenomenologica l  e x p e r i e n c e ,  
o r  d )  p h y s i c s ,  
o r  e )  r e l i g i o u s  dogma, 
o r  f )  o r d i n a r y  l anguage  u s a g e  
among o t h e r  t h i n g s .  O n t o l o g i c a l  economy, per E, means 
n o t h i n g  t o  u s  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t  -- u n l e s s  i t  c u r e s ,  
o r  e a s e s ,  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  problem we a r e  c o n f r o n t i n g .  
T h i s  may l e n d  a n  a i r  o f  u n f a i r n e s s  t o  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  
s i n c e  no doubt  n o t  a l l  t h e  a u t h o r s  whose a c c o u n t s  we w i l l  
c o n s i d e r  were a iming  t o  s o l v e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  problems,  
Yet t h e r e  i s  a p o i n t  a t  which t h e  i s s u e s  b l u r .  T h i s  can  
b e s t  be s e e n  by l o o k i n g  a t  o u r  f i r s t  r i v a l  accourit  -- 
Harman I s . 
2.Harmants  Account 
Harmants  a ccoun t ,  which w i l l  be quo ted  i n  i t s  
e n t i r e t y ,  i s  g i v e n  i n  a one-page n o t e .  33 It begins: 
To s a y  t h a t  numbers can  be i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  
s e t s  i s  n o t . . . t o  say e i t h e r  t h a t  numbers 
a r e  sets  (which i s  t o o  s t z o n g )  o r  t h a t  
-
number t h e o r y  h a s  a  model i n  set  t h e o r y  
(which i s  t o 6  weak).  It i s  t o  s a y ,  
r a t h e r ,  t h a t  any w-sequence o f  d i f f e r e n t  
sets  ( o r  o t h e r  t h i n g s )  can be used as 
t h e  numbers. 
What does  Harmac mean by t h i s ?  S u r e l y  no t  t h a t  I would 
be unders tood  by t h e  g r o c e r  i f  ( s ) h e  asked  how many pounds 
of mushrooms I wanted, and I r e p l i e d :  ' ' the u n i t  s e t  o f  
t h e  u n i t  set  o f  t h e  n u l l  s e t f f ,  because  t h e  u n i t  s e t  o f  
' ,  
t h e  u n i t  set  o f  t h e  n u l l  s e t  i s  t h e  second member o f  
some w-sequence. The c l a im  made i n  t h e  l a s t  s en t ence  
o f  t h e  quo ted  pa r ag raph  i s  more t h a n  a l i t t l e  s i m i l a r  t o  
B e n a c e r r a f t s  c l a i m  t h a t  "Under o u r  a n a l y s i s ,  any system 
of o b j e c t s ,  se ts  o r  n o t ,  t h a t  forms a r e c u r s i v e  p r o g r e s s t o n  
must be  adequa t eu  (WNCNB,  p .  6 8 ) .  D i s cus s ion  of  j u s t  
what i t  might mean w i l l  be postponed u n t i l  l a t e r .  Note 
f o r  the,moment t h e  r e f e r e n c e  t o  sequences  o f  s e t s ,  
Apparen t ly  Harman would a f f i r n ,  (111) and ( I V ) .  Cont inuing 
w i t h  t h a t  Harman s a y s :  
With t h i s  i n  mind, we might c o n s i d e r  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  h y p o t h e s i s  c x i c e r n i n g  t h e  
l o g i c a l  grammar o f  t a l k  abou t  numbers: 
numerals  a r e  b e s t  ana lyzed  as f u n c t i o n  
eymbols r a t h e r  t h a n  names. 
33. f t I d e n t i f y i n g  Numbers," Ana ly s i s  35 (1974 ) :12 .  
It a p p e a r s  t h e n  t h a t  he would deny (1TIII) ; he t h e r e f o r e  
owes u s  a n  accoun t  o f  what ! ' the l o g i c a l  grammar1' of  a  
statement such  a s  ' 5  + 7  = 1 2 '  i s .  Not unaware o f  t h i s  
d e b t ,  he wri tes :  
Knowing t h a t  5 t 7 = 1 2 ,  we know t h a t  f o ?  
any sequence  s, t h e  sum o p e r a t i o n  f o r  
t h a t  sequence  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  f i f t h  and 
s e v e n t h  members o f  t h e  sequence  y i e l d s  t h e  
t w e l f t h  membzr. 
T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  Harman wants  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  l o g i c a l  
grammar ~f ' 5  t 7 = 12' i s  g i v e n ,  i n  E n g l i s h ,  by  ( 2 3 ) :  
( 2 3 )  For  any 2, i f  - s i s  a n  w-sequence t h e n  t h e  sum 
o p e r a t i o n  f o r  - s a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  5 t h  agd 7 t h  members 
y i e l d s  t h e  1 2 t h  member. 
1 ,  
( 2 3 )  r e p r e s e n t s  o n l y  one of  s e v e r a l  ways o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
Harman, as we w i l l  s e e  s h o r t l y ,  a l t h o u g h  I b e l i e v e  it 
i s  t h e  most s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  and  p l a u s i b l e  way. Yet t h i s  
a n a l y s i s ,  where in  ( 2 3 )  i s  khe a n a l y s a n s ,  d.oes n o t  work, 
as it s u b j e c t  - t o  t h e  -- same -- f a t a l  c b j e c t i m s  t h a t  . 
P h i l i p  K i t c h e r  brinp:, - a g a i n s l  Nicrlolas  W h i t e ' s  a n ~ l y s i s .  3 4 
I n  2 o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h i s  p o f n t ,  t h e  r s a d e r  may want t o  
note £,>I- hidherself the cimilarity of ( 2 3 )  ~ 5 t h  (30) on 
page 8 1  below, which i s  'Xhite's acalysis of ' 5  + 7 = 12'. I 
AlLhough K i t c h e r l s  objections apply equally well to 
3 4 .  P h i l i p  K i t c h e r .  ''The P l i g h t  o f  t h e  ? l a t o n i s t , l l  Nous 
12 .  ( & 9 7 8  ) : 119-136; and N i c h o l s s  Whi te ,  "What N'lmSors 
t h e  a n a l y s i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by ( 2 3 ) ,  s i n c e  i t  i s  White he 
b r i n g s  them a g a i n s t y d i s c u s s i o n  o f  them w i l l  be pos tpaned  
u n t i l  we get t o  W h i t e ' s  a c c o u n t ,  which i s  n e x t  a f t e r  
Harman ' s . 
So l e t  u s  c o n z i d e r  o t h e r  ways o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
Harman, I n  t h e  v e r y  n e x t  s e n t e n c e  ( a f t e r  t h e  l a s t  one 
q u o t e d  a b c v e )  he seems t o  s u g g e s t  a  d i f f e r e n t  a n a l y s i s :  
We can make t t i s  more e x p l i c i t  by w r i t i n g  
5, tS 7, = 12,. 
Here ' 5 ' ,  ' 7 '  and ' 1 2 '  a r e  n o t  names b u t  
f u n c t i o n  symbols .  The l e t t e r  ' s t  names 
a sequence  and '5, '  names t h e  f i f t h  member 
o f  t h a t  sequence . . .  
T h i s  i s  s t r a n g e .  C l e a r l y  ' s f  d o e s  n o t  name a sequence .  
It i s  e i t h e r  a v a r i a b l e  o r  a s c h e m a t i c  l e t t e r .  So o u r  
I 
second  i n t e r p r e t a t i o h  o f  Harman i s  t h a t  k.e i s  a d v o c a t i n g  
t n e  f o l l o w i n g  a n a l y s i z :  
( 2 4 )  The l o g i c a l  grammar o f  ' 5  t 7  = 1 2 '  i s ,  o r  i s  
# I 
b e s t  r e p r e s e n t e d  by, '5,  ts 7, = 1 2 , ' .  
- But ' 5  t 7  = 1 2 '  i s  a t r u e  s e n t e n c e ,  whereas  '5,  +, 7, - 
12,' h a s  no t r u t h  v a l v e ;  i t  i s  a  schema. Are we t o  under-  t 
s t a n d  t h a t  Harman t h i ~ k s  ' 5  t 7 = 1 2 '  i s  mere ly  a  schema 
t h e n ?  I d o n ' t  know what Harman means t o  be  g i v i n s ,  i n  
g i v i n g  a n  a n a l y s i s ,  b u t  presumably i t  i s  something t h a t  
i s  e q u i v a l e n t ,  i n  sone  s e n s e ,  t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l ,  a l t h o u g h  
more p e r s p i c u o u s  from t h e  p o i n t  of view o f  g rammat ica l  
s t r u c t u r e .  So t h a t  i f  ' 5  t 7  = 1 2 '  i s  t o  be a n a l y z e d  
as a  schema, i t  i s  i n  some s e n s e  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a  schema, 
, 
and h a s  no t r u t h  v a l u e .  Does Harman mean t o  be  deny ing  
(V)? I doub t  i t ,  b e c a u s e  h e  c l a i m s  t h a t  w e  know t h a t  
I 
5 + 7  = 1 2 ,  which suggesLs  t h a t  he  t h i n k s  i t  i s  t r u e .  
B e s i d e s ,  i f  he t h o u g h t  t h a t  ' 5  t 7 = 1 2 '  i s  n o t  t r u e ,  
why would he  b o t h e r  t o  a n a l y z e  i t  a t  a l l ?  There  i s  no 
a p p a r e n t  problem, i f  i t  i s  n o t  t r u e .  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  one 
need o n l y  accoun t  f o r  o u r  knowledge o f  s o - c a l l e d  
l l a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  a r i t h m e t i c 1 '  (which  i s  p r e c i s e l y  what 
H a r t r y  F i e l d  t r i e s  t o  do .  35) 
Pe rhaps ,  t h e n ,  ( 2 4 )  i s  n o t  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g  an  / 
a c t u a l  s t a t e m e n t ,  b u t  i s  a schema i t s e l f ,  t o  be  u n d e r s t o o d  
36. on  a  p a r  w i t h  t h i s  p a s s a g e  from The Theory of' Numbers . 
C o r o l l a r y  1 3 . 1  ( F e r m a t l s  ~ h e o r e m ) : , I f  p  i s  a  
p r ime ,  t h e n  
aP E a(rnod p ) .  
o f  c o u r s e  1 3 . 1  might  be lriewed a s  a n  a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  
a bona f i d e  s t a t e m e n t  b e g i n n i n g  w i t h  t h e  q u a n t i f i e r  
' F o r  any i n t e g e r  a , . . ' .  But 1 3 . 1  c a n  a l s o  be viewed a s  
a schema t h a t  y i e l d s  a t r u t h  when t h e  name o f  a n  i n t e g e r  
1s s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  l a 1 .  So u n d e r s t o o d ,  Harrnan1s schema 
( 2 4 )  ought  t o  y i e l d  o n l y  t r u t h s  when names o f  sequences  
a r e  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  I s 1 .  The f o l l o w i n g  i s  a n  example ,  
35, I n  S c i e n c e  Without  Numbers ( P r i n c e t o n ,  N . J . :  P r i n c e t o n  
U n i v e r s i t y  pres,. 
36. By Anthony A .  G i o i a ,  (Chicago : Markham P u b l i s h i n g  Co. , 
1970)  p .  4 0 .  
where ' z t  a b b r e c i a t e s  ' t h e  Zermelo sequence ,  0, { @ I ,  
Uf l I l ,  . m e :  
( 2 5 )  The l o g i c a l  grammar o f  ' 5  t 7  = 1 2 '  i s  ( o r  i s  
b e s t  r e p r e s e n t e d  by)  '5, t, 7, = 1 2 , l .  
(When r e a d  a l o u d  i t  might  sound l i k e  t h i s :  'The l o g i c a l  
grammar o f  ' 5  + 7 = 1 2 '  i s  ( o r  i s  b e s t  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y )  
' t h e  sum o p e r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  Zermelo sequence  a p p l i e d  t o  
t h e  f i f t h  and s e v e n t h  members i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  t w e l f t h  
member1.) .  ( 2 6 ) ,  t o o ,  s h o u l d  be  t r u e ,  where l v n l  
a b b r e v i a t e s  ' t h e  Von Neumann sequence ,  8 ,  ( 0 1 ,  {fl, { % I } ,  , . .  
( 2 6 )  The l o g i c a l  grammar o f  ' 5  + 7  = 1 2 l  i s  ( o r  i s  
- b e s t  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y )  
'5,, tVn 7vn - 1 2 v n 1 .  
These d i s p a r a t e  a n a l y s e s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  Harman g i v e  u s  some 
' 8  
c r i t e r i a  showing t h e i r  e q u i v a l e n c e  -- o r  s a y  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  no un ique  l o g i c a l  grammar. 
-- 
The t h i r d  and f i n a l  way I s h a l l  c o n s i d e r  o f  i n t e r -  
p r e t i n g  Harman i n c o r p o r a t e s  t h e  s c h e m a t i c  a s p e c t  o f  what 
he  s a y s ,  w i t h o u t  t h e  u n a t t r a c t i v e  consequence  t h a t  one 
seemingly  unambiguous s e n t e n c e ,  v i z . ,  l t 7 = 1 2 ' ,  h a s  
many seemingly  d i f f e r e n t  l o g i c a l  grammars. It i s  t h i s :  
/ ( 2 8 )  The l o g i c a l  grammar o f  ' 5  t 7  = 1 2 '  i s  ( o r  i s  
b e s t  r e p r e s e n t e d  by)  ( 2 9 ) .  
( 2 9 )  The r e s u l t  of r e p l a c i n g  I s1  by t h e  name o f  a n  
w-sequence of  s e t s  ( o r  o t h e r  t h i n g s )  i n  t h e  
schema: 
is always true. 
What a p p e a r s  t o  be a major  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  
i s  t h a t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  i t  ' 5  t 7 = 1 2 '  i s  r e a l l y  a  meta- 
m a t h e m a t i c a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  a m a t h e m a t i c a l  s t a t e m e n t .  I say  
l a p p e a r s f  because  a f o r m a l i s t  might  a r g u e  t h a t  t h i s  i n  
i t s e l f  i s  no d i f f i c u l t y  a t  a l l ,  b u t  i s  t o  be e x p e c t e d  i f  
one f o r s a k e s  t r a d i t i o n a l  m a t h e m a t i c a l  o b j e c t s .  But i s  
Harman a  f o r m a l i s t ?  The r e f e r e n c e  t o  w-sequences of  
s e t s  s u g g e s t s  n o t .  I n  f a c t ,  t h a t  t a k e s  us  t o  t h e  h e a r t  
o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y .  Here i s  t h e  remainder  o f  Harman1s 
I 
a r t i c l e .  t 
... b u t  we need n o t  suppose  t h a t  ' 5 '  by i t s e l f  
names a n y t h i n g .  It i s  t h e  ' f l  i n  ' f x l .  I n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  t o  s a y  t h a t  numerals  a r e  
f u n c t i o n  symbols  would n o t  be t o , s a y  t h a t  
t h e y  a r e  names o f  f u n c t i o n s .  They 'would  
n o t  be names at  a l l .  It f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e y  
would n o t  be  names o f  o b j e c t s  (which c o n f i r m s  
B e n a c e r r a f l s  c o n c l u s i o n  i n  "What Numbers 
Could Not B e f 1 . .  . ) . It a l s o  f o l l o w s  t h a t  
t h e y  would n o t  b e  names o f  o b j e c t s  t h a t  have 
e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s . . .  
It i s  f a i r l y  c l e a r ,  I t h i n k ,  t h a t  Harman would deny ( I )  
and (11), b u t  a c c e p t  (1111,  ( IV)  and ( V ) .  And pe rhaps  
it l o o k s  as though d o i n g  s o  s u c c e s s f u l l y  makes some 
headway o n ,  B e n a c e r r a f f s  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  problem. A f t e r  
a l l ,  some measure o f  o n t o l o g i c a l  economy would have been C 
a c h i e v e d  -- t h e r e  would be  no numbers t o  worry a b o u t  
anymore. There  would be o n l y  uw-sequances o f  s e t s  ( o r  
o t h e r  t h i n g s ) " ,  and ( p e r h a p s  i t  w i l l  be s a i d )  we had t o  
worry abou t  t h e s e  anyway. I 
I f i n d  such  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  unconv inc ing .  Suppose 
it wese p e r s u a s i v e l y  a rgued  t h a t  a n g e l s  a r e  p u r e  s p i r i t s  
and ,  as. such ,  a r e  i n s e n s i b l e .  It would n o t  l e s s e n  t h e  
problem, i n  my e s t i m ~ t i o n ,  i f  i t  were proved t h a t  Thrones ,  
Dominions, P r i r , c i p a l i t i e s ,  V i r t u e s  and Powers do n o t  
e x i s t ;  t h a t  c l a i m s  a b o u t  a n g e l s  r e q u i r e  o n l y  f o u r  o f  t h e  
n i n e  c h o i r s :  Archaag les ,  Angels ,  Seraphim and Cherubim, 
A number of g rounds  might  be advanced by someone 
a n x i o u s  t o  deny t h a t  t h e  comparison i s  a p t .  It might  be 
c la imed  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  n i n e  c h o i r s  o f  a n g e l s  may be  
e q u a l l y  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  ( i n ) a c c e s s i b l e ,  t h a t  i s  n o t  
s o  f o r  m a t h e m a t i c a l  e n t i t i e s .  But f o r  which mathemat ica l  
e n t i t i e s ,  and why n o t ?  Harman n p p e a l s  t o  w-sequences 
o f  -- se ts .  So pe rha?s  he  t h i n k s  t h a t  s e t s  a r e  e p i s t e m o l o g i -  
tally more a c c e s s i b l e  t h a n  numbers. But t h i s  r e q u i r e s  
a n  argument  because  even i f  t r u e ,  i t  i s  h a r d l y  s e l f -  
e v i d e n t .  Cons ide r  Q u i n e f s  remark:  
It w i l l  p e r h a p s  b e  f e l t  t h a t  any s e t - t h e o r e t i c  
e x p l i c a t i o n  o f  na tu ra .1  number i s  a t  b e s t  a 
cake  o f  obscurum per o b s c u r i u s ;  t h a t  a l l  
e x p l i c a t i o n s  must assume someth ing ,  and t h e  
n a t u r a l  numbers t h e m s e l v e s  a r e  a n  a d m i r a b l e  
a s sumpt ion  t o  s t a r t  w i t h .  I must a g r e e  
t h a t  a c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  s e t s  and s e t  t h e o r y  
from n a t u r a l  numbers and a r i t h m e t i c  would 
be  far  mor d e s i r a b l e  t h a n  t h e  f a m i l i a r  
o p p o s i t e .  3 Li 
Like Harman, B e n a c e r r a f  a l s o  seems t o  t h i n k ,  i n  "What 
Numbers Could Not B e f 1 ,  t h a t  s e t s  a r e  ep i s t emol  o g i c a l l y  
37.  O n t o l o g i c a l  R e l a t i v i t y  and O t h e r  Essays  (New York: 
Columbia U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  l m ) 3 3 .  
more a c c e s s i b l e  t h a n  numbers. But as w e  saw i n  c h a p t e r  
one,  a rguments  l i k e  - h i s  a g a i n s t  numbers would work e q u a l l y  
w e l l  a g a i n s t  s e t s .  So no s u p p o r t  c a n  b e  e x p e c t e d  from 
t h a t  q u a r t e r .  
Another  argument t h a t  might  be g i v e n  i n  Harman1s 
b e h a l f  i s  t h a t  t h e  se ts  Harman r e f e r s  t o  a r e  s e t s  o f  
everyday o b j e c t s .  These a r e  t h o u g h t  by some t o  be  l e s s  
a b s t r a c t  ( and  hence less p r o b l e m a t i c a l )  t h a n  e i t h e r  
p u r e  s e t s  o r  numbers,  because  a t  l e a s t  we a r e  f a m i l i a r  
w i t h  t h e  t h i n g s  t h e y  are s e t s  o f .  For  example,  i t  might  
be  u r g e d  t h a t  Snow W h i t e ' s  a c q u a i n t a n c e  w i t h  e a c h  o f  
S l e e p y ,  Sneezy,  Dopey, Doc, Yappy, Grumpy and B a s h f u l  
makes i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  h e r  t o  5e familiar w i t h  t h e  - s e t  
o f  dwarves.  But s u r e l y  t h e  same f a c t  makes it p o s s i b l e  
f o r  h e r  t o  be  familiar w i t h  t h e  number o f  dwarves t o o :  
B e s i d e s ,  Harman seems t o  want t h e r e  t o  be wLmang s e t s ,  
But i f  t h e r e  are o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many everyday o b j e c t s ,  
as seems l i k e l y ,  t h e n  t h e r e  w i l l  be  a n l y  f i n i t e l y  many 
sets o f  them (6ecauqe l f  2 i s  f i n i t e ,  t h e  c a r d i n a l i t y  of 
l' t h e  power s e t  o f  q, 2-, i s  a l s o  f i n i t e . j .  
I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  i t  might  be  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  
Harman does  n o t  need w-sequences o f  s e t s ;  w - s e q ~ e n c e s  of  
a n y t h i n g  w i l l  do .  But t h e  same s o r t s  of d i f f i c u l t i e s  seem 
t~ emerge h e r e .  If t h e  w-sequences a r e  supposed t o  be 
a b s t r a c t  b u t  h a r m l e s s l y  s o ,  because  composed o f  c o n c r e t e  
objects, the risk is run of there not being any w-sequences 
at all, because there may be only finitely many concrete 
objects, (In chapter one above we saw this problem 
arise in connection with Benacerrafls claim that there 
are only "concrete structures that exhibit tne abstract 
structure of arIthmeticl1.). If, on the other hand, 
w-sequences are full-fledged abstract entities of pure 
mathematics, then they would seem no more epistemologically 
accessible than numbers. So llanalyzing awayv1 numbers 
in terms of' them p~esents us with no epistemological 
gain. 
What thei~ is Harman to do? As I see it, the only 
hope of consistently extending his position so as to 
procure something philosophically acceptable lies in 
analyzing the logical grammar of statements abaut w-sequences 
so that w-sequences, $00, get "analyzed away1'. But 
there is very good reason to think that this cannot be 
done, and we will now look at White's article and Kitcherla 
critique af it to see why this is so. 
3. White1 s Account 
In "What Numbers ~rell' Nicholas P. White argues 
that 
38, Synthese 27 (1974): 111-124. 
If  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  a model o f  a r i t h m e t i c  
i n  s e t  t h e o r y  was e v e r  a  r e a s o n  f o r  
i d e n t i f y i n g  numbers w i t h  s e t s ,  t h e n  I 
m a i n t a i n ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  m u l t i p l e  s e t -  
t h e o r e t i c  models  o f  a r i t h m e t i c  shou ld  
prompt u s ,  n o t  t o  s a y  w i t h  B e n a c e r r a f  
t h a t  numbers canno t  be s e t s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  
t o  scggsst t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  m u l t i p l e  f u l l -  
blown s e r i e s  o f  n a t u r a l  numbers. Thus,  
f o r  example,  i n s t e z d  of  t h e r e  b e i n g  o n l y  
one t h r e e ,  t h e r e  a r e  a f t e r  a l l  many t h r e e s ,  
and many t h i r t y - s e v e n s ,  and s o  o n . . .  
The first s t e p  o f  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  t o  
suppose  t h a t  we c a n ,  i n  our  a r i t h m e t i c a l  
d i s c o u r s e ,  r e p l a c e  o u r  n u m e r i c a l  s i n g u l a r  
t e r m s ,  such  as ' t h r e e 1 ,  by a tomic  g e n e r a l  
t e r m s ,  such  as ' i s  a  t h r e e f ,  o r  ' t h r e e s f .  
( P .  1 1 2 )  
White i s  n o t  d e n y i ~  ( V I I )  s o  much a s  recommending 
t h a t  we revamp o u r  a r i t h m e t i c a l  speech  h a b i t s  t o  r e f l e c t  
t h e  f a c t s  (much t h e  way, he s a y s ,  a p e r s o n  who concluded 
t h a t  t h e  Homeric ?oems were w r i t t e n  by s e v e r a l  peop le  
might  c l a i m  t h a t  " t h e r e  t u r n  o u t  t o  have been s e v e r a l  
HomersH ( p ,  1 1 3 ) ) .  What does  t h e  revamping c o n s i s t  i n ?  
The i n t u i t i v e  i d e a  behind t h e  s u g g e s t i c n  i s  
t h a t  t o  be a t h r e e ,  e - g . ,  i s  t o  s t a n d  i n  a 
c e r t a i n  p o s i t i o n  ( v i z . ,  f o u r t h ,  c o u n t i n g  
z e r o )  i n  some p r o g r e s s i o n  o r  o t h e r .  P l a i n l y ,  
what we t h e r e f o r e  want i s  a  r e l a t i v i z e d  n o t i o n  
o f  what i t  i s  t o  b e  a  t h r e e  -- r e l a t i v i z e d ,  
t h a t  i s ,  t o  p r o g r e s s i o n s .  ( p .  1 1 3 )  
So ' x  - i s  a z e r o  i n  p1 i s  e x p l a i n e d  a s  ' t h e r e  a r e  
no e l e m e n t s  o f  p- which p r e c e d e  - x i n  p l ;  ' x  - i s  a  1 i n  p1 
a s  ' t h e r e  i s  a  p r e c u r s o r ,  x, of x  i n  p  and t h e r e  i s  no 
p r e c u r s o r  o f  - x i n  p which i s  n o t  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  x l ;  and 
s o  f o r t h .  The Peano axioms can be r e w r i t t e n  a s  s t a t e m e n t s  
about progressions. For example, 
The sum of 5 and 0 is 0. 
would be rewritten as: 
( x )  - ( )  (E) (if - x is a zero in and x is in Q, 
then the sum of x and in p - is identical 
with x). 
And 
The sum of n and the successor of m - is the 
successor of the slm of n and m. 
- - 
would be rewritten as: I 
(5 )  (E) (if - X is in E and x is In E, 
 en (the sum of - x and the successor of y 
in 2) in 2 is identlcal with the successor 
in g of the sum of q and x in E.). 
' 5  + 7 = 12', then, would be explained as; 
(30) (E) (the sum in 2 of a 5 in and a 7 in p is 
a 12 in 2). 
So, like Harman, White would deny (VIII), and propose as 
an analysis of ' 5  + 7 = 12' something very like Harman's 
(23). True, Harman speaks of w-sequences instead of 
progressions, and 'the 5th member of1 instead of 'a 5 
in1, But since all it means, for White, for - x to be a 
5 in g is for & to be the 5th (actually, 6th since he 
starts with 0 )  member of g, the difference is trivial. 
So if White's analysis fails, so will Harrnan1s (23). 
Interestingly, although 'rJllitels analysis is very 
like Earman's, and of course both would agree to (III), 
( I V )  and ( V ) ,  t h e y  d i s a g r e e  abou t  ( I ) .  Harman s a y s  
t h e r e  a r e  no  numbers, and White s a y s  t h e r e  a r e  p l e n t y  
o f  numbers.  Yet t h i s  does  n o t  r u l e  o u t  t h e i r  b e i n g  i n  
comple te  agreement  as t o  which i n d i v i d u a l  o b j e c t s  e x i s t !  
The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  Harman p r o b a b l y  t h i n k s  t h a t ,  
i f  t h e r e  were numbers,  t h e y  would be  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s  
o f  a  c e r t a i n  s o r t  ( i . e . ,  (11) would be  t r u e ) .  For  Whi te ,  
(11) i s  f a l s e ;  something i s  a number i f  i t  i s  a  member 
o f  a p r o g r e s s i o n .  Anything t h a t  i s  t h e  t h i r d  member of 
some p r o g r e s s i o n  -- and wnat i s n ' t ?  -- i s  a  3 .  I n  f a c t ,  
e v e r y  number i s  e v e r y  o t h e r  number- So t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between Harman and White i s  a. b i t  l i k e  t h a t  between one 
who m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no  w i t c h e s ,  on t h e  ground 
t h a t  w i t c h e s  c o n s o r t  w i t h  t h e  de7:il and t h e r e  i s  no d e v i l  
t o  c o n s o r t  w i t h ,  and one who m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
w i t c h e s  b u t  no d e v i l ,  because  t o  be a  w i t c h  one need 
o n l y  t h i n k  t h a t  one c o n s o r t s  w i t h  t h e  d e v i l ,  
A c t u a l l y ,  I f i n d  t h e  i n f e r e n c e  from Ix i s  a n  e lement  
i n  a  p r o g r e s s i o n 1  t o  ' x  i s  t h e r e f o r e  a  number1 -- i n  f a c t ,  
' f o r  e v e r y  n ,  x i s  a n  n 1  -- r a t h e r  i m p l a u s i b l e  and 
unmot iva ted .  But t h e r e  i s  more t h e  m a t t e r  w i t h  W h i t e ' s  
view t h a n  t h i s  s u p e r f l u i t y .  The main d i f f i c u l t y  s tems 
from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  f o r  Whi te ,  a s  f o r  Harman, t h e r e  have 
t o  be  p r o g r e s s i o n s .  And as I hope was e v i d e n t  from our  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  p r o g r e s s i o n s  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  Harman, 
whether  and what p r o g r e s s i o n s  a r e  f o r  White i s  c r u c i a l  
f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  whether  h i s  a n a l y s i s  p r o v i d e s  us  w i t h  a 
n e t  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  g a i n .  Now it i s  c l e a r  from t h e  f i r s t  
q u o t e  ( above)  from W h i t e ' s  a r t i c l e  t h a t  h i s  r e a s o n  f o r  
a n a l y z i n g  number s t a t e m e n t s  ( l i k e  ' 5  t 7 = 1 2 ' )  a s  b e i n g  
s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  p r o g r e s s i o n s  ( l i k e  ( 3 0 ) )  i s  t h a t  " t h e r e  
a r e  m u l t i p l e  s e t - t h e o r e t i c  models  o f  a r i t h m e t i c t t .  I t  
t u r n s  o u t ,  however,  t h e r e  a r e  m u l t i p l e  s e t - t h e o r e t i c  
models  o f  what It i s  t o  be a  p r o g r e s s i o n .  We can  s e e  
t h i s  as f o l l o w s .  
To e x p l i c a t e  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a  p r o g r e s s i o n ,  o r  w- 
sequence  s e t - t h e o r e t i c a i l y ,  we might  s t a r t ,  a s  P t l i l i p  
K i t c h e r  d o e s  i n  "The P l i g h t  o f  t h e  ~ l a t o n i s t " ~  by  
a n a l y s i n g  them i n  terms o f  s e t s  and r e l a t i o n s :  
A s e t  x  i s  a quasi-n~!mber set w f t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  a r e l a t i o n  R j u s t  i n  c a s e  t h e r e  i s  a 
un ique  e lement  l ( g , R )  E x, s u c h  t h a t  R i s  
a 1-1 cor respondence  from x  t o  x\ { l ( x ,  R ) )  
[ i . e .  x w i t h o u t  i t s  " f i r s tT  memEer under  
R ] .   set x  i s  a number - set w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  R i f f  it-is a quasi-number s e t  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  R and i s  t h e  s m a l l e s t  q u a s i -  
number set  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  R c o n t a i n i n g  
l ( q , R ) .  ( p .  1 2 4 ) .  
A number s e t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a p r o g r e s s i o n ,  o r  w-sequence. 
To comple te  t h e  r e d u c t i o n ,  we need t o  s a y  what a  
r e l a t i o n  i s .  The u s u a l  t x p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  a r e l a t i o n  
i s  a  s e t  o f  o r d e r e d  p a i r s .  But now t h e  f a c t  s t a t e d  i n  
6 (1 ) on p.  49  above p o s e s  a problem f o r  Whi te :  There  a r e  
nany s e t - t h e o r e t i c  a c c o u n t s  o f  what i t  i s  t o  be  an  
o r d e r e d  p a i r .  It f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  many s e t - t h e o r e t i c  
a c c o u n t s  o f  what a p r o g r e s s i o n  i s .  Were we t o  u s e  
B e n a c e r r a f e a n  r e a s o n i n g ,  we would conc lude  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
no p r o g r e s s i o n s .  K i t c h e r ,  however, c l e v e r l y  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  w e  r e a s o n  l i k e  White -- i . e .  t h a t  we t r y  t o  s o l v e  
t h e  problem by employing t h e  same t r i c k  he employed i n  
c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  numbers: r e l a t i v i z e .  J u s t  a s  something 
i s  a 3 o n l y  r e l a t i v e  t o  a p r o g r e s s i o n ,  something i s  a n  
o r d e r e d  p a i r  < y , z >  o n l y  r e l a t i v e  t o  a n  o r d e r e d - p a i r  ( O P )  
c l a s s .  ( P e r h a p s  we s h o u l d  s a y  something l i k e  Ivy i s  
p a i r e d  w i t h  z  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  O P , c l a s s  C v v  t o  make t h i s  
maneuver p a l a t a b l e  t o  Harman, who, as n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  
n e e d s  i t ,  b u t  p r o b a b l y  would n o t  want t o  speak o f  
o r d e r e d  p a i r s ,  even  r e l a t i v e l y ,  any more t h a n  he wanted 
t o  speak  o f  numbers . ) .  So, f o r  example, t h e  c l a s s  o f  
a l l  Weiner-ordered-pai rs  i s  a n  OP c l a s s ,  a s  i s  t h e  c l a s s  
of a l l  Kuratowski-ordered-pairs .  
But t h e r e  i s  a fundamenta l  problem w i t h  t h i s  
approach ,  which K i t c h e r  p r e s e n t s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
There  a r e  no OP-classes s i m p l i c i t e r ;  a c l a s s  
i s  o n l y  a n  OP c l a s s  r e l a t i v e  t o  a  c o r r e l a t i o n  
o f  i t s  e l e m e n t s  w i t h  p a i r s  o f  s e t s .  To s e e  
t h i s ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c l a s s  of' Kuratowski-ordered-  
p a i r s ,  { { { X I ,  I x , y ) ) :  x ,y  E V ) .  T h i s  i s  an  
OP-class  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  un i fo rm 
c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  < x , y >  w i t h  { { X I ,  { x , y ) ) ,  b u t  
n o t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  uni form c o r r e l a t i o n  
o f  c x , y >  w i t h  { { x ? ) .  Moreover, c o n s i d e r  
any two a r b i t r a r y  se t s  a , b .  Let  f be a 
f u n c t i o n  of two arguments  such  t h a t  f ( x , y )  = 
EExI, { x , y ) )  ( x , y  E V ) .  We can now d e f i n e  
a  f u n c t i o n  g ( x , y )  t h u s :  
The c l a s s  o f  Kura towsk i -o rdered-pa i r s  i s  
a n  OP-class w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  g a s  w e l l  a s  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  f. S i n c e  a , b  a r e  a r b i t r a r y ,  
t h e r e  i s  no s a y i n g  a b s o l u t e l y  which e lement  
o f  t h e  c l a s s  i s  a <y,z>. Any member o f  
t h e  c l a s s  can  be a  < y , z >  i f  w e  choose  o u r  
c o r r e l a t i o n  f u n c t i o n  c o r r e c t l y .  ( p p .  125-6) 
The p o i n t  i s  t h i s .  According t o  Whi te ,  [ [ [ 0 ] ] ]  
i s  a  3 o n l y  r e l a t i v e  t o ,  f o r  example,  t h e  Zermelo 
p r o g r e s s i o n  o f  wnumbersu -- t h a t ~ i s ,  t h e  s e t  
o r d e r e d  by t h e  r e l a t i o n  
R = [ < x , y >  : y  = [x]] .  
Yet what p r e c i s e l y  i s  R ?  Is  R i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  c l a s s  
B = [ [ [XI ,  [ x , [ x l l 1 :  x vl 
o r  t o  t h e  c l a s s  
C = [ [ [XI ,  CB, Cx111: x E V l  
o r  t o  something e l s e ?  K i t c h e r l s  argument shows t h a t  
R = B r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  un i fo rm c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  < x , y >  w i t h  
-
[Ex],  [x ,y ] ] ;  b u t  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  unizorm c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  
<x,y> w l t h  [ [x] ,  [ % , y ] ] ,  R = C.  Thus < A , B >  canno t  even 
b e  s a i d  t o  be  "a Zermelo p r o g r e s s i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  
OP-class [[[x] ,  [x, :~]] :  x,y c V]" ,  Nor can  we speak o f  
i t s  b e i n g  "a Zermelo p r o g r e s s i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  un i fo rm 
-
c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  < x , y >  w i t h  [ [ X I ,  [ x , y ] l U  because  t h a t  
would be  t u  presuppose  t h a t  we had a  n o n - a r i b t r a r y  accoun t  
o f  what a n  o r d e r e d  p a i r  i s  -- and t h e  problem,  p r e c i s e l y ,  
i s  t h a t  we d o n ' t .  
Hence the explication problem that White was 
trying to solve reoccurs at the level of progressions. 
That is, (30) for example was supposed to eliminate 
arbitrariness and vagueness; but it fails to do so, 
because the same features reoccur at other levels. So 
White's analysis is not successful. 
4.Benacerraf1s Account 
- 
I would like now to examine Benacerraf's own 
positive suggestion. Although motivation for it nay 
have declined somewhat along with the success of his 
argument to the effect that numbers do not exist, there 
is something appealing in what he says; 50 a consideration 
of the merits and flaws of his account seems warranted. 
Here is what he says: 
Slogans like "Arithmetic is about 
"Number words refer to numbers,l1 when 
properly urged, may be interpreted as pointing 
out two quite distinct things: (1) that 
number words are not names of special 
nonnumerical entities, like sets, tomatoes, 
or Gila monsters; and (2) that a purely 
formalistic view that fails to assign any 
meaning whatsoever to the statements of 
number theory is also wrong. They need not 
be incompatible with what I am urging here. 
This last formalism is too extreme. 
But there is a modified form of it, also 
denying that number vords are names, 
which constitutes a plausible and tempting 
extension of the view I have been arguing. 
Let me suggest it here. On this view the 
sequence of number words is just that -- a 
sequence of words or expressions with certain 
p r o p e r t i e s .  There  are n o t  two k i n d s  of  
t h i n g s ,  numbers and number words ,  b u t  j u s t  
one ,  t h e  words t h e m s e l v e s .  Most l anguages  
c o n t a i n  such  a  sequence ,  and any such sequence  
( o f  words o r  t e r m s )  w i l l  s e r v e  t h e  pu7poses 
f o r  which w e  have o u r s ,  p r o v i d e d  i t  i s  
r e c u r s i v e  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  r e s p e c t .  I n  
c o u n t i n g ,  we do n o t  c o r r e l a t e  s e t s  w i t h  
i n i t i a l  segments  o f  t h e  numbers as e x t r a -  
l i n g u i s t i c  e n t i t i e s ,  b u t  c o r r e l a t e  s e t s  
w i t h  i n i t i a l  segments  o f  t h e  sequence  o f  
number words ,  The c e n t r a l  i d e a  i s  t h a t  t h i s  
r e c u r s i v e  sequence  i s  a s o r t  o f  y a r d s t i c k  
which we u s e  t o  measure s e t s .  Q u e s t i o n s  o f  
t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e f e r e n t s  of number 
words s h o u l d  be d i s m i s s e d  as misguided i n  
j u s t  t h e  way t h a t  a  q u e s t l o r ,  abou t  t h e  
r e f e r e n t s  o f  t h e  p a r t s  of  a r u l e r  would b e  
s e e n  as misguided.  Although any sequence  of  
e x p r e s s i o n s  w i t h  t h e  p r o p e r  s t r u c t u r e  would 
do t h e  j o b  f o r  which we employ o u r  p r e s e n t  
number words,  t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  some r e a s o n  f o r  
h a v i n g  one ,  r e l a t i v e l y  un i fo rm,  n o t a t i o n :  
o r d i n a r y  communicat ion.  Too many sequences  
i n  common u s e  would make i t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  u s  
t o  l e a r n  t o o  many d i f f e r e n t  e q u f v a l e n c e s .  
The u s u a l  o b j e c t i o n  t o  such  a n  accoun t  -- 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between numbers 
and number words which i t  f a i l s  t o  make, w i l l ,  
I t h i n k ,  n o t  d o ,  It i s  made on t h e  g rounds  
t h a t  "zwei l1 "deux -3 l1 112 , l '  a r e  a l l  
supposed t o  "stand f o r u  t h e  same number b u t  
y e t  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  words (one  o f  them n o t  a  
word a t  a l l ) .  One c a n  mark t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
among t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  and t h e  
s imilari t ies  as w e l l ,  w i t h o u t  c o n j u r i n g  up 
some e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c  o b j e c t s  f o r  them t o  
name, One need o n l y  p o i n t  t o  t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  
o f  f u n c t i o n :  w i t h i n  any numbering sys tem,  
what w i l l  be i m p o r t a n t  w i l l  be what p l a c e  
i n  t h e  sys tem any p a r t i c u l a r  e x p r e s s i o n  i s  
used  t o  mark. ( p p .  71-72, WNCNB). 
The g i s t  of B e n a c e r r a f l s  p r o p o s a l  seems t o  be 
t h a t  a l l  we need i n  o r d e r  t o  count  and do number t h e o r y  i s  
a  r e c u r s i v e  p r o g r e s s i o n .  And we have one i n  t h e  number 
words t h e m s e l v e s .  Numbers a r e  t h e r e f o r e  r e d u n d a n t .  
There  a r e  s e v e r a l  a t t r a c t i v e  a s p e c t s  t o  what he 
s a y s .  It makes s e n s e  t o  s a y  t h a t  i n  c o u n t i n g  o b j e c t s  we 
a r e  c o r r e l a t i n g  words w i t h  o b j e c t s ,  because  we u s u a l l y  
do r e c i t e  s sequence  o f  words when we c o u n t .  So ,  f o r  
example, i n s t e a d  o f  a n a l y z i n g  
( 3 1 )  There  a r e  f i v e  l i o n s  i n  t h e  zoo.  
as 
( 3 2 )  There  I s  a 1-1 cor respondence  between t h e  numbers 
from one t o  f i v e  and t h e  l i o n s  i n  t h e  zoo.  
I suppose  we c o u l d  a n a l y z e  i t  i n s t e a d  as 
( 3 3 )  There  i s  a 1-1 cor respondence  between t h e  number 
words from ' o n e 1  t o  ' f i v e 1  and l i o n s  i n  t h e  zoo. 
And 
( 3 4 )  There  a r e  more l i o n s  t h a n  t i g e r s  i n  t h e  zoo,  
' ,  
i n s t e a d  o f  
(35 )  There  a r e  numbers II, m - such  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  m 
l i o n s  and  n - t i g e r s  i n  t h e  zoo and  m_ > n. 
c o u l d  be  a n a l y z e d  as:  
( 3 6 )  There  are number words g ,  m_ s u c h  t h a t  ' there a r e  
m - l i o n s  and - n t i g e r s  i n  t h e  zoo7 i s  t r u e ,  and m - 
comes b e f o r e  - n.  
Also,  i n  comparison w i t h  Harman1s and W h i t e ' s  
p r o p o s a l s ,  B e n a c e r r a f l s  a p p e a r s  t o  have t h e  m e r i t  o f  
p l a c i n g  less r e l i a n c e  on o t h e r  s o r t s  o f  ma themat ica l  
e n t i t i e s .  There i s  no r e f e r e n c e  t o  s e t s ,  f o r  example; 
n o r  d o e s  he q u a n t i f y  o v e r  p r o g r e s s i o n s .  O f  c o u r s e ,  
if he were t o  embrace (33 )  as t h e  a n a l y s i s  of  ( 3 1 )  he  
wzuld need t o  g i v e  some a c c o u n t  o f  what a c o r r e l a t i o n  
i s .  We would be  a n x i o u s  t o  l e a r n ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  
how it  s t a c k s  up e p i s B e m o l o g i c a l l y  a g a i n s t  numbers 
themse lves .  H e  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e r e  be  number words,  b u t  
s o ,  i t  might  be  s a i d ,  d o e s  everyone  e l se .  Hence a t  
f i rs t  b l u s h  i t  l o o k s  as though some s e r i o u s  headway may 
have  been made on t h e  e p l s t e r n o l o g i c a l  problem p r e s e n t e d  
by a b s t r a c t  m a t h e m a t i c a l  e n t i t i e s .  
Yet a s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t y  c o n f r o n t s  u s  immedia te ly .  
B e n a c e r r a f  wants  i t  t o  be  a consequence o f  h i s  p r o p o s a l  
t h a t  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  p u r e  number t h e o r y ,  l i k e  t h e s e :  
(Sl )  Two i s  a pr ime number. 
( S 2 )  2 t 2 = 4.  
a r e  t r u e ,  even though  t h e r e  are no numbers. T h i s  i s  
ev idenced  by t h e  remark  he  c o n c l u d e s  !'What Numbers Could 
Not Be" w i t h :  v l . . . t h e r e  are  no such  t h i n g s  as numbers; 
which i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  n o t  a t  l e a s t  two prime 
numbers between 15 and 20."  ( p .  73 ) .  But i t  i s  v e r y  
h a r d  t o  s e e  what h i s  p r o p o s a l  comes t o  f o r  s t a t e m e n t s  
l i k e  (S1) and ( S 2 ) ,  much l e s s  how it  accompl i shes  t h i s .  
However, l e t  u s  t r y .  
Given t h a t  (S1) and (S2) a r e  t r u e ,  ( V I I ) ,  ( V I I I )  
and ( IX)  t o g e t h e r  seem t o  have t h e  consequence t h a t  
numbers e x i s t .  So Benacer ra f  h a s  t o  deny one o f  ( V I I ) ,  
( V I I I )  o r  ( I X ) .  From c o n v e r s a t i o n s  w i t h  him, I doub t  
t h a t  he  would want t o  g i v e  up r e f e r e n t i a l  s e m a n t i c s ,  
i . e . ,  deny (1x1. T h e r e f o r e  he h a s  t o  deny ( V I I )  and /o r  
( V I I I ) .  Now one way o f  d o i n g  t h i s  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  a 
general analysis which entails, for example, that the 
logical structures of (S1) and ( S 2 )  differ from their 
surface structures in not having the singular terms 
ltwol and '2' in them. This amounts to only denying 
(VIII) -- precisely what Harman1s proposal does. In 
fact, one way of looking at Harman1s much more explicit 
proposal is as - a development - of Benacerrafls - own position, 
especially of the claim, noted earlier, that "Arithmetic 
is the science that elaborates the abstract structure 
that all progressions have in common merely in virtue 
of being progressions1' (WNCNB, p. 70). It may be that 
Harmanfs proposal, or Whitels perhaps, is much nearer 
to being an explicit statement of what Benacerraf is 
proposing that anything I shall come up with. But since 
we have seen that Harman's proposal fails, it seems a 
good idea to concentrate on any alternatives, and I can 
think of only one. 
Here it is. Benacerraf seems to view statements 
like (S1) and ( S 2 )  as uquasi-interpretedu. They are 
true, he thinks, so they must have an interpretation, 
but somehow he sees the interpretation as arbitrary, so 
long as it meets certain conditions. For example, 
consider his remark that ll., .any system of objects. , . 
that forms a recursive progression must be adequate [as 
number  surrogate^]^^ (p. 68). What such a claim might 
really amount to will be discussed at some length in 
the next, and last, section of this chapter. But in 
c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  l o n g  p a s s a g e  quo ted  above,  e s p e c i a l l y  
t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  "There a r e  n o t  two k i n d s  o f  t h i n g s ,  
numbers and number words,  b u t  j u s t  one ,  t h e  words them- 
s e l v e s , "  it s u g g e s t s  t h a t  B e n a c e r r a f  t h i n k s  t h e  number 
words ought  t o  "do t h e  job"  of t h e  numbers, " s t a n d  i n f 1  
f o r  them. The most s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  way of  a c c o m p l i s h i n g  
t h i s  i s  by a n a l y z i n g  (S1) and ( S 2 ) ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a s :  
( 37 )  'Two1 i s  a pr ime number. 
( 3 8 )  'two1 p l u s  ' two1  = ' f o u r 1 .  
The problem i s  t h a t  ( 3 7 )  j u s t  l o o k s  p l a i n  f a l s e ,  and 
( 3 8 )  d o e s  n o t  even make s e n s e .  So l e t  u s  t r y :  
( 3 9 )  'Two1 i s  a pr ime number word. 
( 4 0 )  ; t w o 1  ''addedu ( r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  number word 
p r o g r e s s i o n )  t o  l t w o l  = ' f o u r 1 .  
But c o n t r a r y  t o  what a n a l y s e s  a r e  supposed t o  d o ,  t h e  
t r u t h  o f  t h e  a n a l y s a n d a ,  ( 3 9 )  and ( 4 0 ) ,  seems t o  
p resuppose  t r u t h  o f  (S1) and Because what 
d o e s  i t  mean f o r  - x t o  b e  a pr ime number word? Presumably 
t h a t  - x d e s i g n a t e s  a pr ime number! So ( 3 9 )  would be 
t r u e  because  (S1) i s  t r u e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  v i c e  v e r s a .  Also ,  
t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  l1addingV words, r e q u i r e d  by ( 4 0 )  seems 
t o  p resuppose  t h a t  of  a d d i n g  numbers.  
But maybe t h i s  i s  wrong. Maybe "Express ion  
A r i t h m e t i c " ,  as I s h a l l  c a l l  i t ,  c a n  be unders tood  w i t h o u t  
p r i o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of a r i t h m e t i c .  A good c a s e  might be 
made t h a t  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a r i t h m e t i c a l  p r e d i c a t e s  o f ,  and 
o p e r a t i o n s  on, number words i n  f a c t  p r e c e d e s ,  i n  c h i l d h o o d ,  
u n d e r s t a n d i p g  o f  a r i t h m e t i c a l  p r e d i c a t e s ,  and o p e r a t i o n s  
on numbers. 
Let  u s ,  t h e n ,  c o n s i d e r  what E x p r e s s i o n  A r i t h m e t i c  
would be a b o u t .  What i s  - t h e  sequence  o f  number words? 
If w e  wanted t o  keep t h i n g s  n i c e  and s i m p l e ,  w e  might  
s a y ,  i n  ana logy  t o  t h e  Peano axioms,  t h a t  t h e  sequence o f  
number words i s  ' z e r o t ,  ' t h e  s u c c e s s o r  o f  z e r o , '  ' t h e  
s u c c e s s o r  o f  t h e  s u c c e s s o r  o f  z e r o , '  e t c .  But t h i s  w i l l  
n c t  do ,  because  t h e  purpose  o f  hav ing  - one sequence ,  
B e n a c e r r a f  s a i d ,  was o r d i n a r y  communicat ion,  and t h e s e  
t e r m s  are f a r  from o r d i n a r y .  
C o n s u l t i n g  my d i c t i o n a r y ,  I l e a r n  t h a t  t h e  name 
' <  
o f  t h e  f i r s t  c a r d i n a l  number i s  ' n a u g h t , '  o r  l z e r o , l  o r  
' c i p h e r , '  and t h a t  t h a t  o f  t h e  second c a r d i n a l  number 
i s  ' one .  1 4 0  T h i s  f a c t  a l o n e  d e f e a t s  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  a n a l o g  t o  t h e  Peano axiom: 
( 4 1 )  No two numbers have t h e  same s u c c e s s o r .  
which presumably would b e :  
( 4 2 )  No two number words have t h e  same s u c c e s s o r .  
because  ' z e r o 1  and ' n a u g h t 1  are two number words t h a t  
have t h e  same s u c c e s s o r .  A c t u a l l y ,  what t h i s  shows i s  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  more t h a n  one sequence  o f  lumber words 
i n  E n g l i s h .  Perhaps  one sequence  c o u l d  j u s t  c o n v e n t i o n a l l y  
be a d o p t e d ,  and t h e n  ( 4 2 )  would be a c c e p t a b l e .  My 
4 0 .  W e b s t e r l s  Seven th  New C o l l e g i a t e  D i c t i o n a r y  ( S p r i n g -  
f i e l d ,  MA: G .  & C .  Merriam Co.; 9 6 7 )  p .  5 7 9 .  
d i c t i o n a r y  shows no more ambiguous terms u n t i l  101,  
which would cor respond  t o  e i t h e r  lone hundred and o n e t  
o r  lone hundred o n e 1 .  Again, e i t h e r  one o f  t h e s e  could  b e  
c o n v e n t i o n a l l y  adop ted  s o  t h a t  ' 1 0 1  t 1 = 102l  f o r  example,  
would have  o n l y  one l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s  ( a s  seems d e s i r a b l e ) .  
Moving r i g h t  a l o n g ,  we have ,  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  10' lone 
b i l l i o n 1 ,  t o  1@12 Ione t r i l l i o n 1 ,  t o  1015 lone q u a d r i l l i o n 1 ,  
. . . t o  1 0  3 3 3  lone  d e ~ i l l i & ~ ,  t o  lone  u n d e c i l l i o n l ,  
t o  lone  d u o d e c i l l i o n l ,  . . . and t o  ' one  v i g i n t i l l i o n 1 .  
But what do w e  do t h e r e a f t e r ?  The o n l y  l a t e r  e n t r y  my 
d i s t i o n a r y  h a s  i s  ' one  c e n t i l l i o n 1  f o r  10303.  What we do 
do a b o u t  1 0  66? I suppose  we c o u l d  s a y  lone  thousand 
v i g i n t i l l i o n s  ; and f o r  l one m i l l i o n .  v i g i n t i l l i o n s  , 
b u t  i t  d o e s  n o t  t a k z  a Georg Cantor  t o  s e e  t h a t  we a r e  g o i n g  
t o  need a  c o n v e n t i o n  t h a t  i n v o l v e s  i n d e f i n i t e  r e i t e r a t i o n  
o f  a t  l e a s t  one  number word. Perhaps  t h e r e  i s  such  a  
c o n v e n t i o n ,  and t h e  d i c t i o n a r y  and I a r e  unaware o f  i t .  
N o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h e r e  -- c o u l d  b e  such a  c o n v e n t i o n .  So 
we can  r e c a s t  B e n a c e r r a f l s  p r o p o s a l  as one abou t  what t h e  
a n a l y s e s  o f  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  p u r e  number t h e o r y  shou ld  b e ,  
r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  one s t a n d a r d  
sequence  o f  number words i n  E n g l i s h  ( o r  r a t h e r ,  American 
E n g l i s h ,  because  t h e  B r i t i s h  have a r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
sys tem a f t e r  one m i l l i o n ) .  That  i s ,  i t  makes s e n s e  t o  view 
Benacer ra f  as p r o p o s i n g  t h a t  ( i )  we s e l e c t  one o f  t h e  
s e v e r a l  w-sequences o f  number words a v a i l a b l e  and make 
t h a t  t h e  s t a n d a r d  one;  and (ii) we i n t e r p r e t  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  
p u r e  number t h e o r y  a s  b e i n g  Mabout l l  ( i n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
s e n s e )  members o f  t h i s  sequence .  
So i n t e r p r e t e d ,  t h i s  m i g h t  be t h o u g h t  t o  c o n t r a d i c t  
two t e n e t s  o f  B e n a c e r r a f l s .  F i r s t ,  he  e x p l i c i t l y  d e n i e s  
t h a t  "number words a r e  namesf1 (WNCNB,  p .  ? I ) ,  and on t h e  
c o n s t r u a l  we are c o n s i d e r i n g  number words do seem t o  f u n c t i o n  
as names -- names o f  t h e m s e l v e s .  The second t e n e t  t h a t  
might  a p p e a r  t o  have been v i o l a t e d  i s  B e n a c e r r a f l s  t h e s i s  
t h a t  we cannot  i d e n t i f y  t h e  numbers w i t h  t h i s  o r  t h a t  
p r ~ g r e s s i o n  -- o f  s e t s ,  o r  o f  a n y t h i n g  ( i n c l u d i n g ,  
presumably ,  number words)  because  t o  do s o  would be p e r f e c t l y  
a r b i t r a r y .  ( I n d e e d ,  such  was t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  argument 
5 we saw on p .  22  above t h a t  l e d  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  ( 5  ) ,  
t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  e x p r e s s i o n s ) .  Yet i t  might  a p p e a r  t h a t  
o u r  c o n s t r u a l  o f  Benacer ra f  h a s  done j u s t  t h a t :  a r b i t r a r i l y  
i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  numbers w i t h  a p r o g r e s s i o n  o f  number words.  
I b e l i e v e  n e i t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  need d e t a i n  u s .  
F i r s t ,  because  I have d o u b t s  as t o  whether  e i t h e r  o b j e c t i o n  
i s  on t h e  mark. It i s  n o t  r e a d i l y  a p p a r e n t  t o  me t h a t  
even i f  (S1), f o r  example,  i s  t o  be  a n a l y z e d  a s  ( 3 9 )  t h a t  
l two '  names i t s e l f ,  o r  t h a t  we have i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  number 
two w i t h  t h e  numSer word ' t w o ' .  It depends  on what t h e  
r e l a t i o n  ''is t o  be  a n a l y z e d  a s f 1  amounts t o ,  and t h i s  i s  a  
s u b j e c t  I would p r e f e r  n o t  t o  go i n t o ,  i n  pa r t  because  
n e i t h e r  Harman, White n o r  B e n a c e r r a f  d o e s .  Second ly ,  even 
i f  it - i s a  consequence o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  now number words 
a r e  names -- i . e . ,  names o f  t h e m s e l v e s  -.- and /o r  numbers 
have been i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  some sense , ,  I 
b e l i e v e  i t  can  be  r e c o n c i l e d  w i t h  t h e  two t e n e t s  of 
B e n a c e r r a f l s  mentioned i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  p a r a g r a p h .  We can 
v iew t h e  c l a i m s  embodied i n  t h o s e  t e n e t s  a s  h a v i n g  b e e n  made 
i n  a n  e a r l i e r  c o n t e x t  -- b e f o r e  h i s  p r o p o s a l .  So t h a t ,  
f o r  example, when he s a y s  "number words a r e  n o t  names1', 
t h i s  i s  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d  as "number words have n o t  f u n c t i o n e d  
a s  names up u n t i l  now, a l t h o u g h  i f  i t  i s  a  consequence o f  
o u r  a d o p t i n g  my p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t h e y  do s o  now, why, s o  be 
itr1. S i m i l a r l y ,  B e n a c e r r a f  i s  n o t  c l a i m i n g  t o  have 
d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t  t h e  numbers a r e  r e a l l y  words;  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  h i s  p r o p o s a l  i n v o l v e s  I t i d e n t i f y i n g  numbers w i t h  wordst1 
i t  o n l y  amounts t o  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  we e n d o r s e  t h e  
' ,  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  as a m a t t e r  o f  conventl .on.  The d i f f e r e n c e  
h e r e  i s  l i k e  t h a t  between t h e  c l a i m  ( t o  use  B e n a c e r r a f l s  
own l l y a r d s t i c k l l  a n a l o g y )  made i n  t h e  absence  o f  a  s t a n d a r d  
m e t e r  b a r ,  t h a t  such  and such  a b a r  h a s  been d i s c o v e r e d  t o  
b e  t h e  s t a n d a r d  one ,  and t h e  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  we l e t  such  and 
such  a b a r  be  t h e  s t a n d a r d  m e t e r ,  
My own i n c l i n a t i o n  i s  t o  view t h e  p r o p o s a l  a s  
i n v o l v i n g  t h e  d e n i a l  o f  (VIII) b u t  n o t ,  o r  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  
( V I I ) .  So t h a t  ' two1  o r  ' 2 '  may o r  may n o t  be s i n g u l a r  
t e r m s  i n  (Sl) and ( S 2 ) ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  b u t  t h e  i s s u e  o f  
what t h e y  r e f e r  t o  does  n o t  a r i s e  because  such  terms do 
n o t  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  a n a l y s a n d a ,  ( 3 9 )  and ( 4 0 ) .  
It i s  now t i m e  t o  l o o k  a t  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l  
i t s e l f .  The p r o p o s a l  s h o u l d  n o t  be s e e n  a s  b e i n g  mere ly  
abou t  E n g l i s h .  Presumably,  Benacer ra f  i s  a d v o c a t i n g  t h a t  
e a c h  group of  d i f f e r e n t  l anguage  u s e r s  s e l e c t  some e x p r e s s i o n  
p r o g r e s s i o n  a s  s t a n d a r d ,  and a n a l y z e  numer ica l  t r u t h s  i n  
terms o f  i t .  T h i s  would mean t h a t  t h e r e  would be -- no s t a n d a r d  
model - o f  a r i t h m e t i c ,  n o t  even one composed o f  e x p r e s s i o n s .  
Each group o f  d i f f e r e n t  l anguage  u s e r s  c o u l d  u s e  a t r a n s l a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p h r a s e  ' t h e  s t a n d a r d  mode l1 ,  b u t  each  would t h e r e b y  
be  r e f e r r i n g  t o  a d i f f e r e n t  p r o g r e s s i o n  of  e x p r e s s i o n s .  
Benacer ra f  i s  aware o f  t h i s  c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e  
consequence ,  i t  would a p p e a r .  I n  r e s p o n s e  ( t h i s  i s  from 
t h e  l o n g  p a s s a g e  quo ted  above)  h e  says:  "One can mark t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  among t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  and t h e  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  as well, w i t h o u t  c o n j u r i n g  up some e x t r a -  
l i n g u i s t i c  o b j e c t s  f o r  them t o  name. One need o n l y  p o i n t  
t o  t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  f u n c t i o n . l l  ( p .  7 2 ) .  
T h i s  sounds n o t  i m p l a u s i b l e ,  b u t  I wonder whether  
t h e  m a t t e r  i s  c l e a r e d  up s o  e a s i l y .  I u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  
( 4 3 )  Two p l u s  two i s  f o u r .  
i s  a good t r a n s l a t i o n  f o r  
( 4 4 )  Deux p l u s  deux f o n t  q u a t r e .  
and f o r  
( 4 5 )  Zwei p l u s  zwei i s t  v i e r .  
They a l l  e x p r e s s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  2 + 2 = 4 ,  t o  u s e  a  some- 
what more neutral terminology. 41 But now it turns out 
that (43) is true because its analysans, (46), is true. 
(46) 'Two1 "added" to Itwo1 is 'four?. 
And (44) is true because (47) is true. 
(47) 'Deuxl ajout6 2 Ideux1 est 6gal B 'quatrel. 
And (45) is true because (48) is true. 
(48) tZweil llhinzufiigt" zu 'zweil 1st 'vier1. 
Although (43), (44) and (45) express the same fact, (46), 
(47) and (48) express different facts. (46) and (47) are 
not translations of each other. The translation of (47) 
is: 
and that of (48) is: 
(50) 'Zweil "added" to 'zweil is lvierl. 
Insofar as we deem (49) true, it is because we understand 
it as meaning that 'deuxl l1addedl1 to Ideux1, relative to 
the progression of French number words, is 'quatrel; whereas 
- 7 -- 
insofar as we deem (50) true, it is because we understand 
it as meaning that lzweil I1addedl1 to 'zweil, relative to 
the progression of German number words, is 'vier1. Clearly, 
7 7
(46), (49) and (50) express different, even if comparable, 
CI1. Since it 1s more neutrai, why aiunl t Benacerraf 
choose lo1, ' 1 7  '2', '3l,. .. as the standard progression 
(or, why didn't we construe him as so choosing)? Because, 
as is evident from the long passage quoted above, the number 
surrogates he is advocating are number words, and ' 2 ' ,  he 
also claims there, is "not a word at allu. Even had he so 
chosen, objections like those I am urging would still be 
frameable, as not all cultures that employ numerals employ 
arabic numerals. 
f a c t s ;  t h e y  a r e  l labout l '  d i f f e r e n t  p r o g r e s s i o n s .  So i t  
l o o k s  as though  B e n a c e r r a f  would have t o  deny t h a t  ( 4 3 ) ,  
( 4 4 )  and ( 4 5 )  a r e  t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  e a c h  o t h e r .  
A second,  r e l a t e d ,  o b j e c t i o n  i s  t h i s .  According 
t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l  under  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  ' 2  t 2 = 4 '  i s  t r u e  
because  ' two1  "addedf1 t o  ' two1  i s  f f o u r f .  But a  French 
propor,ent would s a y ,  and h e r e  I am t r a n s l a t i n g ,  t h a t  
' 2  t 2 = 4 '  i s  t r u e  because  l d e u x l  l1addedr1 t o  l d e u x l  i s  
' q u a t r e l .  And a German proponent  would s a y  i t  i s  t r u e  
because  ' z w e i l  ' 'addedv t o  ' z w e i l  i s  ' v i e r 1 .  Yet ,  a s  was 
remarked above,  ( 4 6 ) ,  ( 4 9 )  and ( 5 0 )  e x p r e s s  d i f f e r e n t  
f a c t s .  So t h e y  canno t  a l l  be r i g h t ,  u n l e s s  t h e y  a r e  
d i s c u s s i n g  something d i f f e r e n t  -- i . e . ,  u n l e s s  ' 2  t 2 = 4 '  
i s  h i g h l y  ambiguous, meaning something d i f f e r e n t  i n  e a c h  
l anguage .  But t h i s  seems c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e ,  
Yet a n o t h e r  way o f  p u t t i n g  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same 
o b j e c t i o n  i s  t h i s .  You would t h i n k  t h a t  ' 2  t 2 = 4 ' i s  
t r u e  by v i r t u e  o f  some - one f a c t ,  m a t h e m a t i c a l ,  l i n g u i s t i c  
o r  o t h e r w i s e .  However, t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  advanced i n  
t h e  p r e c e d i n g  p a r a g r a p h  show t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  s o .  O r  do  
t h e y ?  Perhaps  t h e r e  - i s some one s t a t e m e n t  t h a t ,  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  when i n s e r t e d  i n  t h e  b l a n k  o f  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  schema, y i e l d s  a t r u t h  t h a t  Is n o t  r a d i c a l l y  
language-re l .a t  i v e  : 
' 2  -b 2  = 4 '  i s  t r u e  because  
We know t h a t  n e i t h e r  ( 4 6 ) ,  ( 4 9 )  n o r  (TO) works. But 
p e r h a p s  ' 2  t 2 = 4 l  i s  t r u e  by  v i r t u e  o f  all such  s t a t e m e n t s .  
That  i s ,  maybe i t  i s  t r u e  because  o f  t h e  f a c t  s t a t e d  i n  ( 5 1 ) .  
( 5 1 )  Given any s t a n d a r d  number word p r o g r e s s i o n ,  t h e  
second member o f  i t  when "added1' t o  t h e  second 
member o f  i t  y i e l d s  t h e  f o u r t h  member of i t .  
And B e n a c e r r a f  need n o t  deny t h a t  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  ( 5 1 )  
i n t o ,  s a y ,  French & a t r a n s l a t i o n .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h i s  i d e a  f o u n d e r s  on t h e  r o c k s  t h a t  
c a p s i z e d  Harmants  ( 2 3 )  and W h i t e ' s  ( 3 0 ) .  T h i s  can  be 
s e e n  by n o t i n g  t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  between ( 5 1 )  and ( 2 3 )  (on  
p .  76  a b o v e ) .  The o n l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  
Harman q u a n t i f i e s  o v e r  a l l  p r o g r e s s i o n s ,  whereas  B e n a c e r r a f  
q u a n t i f i e s  o v e r  a l l  s t a n d a r d  number word b r b g r e s s i o n s .  
But I c a n n o t  see how t h i s  would make B e n a c e r r a f l s  job  any 
e a s i e r ,  because  i t  s t i l l  remains  t h e  c a s e  t h a t ,  a s  we 
saw on p ,  88 above,  t h e r e  is  no a b s o l u t e  n o t i o n  o f  a s e t  
o f  o r d o r e d  p a i r s ,  and i t  i s  h a r d  t o  s e e  how t h e  n o t i o n  o f  
a r e l a t i o n ,  and hence  o f  a  p r o g r e s s i o n ,  can  be  unpacked 
w i t h o u t  i t .  
So i t  l o o k s  as though  i t  i s  a consequence of  
B e n a c e r r a f t s  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no s i n g l e  f a c t  by 
v i r t u e  o f  which ' 2  t 2 = 4 '  , f o r  example,  i s  t r u e .  A l s o ,  
t h a t  ' 2  t 2  = 4 '  i s  many-ways ambiguous, and t h a t  ( 4 3 ) ,  
( 4 4 )  and ( 4 5 )  a r e  n o t  t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  each  o t h e r .  While 
u n a t t r a c t i v e ,  t h e s e  consequences  do n o t  r e n d e r  t h e  p r o p o s a l  
i n c o h e r e n t .  Perhaps  some s t o r y  can  be  t o l d  t h a t  w i l l  
make them palatable. ,Perhaps something can be gained by 
pointing to "the similarity of function1' that (43), (44) 
and (45) would play, for example. Nonetheless, the difference 
between numerical truths of different languages makes 
numerical truths radically language-dependent. In fact, 
what it might be said to come down to is that there are 
no strictly numerical truths. The only truths to be had, 
whatever their similarity of function, are those such as 
( 4 6 ) ,  (47) and (48), and these are about words. Each 
language that has a standard progression of expressions 
can have an expression arithmetic about such expressions, 
but each expression arithmetic will differ from the others; 
each will have different truths (as (49) and (50) are 
different) about different objects (as the words 'deux' 
and 'zwei'). There would even be no one arithmetic, 
Upon analysis, for example, the axiom of Peano Arithmetic: 
0 is a number. 
would be, in American-English Expression Arithmetic: 
'Zerof is a number word. 
But in German Expression Arithmetic is would be the very 
different : 
'Null' ist ein Zahlwort. 
And similarly for French Expression Arithmetic. If 
expressions are the proper objects of the domain, then it 
would seem that one could add further axioms onto one's 
expression arithmetic. The following statements, for 
example, seem of interest and importance, Why shouldn't 
they be theorems of American-English Expression Arithmetic? 
Among the first ten number words the letter l e t  occurs 
nine times. 
IThreel is not only a prime number word, it is the only 
number word in the first ten with a 'th' in it. 
There are only fifteen letters of the alphabet occurring 
among the first ten number words. 
Of course, were we to try to make our expression arithmetics 
completer, each would start looking quite different from 
the others. One would wonder what had become of plain 
old arithmetic. No doubt someone would come along (this 
consideration may sound familiar from chapter one) and try 
to formulate what it is all these expression arithmetics 
have in common -- and we would be back to wondering about 
Peano Arithmetic again. 
I doubt that Benacerraf would consider even trying 
to make the consequences of the preceding scenario seem 
palatable. On the other hand, I do not know how he would 
attempt to avoid them, while still remaining faithful to 
the proposal under consideration. It seems to me that the 
most plausible way of avoiding all the unattractive 
consequences cited so far would be to find a set of truth 
conditions, conditions like (51), that are not -relative 
to a particular number word progression, and under which 
statements of pure number theory come out true. But we 
saw how (51) was not available to Benacerraf, Besides, 
even  i f  i t  were,  t h e r e  i s  something q u e e r  a b o u t  hav ing  t h e  
t r u t h  o f  a n  a r i t h m e t i c a l  s t a t e m e n t  l i k e  ' 2  + 2 = 4 '  be 
c o n t i n g e n t  upon t h e  t r u t h  o f  ( 5 1 ) .  R e c a l l  t h a t  ''a s t a n d a r d  
number word p r o g r e s s i o n "  r e f e r s  t o  one t h a t  had been a g r e e d  
upon as t h e  s t a n d a r d  one f o r  a  c e r t a i n  l anguage ,  and i n  
t h i s  s e n s e  it c o u l d  t u r n  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  may n o t  b e ,  now 
o r  e v e r ,  any s t a n d a r d  number word p r o g r e s s i o n s .  Then 
'2 t 2 = 4 '  would be fa lse .  
Also ,  '2 + 2 = 4 '  i s  supposed t o  be  t h e  s o r t  o f  
t h i n g  t h a t  i s  t r u e  i n  a l l  p o s s i b l e  w o r l d s ,  even wor lds  where 
t h e r e  a r e  no words. ( I  assume such  wor lds  a r e  p o s s i b l e . ) .  
So it seems unwise t o  make t h e  t r u t h  o f  i t  c o n t i n g e n t  
upon f a c t s  a b o u t  word p r o g r e s s i o n s .  
' < 
Another  s e r i o u s  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s .  Suppose B e n a c e r r a f  
were a b l e  t o  a v o i d  committment t o  ma themat ica l  e n t i t i e s ,  
t h a t  he were a b l e  t o  make do w i t h  l i n g u i s t i c  e x p r e s s i o n s .  
Would we be any b e t t e r  o f f ?  C e r t a i n l y ,  some l e v e l  o f  
o n t o l o g i c a l  economy would have been e f f e c t e d  But why do 
away w i t h  numbers ii: i a v o r  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s ?  There  i s  no 
t r a n s p a r e n t l y  o b v i o u s  r e a s o n  f o r  p r e f e r r i n g  t h e  r e d u c t i o n ,  
as i t  were,  o f  numbers t o  e x p r e s s i o n s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h a t  o f  
e x p r e s s i o n s  t o  I f  t h e  former  i s  t o  be p r e f e r r e d ,  
r e a s o n s  s h o u l d  be  g i v e n .  Benacer ra f  g i v e s  no r e a s o n s .  
4 2 .  A t  l e a s t ,  n o t  t o  me. And no t  t o  any one who t h i n k s  
t h a t  my h y p o t h e t i c a l  l i t t l e  f r i e n d  K u r t ,  d i s c u s s e d  on p .  1 1 3  
below, i s  no more remarkab le  t h a n ,  s a y ,  E r n i e  o r  Johnny.  
On t o p  o f  t h i s ,  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  u s u a l l y  r e g a r d e d  a s  b e i n g  
a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  accoun t  
o f  what t h e y  a r e ,  o r  a rguments  showing how, a l t h o u g h  
e x p r e s s i o n s  are a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s ,  p r o p o s i t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  
them a r e  knowable, I t h i n k  we ought  t o  be wary o f  suppos ing  
t h a t  much e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  p r o g r e s s  h a s  been made. There  
w i l l  be  more d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e s e  m a t t e r s  i n  t h e  n e x t  
c h a p t e r .  
Thus we have  s e e n  t h a t  B e n a c e r r a f l s  p r o p o s a l ,  i n  
s p i t e  o f  s e v e r a l  a t t r a c t i v e  f e a t u r e s ,  r u n s  i n t o  s e r i o u s  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  when i t  comes t o  g i v i n g  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  s t a t e m e n t s  
o f  p u r e  number t h e o r y ,  l i k e  (S1) and (d2). The u n a t t r a c t i v e  
consequences  o f  one  way o f  c o n s t r u i n g  Benacer ra f  a r e  t h a t  
' , 
such  s t a t e m e n t s  t u r n  o u t  t o  be  n o t  s imply  t r u e  and i n  
accordance  w i t h  some one m a t h e m a t i c a l  f a c t ,  b u t  h i g h l y  
ambiguous t h i n g s  t h a t  mean something d i f f e r e n t  i n  e a c h  
l a n g u a g e ,  T h i s  would l e a d  t o  a m u l t i t u d e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
( e x p ~ e s s i o n )  a r i t h r n e t i c s ,  and  make t h e  t r u t h  o f  n u m e r i c a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  c o n t i n g e n t  upon f a c t s  a b o u t  o u r  number-names. 
Such i m p l a u s i b i l i t i e s  are c i rcumvented  by t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
c o n s t r u a l ;  b u t  t h a t  r o u t e ,  a l t h o u g h  i n  many ways b e t t e r ,  
i n t e r p r e t s  B e n a c e r r a f ' s  r a t h e r  i n e x p l i c i t  s u g g e s t i o n  a s  
amounting t o  Harmants ,  o r  something v e r y  l i k e  i t ,  and we 
have s e e n  how Harman1s p r o p o s a l  f a r e s ,  
5.A F i n a l  Word on B e n a c e r r a f ,  Harman 
and White 
Both Harman and White t o o k  t h e i r  cue  from 
B e n a c e r r a f .  Tha t  i s ,  t h e y  a l l  a g r e e d  t h a t  we c a n  conc lude  
from t h e  f a c t  o f  m u l t i p l e  s e t - t h e o r e t i c  e x p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
number t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no un ique  o b j e c t  t h a t  i s  t h e  number 
one ,  n o r  one t h a t  i s  t h e  number two,  e t c .  And t h e y  a g r e e d  
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  s e t s .  S i n c e  t h e i r  a c c o u n t s  do n o t  work, I 
b e l i e v e  we a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  t e n t a t i v e l y  conc lude  t h a t  t h e s e  
c l a i m s  do n o t  make s a t i s f a c t o r y  b e d f e l l o w s .  A b i t  more 
g e n e r a l l y ,  I t h i n k  we may view w i t h  s u s p i c i o n  any p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  d e n i e s  ( I )  a n d  (11) w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  ( I I I ) ,  ( I V )  and 
( V ) ,  u n l e s s  w e  a r e  a c t u a l l y  p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  a thorough-  
g o i n g  and  c o n s i s t e n t  r e d u c t i o i ~ .  But t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  t h e  l a t t e r ,  it seems t o  m e ,  because  i t  i s  
no c o i n c i d e n c e  t h a t  Harmanfs ,  W h i t e ' s  and e s p e c i a l l y  
B e n a c e r r a f l s  r e a s o n s  f o r  a n a l y z i n g  away numbers ( a s  un ique  
o b j e c t s )  a p p l y  a s  w e l l  t o  o t h e r  m a t h e m a t i c a l  o b j e c t s ;  
m a t h e m a t i c a l  o b j e c t s  a r e  a l l  of a  p i e c e ,  Non-spa t i a l  and 
non-temporal ,  t h e y  are members o f  a p l a t o n i c  r ea lm of  
o b j e c t s  s t a n d i n g  i n  mathemat ica l  r e l a t i o n s  t o  each  o t h e r .  
B e n a c e r r a f f s  problem, of how we come t o  know t r u t h s  a b o u t  
them, a p p l i e s  t o  se ts  as w e l l  as t o  numbers.  Indeed we 
s a y  i n  c h a p t e r  one how arguments  a k i n  t o  h i s  own f o r  
a n a l y z i n g  away numbers would have done away w i t h  s e t s .  43 
43.  I do n o t  mean t o  imply t h a t  Benacer ra f  i s  unaware 
t h a t  h i s  1968 p o s i t i o n  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  h i s  1973 o b j e c t i o n s .  
Before  l e a v i n g  t h i s  th reesome o f  p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  I 
would l i k e  t o  d i s c u s s  a c l a i m  t h a t  many may f i n d  a p p e a l i n g ,  
which a p p e a r s  i n  v a r i o u s  forms i n  t h e i r  and o t h e r s '  w r i t i n g s .  
It i s  supposed t o  b e  a p r imary  m o t i v a t o r  f o r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  
t h a t  t h e r e  are no numbers.  I d i s c u s s  i t  w i t h  t h e  hope of 
chang ing  t h e  minds o f  any r e a d e r s  who s t i l l  f e e l  t h e  view- 
p o i n t  r e p r e s e n t e d  by B e n a c e r r a f ,  Harman and White i s  
b a s i c a l l y  sound,  and i t  i s  j u s t  t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  f o r m u l a t i o n s  
which are d e f e c t i v e .  Harman makes t h e  c l a i m  i n  p e r h a p s  
i t s  b l u n t e s t  form: 
( 5 2 )  Any w-sequence o f  d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  ( o r  o t h e r  t h i n g s )  
can  be  u s e d  as t h e  numbers. 
White w r i t e s  : j ,  
For  even  i f  w e  t a k e  t h e  r e f e r e n c e s  o f  n u m e r i c a l  
e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  o u r  o r d i n a r y  a r i t h m e t i c a l  
d i s c o u r s e  t o  be  f i x e d ,  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  m u l t i p l e  
models o f  a r i t h m e t i c  makes u s  r e a l i z e  t h a t  we 
c o u l d  e q u a l l y  w e l l  have r e f e r r e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  
and S t i l l  have  come o u t  w i t h  a r i t h m e t i c a l  t r u t h s .  
( P *  1 1 7 )  
B e n a c e r r a f  writes: 
Under o u r  a n a l y s i s ,  a n y  sys tem of o b j e c t s ,  s e t s  
o r  n o t ,  t h a t  forms a  r e c u r s i v e  p r o g r e s s i o n  
must be  a d e q u a t e ,  (WNCNB,  p .  6 8 )  
I n  a similar v e i n ,  Q u i n e  writes: 
Any p r o g r e s s i o n  w i l l  s e r v e  as a  v e r s i o n  o f  
number s o  l o n g  and o n l y  s o  l o n g  a s  we s t i c k  
t o  one and t h e  same p r o g r e s s i o n  . . . (  O n t o l o g i c a l  
R e l a t i v i t y  p ,  45)  
Dedekind, much e a r l i e r ,  may have had a  l i k e  t h i n g  i n  mind 
when he  wro te :  
If i n  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  a  s imply  i n f i n i t e  
sys tem N set  i n  o r d e r  by a  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  
@ we e n T i r e l y  n e g l e c t  t h e  s p e c i a l  c h a r a c t e r  
o f  t h e  e l e m e n t s ;  s imply  r e t a i n i n g  t h e i r  
d i s t i n g u i s h a b i l i t y  and t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  
o n l y  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  t o  one a n o t h e r  i n  which 
t h e y  a r e  p laced  by t h e  o r d e r - s e t t i n g  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  @, t h e n  are t h e s e  e l e m e n t s  
c a l l e d  n a t u r a l  numbers o r  o r d i n a l  numbers 
o r  s imply  numbers,  and t h e  base-element  
1 i s  c a l l e d  t o base-number of t h e  number- 
s e r i e s  N. With r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h i s  f r e e i n g  
t h e  e l e m e n t s  from e v e r y  o t h e r  c o n t e n t  
( a b s t r a c t i o n )  we are j u s t i f i e d  i n  c a l l i n g  
numbers a f r e e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  human mind. 
The r e l a t i o n s  o r  laws which a r e  d e r i v e d  
e n t i r e l y  from t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  a ,  8 ,  8, 6 
i n  ( 7 1 )  and t h e r e f o r e  a r e  a lways  t h e  same 
i n  a l l  o r d e r e d  s imply  i n f i n i t e  s y s t e m s ,  
wha tever  names may happen t o  be  g i v e n  t o  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  e l e m e n t s . . f o r m  t h e  f i r s t  
o b j e c t  of t& s c i e n c e  of numbers o r  
a r i t h m e t i c .  
What do  t h e s e  c l a i m s  mean? I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  what 
d o e s  ( 5 2 )  mean? S u r e l y  n o t  t h a t  a TV n e w s c a s t e r  would even 
b e  u n d e r s t o o d ,  much l e s s  s a y i n g  something t r u e ,  i f  ( s ) h e  
were t o  announge: "The number o f  p l a n e t s  i n  o u r  s o l a r  
sys tem h a s  now been d e f i n i t i v e l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  be t h e  
u n i t  s e t  o f  t h e  u n i t  s e t  o f  t h e  n u l l  s e t . "  So t h e  c l a i m  
i s  n o t  t h a t  anyone can  u s e  any w-sequence ( s ) h e  wants  f o r  
any p u r p o s e .  Pe rhaps  i t  i s  t h a t  t h e  a r i t h m e t i c i a n  c a n  use  
any w-sequence ( s ) h e  wants  w h i l e  d o i n g  a r i t h m e t i c ,  i n  t h e  
4 4 .  Richard  Dedekind, E s s a y s  & the Theor o f  Numbers 
(New York: Dover P u b l i c a t i o n s ,  I n c .  1 9  -d! 3 p . T 8 .  
s e n s e  t h a t  ( s ) h e  c a n  o b t a i n  r e s u l t s  t r u e  o f  a l l  w-sequences 
by r e a s o n i n g  a b o u t  any one  o f  them. If s o ,  t h e  c l a i m  i s  
t r u e  ( p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  a r i t h m e t i c i a n  d o e s  n o t  f o c u s  upon 
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  w-sequence which o t h e r  w-sequences 
l a c k )  b u t  unremarkable .  Any model o f  a  t h e o r y ,  however un- 
i n t e n d e d ,  i s  s t i l l  a model.  And i f  - A and - B w e m o d e l s  o f  t h e  
same t h e o r y ,  t h e n  t h e y  model e a c h  o t h e r  i n  c e r t a i n  r e s p e c t s .  
T h i s  no more-shows t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no i n t e n d e d  model t h a n  
( t o  t a k e  a n  e x a g g e r a t e d  example) t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c h e m i s t s  
can  a r r i v e  a t  h y p o t h e s e s  t r u e  a t  t h e  m o l e c u l a r  l e v e l  by 
r e a s o n i n g  a b o u t  t i n k e r - t o y  models  shows t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
no m o l e c u l e s .  
The r e w o n  why t h e  n e w c a s t e r f s  remark i s  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  
' 8 
h a s  t o  do w i t h  communication. A s  B e n a c e r r a f  p o i n t s  o u t :  
"Too many sequences  i n  common u s e  would make i t  n e c e s s a r y  
f o r  u s  t o  l e a r n  t o o  many d i f f e r e n t   equivalence^.'^ (WNCNB,  
p .  7 2 ) .  Taking o u r  cue  from W h i t e ' s  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  c l a i m ,  
t h e n ,  p e r h a p s  ( 5 2 )  s h o u l d  be  i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  mean t h a t  a l l  
a r i t h m e t i c i a n s ,  o r  b e t t e r ,  a l l  of u s ,  might  have spoken a  
d i f f e r e n t  l anguage ,  one i n  which p a r t i c u l a r  s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l  
e x p r e s s i o n s  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  o c c u r  wherever  we a c t u a l l y  now 
u s e  n u m e r i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n s .  So t h a t ,  f o r  example,  ' t h e  u n i t  
Set of t h e  u n i t  set  o f  t h e  n u l l  s e t '  might  be used  i n s t e a d  
of ! t h e  number t e n f .  Then t h e  n e w s c a s t e r f s  rernmk would 
c e r t a i n l y  be  i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  Assuming t h i s  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  d o e s  
i t  p r o v i d e  u s  w i t h  a r e a s o n  f o r  c o n c l u d i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
no numbers? 
Suppose t h a t  i n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e  d e s c r i b e d ,  we had 
n o t  deve loped  s e t  t h e o r y .  Then I t h i n k  t h e  o n l y  t h i n g  t h i s  
p o s s i b i l i t y  d e m o n s t r a t e s  i s  t h a t  t h e  numbers m i g h t  have 
had d i f f e r e n t  names. Suppose,  i n s t e a d ,  t h a t  i n  t h e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e  d e s c r i b e d  w e  - had deve loped  se t  t h e o r y  ( s o  
t h a t  ' t h e  u n i t  s e t  o f  t h e  u n i t  s e t  o f  t h e  n u l l  s e t f ,  f o r  
example, would r e f e r  t o  a s e t ,  v i z . ,  {{O)) ,  as i t  does  now. ) .  
We would coun t  u s i n g  s e t - t h e o r e t i c  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  We would, 
i n  e f f e c t ,  b e  a k i n  t o  B e n a c e r r a f f s  f r i e n d  E r n i e  -- o r  
E r n i e  b e f o r e  he  l e a r n e d  how t o  "speak w i t h  t h e  v u l g a r " ,  
as B e n a c e r r a f  p u t  i t .  Tha t  i s ,  we would have s e t  t h e o r y ,  
and have deve loped  a s u b s e t  o f  it a round  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
w-sequence o f  se ts  -- s a y ,  t h e  sequence  O ,  { a ) ,  {O, (011,  
(0, {%I ,  ( 0 ,  (0111, . . . as E r n i e  d i d  -- which we u s e  f o r  
c o u n t i n g ,  and r e l a t i o n s  among whose members we s t u d y .  Maybe 
we even  c a l l  t h i s  sequence  ' t h e  numbersf  and u s e  t h e  
a b b r e v i a t i o n s  ' z e r o 1 ,  ' o n e 1 ,  ' t w o 1 ,  e t c .  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  
r e s p e c t i v e  members. I f  s o ,  we a r e  j u s t  l i k e  E r n i e ;  we a r e  
a n  e n t i r e  s o c i e t y  o f  E r n i e s .  
What d o e s  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  show? I t h i n k  i t  i s  t h a t  
we might  have had a d i f f e r e n t  i n t e n d e d  model o f  a r i t h m e t i c  
t h a n  t h e  one we do have ,  and s t i l l  have a r r i v e d  a t  a r i t h -  
m e t i c a l  t r u t h s .  That  seems t o  be t h e  g i s t  o f  W h i t e ' s  
remark ,  and one o f  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  t o  be drawn from 
B e n a c e r r a f f s  f a b l e  o f  E r n i e  and Johnny.  
F i r s t  of a l l ,  I do n o t  know i f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
p o s s i b l e .  That  i s ,  I do n o t  know i f  i t  i s  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  a s o c i e t y  t o  d e v e l o p  se t  t h e o r y  b e f o r e  i t  
d e v e l o p s  a r i t h m e t i c .  4 5 But i f  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  i t  does  n o t  
f o l l o w  t h a t  a s  t h i n g s  a r e  e i t h e r  ( i )  w e  have no i n t e n d e d  
model o f  a r i t h m e t i c ,  o r  t h a t  (ii) t h e r e  a r e  no numbers. 
With r e g a r d  t o  ( i ) ,  i f  a n y t h i n g ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  o u r  
f u n c t i o n i n g  w i t h  a d i f f e r e n t  i n t e n d e d  model t e n d s  t o  s u p p o r t  
t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  we need some i n t e n d e d  model o r  o t h e r ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  undermine i t .  (The model i n  t h e  E r n i e  s o c i e t y  
i s  d i f f e r e n t ,  b e c a u s e  we d o  n o t  now, b u t  would i n  t h a t  
-
s o c i e t y ,  m a i n t a i n  t h a t ,  s a y ,  5 i s  a member of  7 . ) .  With 
r e g a r d  t o  ( i i ) ,  we might  d e s c r i b e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a s  one i n  
which we had no numbers,  b u t  i n s t e a d  used  se t s ;  b u t  t h e n  
a g a i n ,  we might  d e s c r i b e  i t  as one i n  which t h e  numbers a r e  
-
sets  ( e . g , ,  2 = {%, (011). A t  b e s t  t h i s  shows t h a t  
a r i t h m e t i c ,  p u r e  and a p p l i e d ,  i s  d o a b l e  even i f  t h e r e  were 
no numbers,  n o t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no numbers,  o r  t h a t  t h e  
-
h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no numbers i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
a c t u a l  p r a c t i c e s .  
Bu t ,  i t  might  be  u rged  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  b o t h  p u r e  and 
a p p l i e d  number t h e o r y  i s  d o a b l e  w i t h o u t  s u p p o s i n g  t h a t  
45. N o t i c e  t h a t  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  n o t  one t h a t  Benacer ra f  
h a s  t o  f a c e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  h i s  Ernie-Johnny s i t u a t i o n ,  s i n c e  
he  a s k s  u s  t o  imagine  o n l y  one E r n i e ,  n o t  a  s o c i e t y  of  
-
E r n i e s ,  He does  p r e s u p p o s e ,  however,  t h a t  a  p e r s o n  cou ld  be 
t a u g h t  a f u l l - f l e d g e d  se t  t h e o r y  w i t h o u t  even knowing how t o  
c o u n t ,  and t h i s  may i n v o l v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
t h e r e  a r e  numbers shows t h a t  numbers a r e  d i s p e n s a b l e ,  and 
s o ,  by Occamls Razor,  ough t  t o  be  d i s p e n s e d  w i t h .  No, it 
d o e s  n o t ;  because  t h e  same s o r t  of  argument c o u l d  be  
advanced f o r  any p a r t i c u l a r  model of  a r i t h m e t i c  -- e * g .  9 
E r n i e ' s  model.  Then s i n c e  i t  would be t r u e  t o  s a y  o f  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  model t h a t  w e  ought  t o  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  - 9  i t  we 
would have t o  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  - a l l  models  of a r i t h m e t i c ,  
(Having no models ,  a r i t h m e t i c  would be  i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  by t h e  
Completeness Theorem!) Not s o ,  might  be t h e  r e j o i n d e r ,  
b e c a u s e  we s h o u l d  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  o n l y  t h o s e  models whose 
e x i s t e n c e  we l a c k  independen t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r .  But now 
t h e  problem i s  w i t h  what c o u n t s  a s  " independen t  j u ~ t i f i c a t i o n ~ ~ .  
U n t i l  we a r e  t o l d ,  and p r o b a b l y  even a f t e r  we a r e ,  n o t h i n g  
p r o h i b i t s  u s  from p r o p o s i n g  s i m i l a r  a rguments  t h a t  would 
have  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  d o i n g  away w i t h ,  s a y ,  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  T h i s  
move s h o u l d  be  familiar from c h a p t e ~  one above,  b u t  i n  c a s e  
i t  i s  n o t ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o s s i b i l i t y .  
We might  have  spoken a d i f f e r e n t  l a n g u a g e ,  one i n  
which we u s e  n u m e r i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n s t e a d  o f  e x p r e s s i o n  
e ~ p ~ e s s i o n s ,  Tha t  i s ,  imagine  & l a  B e n a c e r r a f ,  a m i l i t a n t  
Py thagorean  who t e a c h e s  h i s  c h i l d ,  l i t t l e  K u r t ,  a r i t h m e t i c  
and a l l  a b o u t  numbers, b u t  when t h e  time comes f o r  Kurt  t o  
l e a r n  h i s  a l p h a b e t ,  he  i s  t o l d  t h a t  la1 i s  j u s t  a n o t h e r  
name f o r  t h e  number one ,  ' b l  f o r  two,  and s o  on f o r  t h e  
s i n g l e  s i g n s ;  t h a t  v c o n c a t e n a t i o n "  o f  " t h e  l e t t e r s u  n l ,  . . . ,  
"k t o  y i e l d  t h e  l o n g e r  w e x p r e s s i o n l l  m i s  j u s t  t h i s  o p e r a t i o n :  
(where p  1) p 2 ,  ... pk a r e  t h e  f i r s t  k p r i m e s ) .  So i t  would 
t u r n  o u t  t h a t  a l l  t a l k  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  i s  j u s t  t a l k  o f  numbers,  
4 6 f o r  Kur t .  Now imagine  t h a t  we a r e  a  s o c i e t y  of K u r t s .  
T h i s  shows t h a t  s y n t a x  i s  d o a b l e  even i f  t h e r e  a r e  no 
e x p r e s s i o n s .  Hence, were we t o  r e a s o n  i n  a f a s h i o n  p a r a l l e l  
t o  t h z t  b e i n g  h y p o t h e t i c a l l y  u r g e d ,  we would conc lude  t h a t  
e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  d i s p e n s a b l e ,  and s o ,  by Occamls Razor ,  t h a t  
t h e y  ought  t o  be  d i s p e n s e d  w i t h .  But t h i s  i s  r i d i c u l o u s .  
So much f o r  (52), t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  "any w-sequence 
of  d i f f e r e n t  sets ( o r  o t h e r  t h i n g s )  c a n  be used  a s  t h e  
numbers1'. While a t  f i r s t  b l u s h ,  p e r h a p s ,  a l l u r i n g ,  w e  have 
s e e n  t h a t  upon i n s p e c t i o n  i t  p r o v e s  false i f  i t  means: 
Anyone can  u s e  any w-sequence ( s ) h e  wants  f o r  any 
purpose .  
And i f  i t  means e i t h e r  
The a r i t h m e t i c i a n  can  u s e  any w-sequence ( s ) h e  
wants  w h i l e  d o i n g  a r i t h m e t i c  ( i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  
( s ) h e  c a n  o b t a i n  r e s u l t s  t r u e  o f  a l l  w-sequences 
by r e a s o n i n g  abou t  any one of  t h e m ) .  
o r  
We might  have spoken a d i f f e r e n t  l a n g u a g e ,  one 
i n  which p a r t i c u l a r  s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n s  
o c c u r  wherever  we a c t u a l l y  now u s e  n u m e r i c a l  
e x p r e s s i o n s .  
4 6 .  T h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  was s u g g e s t e d  t o  my by Richard  
C a r t w r i g h t  . 
t h e n ,  a l t h o u g h  t r u e ,  i t  does  n o t  j u s t i f y  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no numbers,  A s  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h a t  c o n c l u s i o n ,  
a t  b e s t  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  an  u n i n h i b i t e d  a p p e a l  t o  Occam's 
Razor -- u n i n h i b i t e d  by any e x p l a n a t i o n  a s  t o  why t h e  numbers,  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  ought  t o  be s a c r i f i c e d .  
CHAPTER 111: FORMALISM 
1. Introduction 
One of the most serious challenges faced by the 
position that numbers exist comes from formalists, like 
Hilbert, who claim that we do not need the traditional 
non-linguistic mathematical entities to do mathematics at 
all; linguistic objects will do. This claim has often 
been criticized, but I wish to challenge not the claim 
itself, but the presupposition that seems to lie behind 
the claim, namely, that linguistic objects, expressions, 
are epistemologically accessible but mathematical entities 
are not. 
There are two main grounds as I see it that the 
formalist wouldadvanceby way of justifying the presup- 
position. First, (s)he would say that expressions are 
concrete whereas mathematical entities, including numbers, 
are abstract. And second, (s)he would say that even if 
expressions are abstract objects, they can be known about 
on the basis of their tokens, which are concrete objects 
-- unlike the case with numbers, because numbers have no 
tokens . 
In the next section of this chapter, section 2, 
i examine the first ground and argue that it is false; and 
in the following section, section 3, I examine the second 
ground and argue that it too is false. 
2 .  F i r s t  F o r m a l i s t  C l a i m  
B e n a c e r r a f  u r g e d  u s  t o  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  num'.)ers i n  f a v o r  
o f  number words. Yet he was n o t  a n x i o u s  t o  f o r e s o  a l l  
m a t h e m a t i c a l  e n t i t i e s  -- e . g . ,  se ts .  T h i s  h a l f - h e a r t e d  
fo rmal i sm i s  one  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  h i s  p o s i t i o n  
f a c e s ,  as we saw e a r l i e r ,  So one might  t h i n k  t h a t  a  more 
thoroughgo ing  fo rmal i sm would be l e s s  p r o b l e m a t i c a l .  These 
p a s s a g e s  o f  H i l b e r t t s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  he  would deny n o t  o n l y  ( I )  
and (11), b u t  (111) and p o s s i b l y  ( I V )  a s  w e l l :  
No more t h a n  any o t h e r  s c i e n c e  c a n  mathemat ics  
be  founded by l o g i c  a l o n e ;  r a t h e r ,  a s  a  c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  l o g i c a l  i n f e r e n c e s  and t h e  
performance  o f  l o g i c a l  o p e r a t i o n s ,  something must 
a l r e a d y  be  g i v e n  t o  u s  i n  o u r  f a c u l t y  o f  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  c e r t a i n  e x t r a l o g i c a l ~ c o n c r e t e  
o b j e c t s  t h a t  ar? i n t u i t i v e l y  p r e s e n t  as immediate  
e x p e r i e n c e  p r i o r  t o  a l l  t h o u g h t .  If l o g i c a l  
i n f e r e n c e  i s  t o  be  r e l i a b l e ,  i t  must be p o s s i b l e  
t o  s u r v e y  t h e s e  o b j e c t s  c o m p l e t e l y  i n  a l l  t h e i r  
p a r t s ,  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  o c c u r ,  t h a t  t h e y  
d i f f e r  from one a n o t h e r ,  and t h a t  t h e y  f o l l o w  
e a c h  o t h e r ,  o r  are c o n c a t e n a t e d ,  i s  immedia te ly  
g i v e n  i n t u i t i v e l y ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t s ,  a s  
something t h a t  n e i t h e r  c a n  be  r e d u c e d  t o  
a n y t h i n g  e l s e  n o r  r e q u i r e s  r e d u c t i o n .  T h i s  
i s  t h e  b a s i c  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  I 
r e g a r d  as r e q u i s i t e  f o r  ma themat ics  a n d ,  i n  
g e n e r a l ,  f o r  a l l  s c i e n t i f i c  t h i n k i n g ,  under-  
s t a n d i n g ,  and communicat ion.  And i n  mathemat ics ,  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  what we c o n s i d e r  c o n c r e t e  
s i g n s  t h e m s e l v e s ,  whose s h a p e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  c o n c e p t i o n  we have  a d o p t e d ,  i s  immedia te ly  
c l e a r  and r e c o g n i z a b l e , . . A l l  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  
t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e  mathemat ics  are c o n v e r t e d  
i n t o  f o r m u l a s ,  s o  t h a t  mathemat icq  
becomes an i n v e n t o r y  o f  - f o r m u l a s .  7- 
47. "The Founda t ions  o f  Mathemat ics ,"  From Frege  t o  Gade l ,  
e d i t e d  by J e a n  van H e i j e n o o r t  ( c a m b r i d g n a s s .  ~ a r v G d m 7 )  
pp. 464f (my i t a l i c s ) .  
Among t h e  l lconcrete  s i g n s "  a r e  
I n  number t h e o r y  ... t h e  numer ica l  symbols 
where each numerical  symbol i s  i n t u i t i v e l y  
r e c o g n i z a b l e  by t h e  f a c t  i t  c c - t a i n s  only  
1 's .  These numer ica l  symbols ~ h i c h  a r e  
themselves  - our  s u b j e c t  mattgg have no 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  themse lves .  
Formulas [ a r e ]  always used e x c l u s i v e l y  f o r  
communication i n  i n t u i t i v e  number t h e o r y .  
The l e t t e r s  [ s t and ]  f o r  numer ica l  symbols 
and a n  equa t ion  communicated t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  two symbols co inc ided .  I n  a l g e b r a ,  on 
t h e  o t h e r  hand, we r e g a r d  e x p r e s s i o n s  
c o n t a i n i n g  l e t t e r s  as independent  s t r u c t u r e s  
which f o r m a l i z e  t h e  m a t e r i a l  theorems o f  
number t heo ry .  I n  p l a c e  o f  s t a t e m e n t s  about  
numer ica l  symbols', we h a v e f o r m u l a s  which 
--
are themselves  t h e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  of 
-
i n t u i t i v e  ( p .  145,  "On t h e  I n f i n i t e l f ,  
my i t a l i c s  
So f o r  H i l b e r t  t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  s t udy  i n  mathematics a r e  
numerical  symbols and formulas  -- e x p r e s s i o n s ,  i n  o t h e r  words. 
Not ice  t h a t  he r e f e r s  t o  them a s  " conc re t e  o b j e c t s 1 ' .  
H a r t r y  F i e l d  goes  a s t e p  f u r t h e r  t h a n  H i l b e r t  does ;  
he  e x p l i c i t l y  d e n i e s  (IV) and even ( V ) .  (Hence he would 
deny every  one o f  ( I )  - ( V ) , ) .  Th is  i s  ev iden t  i n  t h e  
fo l l owing  pas sages  from Sc ience  Without Numbers. 49 
Nominalism i s  t h e  d o c t r i n e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no 
a b s t r a c t  e n t i t i e s .  The term ' a b s t r a c t  e n t i t y 1  
may n o t  be e n t i r e l y  c l e a r ,  bu t  one t h i n g  t h a t  
does  seem c l e a r  i s  t h a t  such a l l e g e d  e n t l t i e s  
as numbers, f u n c t i o n s ,  and s e t s  a r e  a b s t r a c t  -- 
t h a t  i s ,  t h e y  would be a b s t r a c t  i f  t hey  e x i s t e d .  
I n  defending nominalism t h e r e f o r e ,  I am denying 
48. "On t h e  I n f i n i t e , l l  i n  Philosophy of  Mathematics 
e d i t e d  by Benacerraf  and Putnam, p .  143,my I t a l l c s ,  
49. P r i n c e t o n ,  N . J . :  P r i nce ton  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 0 ,  
that numbers, functions, sets or any similar 
entities exist. (p. 1) 
Toward that part of mathematics which does 
contain references to (or auantifications 
over) abstract entities -- and this includes 
virtually all of conventional mathematics -- 
I adopt a fictionalist attitude: that is, 
I see no readon to regard this part of 
mathematics as true. (p. 2 )  
In spite of his disavowal of abstract entities, he 
endorses a nominalistic theory that "...contains, besides 
the usual quantifiers ' v '  and ' a ' ,  also quantifiers like 
' ~ 8 7  (meaning 'there are exactly 87') ..." (p. 2 1 ) .  
Since quantifiers are expressions, this suggests that he 
thinks that expressions are not abstract objects. And 
indeed this is supported by his statementithat 
... nominalistically inclined philosophers 
[usually] try to reinterpret mathematics -- 
reinterpret it so that its terms and 
quantifiers don't make reference to abstract 
entities (numbers, functions, etc.) but only 
to entities of other sorts, say physical 
objects, or linguistic expressions, or mental 
constructions. (p. 1) 
Like Hilbert, Field thinks (i) the objects that 
mathematics is traditionally viewed as being about don't 
exist, but (ii) there are expressions. How would either 
respond to the charge that I wish to make, that such a 
position is not justified on epistemological grounds, because 
numbers, at least, are on an eplsternological par (roughly) 
with expressions? I think the answer is clear enough from 
the passages quoted above: both would deny that numbers 
are even on a rough epistemological par with expressions, 
s a y i n g  t h a t  numbers a r e  - a b s t r a c t ,  wherers  e x p r e s s i o n s  - a r e  
c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  
Whatever t h e  a b s t r a c t - c o n c r e t e  d i s t i n c t i o n  amounts t o ,  
nuii.bers a r e  g e n e r a l l y  regarded  a s  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s  par 
e x c e l l e n c e  -- and I f o r  one have no d e s i r e  t o  cha l l enge  
t h a t .  Express ions ,  however, a r e  a n o t h e r  s t o r y .  H i l b e r t  and 
F i e l d  c l a s s i f y  them a s  c o n c r e t e ,  b u t  t h e i r  r e a s o n s  f o r  doing 
s o  a r e  obscure .  F i e l d  s a y s  n o t h i n g  f u r t h e r  about  t h e  c o n c r e t e /  
a b s t r a c t  s t a t u s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  t h a t  I am aware o f .  H i l b e r t ,  
as we saw i n  t h e  f i r s t  passage  quoted above,  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
t h e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  i n  q u e s t i o n  as be ing  w i n t u i t i v e l y  
p r e s e n t  as immediate expe r i ence  p r i o r  t o  a l l  thought . l l  T h i s  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  a l l  
of t h e i r  p a r t s ,  should  be d i r e c t l y  e x p e r i e n c a b l e ,  and no t  
known by v i r t u e  o f  an i n f e r e n c e .  He a l s o  s t i p u l a t e s ,  i n  
t h e  same passage ,  t h a t  
. . . i t  must be p o s s i b l e  t o  survey  t h e s e  o b j e c t s  
comple te ly  i n  a l l  t h e i r  p a r t s ,  and t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e y  occur ,  t h a t  t h e y  d i f f e r  from one 
a n o t h e r ,  and t h a t  t h e y  f o l l o w  each  o t h e r ,  o r  
a r e  conca t ena t ed ,  i s  immediately g iven  
i n t u i t i v e l y ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t s ,  a s  
something t h a t  n e i t h e r  can be reduced t o  
any th ing  e l s e  n o r  r e q u i r e s  r e d u c t i o n .  
I s h a l l  r e f e r  t o  t h i s  s e t  of  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  H i l b e r t l s  
c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  must meet as t h e  l l p e r c e p t i b i l i t y  requiirernentvl,  
a l t hough  i t  amounts t o  a number o f  s e p a r a t e  r equ i r emen t s .  
(The requ i rement  t h a t  "it must be p o s s i b l e  t o  survey 
t h e s e  o b j e c t s  comple te ly  i n  a l l  t h e i r  p a r t d ' i s  sometimes 
r e i ' e r r e d  t o  as t h e  f l s u r v e y a b i l i t y f l  r e q u i r e m e n t .  ) .  I c a l l  
i t  t h e  f f p e r c e p t i b i l i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t u  b e c a u s e ,  w h i l e  i t  i s  
less t h a n  t o t a l l y  c l e a r ,  i t  seems t o  s t i p u l a t e  t h a t ,  a t  
t h e  minimum, t h e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  I n  q u e s t i o n  ( e x p r e s s i o n s )  
and v a r i o u s  t h i n g s  abou t  them, be  p e r c e p t l b l e  ( b y  means 
a f  t h e  s e n s e s ,  o r ,  p e r h a p s ,  w i t h  t h e  "mind's  e y e f f ) .  
L o g i c i a n s  who a p p a r e n t l y  s h a r e  H i l b e r t f s  o p i n i o n  
a b o u t  e x p r e s s i o n s  b e l n g  c o n c r e t e  i n c l u d e  J o s e p h  S h o e n f i e l d ,  
f o r  whom "a s e n t e n c e . . . i s  a c o n c r e t e  ~ b j e c t . , . ' ~  because  i t  
i s  a n  " o b j e c t  which a p p e a r s  on p a p e r  when we w r i t e  down 
50 
a n  axiomv , and Benson Mates, f o r  whom "a s e n t e n c e ,  a t  
l eas t  i n  i t s  w r i t t e n  form, i s  a n  o b j e c t  h a v i n g  a shape  
a c c e s s i b l e  t o  s e n s o r y  p e r c e p t i o n ,  o r ,  a t  y o r s t ,  i t  i s  a  
set o f  s u c h  o b j e c t s n .  5 1  
No doub t  some s o r t s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  a re  - p e r c e p t i b l e  -- 
t h a t  i s ,  a r e  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  o r  e v e n t s ,  But a r e  t h e  ones  
H i l b e r t ,  F i e l d ,  S h o e n f i e l d  and Mates are t a l k i n g  a b o u t  
p e r c e p t i b l e  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  o r  e v e n t s ?  Q u i t e  f r a n k l y ,  
no. They canno t  b e ,  S h o e n f i e l d f s  f o r m a t i o n  r u l e s  f o r  
f o r m u l a s ,  f o r  example, e n t a i l  t h a t  t h e r e  are  i n f i n i t e l y  
many f o r m u l a s  ( p .  1 5 ) .  F i e l d ' s  n o m i n a l i s t i c  t h e o r y ,  a s  
we saw, " c o n t a i n s ,  b e s i d e s  t h e  u s u a l  q u a n t i f i e r s  f v l  and 
' a f ,  a l s o  q u a n t i f i e r s  l i k e  lag7 . . . I f .  I t a k e  i t  he means: 
50. Mathemat ica l  Logic (Reading,Mass  Addison-Wesley, 1967) 
p * 2 .  
51. Elementary  Logic ( N e w  York: Oxford,  1972)  p .  1 0 .  
f o r  e v e r y  E ,  h i s  t h e o r y  c o n t a i n s  a  q u a n t i f i e r  w i t h  t h e  
numeral  f o r  - n as a s u b s c r l p t .  (He a l l o w s  h i m s e l f  t o  p r e s e n t  
h i s  i d e a s  p l a t o n i s t i c a l l y . ) .  T h i s  r e q u i r e s  i n f i n i t e l y  
many q u a n t i f i e r s .  And H i l b e r t  r e q u i r e s  i n f i n i t e l y  many 
n u m e r i c a l  symbols (1, 11, 111, ...) f o r  t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  
s t u d y  o f  number t h e o r y .  Each o f  t h e s e  a u t h o r s  needs  
i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  one s o r t  o r  a n o t h e r ,  and 
t h e r e  s imply  a r e n ' t  i n f i n i t e l y  many p e r c e p t i b l e  p h y s i c a l  
o b j e c t s .  
Let  u s  pause  t o  s e e  why. F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  t h e r e  may 
r ~ o t  even be i n f i n i t e l y  many p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s .  As we remarked 
i n  c h a p t e r  one ,  i f  space- t ime i s  f i n i t e  (and t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  
t o  b e l i e v e  i t  i s ) ,  t h e n  g i v e n  any s t a n d a r d  p o s i t i v e  r e a l  
v a l u e  v, no m a t t e r  how t i n y ,  if we r e g a r d  t h e  whole p h y s i c a l  
u n i v e r s e  as b e i n g  d i v i d e d  up i n t o  space- t ime volumes o f  
s i z e  ( q u a d r u b i c  inch-seconds  o r  wha tever  t h e  u n i t  would 
b e )  t h e r e  would s t i l l  b e  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many such  p h y s i c a l  
volumes. I n  f a c t ,  t h e r e  would s t i l l  be  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many 
s e t s  o f  them. Second ly ,  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t s  
-
be p e r c e p t i b l e ,  no m a t t e r  now b r o a d l y  c o n s t r u e d ,  r u l e s  
o u r  t a k i n g  t e e n y - t i n y  o b j e c t s  as e x p r e s s i c n s ;  s o  how s m a l l  
v  can  b e  i s  l i m i t e d .  And t h i r d l y ,  g i v e n  t h i s  l a s t  f a c t ,  
- 
t h e r e  c e r t a i n l y  a r e n ' t  i n f i n i t e l y  many s t r i n g s  o f  1 ' s  
t h a t  can  b e  l lsurveyed c o m p l e t e l y  i n  a l l  t h e i r  p a r t s f 1 ,  a s  
H i l b e r t  r e q u i r e s ,  because  most would j u s t  be t o o  l o n g  t o  
be  s u r v e y e d ,  
But i t  might  be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  s u r v e y a b i l i t y  
r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  j u s t  p l a i n  u n r e a s o n a b l e ,  and s o  s h o u l d  be  
dropped -- o r  a t  l e a s t  c o n s t r u e d  as " s u r v e y a b l e  by Godff, 
o r  something e q u a l l y  g e n e r o u s .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i t  might  
be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  d i s c u s s i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
where in  t h e  p h y s i c a l  u n i v e r s e  was viewed as b e i n g  
p a r t i t i o n e d  i n t o  space- t ime volumes, p resupposed  t h a t  t h e  
o b j e c t s  i n  q u e s t i o n  c o u l d  n o t  c ~ v e r l a p .  Roder ick  Chisholm 
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  s i n c e  a b l a n k  p i e c e  o f  p a p e r  c o u l d  be c u t  
up s o  as t o  form (a  t o k e n  o f )  a n  e x p r e s s i o n ,  s a y ,  o f  ! c a t r ,  
and s i n c e  t h e  t o k e n  would j u s t  a p a r t i c u l a r  b i t  o f  
p a p e r ,  t h e  t o k e n  o f  ' c a t t  a l r e a d y  e x i s t s  b e f o r e  t h e  p a p e r  
i s  c u t  up, s i n c e  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  b i t  o f  p a p e r  d o e s .  
' # 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i t  c o u l d  be c u t  up t o  form a  t o k e n  o f  ! d o g 1 .  
So t h a t  e x i s t s  t o o ,  And s o  on.  Thus t h e r e  b e i n g  a f i n i t e  
amount of  m a t t e r  might  be  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h e r e  b e i n g  
i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n  ( t o k e n s ) .  
There  a r e  two r e s p e c t s  i n  which t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  
f a i l s ,  F i r s t ,  even i f  we a g r e e  t h a t  many words e x i s t  as 
p a r t s  o f  t h e  p a p e r  even though t h e  p a p e r  w i l l  n e v e r  be  c u t  
up,  it seems t o  me t h a t  t h e s e  e x p r e s s i o n s  f a i l  t o  meet 
t h e  p e r c e p t i b i l i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t .  We have n o t  i n q u i r e d  t o o  
c l o s e l y  i n t o  what t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  amounts t o .  I n  a  s e n s e  
t h e  t o k e n  o f  ' c a t f ,  t h e  t o k e n  of  ' d o g t  and a l l  t h e  o t h e r  
t o k e n s  are p e r c e p t i b l e  because  t h e y  a r e  lfpartsf? o f  t h e  
p a p e r ,  and t h e  p a p e r  i s  p e r c e p t i b l e .  Yet i t  seems c l e a r  
enough from H i l b e r t f s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  " . . . t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
[ t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s ]  occur ,  t h a t  they  d i f f e r  from one 
a n o t h e r . . .  [ should be] immediately g iven  i n t u i t i v e l y  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t s v 1  ("Foundations o f  Mathematics1I, p .  4 6 4 )  
t h a t  t h e  exp res s ions  i n  q u e s t i o n  ought t o  be d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
from one ano the r  even i f  t h e r e  i s  some o v e r l a p ,  and t h i s  
seems v i o l a t e d  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  ca se .  
The second r e s p e c t  i n  which Chisholmls  sugges t ion  
f a i l s  i s  t h a t  even i f  t h e  paper  token of ' c a t 1  e x i s t s ,  
because it  i s  p a r t  of t h e  pape r ,  and s i m i l a r l y  f o r  'dog1 
and so  on, t h e r e  w i l l  no t  be i n f i n i t e l y  many expres s ions  
t h a t  a r e  " p a r t s "  of  t h e  paper .  The land so  on1  cannot be  
cons t rued  as lad i n f i n i t u m 1  -- o r  a t  l e a s t  I cannot s e e  
how i t  can be s o  cons t rued .  For  cons ide r  w r i t t e n  Engl i sh  
e x p r e s s i o n  ( t y p e s ) .  There a r e  on ly  f i n i t e l y  many l e t t e r s ,  
words, s en t ences  o f  l e n g t h  11 f o r  any p a r t i c u l a r  n, and 
sen tences  o f  l e n g t h  l e s s  t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  5. The f a c t  
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many Eng l i sh  exp res s ions  i s  due 
t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  g iven  a sen tence  of l e n g t h  5, t h e r e  i s  
always a  s en t ence  o f  l e n g t h  g r e a t e r  t han  n. Now I do not  
t h i n k  i t  i s  unreasonable  t o  assume t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some 
p o s i t i v e  r e a l  va lue ,  c a l l  i t  - r ,  t h a t  i s  t h e  lower bound on 
how many square  i nches ,  o r  Angstrom u n i t s ,  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
i n s t a n t i a t e  t h e  smallest word. (Chalk t h i s  assumption up 
t o  t h e  p e r c e p t i b i l i t y  requi rement ,  i f  i t  i s  thought  t h a t  
some j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  needed . ) .  Then even i f  t h e  p i ece  o f  
paper  i s  i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e  ( a  dubious  s u p p o s i t i o n ,  bu t  
t h e  paper  i s  i n  space ,  and d o u b t l e s s  c o n s i s t s  o f  some 
space ,  and i t  may be t h a t  space  i s  i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e )  
t h e  paper  i t s e l f  i s  on ly  f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e  b y  ;. I n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  i f  t h e  paper  i s  of  s i z e  2, t h e n  t h e  l a r g e s t  
number o f  words t h a t  can be i n s t a n t i a t e d  b y  means of  i t  i s  
l e s s  t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  s/r ( o r ,  more p r e c i s e l y ,  i t  i s  l e s s  
t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  t h e  smallest whole number l e s s  t h a n  o r  
e q u a l  t o  s / r ) .  So t h e r e  i s  an  upper bound t o  t h e  l e n g t h  
o f  t h e  s en t ence  t h a t  can be accomodated; and hence i n f i n i t e l y  
many E n g l i s h  s e n t e n c e s  cannot  be " p a r t s t 1  of  t h e  p i e c e  of  
paper ,  even i n  t h i s  very  l i b e r a l i z e d  s ense  o f  l1part1!. 
There i s  no need,  i t  might b e  u rged ,  f o r  t h e  exp re s s ion  
t okens  t o  be a l l  of  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s .  Because i f  t h e  
p i e c e  o f  paper  i s ,  say ,  8'' x ll", t h e n  a 1" x 2" token  of 
' c a t t  c u t  o u t  o f  t h e  paper  would be a d i f f e r e n t  token from 
a 5" x 10" token  of  ' c a t 1  c u t  ou t  o f  t h e  pape r ,  even though 
t h e i r  p a r t s  o v e r l a p .  Now, t h e  o b j e c t i o n  c o n t i n u e s ,  if 
space  i s  i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e ,  t h e n ,  as was i n d i c a t e d  above,  
i t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  paper  i s  t o o .  Hence 
t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many d i f f e r e n t  t okens  o f  ' c a t  
between 1" x  2" and t h e  5" x 1011 tokens ,  a l l  of which e x i s t  
c o n c u r r e n t l y  as l tpar ts l t  o f  t h e  paper .  
The a p p r o p r i a t e  r e j o i n d e r  t o  t h i s ,  I t h i n k ,  i s  t o  
p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  i n f i n i t e l y  many such tokens  would b e  
p a r t i t i o n a b l e  i n t o  a f i n i t e  number o f  equ iva l ence  c l a s s e s ,  
depending on t h e  atoms of  paper  t h e y  c o n s i s t  o f .  There 
w i l l  be  nc p o s s i b l e  way o f  p e r c e p t u a l l y  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  
among t h e  members o f  a n  e q u i v a l e n c e  c l a s s .  They w i l l  be 
p e r c e p t u a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t .  To suppose ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a s  t h i s  
o b j e c t i o n  must ,  t h a t  t o k e n  a i s  n o t  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  t o k e n  b  
- - 
even though and b  do  n o t  d i f f e r  p e r c e p t i b l y  i s  t o  v i o l a t e  
- 
t h e  p e r c e p t i b i l i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t .  Once a g a i n ,  i t  h a s  t h e  
consequence  t h a t  a p i e c e  o f  p a p e r  c a n  o n l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  a f i n i t e  number o f  e x p r e s s i o n  t o k e n s .  
The upsho t  o f  a l l  t h i s  i s  t h a t  i f  b e i n g  "concre teI1  
e n t a i l s  b e i n g  v p e r c e p t i b l e m ,  t h e n  even though some s o r t s  
o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  - a r e  p e r c e p t i b l e  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  o r  e v e n t s ,  
t h e  s o r t s  t h a t  H i l b e r t ,  F i e l d ,  S h o e n f i e l d  and Mates a r e  
concerned w i t h  a r e  n o t .  What t h e s e  w r i t e r s  have i n  common 
' 8  
i s  t h a t  i n  t h e i r  a n x i e t y  t o  a v o i d  commit t ing  t h e m s e l v e s  
t o  c e r t a i n  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s  t h a t  t h e y  found o b j e c t i o n a b l e  -- 
m a t h e m a t i c a l  o n e s ,  i n  t h e  c a s e s  o f  H i l b e r t  and F i e l d ,  meanlngs 
o r  f a c t s ,  f o r  S h o e n f i e l d  ( p .  21, a n d  s t a t e m e n t s ,  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  
t h c u g h t s ,  and judgments  f o r  Mates ( p .  1 0 )  -- t h e y  f o r g o t  
t o  t a k e  heed o f  t h e  type- token  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  P e i r c e ,  who 
i n t r o d u c e d  t h e  nomenc la tu re ,  d e s c r i b e d  i t  t h u s :  
A common mode o f  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  amount o f  
m a t t e r  i n  a MS. o r  p r i n t e d  book i s  t o  
coun t  t h e  number o f  words. T h e r e  w i l l  
o r d i n a r i l y  be a b o u t  twen ty  t h e ' s  on a  page ,  
and  o f  c o u r s e  t h e y  c o u n t  a s  twenty  words. 
I n  a n o t h e r  s e n s e  o f  t h e  word ' w o r d 1 ,  
however, t h e r e  i s  b u t  one ' t h e 1  i n  t h e  
Engl- i sh  l anguage ;  and i t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
t h i s  word s h o u l d  l i e  v i s i b l y  on a  page o r  
b e  h e a r d  i n  any v o i c e ,  f o r  t h e  r e a s o n  t h a t  
i t  i s  n o t  a  S i n g l e  t h i n g  o r  S i n g l e  e v e n t .  
It d o e s  n o t  e x i s t ;  i t  o n l y  d e t e r m i n e s  t h i n g s  
t h a t  do e x i s t .  Such a d e f i n i t e l y  S i g n i f i c a n t  
Form, I propose  t o  term a  Type. A S i n g l e  
e v e n t  which happens once and whose i d e n t i t y  
i s  l i m i t e d  t o  t h a t  one happening o r  a  S i n g l e  
o b j e c t  o r  t h i n g  which i s  i n  some s i n g l e  p l a c e  
a t  any one  i n s t a n t  o f  time, s u c h  e v e n t  o r  t h i n g  
b e i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  o n l y  as o c c u r r i n g  j u s t  
when and where i t  d o e s ,  such  a s  t h i s  o r  t h a t  
word on a s i n g l e  l i n e  o f  a s i n g l e  page o f  a 
s i n g l e  copy o f  a book, I w i l l  v e n t u r e  t o  c a l l  
a  Token. ... I n  o r d e r  t h a t  a Type may be  u s e d ,  
i t  h a s  t o  be  embodied i n  a Token which 
s h a l l  be  a s i g n  o f  t h e  Type, and t h e r e b y  o f  
t h e  o b j e c t  t h e  Type s i g n i f i e s .  I p ropose  t o  
c a l l  s u c h  Token o f  a Type a n  I n s t a n c e  o f  
t h e  Type. @ 
Once t h a t  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  b e f o r e  i t  i s  f a i r l y  
c l e a r ,  I t h i n k ,  t h a t  H i l b e r t ,  F i e l d ,  S h o e n f i e l d  and Mates 
' ,  
are, o r  ough t  t o  be ,  concerned w i t h  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ,  n o t  
t o k e n s .  T h i s  i s  s o  because  e a c h  o f  them wants  t h e r e  t o  be 
i n f i n i t e l y  many s u c h  t h i n g s ,  b u t  u n l e s s  t h e  u n i v e r s e  i t s e l f  
i s  somehow i n f i n i t e  t h e r e  are o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n  
t o k e n s ,  as t h e s e  are  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  o r  e v e n t s ,  Nor cou ld  
i t  b e  mere ly  - sets  o f  t o k e n s  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  concerned w i t h ,  
c o n t r a r y  t o  what Mates s a i d ,  because  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  
many o f  t h e s e  t o o  ( a g a i n ,  u n l e s s  t h e  u n i v e r s e  i t s e l f  i s  
somehow i n f i n i t e ) .  So i t  must be  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  -- and 
t h e s e  a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  These p o i n t s  might  w e l l  have 
52 .  C o l l e c t e d  Papers  o f  C h a r l e s  S a n d e r s  P e i r c e ,  Vol.  I V ,  
e d i t e d  by H a r t s h o r n e  and Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  
P r e s s ,  1958)  p. 423,  from ltProlegomena t o  a n  Apology f o r  
Pragmatism". 
been apparen t  t o  t h e  a u t h o r s  i n  q u e s t i o n  had they  n o t ,  a s  
was i n d i c a t e d  above,  o t h e r  f i s h  t o  f r y .  Goodman and Quine 
cons ide r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  d i r e c t l y  o f  whether one can renounce 
a b s t r a c t  e n t i t i e s  and s t i l l  assume t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  
many c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  -- e s p e c i a l l y  e x p r e s s i o n s .  53 At t h e  
t ime ,  bo th  were n o m i n a l i s t s ;  ("We do not  b e l i e v e  i n  a b s t r a c t  
e n t i t i e s . "  ( p .  1 3 7 ) ) .  Here i s  how t h e y  answered i t ,  and 
why : 
We d e c l i n e  t o  assume t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  
many o b j e c t s ,  Not on ly  i s  ou r  own exper ience  
f i n i t e ,  bu t  t h e r e  i s  no g e n e r a l  agreement among 
p h y s i c i s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  more t h a n  f i n i t e l y  
many p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  i n  a l l  space-t ime.  If 
i n  f a c t  t h e  c o n c r e t e  world i s  f i n i t e ,  accep tance  
o f  any t h e o r y  t h a t  presupposes  i n f i n i t y  would 
r e q u i r e  u s  t o  assume t h a t  i n  addi t$on t o  t h e  
c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ,  f i n i t e  i n  number, t h e r e  a r e  
a l s o  a b s t r a c t  e n t i t i e s .  ( p .  174)  
C l a s s i c a l  syn tax ,  l i k e  c l a s s i c a l  a r i t h m e t i c ,  
presupposes  an i n f i n i t e  realm of o b j e c t s ;  f o r  
it assumes t h a t  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  it t r e a t s  o f  
admit conca t ena t ion  t o  form longe r  exp res s ions  
wi thout  end. But i f  exp res s ions  must,  l i k e  
eve ry th ing  e l s e ,  be found w i t h i n  t h e  conc re t e  
world,  t h e n  a l i m i t l e s s  realm of exp res s ions  
cannot be assumed. Indeed,  exp res s ions  
cons t rued  i n  t h e  customary way a s  a b s t r a c t  
t ypograph ica l  shapes  do no t  e x i s t  a t  a l l  i n  
t h e  c o n c r e t e  world; t h e  language e lements  i n  
t h e  c o n c r e t e  world a r e  r a t h e r  i n s c r i p t l o n s  o r  
marks, t h e  shaped o b j e c t s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  
shapes .  ( p .  175)  
By adop t ing  t h e  s t r a t e g y  t h e y  do,  they  run  t h e  r i s k ,  f o r  
example, t h a t  some ( o f  what t hey  cons ide r  t o  b e )  formulas 
53 .  "Stens  Toward A Cons t ruc t ive  Nominalismn i n  Problems 
ana  P r o j e c t s  ( I n d i a n a p o i i s  ana New Yorlk: Bobbs-Merri l l ,  1972) .  
w i l l  n o t  be theorems merely because no i n s c r i p t i o n  d l d  o r  
w i l l  e x i s t  t o  be a needed l i n e  i n  a proof .  To dec rease  
t h e  r i s k  o f  t h i s  s o r t  o f  t h i n g  happening,  t h e y  adopt a 
p loy  t h a t  appea r s  very  much l i k e  t h a t  suggested by Chisholm, 
above. They i n c l u d e  i n  t h e  s t o c k  o f  i n s c r i p t i o n s  l l . .  .not  
on ly  t h o s e  t h a t  have c o l o r s  o r  sounds c o n t r a s t i n g  wi th  t h e  
sur roundings ,  bu t  a l l  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  shaped spa t io - tempora l  
r e g i o n s  even though t h e y  be i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from t h e i r  
sur roundings  i n  c o l o r ,  sound, t e x t u r e ,  e t c . l t  ( p .  1 7 5 ) .  
It i s  impor tan t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t hey  have no i l l u s i o n s  
t h a t  adopt ion  o f  such a ploy g a i n s  them i n f i n i t e l y ,  o r  
i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  many e x p r e s s i o n s :  "The number and l e n g t h  of 
i n s c r i p t i o n s  w i l l  s t i l l  be l i m i t e d  i n s o f a r  a s  t h e  s p a t i o -  
t empora l  world i t se l f  i s  l i m i t e d , "  ( p .  175) t hey  c a u t i o n .  
Bes ides ,  t h e r e  i s  r ea son  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e i r  p loy d i f f e r ?  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  from t h e  one sugges ted  by Chisholm l.n o t h e r  
r e s p e c t s ,  t oo .  It i s  n o t  c l e a r  from t h e  above passage 
t h a t  Goodman and Quine wish t o  a l low ove r l app ing  i n s c r i p t i o n s  
( so  t h a t ,  e , .g. ,  a token of  'dog'  could c o n s i s t  o f  much t h e  
same paper  as a token o f  t c a t t ) ,  That Goodman, a t  l e a s t ,  
would no t  s o  approve i s  sugges ted  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  Languages 
of - ~ r t ~ ~  he r e q u i r e s  o f  a n o t a t i o n a l  scheme (and he ho lds  
Eng l i sh  a l p h a b e t i c a l  n o t a t i o n  t o  be one (pp .  1 4 0 f f ) )  t h a t  
any two c h a r a c t e r s  o f  i t  be d i s j o i n t ;  t h a t  i s , . t h a t  no 
mark may belong t o  more than  one c h a r a c t e r  ( p .  1 3 3 ) .  The 
5 4 e I n d i a n a p o l i s  and N e w  York: Bobbs-Xerr i l l  , 1968. 
''marks'' he re  j u s t  c o n s i s t  o f  (pa r t s  o f )  t h e  paper i t s e l f ;  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r s  a r e  ' c a t '  and 'dog1 .  I n  t h e  Chisholm 
s c e n a r i o  a  m a j o r i t y  cf  t h e  paper  molecules  compris ing t h e  
!dog1 mark w i l l  comprise t h e  ' c a t r  mark t o o ,  and a t  t h e  
same t ime.  It i s  not  p e r f e c t l y  c l e a r  whether Goodman's 
requirement  t h a t  "no mark belong t o  more than  one c h a r a c t e r "  
r u l e s  o u t  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  bu t  I b r i n g  up t h e  m a t t e r  
because it looks  s u s p i c i o u s l y  l i k e  i t  might .  
Lest  t h e  r e a d e r  t h i n k  t h a t  s h o r t  and u n c h a r i t a b l e  
s h r i f t  i s  be ing  made o f  H i l b e r t ,  l e t  us d i s c u s s  t h e  m a t t e r  
a b i t  more. It might be urged t h a t  H i l b e r t  r e q u i r e s  on ly  
f i n i t e l y  many numerals (which, r e c a l l ,  a r e  s t r i n g s  of  l r s  
f o r  him).  Unfo r tuna t e ly ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  s o ,  because i n  h i s  
' , 
view of m u l t i p l i c a t i o n ,  f o r  example, t h e  product  i s  a  longer  
numeral t h a n  e i t h e r  m u l t i p l i c a n d .  O r ,  i t  might be urged 
t h a t  H i l b e r t  r e q u i r e s ,  no t  an a c t u a l  i n f i n i t y ,  but  merely 
a p o t e n t i a l  - i n f i n i t y  o f  numeral ( t o k e n s ) .  Yet i t  i s  hard 
t o  s e e  how t h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  i f  t r u e ,  h e l p s .  H i l b e r t  
h imse l f ,  a t  one p o i n t  i n  "On t h e  I n f i n i t e 1 '  w r i t e s :  
Someone who wished t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  b r i e f l y  
t h e  new concept ion  o f  t h e  i n f i n i t e  which 
Cantor i n t roduced  might say t h a t  i n  a n a l y s i s  
we d e a l  w i th  t h e  i n f i n i t e l y  l a r g e  and t h e  
i n f i n i t e l y  small on ly  a s  l i m i t i n g  concep t s ,  
as something becomlng, happening,  i . e . ,  w i t h  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  i n f i n i t e .  ( p .  139)  
But "as r e g a r ~ s  t h e  i n f i n i t e l y  small and t h e  i n f i n i t e l y  
l a r g e , "  he s a y s ,  ' ' the u n i v e r s e  i s  f i n i t e  i n  [ t h e s e ]  two 
r e s p e c t s q q .  ( p .  1 3 7 ) .  And n o t  o n l y  i n  t h e s e  r e s p e c t s :  
l q . . . t h e  i n f i n i t e  i s  nowhere t o  be found i n  r e a l i t y .  It 
n e i t h e r  e x i s t s  i n  n a t u r e  n o r  p r o v i d e s  a l e g i t i m a t e  basis 
f o r  t h o u g h t . "  ( p .  1 5 1 ) .  
It sounds  t o  me l i k e  H i l b e r t  i s  r e n o u n c i n g  even 
p o t e n t i a l  i n f i n i t i e s .  B e s i d e s ,  i f  e v e r y t h i n g  i n  n a t u r e  i s  
f i n i t e ,  t h e n  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many numeral  t o k e n s ,  
and s o  t h e r e  i s  a  l o n g e s t  o n e ( s ) .  Pe rhaps  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  t h e r e  c o u l d  have been a l o n g e r  one .  But s i n c e  we a r e ,  
t a l k i n g  abou t  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ,  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  seems most r e l e v a n t  i s  t h a t  o f  p h y s i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  -- 
and p e r h a p s  i t  i s  n o t  p h y s i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e r e  c ~ u l d  
have  been a l o n g e r  one ,  much less  i n f i n i t e l y  many l o n g e r  
o n e s ,  
Another  way t o  t r y  t o  e x p l o i t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  
p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  even though t h e r e  may b e  o n l y  
f i n i t e l y  many a c t u a l  t o k e n s ,  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many 
p o s s i b l e  o n e s ,  But it i s  h a r d  t o  s e e  how t h i s  i d e a  would 
h e l p  e i t h e r .  An i n f i n i t y  o f  p o s s i b l e  o b j e c t s  s t r i k e s  me 
as more p r o b l e m a t i c a l  i n  many r e s p e c t s  t h a n  one o f  a b s t r a c t  
o b j e c t s .  Pe rhaps  t h i s  i s  t h e  way someone l i k e  F i e l d  would 
c a r e  t o  go,  t h o u g h ,  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  he  owes u s  a n  accoun t  
o f  t h e s e  i n f i n i t e l y  many p o s s i b l e  o b j e c t s :  i n  what s e n s e  
t h e y  are p o s s i b l e ,  and u n d e r  what c o n d i t i o n s  t h e y  a r e  
i d e n t i c a l .  T h i s  l a s t  r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  n o t o r i o u s l y  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  f u l f i l l .  But even i f  he were t o  succeed  i n  p r o v i d i n g  
u s  w i t h  such  a n  a c c o u n t ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  de fend  t h e  t h e s i s  
that expressions are concrete objects whereas numbers are 
not he would have to satisfactorily explain how it is that 
nonexistent objects are concrete ones. (If they were to 
exist, they would be concrete? This would appear to be true 
of Godzilla, King Kong and the twenty fat men in the doorway, 
none of whom, fortunately, seem the least bit concrete.). 
Michael Resnik points out that "it is possible that 
Hilbert thought of written numerals as Kantian constructions 
in intuitionv, (Frege and the Philosophy - of Mathematics, 
p. 9 9 ) .  While not as readily subject to difficulties 
involving infinity, this perspective is also subject, 
Resnik argues, to a Fregean objection to   ant^^ which Resnik 
poses as follows: "How do we see by direcp inspection that 
, 
a numeral of length 1,000,003 is shorter than a numeral of 
length 1,004,004?fl ( p ,  9 9 ) .  Hilbert could say: we can see, 
because all such numerals are surveyable. But in what 
senae are very long numerals ~s~rveyable~~? Resnik suggests 
that 
...[ Hilbert] might argue that our operations 
with short numerals reveal patterns that we 
I1see" must hold for larger numerals and 
permit us to llsurveyu them as well. For 
example, in rearranging the terms of small 
sums we observe a pattern which we express 
by asserting the general associative and 
commutative laws of addition for all 
numerals...Finitary statements about small 
numerals would be directly evident, as 
would be the patterns recognizable 
through their aid, Finitary statements 
involving large numerals would then be 
5 5 .  Frege gives it in The Foundations of Arithmetic (Evanston, 
Ill. Northwestern ~ n l v e r z y  Press, 1980)sections 5 and 8 9 .  
j u s t i f i e d  by a p p l y i n g  t h e s e  p a t t e r n s  o r  
g e n e r a l  laws ... H i l b e r t t s  o n t o l o g i c a l  
problems cou ld  be s t r a i g h t e n e d  o u t  & 
r e c o g n i z i n g  a b s t r a c t  symbol t y p e s  whose 
p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  known th rough  o b s e r v i n g  
t h e  p a t t e r n s  t o  which t h e i r  i n s c r i b e d  
i n s t a n c e s  conform. ( p .  100,  my i t a l i c s ) .  
Once a g a i n ,  a s  t h e  i t a l i c i z e d  pa s sage  i s  meant t o  i n d i c a t e ,  
H i l b e r t  i s  d r i v e n  t o  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ,  which a r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
a b s t r a c t  r a t h e r  t h a n  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  There  seems no 
a v o i d i n g  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  i f  you want i n f i n i t e l y  many 
o b j e c t s  -- o r  even,  pe rhaps ,  f i n i t e l y  many some of which 
a r e  ve ry  v e r y  l a r g e  -- you must r enounce  p u r e  nominalism. 
I conc lude  t h a t  H i l b e r t  and F i e l d  (and  Mates and 
S h o e n f i e l d )  are j u s t  wrong i n  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  
o f  t h e  s o r t  t h e y  are concerned w i t h  a r e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  
whereas numbers a r e  a b s t r a c t .  B a s i c a l l y ,  t h e  r e a s o n  i s  
because  t h e y  need,  o r  assume t h e r e  a r e ,  i n f i n i t e l y  many 
such  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  and t h i s  a ssumpt ion  i s  j u s t i f i e d  on ly  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ,  n o t  t o k e n s ,  and t h e s e  
a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  Some, l i k e  Goodman, might j u s t  t a k e  
t h i s  t o  show t h a t  one  o u g h t n ' t  t o  assume t h a t  t l - ? r e  a r e  
i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s .  By n o t  s o  assuming,  one can  
hope t o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  are 
c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  So l e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n :  Are 
t h e r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s ?  
According t o  c l a s s i c a l  p roof  t h e o r y ,  y e s ,  c l e a r l y .  
Because if p  and q a r e  s e n t e n c e s ,  t h e n  t h e i r  c o n j u n c t i o n  
d i s j u n c t i o n ,  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  d e n i a l ,  e t c . )  w i l l  be t o o ,  
and no sen tence  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  a  con junc t ion  of which i t  
i t  a p a r t .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i n  Goodman and Q u i n e t s  
n o m i n a l i s t i c  t heo ry  of  syn tax ,  as p re sen ted  i n  llSteps Toward 
A Cons t ruc t ive  N ~ m i n a l i s r n ~ ~  t h i s  need no t  ho ld .  How a r e  
we t o  choose between them? There i s  no s imple  way, There 
i s  no obvious f a c t  t o  t h e  m a t t e r ;  some would s a y  t h a t  t he r e  
i s  no f a c t  t o  t h e  m a t t e r  a t  a l l .  What we do i n  such a 
s i t u a t i o n  presumably i s  t o  compare t h e o r i e s  a long  s e v e r a l  
dimensions -- s i m p l i c i t y ,  f r u i t f u l n e s s ,  degree  o f  conf i rmat ion ,  
among o t h e r  th ings ' .  And o f  Goodman and Q u i n e l s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  a n o m i n a l i s t i c  t h e o r y  o f  syn tax ,  I t h i n k  Samuel Johnson 's  
remark about a woman p reach ing  and a d o g ' s  walking on h i s  
h ind  legs i s  a p p l i c a b l e :  "It i s  n o t  done w e l l ;  bu t  you 
' #  
a r e  s u r p r i s e d  t o  f i n d  it done a t  a l l . f 1  For t h e  r e s u l t  of  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  e x p r e s s i o n  tokens  r a t h e r  t han  t y p e s  i s  a  
r a t h e r  cumbersome t h e o r y ,  and one w i t h  t h e  consequence 
t h a t ,  f o r  example, some formulas  may f a i l  t o  be theorems 
because t h e r e  happen t o  be no sequences o f  i n s c r i p t i o n s  
c o n s t i t u t i n g  p roo f s  o f  them, as was noted e a r l i e r .  This  
j u s t  r u n s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  needs o f  most proof t h e o r i s t s ,  who 
p r e f e r  t o  be a b l e  t o  assume t h a t  t h e  s e t  of  formulas  i s  
c l o s e d  under  such o p e r a t i o n s  &s con junc t ion  and a l t e r n a t i v e  
d e n i a l ,  and t h a t  t h e  s e t  o f  theorems i s  c lo sed  under 
l o g i c a l  e n t a i l m e n t ,  
Nor does  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  improve f o r  a  ' I f i n i t i ~ t ' ~  l i k e  
Goodman when we look t o  l i n g u i s t i c s  f o r  an  answer t o  t h e  
q u e s t i o n :  a r e  t h e r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s ?  -- c o n t r a r y  
what one might suppose.  For a l t h o u g h ,  a g a i n ,  t h e r e  
appea r s  t o  be no l o n g e s t  s en t ence  o f  Eng l i sh  -- one can 
always p r e f a c e  a sen t ence  w i th  'Harry t h i n k s  t h a t 1 ,  o r  
c o n j o i n  two s e n t e n c e s  -- one might suppose t h a t  t h e r e  was 
a b i t  more mo t iva t i on  f o r  having a t h e o r y  t h a t  countenanced 
on ly  f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s .  Because t h e r e  i s  good 
r ea son  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  no one e v e r  d i d  o r  w i l l  i n s c r i b e  
o r  u t t e r  a sen t ence  o f ,  s ay ,  one b i l l i o n  words, and what 
t h e  s e t  of E n g l i s h  s e n t e n c e s i s ~ s s u p p o s e d  t o  have some 
i n t i m a t e  connec t ion  w i t h  speaker -heare rs  of E n g l i s h .  Yet 
con f ron t ed  w i t h  such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  most l i n g u i s t s  today 
would, I t h i n k  answer t h e  q u e s t i o n  whether t h e r e  a r e  
i n f i n i t e l y  many s e n t e n c e s  i n  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e ,  Here, f o r  
example, i s  Emmon Bach's  r e sponse :  
... t h e  s e t  o f  E n g l i s h  s e n t e n c e s  i s  n o t  some- 
t h i n g  t h a t  e x i s t s  a p a r t  from t h e o r i e s  about  
language and about  E n g l i s h  ... The on ly  way 
i n  which we can dec ide  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  t o  
a s k  about  t h e  k i n d s  o f  t h e o r i e s  t h a t  would 
l e a d  t o  one o r  t h e  o t h e r  answer . . ,On t h e  one 
hand, it seems t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no l o n g e s t  
E n g l i s h  s en t ence ;  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h i s  
seems t o  l e a d  u s  t o  s ay  t h a t  t h e r e  cou ld  
be an  E n g l i s h  s en t ence  a b i l l i o n  words 
l ong .  The way o u t  o f  t h e  impasse i s  t o . . .  
[ s e p a r a t e ]  o u t  a  t h e o r y  of  grammar from a  
t h e o r y  o f  performance.  The s e t  of grammatical  
E n g l i s h  s en t ences  i s  i n f i n i t e ;  t h e r e  i s  
no l o n g e s t  Eng l i sh  s e n t e n c e .  But t h e  s e t  
o f  a c t u a l l y  u s a b l e  E n g l i s h  s en t ences  i s  
f i n i t e ,  not  because  of  t h e  grammar of 
Eng l i sh ,  bu t  because o f  o t h e r  f a c t o r s ,  
most ly  comple te ly  n o n l i n g u i s t i c :  l i m i t a t i o n s  
on a t t e n t i o n  span ,  f a c t s  about  t h e  l e n g t h  
of  human l i f e ,  and so  on.  
... If we dec ide  t o  t r e a t  t h e  obvious  l i m i t a t i o n s  
on l e n g t h  and complexity a s  a  m a t t e r  t o  
be d e a l t  wi th  i n  t h e o r i e s  of  performance,  we 
can account  f o r  t h e  way i n  which sen tences  
a r e  used as fundamental  b u i l d i n g  b locks  f o r  
o t h e r  s en t ences ,  and i n  a d d i t i o n  we w i l l  be 
a b l e  t o  account  f o r  o t h e r  f a c t s .  If l i m i t a t i o n s  
on  l e n g t h  and complexity a r e  a f u n c t i o n  o f  
language use  r a t h e r  t h a n  knowledge about 
language,  t h e n  changing t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  of  
performance ought t o  r e s u l t  i n  changes i n  
t h o s e  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  and t h i s  indeed seems t o  
be t h e  ca se .  If we a l low people  i n c r e a s i n g  
l e n g t h s  o f  t ime t o  p r e p a r e  an u t t e r a n c e ,  o r  
i f  we f u r n i s h  them wi th  e x t e r n a l  a i d s  t o  
memory, t h e y  can produce and unders tand 
longe r  and more complicated s e n t e n c e s .  
A l l  of  t h i s  p o i n t s  up t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
s e t  o f  E n g l i s h  s en t ences  i s  a t h e o r e t i c a l  
c o n s t r u c t  r a t h e r  t h a n  something d i r e c t l y  
obse rvab le  o r  g iven .  The s e t  o f  a c c e p t a b l e  
u t t e r a n c e s  o  Eng l i sh  i s  a n o t h e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  
c o n s t r u c t . .  . $6 
I t h i n k  t h e s e  two impor tan t  p o i n t s  emerged q u i t e  
n i c e l y  i n  t h e  cou r se  o f  Bach l s  d i s c u s s i o n :  ( i)  whether o r  
no t  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many s e n t e n c e s ,  even what a  
s en t ence  i s  o r  what Eng l i sh  i s ,  i s  a t h e o r e t i c a l  m a t t e r ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a datum o r  a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  m a t t e r  o f  empLrical  
f a c t ;  and ( i i )  accord ing  t o  t h e  b e s t  t h e o r y ( i e s )  a v a i l a b l e ,  
t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many Eng l i sh  s e n t e n c e s .  ( i)  and 
(ii) seem t o  me t o  be c o r r e c t .  For  b e s i d e s  t h e  r ea sons  
Bach g i v e s  f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many 
s e n t e n c e s ,  Chomsky c i t e s  t h i s  one:  
56. S y n t a c t i c  Theory (New York: Ho l t ,  R inehar t  and Winston, 
1974) PP. 25f .  
I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  l a n g u a g e s  
a r e  i n f i n i t e  i s  made i n  o r d e r  t o  s i m p l i f y  
t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e s e  l a n g u a g e s .  I f  a  
grammar d o e s  n o t  have r e c u r s i v e  d e v i c e s . . .  
i t  w i l l  be  p r o h i b i t i v e l y  complex. I f  i t  
d o e s  have r e c u r s i v e  d e v i c e s  o f  some s o r t ,  
i t  w i l l  p roduce  i n f i n i t e l y  many s e n t e n c e s .  57 
S i m p l i c i t y  i s  a  well-known d e s i d e r a t u m  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  
t h e o r i e s .  And e s p e c i a l l y  s o  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a grammar f o r  a 
n a t u r a l  l anguage ,  as t h e r e  a r e  good arguments  f o r  t h e  c l a i m  
t h a t  i n  o r d e r  f o r  s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s  t o  s p e a k / h e a r ,  t h e y  must 
have  knowledge o f  such  grammars. So one might  p l a u s i b l y  
a r g u e  t h a t  s i n c e  knowledge o f  a grammar, i f  a c q u i r e d ,  i s  
g e n e r a l l y  a c q u i r e d  i n  a few y e a r s 1  t i m e ,  i t  p r o b a b l y  i s  n o t  
t h e  c a s e  t h a t  t h e  grammar i t s e l f  i s  " p r o h i b i t i v e l y  complexff .  
Ske tchy  though t h i s  h a s  been ,  I do n o t  i n t e n d  t o  
p u r s u e  f u r t h e r  t h e  i s s u e  o f  why t h e  f a v o r e d  t h e o r i e s  i n  
l i n g u i s t i c s  a r e / s h o u l d  b e  committed t o  i n f i n i t e l y  many 
s e n t e n c e s  -- i . e . ,  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  ( i i ) ,  For  t h i s  seems t o  
me t o  be  a f a i r l y  c o m p l i c a t e d  t e c h n i c a l  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  i s  
b e s t  n o t  gone i n t o  a t  l e n g t h  h e r e .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  i t  
i s  a t h e o r e t i c a l  m a t t e r  what a s e n t e n c e  i s ,  and how many 
-
t h e r e  a r e .  And f o r  v a r i o u s  t h e o r e t i c a l  r e a s o n s ,  l i n g u i s t s  
d o i n g  s y n t a x  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many s e n t e n c e s ,  
and t h a t  t h e  s o r t s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  t h e y  a r e  s t u d y i n g  a r e  
57. S y n t a c t i c  S t r u c t u r e s  (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1 9 6 4 )  
PP* 23f .  
t y p e s .  58 So it  l o o k s  as though we a r e  on p r e t t y  f i r m  ground 
i n  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  j u s t  as i f  t h e r e  a r e  any numbers t h e r e  
are i n f i n i t e l y  many, and t h e y  a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s ,  so  t o o  
t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s ,  and hence ( f o r  t h e  
r e a s o n s  g i v e n  on pages  117 t o  1 1 3  above)  t h e y  a r e  a b s t r a c t  
o b j e c t s .  
Some might  f e e l  t h a t  what c u r r e n t  l i n g u i s t i c  t h e o r y  
h a s  t o  s a y  does  n o t  d e c i d e  t h e  i s s u e  o f  how many e x p r e s s i o n s  
6 
t h e r e  a r e ,  The f o l l o w i n g  l i n e  of r e a s o n i n g  might  be u r g e d .  
" C l e a r l y ,  - i f  t h e r e  are numbers t h e r e  have t o  be i n f i n i t e l y  
many o f  them, But i t  i s  n o t  s o  w i t h  e x p r e s s i o n s .  The 
c h o i c e  o f  i n f i n i t e l y  r a t h e r  t h a n  f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s  
i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  -- a c h o i c e .  It i s  a f a i r l y  a r b i t r a r y  
one  a t  t h a t ,  based  as i t  i s  l a r g e l y  on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  
s i m p l i c i t y .  U n l i k e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  number, t h e o r i e s  i n  
which t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  p o s s i b l e .  
W r i t e r s  l i k e  C h a r l e s  P. Hocke t t  and D,L. Olmsted even 
u r g e  t h a t  we adop t  such  t h e o r i e s .  But t h e o r i e s  i n  which 
t h e r e  a r e  some b u t  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many numbers a r e  nonsense .  
The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  e x p r e s s i o n s  i s  q u i t e  
58. For  example,  Chomsky w r i t e s  t h a t  "each s e n t e n c e  i s  
r e p r e s e n t a b l e  as a f i n i t e  sequence  of . . .phonemes  ( o r  l e t t e r s ) I f  
( p .  1 3  o f  S y n t a c t i c  S t r u c t u r e s ) .  Phonemes, i n  t h e i r  t u r n ,  
are p o r t r a y e d  by Jakobson and H a l l e  i n  Fundamentals  o f  
Lang~iage  as t y p e s :  W h e t h e r  s t u d y i n g  phonemes o r  c o n t e x t u a l  
v a r i a n t s  ( " a l l o p h o n e s " ) ,  i t  i s  a lways ,  a s  t h e  l o g i c i a n  would 
s a y ,  t h e  u s i g n - d e s i g n f l  and n o t  t h e  " s i g n - e v e n t u  t h a t  we 
d e f i n e . "  ( 'S-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1956,  p. 1 3 ) .  
d i s a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  numbers; wha tever  c u r r e n t  
l i n g u i s t i c  t h e o r y  s a y s ,  t h e r e  s t i l l  might  be  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  
many e x p r e s s i o n s  -- i t  a t  l e a s t  makes s e n s e  t o  suppose  t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s  -- and i f  t h a t  i s  
t h e  c a s e ,  t h e n  e x p r e s s i o n s  need n o t  b e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s . l l  
What I want t o  u r g e  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  l i n e  o f  
r e a s o n i n g  i s  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  e x p r e s s i o n s  i s  v e r y  
similar t o  t h a t  i n v o l v i n g  numbers,  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  view 
e n u n c i a t e d  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  p a r a g r a p h .  So t h a t  i f  t h e r e  
i s  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  if t h e r e  are any numbers,  t h e r e  
a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many o f  them, t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  t h e r e  are i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s .  F o r ,  f i r s t ,  i t  
i s  t r u e  t h a t  i n  a s e n s e  t h e r e  was, o r  i s ,  a  c h o i c e  a s  t o  
how many e x p r e s s i o n s  t o  assume t h e r e  a r e .  But t h i s  i s  
s o  w i t h  numbers t o o ;  t h e r e  i s  a c h o i c e  as t o  how many numbers 
t o  assume t h e r e  are: f i n i t e l y  many o r  i n f i n i t e l y  many. Yet 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  c h o i c e  d o e s  n o t  mean t h a t  t h e  m a t t e r  
i s  c o m p l e t e l y  a r i b t r a r y .  Good r e a s o n s  c a n  be  g i v e n  f o r  t h e  
c h o i c e  o f  i n f i n i t e l y  many numbers -- and e x p r e s s i o n s  t o o ,  
as was i n d i c a t e d  above.  And, second,  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  l i n g u i s t i c  
s y n t a c t i c  t h e o r i e s  @ v - f i n i t e  models a r e  p o s s i b l e  ( t h a t  i s ,  
t h e y  are n o t  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  i n c o h e r e n t )  and even espoused 
some w r i t e r s .  But a g a i n ,  a similar s i t u a t i o n  o b t a i n s  i n  
mathema4;ics. Tha t  i s ,  t h e r e  a r e  t h e o r i e s  a b o u t  number t h a t  
have  f i n i t e  models ,  and w r i t e r s  who espouse  such  t h e o r i e s .  
Let  m e  a m p l i f y .  
R e c a l l  t ha t  t h e  basis f o r  t h e r e  be ing  a I1choicef1 
about  how many expres s ions  of  Eng l i sh  -- sen tences  i n  p a r t i -  
c u l a r  -- t h e r e  a r e  l a y  i n  t h e  f a c t  t ha t  we have c o n f l i c t i n g  
i n t u i t i o n s  about t h e  m a t t e r .  On t h e  one hand, if g and q 
a r e  s en t ences  of  Eng l i sh ,  t h e n  s o  i s  t h e i r  con junc t ion ;  
hence i t  seems t h e r e  i s  no l o n g e s t  sen tence  o f  Eng l i sh .  On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand, we observed i n  suppor t  of t h e  hypo thes i s  
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  on ly  f i n i t e l y  many tha t  we can be reasonably  
c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  no one e v e r  d i d  o r  w i l l  i n s c r i b e  o r  u t t e r  a 
s en t ence  o f ,  say ,  a  t r i l l i o n  words. Because even a t  f i v e  
words p e r  second it  would t a k e  n e a r l y  6 ,342  y e a r s  t o  u t t e r  
t h e  sen tence .  I n  c u r r e n t  mainstream l i n g u i s t i c  t h e o r y ,  
r e s o l u t i o n  i s  achieved by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  competence from 
performance,  and say ing  t h a t  whi le  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  
many sen tences ,  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  performance render  t h e  
number of a c c e p t a b l e  s en t ences  f i n i t e .  
This  s i t u a t i o n  has  i t s  c o u n t e r p a r t  i n  a p a i r  of  
t 
c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t u i t i o n s  t h a t  occur  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  numbers. 
On t h e  o n e  hand, g iven  a number we can always add 1 t o  i t  t o  
o b t a i n  a g r e a t e r  number, s o  t h e r e  seems t o  be no g r e a t e s t  
number. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, we can be reasonably  con f iden t  
t h a t  no one e v e r  d i d  o r  w i l l  count ( b y  1 ' s )  up t o ,  s ay ,  a  
t r i o  Because, aga in ,  1 0 1 2  seconds i s  n e a r l y  31,710 
y e a r s .  This  would suppor t  t h e  hypo thes i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
on ly  f i n i t e l y  many numbers. I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e s e  I n t u i t i o n s ,  
t o o ,  r e s o l u t i o n  can be achieved by p o i n t i n g  t o  a  s o r t  of 
competence-performance d i s t i n c t i o n ,  and say ing  t h a t  whi le  
t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many numbers, f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  p e r f o r -  
mance l i m i t  how many zan f e a s i b l y  be counted up t o .  L e t l s  
c a l l  them t h e  ' l f ea s ib l e "  numbers ( f o r  r ea sons  t h a t  w i l l  soon 
become a p p a r e n t ) .  
I a m  n o t  c la iming  t h a t  everyone w i l l  f e e l  t h i s  l a s t -  
1 2  
mentioned i n t u i t i o n  -- t h a t  no one can count up t o  1 0  -- 
t o  be p r e s s i n g l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  how many numbers 
t h e r e  a r e .  An opponent may be tempted t o  excla im:  l tTha t l s  
absurd.  If - n i s  a number, s o  i s  n  + 1. So i f  t h e r e  a r e  any 
- 
numbers, a t r i l l i o n  i s  one of them." But t h i s  i s  j u s t  t o  
i n s i s t  on t h e  f irst  o f  t h e  two c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t u i t i o n s ;  i t  
w i l l  n o t  make t h e  second go away, o r  p rov ide  any r e s o l u t i o n  
f o r  i t .  I n  response  t o  t h e  sugges t ion  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  only  
f i n i t e l y  many sen tences ,  a l i n g u i s t  could excla im i n  s i m i l a r  
f a s h i o n :  "Tha t ' s  absurd .  If t h e  r e s u l t  of  r e p l a c i n g  In1  
- 
by an a r a b i c  numeral i n  'There a r e  g guinea  p i g s  i n  t h e  
f i e l d 1  i s  a  s en t ence ,  s o  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  r e p l a c i n g ,  In1  by  
- 
t h e  nex t  a r a b i c  numeral.  59 O r ,  i f  p and 9 a r e  s e n t e n c e s ,  
them .so i s  t h e i r  con junc t ion .  "But , I 1  my opponent may 
con t inue ,  '!why t h i n k  t h a t  i n  o r d e r  f o r  a number t o  e x i s t  we 
should  be a b l e  t o  count up t o  i t ?  Why, t h e  s e t  o f  so-ca l led  
f e a s i b l e  numbers wonl t  even be well-defined.I1 Th i s ,  t o o ,  
59. This i s  b a s i c a l l y  one of  Bachls  examples. It i s  from 
An I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  Transformat iona l  Grammars (New York: Ho l t ,  
- 
Rinehar t  and winston,  1964) ,  p .  13 .  
h a s  i t s  l i n g u i s t i c  a n a l o g :  "Why t h i n k  t h a t  f o r  a  s e n t e n c e  
t o  e x i s t  we s h o u l d  be a b l e  t o  u t t e r  i t?  After a l l ,  t h e  c l a s s  
o f  a c c e p t a b l e  s e n t e n c e s  i s  n o t  g o i n g  t o  be  w e l l - d e f i n e d  
e i t h e r . "  
The p o i n t  I wish  t o  make h e r e  i s  n o t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many numbers, f o r  t ha t  i s  a  c l a i m  I would n o t  
c a r e  t o  d e f e n d .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  c l a i m i n g  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  
f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s  i s  ana logous  i n  i m p o r t a n t  r e s p e c t s  
t o  c l a i m i n g  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many numbers.  J u s t  a s  
t h e  l a t t e r  c l a i m  r e l i e s  upon some assumpt ion  as t h a t  a  
number i s  something t h a t  i s  coun ted  up t o ,  o r  c a n  b e  coun ted  
-
up t o ,  t h e  fo rmer  c l a i m  can  be m a i n t a i n e d  o n l y  by i n s i s t i n g  
t h a t  f o r  something t o  be  a s e n t e n c e  i t  must be  u t t e r e d  o r  
i n s c r i b e d ,  o r  b e  c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  u t t e r e d  o r  i n s c r i b e d .  So 
if t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  some numbers i m p l i e s  t h e r e  are i n f i n i t e l y  
many, t h e n  i t  seems t o  me t h a t  we have  ample ground f o r  
c o n c l u d i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  are  i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s ,  t o o ,  
S t i l l  my opponent  may n o t  be  s a t i s f i e d .  Con t inu ing  
t h e  l i n e  o f  c r i t i c i s m  s k e t c h e d  e a r l i e r ,  he  o r  s h e  may s a y  
t h a t  i n f i n i t y  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  v e r y  n o t i o n ,  o r  d e f i n i t i o n ,  
o f  number -- whether  o r  n o t  t h e r e l a c t u a l l y  a r e  any -- s o  t h a t  
no t h e o r y  o f  number i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  h a s  a f i n i t e  model.  By 
way o f  s u p p o r t i n g  t h i s  c l a i m ,  he  o r  s h e  may p o i n t  t o  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t l y  and  w i d e l y  a c c e p t e d  t h e o r y  of n c t u r a l  
number c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  Peano axioms,  which t a k e n  t o g e t h e r  
have no f i n i t e  models .  And t h a t  even though t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
t h e o r y  o f  number d i d  no t  e x i s t  u n t i l  Dedekind enunc ia ted  
i t  i n  t h e  l a t e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  p rev ious  n o t i o n s  of number 
had, whatever t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  and flaws, i nco rpo ra t ed  
t h e  i n t u i t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no l a r g e s t  number -- t h a t  i f  
n  - i s  a number, s o  i s  n  - + 1 -- t h u s  r u l i n g  ou t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  t h e r e  be ing  f i n i t e l y  many numbers. No such agreement 
e x i s t s  on -the number o f  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  though ( i t  w i l l  be 
s a i d ) .  For example, Char les  F. Hocket t ,  i n  S t a t e  -- of t h e  
6 0  A r t  c la ims  t h a t  "it i s  e m p i r i c a l l y  a b s u r d . , , t h a t  t h e  
-
m i l l i o n t h  -- o r  even t h e  thousandth -- t e rm of  [ t h e  s e r i e s  
one. 
one and one. 
one and one and one. 
. . . I  
i s  i n  f a c t . .  .Eng l i sh ,  j u s t  as a m i l l i o n  i s  no t  a p o s s i b l e  
f o o t b a l l  s co re . "  (p .  6 0 ) .  O f  cou r se ,  he would be  i n c o n s i s t e n t  
i f  he a l s o  main ta ined  t h a t  i f  t h e  n t h  term of  t h e  s e r i e s  
i s  Eng l i sh ,  s o  i I  t h e  - n + lSt, bu t  he does n o t .  He f o r e s a k e s  
t h i s  i n t u i t i o n ,  g i v i n g  as j u s t i f i c a t i o n :  
t h i s  does no t  mean t h a t  we can s p e c i f y  e x a c t l y  
which term o f  t h e  s e r i e s  i s  t h e  l a r g e s t  t h a t  
i s  good Eng l i sh ,  any more than  we can s p e c i f y  
-
t h e  l a r g e s t  p o s s i b l e  f o o t b a l l  s c o r e  o r  wr i te  
down t h e  formula f o r  t h e  l a r g e s t  p o s s i b l e  
methane-ser ies  hydrocarbon molecule .  A 8  one 
a t t e m p t s  a l a r g e r  and l a r g e r  s en t ence  o f  t h e  
k ind  shown, o r  of t h e  k ind  de f ined  by  any 
o t h e r  open-ended p a t t e r n ,  one encounte rs  
c e r t a i n -  f l e x i b l e  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  t h a t  a r e ,  i n  
my op in ion ,  p a r t  o f  t h e  language,  j u s t  a s  
t h e  t ime  l i m i t s  o r a f o o t b a l l  game a r e  Dart 
- 
of f o o t b a l l .  
6 0 ,  The Hague: Mouton, 1968. 
(pp .  60-61) Hocke t t  i s  n o t  t h e  o n l y  one t o  a r g u e  f o r  
" f i n i t i s m l f  i n  l i n g u i s t i c s .  D.L.  Olmsted compares t h e  
s i t u a t i o n s  o f  l i n g u i s t s  s t u d y i n g  l anguage  i n  t h e  f i e l d  w i t h  
t h a t  o f  l i n g u i s t s  a p p r o a c h i n g  i t  "from a background i n  
symbol ic  l o g i c  and  i n  c o n t e x t s  which i n c l u d e  programming 
computers  t o  a i d  i n  a n a l y s i s  o r  t r a n ~ l a t i o n . ' ~  6 1  He c l .a ims 
t h a t  " t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  E n g l i s h  s e n t e n c e s ' a r e  n o t  a lways  
less  t h a n  a m i l l i o n  words i n  l e n g t h  smells o f  t h e  computer  
c e n t e r  r a t h e r  t h a n  o f  t h e  f i e l d  s i t u a t i o n .  The f i e l d  worker  
i s  q u i t e  r e a d y  t o  assume t h e  c o n t r a r y . "  ( p .  3 0 4 ) .  Another  
r e a s o n  he g i v e s  f o r  v iewing  t h e  assumpt ion  i n  q u e s t i o n  " w i t h  
s u ~ p i c i o n , ' ~  he  s a y s ,  i s  t h a t  " s e n t e n c e s  c o n s i s t  o f  more 
t h a n  w o r d s . . . t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  i n t o n a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  . . . [  I]t may 
' I 
be stated as a theorem t h s t  a s e n t e n c e - t e r m i n a l  p a t t e r n  w i l l  
c o i n c i d e  w i t h  t h e  end o f  a b r e a t h  g roup  a t  ] . e a s t  once i n  
e v e r y  11 b r e a t h s ,  where - n i s  a d i g i t  g r e a t e r  t h a n  zero.! '  
( p .  304) .  And presumably ,  a m i l l i o n  word s e n t e n c e  v i o l a t e s  
t h i s  t h e m e m .  "So," my opponent  might  c o n c l u d e ,  " t h e o r i z s  
a b o u t  r~umber have t o  be  f f i n f i n i t i s t i c , "  b u t  t h e o w i e s  abou t  
e x p r e s s i o n s  need n o t  b e ,  as i s  ev idenced  by t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  r e s p o n s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  v iews .  Hence, t h e r e  i s  an  
-
i m p o r t a n t  d i s a n a l o g y  Setween numbers and   expression^,'^ 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  I s t i l l  t h i n k  t h e  ana logy  o b t a i n s ,  
H e r e ' s  why. It i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  been a  f a i r  d e g r e e  
of consensus  on t h e  i s s u e  o f  whether  t h e r e  i s  a  g r e a t e s t  
61. I1On Some Axioms About S e n t e n c e  Leng th f f ,  Language 43  
(1967)  303-5s P *  303. 
number. But n o t ,  as t h e  p r eced ing  s k e t c h  would have us  
i n f e r ,  unanimity .  J u s t  as l l f i n i t i s m "  i n  s y n t a x ,  a s  I s h a l l  
c a l l  i t ,  h a s  i t s  proponents ,  ' ' f i n i t i s m "  i n  mathemat ics  
does  t o o .  Disagreement over  whether  t h e r e  a r e  any a c t u a l ,  
as opposed t o  p o t e n t i a l  i n f i n i t i e s  goes back a t  l e a s t  t o  
A r i s t o t l e .  But i n  modern times A . S .  Yessenin-Volpin goes  
a s t e p  f u r t h e r .  62 He a s k s :  
why has  such e n t i t y  as lo1* t o  be long  t o  a 
n a t u r a l  number s e r i e s  [ s i c ] ?  Nobody has  
counted up t o  i t  (1012 seconds  c o n s t i t u t i n g  
more t h a n  20,000 yef$s )  and eve ry  a t t e m p t  
t o  c o n s t r u c t  t h e  10  - t h  memberlqf sequence 
0,  0 1 ,  O w ,  . . . r e q u i r e s  j u s t  1 0  s t e p s .  
But t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  l n  s t e p s 1  p resupposes  t h a t  
n  i s  a n a t u r a l  number i . e .  a number o f  a 
- 
n a t u r a l  number ser ies .  So t h i s  n a t u r a l  
a t t e m p t  t o  c o n s t r u c t  t h e  number 10J2,  i n  a  
n a t u r a l  number series i n v o l v e s  a v i c i o u s  
c i r c l e .  (pp.  4 f )  
A s  a r e s u l t  he c l a ims  n o t  t o  ". . . r e a l l y  b e l i e v e  i n  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  a s e r i e s  c o n t a i n i n g  10''~ ( p .  5 ) ,  ev idenc ing  
more i n t e r e s t  i n  " t h e  s e r i e s  F o f  f e a s i b l e  numbers, 1 - e , ,  
o f  t h o s e  up t o  which i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  count . ' '  ( p .  5 ) .  
My opponen t ' s  f i r s t  i n c l i n a t i o n  upon h e a r i n g  t h i s  
62. I n  "The U l t r a - I n t u i t i o n i s t i c  C r i t i c i s m  and t h e  Anti-  
t r a d i t i o n a l  Program f o r  Foundat ions  of Mathematics,l1 
I n t u i t i o n i s m  and Proof Theory ( P r o c .  Conf . ,  Buffalo,N.Y.1968) 
(Amsterdam: ~ z h  Hol land,  15701, pp.  3-45. 
And he c l a ims  t h a t  "many p e o p l e , ,  e . g .  Bo re l ,  F r e c h e t ,  
Mannoury, R i e z e r  and van Dautz ig  doubted [ t h e  un iqueness  
(up t o  isomorphism) o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  number s e r i e s ] ,  o r  t h e  
l f i n i t e n e s s l  o f  ve ry  g r e a t  numbers l i k e  1 0  (van  Dan tz ig )  . 
p .  4n. 10 
might be t o  s a y  t h a t  any such theo ry  would be i n c o n s i s t e n t ;  
t h a t  - of  cou r se  lo1* i s  a  number, and t o  ma in t a in  o therwise  
i s  t o  c o n t r a d i c t  some i n d u c t i o n  axiom. But Yessenin-Volpin 
r e j e c t s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  mathematical  i n d u c t i o n  (and many 
o t h e r s  o f  what he c a l l s  t h e  " t r a d i t i o n a l  assumptions under- 
l y i n g  t h e  body of  modern mathematicsv1 ( p .  4 ) ) .  So however 
e c c e n t r i c  h i s  view, i t  cannot be f a u l t e d  f o r  ou t  and ou t  
i ncons i s t ency .  
His /her  second i n c l i n a t i o n  might be t o  s a y  something 
t o  t h i s  e f f e c t :  Yessenin-VolpinTs t h e o r y ,  o r  view, i s  not  
one about - t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers; f o r  by " n a t u r a l  numberv1 I 
mean something t h a t  acco rds  w i t h  some one o f  t h e  u s u a l  
i n d u c t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n s  and behaves i n  accordance wi th  Peano 
. 0 
Ari thmet ic .  Yessenin-Volpinls  may be a theo ry  about t h e  
v f e a s i b l e v  numbers, as he c a l l s  them, bu t  a t  b e s t  t h i s  
c o n s t i t u t e s  on ly  a s u b s e t  -- and probably a n  i l l - d e f i n e d  
one -- of  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers. 
Such a response  would be unde r s t andab le .  Af t e r  a l l ,  
t h e  inductive-Peano Ar i thmet ic  concept ion  o f  number i s  by 
now very  wel l -en t renched ,  But t h e  l i n g u i s t ' s  view of  
-- -- 
expres s ions  - as a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s  of  which t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  
- -
many - i s  q u i t e  wel l -entrenched,  t o o .  We have,  cor responding  
-
t o  t h e  h i s t o r j c a l  f a c t s  claimed by my opponent,  some 
l i n g u i s t i c  f a c t s  -- t o  w i t ,  t h a t  acco rd ing  t o  c u r r e n t  
s y n t a c t i c  t h e o r y  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s .  And 
t h a t  even b e f o r e  c u r r e n t  t heo ry  was enunc ia ted  language 
t h e o r i s t s  were committed t o  more t h a n  t h e  f i n i t e  i~ l i n g u i s t i c s .  
(Fo r  example, Chomsky r e f e r s  t o  Wilhelm von Humboldtfs  1836 
view t h a t  a language "makes i n f i n i t e  use  of f i n i t e  meansff.  6 3 )  
So i t  would a l s o  be unders tandable  i f ,   onf fronted wi th  t h e  
-
e x i s t e n c e  of a f f f i n i t i s t i c "  view l i k e  H o c k e t t f s ,  a l i n g u i s t  
responded i n  a f a s h i o n  similar t o  t h a t  mani fes ted  by my 
opponent when conf ron ted  by Yessenin-Volpinls  l f f i n i t i s t i c f f  
view o f  number, That i s ,  he o r  she  might f i rs t  accuse Hockett  
o f  i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  To which t h e  cor responding  a p p r o p r i a t e  
r e p l y  would be t o  p o i n t  ou t  t h a t  Hockett  f o r s a k e s  t h e  
i n t u i t i o n  t h a t  i f  t h e  r e s u l t  of r e p l a c i n g  In1 by an a r a b l c  
- 
numeral i n  a sen tence  such as 'There  a r e  n  gu inea  p i g s  i n  
- 
t h e  f i e l d f  i s  a sen tence ,  t h e n  s o  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  of r e p l a c i n g  
n  by t h e  nex t  a r a b i c  numeral.  Secondly,  he o r  she might 
- 
say  something t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  H o c k e t t f s  and Olmsted ts  
views a r e  no t  about t h e  s e n t e n c e s  of a  s y n t a c t i c  t h e o r y ,  but  
merely about  t h e  a c c e p t a b l e  s e n t e n c e s ,  o r  even,  perhaps ,  
about  a c t u a l  u t t e r a n c e s .  I n  f a c t ,  Bach comes q u i t e  c l o s e  
t o  s ay ing  p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  : 
The d i sagreements  about  whether t o  c o n s i d e r  
l i m i t a t i o n s  on l e n g t h  and complexity p a r t  
of  a grammar, as evidenced i n  such w r i t i n g s  
as Hocket t ,  1968; Reich, 1969; and Olmsted, 
1967, compared t o  t h e  more o r  l e s s  s t anda rd  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l  view expressed  h e r e ,  seem 
t o  stem l a r g e l y  from d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  
meaning of  such te rms  as l fEngl ish  languagen 
and ItEnglish sentencell .  It i s  f f e m p i r i c a l l y  
absurdf f  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e r e  could  be an 
Eng l i sh  s en t ence  a m i l l i o n  words l ong ,  a s  
63. A s  e c t s  of t h e  Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass. MIT 
5 - T - -  -Pres s  19 5 p .v .  
Hocket t  writes, on ly  i f  you mean by "Engl i sh  
s en t ence"  e i t h e r  a c t u a l  u t t e r a n c e  o r  
a c c e p t a b l e  s e n t e n c e .  ( S y n t a c t i c  Theory, p ,  2 6 ) .  
A c t u a l l y ,  by ' E n g l i s h  s e n t e n c e 1  Olmsted may mean 
' a c t u a l  u t t e r a n c e '  f o r  he s a y s :  
Indeed ,  i t  may be s t a t e d  a s  an  e m p i r i c a l  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  t h a t ,  u s i n g  m y  d e f i n i t i o n s  
o f  l s e n t e n c e l  and 'word1 s o  fa r  found 
u s e f u l  i n  d e s c r i b i n g  a c t u a l  u t t e r a n c e s ,  
eve ry  s e n t e n c e  i n  eve ry  l anguage  s o  f a r  
s t u d i e d  I s  less t h a n  one m i l l i o n  words 
l ong .  ( p .  304, my i t a l i c s ) .  
It seems t o  me t h a t  t h e  " e m p i r i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n u  w a r r a n t s  
t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o n l y  i f  by ' s e n t e n c e 1  he  means ' a c t u a l  
u t t e r a n c e 1 .  Then a g a i n ,  he s a y s ,  as we saw e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  
" . . . s e n t e n c e s  c o n s i s t  o f  more t h a n  words . : . :  t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  
i n t o n a t i o n  p a t t e r n s . l l  Are i n t o n a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  a b s t r a c t  
o b j e c t s ?  One would be i n c l i n e d  t o  t h i n k  s o ,  bu t  t h e n ,  
s i n c e  s e n t e n c e s  c o n s i s t  o f  them, t h i s  would seem t o  make 
s e n t e n c e s  a b s t r a c t ,  t o o  -- which a c t u a l  utterances, 
presumably,  are n o t .  It shou ld  b e  mentioned h e r e  t h a t  
b e s i d e s  an  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  make type- token d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  r e a d e r  (which i s ,  pe rhaps ,  n o t  such a  s e ~ i o u s  m a t t e r ) ,  
Olmsted writes as though he  has  never  hea rd  o f  t h e  competence- 
performance d i s t i n c t i o n .  For  h i s  whole a r t i c l e  i s  based 
on t h e  d i f f e r i n g  perspectives o f  t h e  l l l o g i c i a n l l  l i n g u i s t  
and t h e  f i e l d  worker .  And o b v i o u s l y ,  u n l i k e  t h e  fo rmer ,  
t h e  l a t t e r  approaches  h i s / h e r  work w i t h  a t h e o r y  o f  performance 
i n  tow, o r  some f a c s i m i l e  t h e r e o f .  It i s  t h i s  which e n a b l e s  
t h e  f i e l d  worder t o  r ea sonab ly  conclude t h a t  any u t t e r a n c e  
he/she  i s  l i k e l y  t o  h e a r  w i l l  be l e s s  t h a n  a m i l l i o n  words 
i n  l e n g t h ,  and n o t  t h e  assumption t h a t  Olmsted imputes t o  
h i d h e r ,  t h a t  I1English s e n t e n c e s  a r e  always less  than  a 
m i l l i o n  words i n  length.I1 The "theoremu quoted above about  
s en t ence - t e rmina l  p a t t e r n s  c o i n c i d i n g  wi th  t h e  end of  
b r e a t h  groups  t h a t  he ment ions  i s  a n o t h e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  
t h i s ;  i t  seems a paradigm o f  what one would expec t  from a  
t h e o r y  o f  performance.  Perhaps Olmsted i s  no t  unaware o f  
t h e  competence-performance d i s t i n c t i o n  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  by 
means o f  i t  one can r e s o l v e  t h e  i s s u e s  he r a i s e s ;  perhaps  
he  r e j e c t s  t h a t  d i s t i n c t i o n .  But i f  s o ,  he should  make 
t h i s  c l e a r ,  and s t a t e  h i s  r ea sons  why. 
' 
No such a c c u s a t i o n  can  be d i r e c t e d  towards  Hocke t t ,  
who e x p l i c i t l y  r e j e c t s  t h e  competence-performance d i s t i n c t i o n  
(pp.  63-66), a l t hough  he,  t o o ,  a p p e a r s  t o  mean by 'Eng l i sh  
s e n t e n c e 1  ' u t t e r a n c e  o r  i n s c r i p t i o n  o f  E n g l i s h 1 ,  But t h e n ,  
h e  seems t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  E n g l i s h  language i s  a s e t ,  no t  
o f  s e n t e n c e s ,  bu t  o f  p o s s i b l e  s e n t e n c e s ,  f o r  he says  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  "no d e f i n i t e  boundary t o  t h e  ' s e t  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  
s e n t e n c e s 1  o f  t h e  language;  and j u s t  f o r  t h e s e  r e a s o n s  
languages  a r e  i l l - d e f i n e d . l l  ( p .  6 1 ) .  O f  cou r se  f o r  such an 
account  t o  be p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  i t  must s p e l l  
o u t  ( a s  was mentioned e a r l i e r )  t h e  i d e n t i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  
t h e s e  p o s s i b l e  ob j  e c t s .  The re fo re  he might p r e f e r  i n s t e a d  
t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  language w i th  t h e  s e t  o f  a c c e p t a b l e  s e n t e n c e s .  
But t h e n  H o c k e t t l s  t h e o r y  w i l l  be of no u se  t o  anyone who 
m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  c o n c r e t e ,  s i n c e  most a c c e p t a b l e  
s e n t e n c e s  w i l l  n o t  be i n s t a n t i a t e d  i n  a n  u t t e r s n c e  o r  
i n s c r i p t i o n ,  and s o  w i l l  have t o  be  cons idered  t y p e s ,  and 
hence a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  Unless ,  t h a t  i s ,  r e c o u r s e  i s  made 
t o  Goodman and Q u i n e l s  t r i c k  o f  count ing  a f r i sbee ,  f o r  
example, as c o n t a i n i n g  a n  i n s c r i p t i o n  of an unused sen t ence  
such  as t h e  con junc t ion  of (53)  and ( 5 4 ) .  
(53)  Pau l ine  b a t t e d  .900 f o r  t h e  Yankees whi le  s i n g i n g  
t h e  r o l e  of Tosca i n  - Das Rheingold.  
( 5 4 )  Her b r o t h e r  a t e  n i n e t e e n  pounds of  popcorn whi le  
f i r i n g  h i s  B-B gun a t  unsuspec t ing  l y c a n t h r o p e s ,  
But t h i s  s o r t  o f  t e r r i b l y  a r t i f i c i a l  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  c o n t r i v a n c e  
i s  no t  l i k e l y  t o  a p p e a l  t o  a l i n g u i s t ,  a s  i t s  s o l e  f u n c t i o n  
i s  t o  s a f egua rd  nominalism -- a t  t h e  c o s t  of r e n d e r i n g  
i t  imposs ib l e  t o  de te rmine  what i n s c r i p t i o n ,  if any,  a 
g iven  o b j e c t  i s ,  o r  u c o n t a i n s l l .  Not t o  mention t h a t  l i n g u i s t s  
a r e  concerned no t  on ly  w i t h  i n s c r i p t i o n s ,  but  a l s o  w i th  
u t t e r a n c e s .  For suppose t h a t  a l i n g u i s t  were t o  t r y  t o  
d e s c r i b e  i n  Goodman-Quine f a s h i o n  a n a t u r a l  language t h a t  
had no i n s c r i p t i o n s  b u t  on ly  u t t e r a n c e s .  N a t u r a l l y ,  he/she  
would no t  want t o  be l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  prima f a c i e  a c t u a l  
I 
u t t e r a n c e s  any more t h a n  Goodman and Quine  wanted t o  be l i m i t e d  
t o  t h e  prima f a c i e  a c t u a l  i n s c r i p t i o n s .  So t h e  cor responding  
move would be t o  count a l l  manner o f  n o i s e ,  e , g . ,  r o b b i n s 1  
songs ,  as u t t e r a n c e s  o f  e . g . ,  t h e  c o n j u n c t i o n  of (53 )  and 
( 5 4 ) .  But I cannot s e e  how such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i l l  be 
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  t r u t h s  of phonology -- f o r  example, t h a t  
t h e  f i rs t  phone o f  t h e  s en t ence  i n  q u e s t i o n  i s  an u n a s p i r a t e d  
b i l a b i a l  v o i c e l e s s  s t o p ,  a  sound tha t  a r o b i n  cannot produce.  
I n  conc lus ion  t h e n ,  I t h i n k  i t  f a i r  t o  s ay  t h a t  t h e  
c l a im  made by o u r  f o r m a l i s t s  t h a t  exp res s ions  a re  c o n c r e t e  
o b j e c t s  r a t h e r  t h a n  a b s t r a c t  ones ,  has  been shown t o  be 
u n j u s t i f i e d .  It i s  u n j u s t i f i e d ,  I argued,  because on ly  
f o r m a l i s t s  w i l l i n g  t o  do without  i n f i n i t i e s  can hope t o  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  ma in t a in  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  
But none of  t h e  f o r m a l i s t s  we d i s c u s s e d  seemed t o  be so  
w i l l i n g ,  This  i s  no t  t o  s ay  t h a t  t h e  on ly  argument f o r  
e x p r e s s i o n s  be ing  a b s t r a c t  i s  t h a t  t h e r q  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  
many o f  them. Other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  can  a l s o  be advanced 
which mot iva t e  t h a t  conc lus ion .  For example, it i s  very  
hard  t o  s e e  how one would go about s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  syn tax  
f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  n o m i n a l i s t i c  t heo ry  of  e x p r e s s i o n s .  One 
d i f f i c u l t y  l i e s  i n  s ay ing  what t h e  tokens  of t h e  language 
a r e  wi thout  making r e f e r e n c e  t o  t y p e s .  One can po in t  t o  
a s p e c i f i c  i n k  mark, f o r  example, and s a y  "anyth ing  p h y s i c a l l y  
similar i n  shape t o  t h a t  i s  t h e  same s o r t  o f  tokenu  -- a s  
Hugly and Sayward do; s ee  pages 185-186 below -- but  a s  
we s h a l l  s e e  i n  connec t ion  wi th  t h e i r  p roposa l  one then  
needs a fancy theo ry  of  when two t h i n g s  a r e  " p h y s i c a l l y  
siniilar i n  shape1',  S i m i l a r  remarks apply  t o  Goodman and 
Q u i n e t s  a t t empt  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  c h a r a c t e r s  o f  t h e i r  language 
i n  "S teps  Toward a C o n s t r u c t i v e  Nominalismw, The c h a r a c t e r s  
a r e  no t  supposed t o  c o n s i s t  o f  t h e  shapes  ' v l ,  I " ,  ' ( I ,  
' ) I ,  ) I f ,  and ' E "  , of  cou r se ,  bu t  r a t h e r  o f  Il1v1-shaped 
i n s c r i p t i o n s I 1  and " ' ( ' - shaped  i n s c r i p t i o n s " ,  e t c .  ( p .  1 3 8 ) .  
Not t h a t  Goodman i s  unaware t h a t  no s imple  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  
c o n t r u a l  o f  l l p h y s i c a l l y  s i m i l a r  i n  shapef1 w i l l  do .  He seems 
t o  be aware o f  i t  i n  Languages - of - 9  A r t  bu t  he does  not  g i v e  
a t h e o r y  t h a t  would s o l v e  t h e  problem. The p o i n t  of 
emphasizing o u r  f o r m a l i s t s 1  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i th  i n f i n i t y ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  o t h e r  s o r t s  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t hey  f a c e ,  was t o  
show why p r i n c i p l e  t h e y  cannot ma in t a in  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  
a r e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ,  
3, Second Formalist Claim 
I advanced t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  (most)  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  
on an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  p a r  w i t h  numbers, s o  t h a t  i f  we t h i n k  
e x p r e s s i o n s  e x i s t  -- o r ,  more c o n s e r v a t i v e l y ,  i f  we t h i n k  
t h a t  i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n s  e x i s t ,  which i s  what I 
w i l l  assume th roughout  t h i s  s e c t i o n  of t h e  c h a p t e r  based on 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  advanced i n  s e c t i o n  one -- we should  have 
no more qualms about  a d m i t t i n g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  numbers. 
Opposed t o  t h i s  t h e s i s  are t h e  u f o r m a l i s t s M  -- t h o s e  who 
contend t h a t  e k p r e s s i o n s  e x i s t ,  whereas mathemat ical  e n t i t i e s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  numbers, do n o t .  We examined t h e i r  f i r s t  l i n e  ! 
of de fense  i n  s e c t i o n  one of  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  which was t h a t  
numbers a r e  a b s t r a c t ; ,  whereas e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  c o n c r e t e ,  and 
found i t  want ing .  I n  r e p l y ,  a l l f o r m a l i s t "  might  w e l l  
concede  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  o r  most o f  them, a r e  a b s t r a c t  
o b j e c t s ,  l i k e  numbers.  But t h e n  ( s ) h e  would f a l l  back on 
h i s / h e r  second  l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e ,  s a y i n g  someth ing  l i k e  t h i s :  64  
"Even though  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( t y p e s ,  t h a t  i s )  a r e  a b s t r a c t  
o b j e c t s ,  t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  a mighty d i s a n a l o g y  between e x p r e s s i o n s  
and  numbers.  For  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( a g a i n ,  t y p e s )  have t o k e n s  -- 
s p l o t c h e s  o f  i n k ,  a i r  d i s t u r b a n c e s ,  and s o  f o r t h  -- t h a t  
a r e  r e a d i l y  p e r c e p t i b l e .  We can  come t o  know abou t  
e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  by means o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e i r  t o k e n s ,  
and t h e r e b y  c i rcumvent  the  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  problems c h r o n i c l e d  
by B e n a c e r r a f .  No such  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  numbers, however, f o r  numbers have  no t o k e n s .  So even 
were t h e y  t o  e x i s t ,  w e  would b e  u n a b l e  t o  know a n y t h i n g  
a b o u t  them." 
I want t o  c h a l l e n g e  t h i s  argument .  I do n o t  w i s h  
t o  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  have t o k e n s  
and numbers do n o t .  But I do w i s h  ( a )  t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e  c l a i m  
-
t h a t  "we c a n  come t o  know a b o u t  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  by means 
o f  i n t e r a c t i n g  w i t h  t h e i r  tokens" ;  and ( b )  t o  d i s p u t e  t h e  
c l a i m  t h a t  "no such  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
numbers". With r e g a r d  t o  ( a ) :  n o t  o n l y  i s  no ment ion  made 
-- 
64,. T h i s  argument ,  o r  something v e r y  l i k e  i t ,  was employed 
by Haro ld  Hodes i n  c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  me one day ,  by way o f  
d e f e n d i n g  a "modal l o g i c i s t I 1  p o s i t i o n  he  t o o k  i n  h i s  ( a s  y e t  
u n p u b l i s h e d ,  as f a r  as I know) p a p e r ,  vLogic ism And The 
O n t o l o g i c a l  Commitments o f  Mathematics ' l .  O f  c o u r s e ,  he i s  
i n  no way r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  whatever  d e f e c t s  e x i s t  i n  my 
f o r m u l a ~ i o n  of t h e  argument .  
o f  - how "we c a n  come t o  know a b o u t  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s "  by means 
o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e i r  t o k e n s  -- s u r e l y  a n  e s s e n t i a l  
i n g r e d i e n t  i n  any f u l l y  a d e q u a t e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  a c c o u n t ,  
a l t h o u g h ,  a d m i t t e d l y ,  a h a r d  one  t o  come by -- b u t  t h e  v e r y  
c l a i m  i t s e l f  t h a t  "we c a n  come t o  know a b o u t  e x p r e s s i o n  
types1 '  i s  q u i t e  o b s c u r e .  What c o u l d  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  mean by 
t h i s ?  Here are a  few o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  
( i) We can  come t o  have  p r o p o s i t i o n a l  knowledge o f  
e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  -- i . e . ,  we can  come t o  know 
f a c t s  a b o u t  e x p r e s s i o n s .  
( i i )  We c a n  come t o  have  what R u s s e l l  c a l l e d  "knowledge 
bg a c q u a i n t a n c e m  r e g a r d i n g  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ;  
( i i i )  We can  come t o  p o s s e s s  t h e  c o n c e p t s  9 f  e x p r e s s i o n  
t y p e s  (e .g . ,  t o  have  a c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  word 
l c a t a s t r o p h e l ) .  
It i s  h a r d  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  f o r m a l i s t ' s  c l a i m s  w i t h o u t  
knowing what i s  meant by "we c a n  come t o  know abou t  e x p r e s s i o n  
t y p e s w .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  I want t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  i s  j u s t i f i e d  i n  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  'I7,ve can  
come t o  know a b o u t  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s v  -- whatever  t h i s  
amounts t o  -- "by means o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e i r  t o k e n s u  
we c a n  a l s o ,  and on a similar b a s i s ,  llcome t o  know a b o u t u  
numbers. Tha t  i s ,  i f  we can  come t o  have p r o p o s i t i o n a l  
knowledge o f  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  t h e n  we c a n  come t o  have 
p r o p o s i t i o n a l  knowledge o f  numbers.  If we c a n  llbecome 
a c q u a i n t e d  w i t h v  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  t h e n  we can  become a c q u a i n t e d  
I 
w i t h  numbers.  And i f  i t  i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  coming t o  have 
c o n c e p t u a l  knowledge o f  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  t h e n  w e  can  come t o  
have c o n c e p t s  o f  numbers,  l i k e  t h a t  o f  2 ,  t o o .  But on t h e  
I 
b a s i s  o f  what? t h e  r e a d e r  may w e l l  a s k ,  s i n c e  i t  h a s  a l r e a d y  
been a d m i t t e d  t h a t  numbers have  no t o k e n s .  Here w e  come 
t o  p o i n t  t h a t  I wish  d i s p u t e  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  
"no such  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  numbers". 
That  is ,  I w i l l  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e r e  - are r e a d i l y  p e r c e p t i b l e  
phenomena t h a t  f u n c t i o n  as n u m e r i c a l  a n a l o g s  a c t u a l  
u t t e r a n c e s  and ~ n s c r i p t i o n s .  Although n o t  t o k e n s  o f  numbers,  
I b e l i e v e  t h e y  c a n  j u s t  as r e a d i l y  p r o v i d e  u s  w i t h  "knowledge 
o f v  numbers -- i n  wha tever  s e n s e  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  c a r e s  t o  use  
t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  -- as u t t e r a n c e s  and i n s c r i p t i o n s  c a n  p r o v i d e  
u s ,  i f  t h e y  do ,  w i t h  "knowledge o f v f  e x p r e s s > o n s .  65 
There  i s  a p r ima  f a c i e  i n s u r m o u n t a b l e  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  
t h i s  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  I would l i k e  t o  g e t  o u t  o f  t h e  way now. 
It i s  t h i s .  Even i f  t h e r e  a r e  n u m e r i c a l  a n a l o g s  o f  t o k e n s ,  
we can  have  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many o f  t h e s e ,  So 
i t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  even i f  t h e y  e n a b l e  u s  t o  have knowledge 
o f  numbers, i t  w i l l  be o f  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many numbers.  Yet 
what we want t o  accoun t  f o r  i s  o u r  knowledge o f  i n f i n i t e l y  
many numbers i f  we a r e  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  o u r  knowledge of  
a r l t h m e t  i c .  
- 
6 5 .  H e n c e f o r t h  I s h a l l  f r e e l y  u s e  p h r a s e s  l i k e  lfknowledge 
o f u  and l'knows a b o u t u ;  t h e  r e a d e r  shou ld  b e a r  i n  mind t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  we had above on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  c o n s t r u i n g  
t h e  f o r m a l i s t ' s  c l a i m  as ( i ) ,  (ii) o r  (iii),  and u n d e r s t a n d  
t h a t  such  p h r a s e s ,  when t h e y  a p p e a r  below, a r e  t o  be c o n s t r u e d  
i n  wha tever  s e n s e  i s  i n t e n d e d  by t h e  f o r m a l i s t  i n  t h e  
a f o r e m e n t i o n e d  c l a i m .  
The problem w i t h  t h i s  argument i s  tha t  i t  assumes 
t h a t  
( F )  If a p e r s o n  h a s  a c q u a i n t a n c e  w i t h  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  
many t okens ,  t h e n  ( s ) h e  can  have knowledge o f  o n l y  
f i n i t e l y  many t y p e s .  
y e t  i f  t h e  f o r m a l i s t l s  argument t ha t  we a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  i s  
t o  even g e t  o f f  t h e  ground,  ( F j  must be fa lse .  For  r e c a l l  
t h a t  t h e  f o r m a l i s t ' s  argument i n v o l v e s  assuming tha t  "we 
can  come t o  know about  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  by means o f  i n t e r -  
a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e i r  t o k e n s u .  C l e a r l y  we i n t e r a c t  w i t h  on ly  
f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n  t o k e n s .  So i f  ( F )  were t r u e ,  we 
cou ld  "have knowledge of1' on ly  f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n  
t y p e s ,  t o o  -- c o n t r a r y  t o  what we have been-assuming :  t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ,  and hence 
i n f i n i t e l y  many t o  have  t o  "know aboutl1.  ( I  suppose i t  
i s  n o t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  we have 
p r o p o s i t i o n a l  knowledge t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  mr.ny 
e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ,  we are o n l y  l l acqua in ted  wi th f1  o r  have 
" t h e  concep t s  o fv1  o n l y  f i n i t e l y  marly o f  them -- w i t h  t h e  
ones  t h a t  have t o k e n s .  But t h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  v e r y  odd, 
s i n c e  i t  makes i t  t o t a l l y  m y s t e r i o u s  how we e v e r  corn2 t o  
u t t e r  a s e n t e n c e  t h a t  we have neve r  s een  o r  hea rd  an  i n s t a n c e  
o f .  Bea ide s ,  any account  o f  o u r  g rammat ica l  competence 
r e g a r d i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s  must accoun t  f o r  o u r  llknowledge o f1 ' ,  
I n  some s e n s e ,  i n f i n i t e l y  many o f  t h e m . ) .  
To g e t  back t o  t h e  f o r m a l i s t l s  a rgument :  ( s ) h e  s a y s  
we can come t o  have knowledge of e x p r e r s i o n  t y p e s  by  means 
o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e i r  tokens .  The g e n e r a l  i d e ~ .  seems 
t o  be t h a t  by seeing/hearing/(perhaps) f e e l i n g  a c e r t a i n  
number o f  t okens  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  exp res s ion  t y p e ,  one can 
come t o  know c e r t a i n  impor tan t  f a c t s ,  a t  l e a s t ,  about t h e  
t y p e .  We can s e e  though,  based on t h e  fo rego ing  d i s c u s s i o n ,  
t h a t  w i t h o u t ' a  supplemental  account  of how we came t o  know 
e x p r e s s i o n s ,  t h i s  method by i t s e l f  w i l l  on ly  a f f o r d  v s  
knowledge of t h o s e  exp res s ion  t y p e s  t h a t  hkve tokzns  we 
p h y s i c a l l y  i n t e r a c t  w i th .  And of course  no one who has  
--
thought  about t h e  m a t t e r  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  t h e  only  
t y p e s  t h a t  we know about .  Even someone anxious  t o  deny 
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  many sen tences  would agree  t h a t  
eqch o f  u s  knows more s e ~ l t e n c e s  t han  we have come i n t o  c o n t a c t  
wi th .  So t h e  f i r s t  t h i n g  t o  n o t e  about  t h e  f o r m a l i s t ' s  
account  of  how we can come t o  know about exp res s ions  -- 
through t h e i r  t okens  -- i s  t h a t  a t  b e s t  i t  t o o  only e x p l a i n s  
how we come t o  know some o f  t h e  t ypes  we do know, 
S t i l l ,  t h a t  a t  least i s  something. And t h e  f o r m a l i s t l s  
p o i n t ,  I t a k e  i t ,  i s  t h a t  even t h a t  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  however 
p a r t i a l ,  i s  l a c k i n g  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  numbers and mathematical  
e n t i t i e s  g e n e r a l l y ,  because they  have no tokens .  This  i s  
presumably why, accord ing  t o  t h e  f o r m a l i s t ,  a l though  they  
a r e  a b s t r a c t ,  e x p r e s s i o n s  escape  t h e  c l u t c h e s  of B e n a c e r r a f l s  
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  problem. 
I a g r e e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no number t okens ,  se .  
-
But i t  seems t o  me t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t h i n g s  which f u n z t i o n  
a n a l o g o u s l y :  u n i t s ,  p a i r s ,  t r i c s ,  q u a d r u p l e s ,  q u i n t u p l e s ,  
... s c o r e s ,  . . . g  r o s s e s ,  e t c .  Admit tedly  what t h i s  f u n c t i o n  
--
i s  u n c l e a r  -- a s  w i t h  t h e  f o r m a l i s t ' s  o r i g i n a l  d o c t r i n e .  
[ A s  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  no ment ion  w?,s made o f  - how i n t e r a c t i o ~ .  
w i t h  t o k e n s  y i e l d s  knowledge c f  t y p e s . ) .  But j u s t  a s  w i t h  
l e a r n i n g  i n  c h i l d r e n ,  some p l a u s i b l e  s o r t  o f  s t o r y  -- what- 
even  i t  may b e  -- c a n  be  t o l d .  I d e n t i c a l  t w i n s ,  happy 
c o u p l e s ,  p a i r s  o f  s h o e s  o r  j a c k s ,  and d o u b l e s  i n  b a s e b a l l  
o r  t e n n i s  e n a b l e  u s  t o  know about  t h e  number 2 .  T r i p l e t s ,  
happy t h r e e s o m e s ,  Beethoven t r i o s ,  ma jo r  r1.nd minor t r i a d s ,  
and t r i p l e s  i n  b a s e b a l l  o r  bowl ing i l l u m i n a t e  u s  abou t  3 .  
Q u a d r u p l e t s ,  happy foursomes ,  Beethoven q u a r t e t s ,  Greek 
m u s i c a l  t e t r a c h o r d s ,  and t h e  q u a d r u p l e  o f  o n e ' s  a l lowance  
i n f o r m  u s  a b o u t  4 .  There  are p e r c e p t i b l e  p a r t i c u l a r s  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  which e n a b l e s  u s  t o  "know o u r  nuhnbersVf ,  j u s t  
a s  e x p r e s s i o n  t o k e n s  e n a b l e  u s  t o  "know o u r  l e t t e r s " ,  O f  
c o u r s e ,  I would n o t  deny t h a t  t h e r e  - a r e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  even 
i m p o r t a n t  o n e s ,  between t h e  two i n s t a n t i a t i o n  - r e l a t i o n s  
( i f  I may be Y O  b o l d  as t o  c a l l ,  f o r  example,  t h e  F i r s t  
Couple,  Adam and Eve, a n  " i n s t a n c e f V  o f  2 )  ; It  i s  j u s t  t h a t  
I do n o t  t h i n k  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  s u f ' f i c ~ e n t  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  
f o r m a l i s t f s  c l a i m  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  we can  come t o  1;ni3w about  
e x p r e s s i c n  t y p e s  by e x p e r i e n c i n g  t h e i r  t o k e n s ,  Ifnu such  
e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  ilumbe~ s u  ( s o  t h a t  
even were numbers t o  e x i s t ,  t h e y  would be e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  
i n a c c e s s i b l e ) ,  I t h i n k  t h a t  what t h i s  f o r m a l i s t i c  c l a i m  
amounts t o  i s  t h a t  p a i r s ,  t r i o s ,  and s o  f o r t h  are n o t  t h e  
n u m e r i c a l  a n a l o g s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n  t o k e n s ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no 
s u c h  a n a l o g s .  I n  view o f  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  Sesame S t r e e t  i n  
t e a c h i n g  " t h e  numbers1' t o  t o t s  by means o f  j u s t  such d e v i c e s  
as showing p a i r s  o f  s h o e s  and j a c k s ,  and happy t h r e e s o m e s ,  
one  wonders what t h e  f o r m a l i s t  c o u l d  have i n  mind. The 
res t  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w i l l  c o n s i s t  i n  a  number 
o f  o b j e c t i o n s  t h a t  might  be  r a i s e d ,  and r e s p o n s e s  t o  them. 
Due t o  t h e  immensi ty o f  t h e  t o p i c  and  t o p i c s  i t  impinges  t 
upon, i t  w i l l  o f  n e c e s s i t y  be  s k e t c h y  and have more n e a r l y  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a p r e l i m i n a r y  s t u d y  t h a n  a fu l l -b lown one ,  
and  f o r  t h i s  I a p o l o g i z e  i n  advance .  
My f i r s t  o b j e c t i o n  i s  n o t  one t h a t l a  f o r m a l i s t  would 
n e c e s s a r i l y  r a i s e ,  b u t  i t  i s  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  one .  66 
O b j e c t i o n  #1: T h i s  a t t e m p t  t o  e x p l a i n  how i t  i s  
t h a t  we come t o  have  knowledge o f  numbers i s  c i r c u l a r .  I n  
o r d e r  t o  r e c o g n i z e  a p a i r  o f  s h o e s ,  f o r  example ,  as a p a i ~  
o f  s h o e s ,  one must a l r e a d y  have  t h e  concep t  o f  2 ,  because  
t h a t  i s  ( p a r t l y )  what r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a p a i r  o f  s h o e s  c o n s i s t s  
i n :  r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  2 s h o e s .  
Response t o  #1: I n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h i s  o b j e c t i o n  we 
r i s k  becoming e m b r o i l e d  i n  such  q u e s t i o n s  as whether  t r a n s i t i v e  
c o u n t i n g  (1 shoe ,  2 s h o e s ,  3 s h o e s ,  , . . )  o r  i n t r a n s i t i v e  
- 
6 6 .  T h i s  was s u g g e s t e d  t o  me by Lon Berk .  
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coun t ing  (1, 2 ,  3 ,  + * )  llcomes f i r s t ' '  ( i n  p o s s i b l e  l e a r n i n g  
s equences ) .  It might seem, f o r  example, t h a t  we a r e  o f f  
t h e  hook i f  t r a n s i t i v e  coun t ing  "comes f i r s t v 1 ,  While 
i n t e r e s t i n g ,  I b e l i e v e  t h i s  s o r t  o f  i s s u e  can b e  s i de s t epped  
h e r e .  My c l a i m  i s  t h a t  - i f  e x p r e s s i o n  t okens  can g i v e  u s  
knowledge of e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ,  t h e n  p a i r s ,  t r i p l e s ,  e t c . ,  
can g i v e  u s  knowledge o f  numbers. Now i t  may be t h a t  
knowledge o f  numbers i s  i n n a t e ,  ha s  -- t o  be i n n a t e ,  o r  we 
would n o t  be a b l e  t o  s e e  a p a i r  as a p a i r  o r  a t r i p l e  as 
- -
a t r i p l e ,  and s3 on. But i t  seems t o  me t h a t  one can make 
---
j u s t  - as good a c a s e  f o r  c l a iminq ,  as some do, t h a t  knowledge 
--- -
o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  Is i n n a t e  too; o the rwi se  how, i t  might be 
-
asked ,  cou ld  we r ecogn ize  a token  o f  ' c a t :  as a token  a f  
7
' c a t 1 ,  u n l e s s  we a l r e a d y  had t h e  concept  of  t h e  word ' c a t ! ?  
That i s ,  it  could  be a rgued  t h a t  I n  o r d e r  t o  r ecogn ize  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  spoken u t t e r a n c e  as a token  of ' c a t 1 ,  one would 
have t o  be a b l e  t o  r ecogn ize  o t h e r  u t t e r a n c e s  a s  t okens  of 
t h e  same word, and t h i s  r e q u i r e s  knowledge o f  t h a t  word, o f  
--- 
' o a t 1 .  Again, I do n o t  want t o  become en t ang led  i n  e m p i r i c i s t -  
r a t i o n a l i s t  d i s p u t e s  about  what ,  if any,  i n n a t e  knowledge 
o r  d i s p o s i t i o n s  we have t o  have i n  o r d e r  t o  do what we do .  
The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  i n t u i t i o n  behind o b j e c t i o n  #1 c u t s  
bo th  ways; t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  unde rcu t s  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  
t h a t  we l e a r n  about  2 and 3 e . g , ,  from p a i r s  and t r i p l e s ,  
67. Benacerraf  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  and d i s c u s s e s  t h e s e  modes o f  
couf i t ing i n  "What Numbers Count Not Bef1. 
i t  a l s o  u n d e r c u t s  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  we l e a r n  abou t  
e x p r e s s i o n s  f rom t o k e n s  o f  them. A s  l o n g  a s  we a r e  assuming,  
w i t h  t h e  f o r m a l i s t ,  t h a t  knowledge o f  e x p r e s s i o n  t o k e n s  d o e s  
y i e l d  knowledge o f  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ,  we a r e  t a c i t l y  a g r e e i n g  
t o  n o t  d i s c u s s  t h e  above i s s u e  ( a l t h o u g h  i t  may w e l l  be  
t h a t  we are t a k i n g  a s t a n d  on i t ) .  So l e t  u s  nc t  d i s c u s s  
i t .  
O b j e c t i o n  # 2 :  It may w e l l  be  t r u e  t h a t  we cou ld  
o b t a i n  knowledge o f  small numbers t h i s  way; b u t  i t  does  n o t  
a c c o u n t  f o r  how we c o u l d  have knowledge, n o t  o n l y  of  
i n f i n i t e l :  many numbers (as we saw e a r l i e r ) ,  b u t  even o f  
l a r g e  numbers.  We n e v e r  e x p e r i e n c e ,  f o r  example,  a t r i l l i o n -  
t u p l e  o f  c o n c r e t e  p e r c e p t i b l e  p a r t i c u l a r s ,  s o  t h a t  we 
c o u l d  come t o  know a b o u t  a t r i l l i o n  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  i t .  
Yet s u r e l y  i f  we know a b o u t  a hundred ,  we know abou t  a  
t r i l l i o n .  
Response t o  #2: Yes, e x c e p t  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
f e d e r a l  budge t ,  numbers l i k e  a t r i l l i o n  a r e  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  
have " i n s t a n t L a t i o n s  t h a t  we can  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  c o n c r e t e  
p e r c e p t i b l e  p a r t i c u l a r s  -- which i s  p e r h a p s  why p e o p l e  
t e n d  t o  t h i n k  o f  s u c h  numbers as a b s t r a c t  compared t o  t h e  
number o f ,  s a y ,  o n e ' s  t o e s ,  o r  t h e  p l a n e t s ,  and why p e r s o n s  
on TV a f t e r  making r e f e r e n c e  t o  a l a r g e  number ( l i k e  a  
t r i l l i o n )  a lways  append some comment such  a s :  "Thht many 
d o l l a r  b i l l s  l a i d  end t o  end would go t o  t h e  moon and back 
1 9  1,/2 times1'. But a g a i n ,  I d o  n o t  t h i n k  t h i s  f a c t  need 
d e t a i n  u s  h e r e ,  f o r  t h e  same r e a s o n  as was p u t  f o r t h  i n  
r e s p o n s e  t o  o b j e c t i o n  # l .  That  i s ,  i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  t r u e  
t h a t  t h i s  accoun t  needs  supp lement ing  t o  e x p l a i n  how we 
o b t a i n  knowledge of numbers whose i n s t a n c e s  have n e v e r  been 
e x p e r i e n c e d .  T h i s  i s  j u s t  t o  concede once a g a i n  t h a t  t h e  
p r e s e n t  a c c o u n t  i s  o n l y  meant t o  be  p a r t i a l .  I n  e x a c t l y  
t h e  same way, though ,  t h e  f o r m a l i s t ' s  token- to - type  a c c o u n t  
o f  how we .come t o  have  knowledge o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  i s  a l s o  
p a r t i a l  (as w e  ~ o t e d  e a r l i e r ) ,  b e c a u s e  i t  needs  supp lement ing ,  
t o o ,  t o  e x p l a i n  how we come t o  have  knowledge o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  
( l i k e  l o n g  s e n t e n c e s )  i n s t a n c e s  o f  which have n e v e r  been 
e x p e r i e n c e d .  I s u s p e c t  t h a t  were t h e  f o r m a l i s t  t o  p r o v i d e  
t h e  needed s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n ,  similar p r i n c i p l e s  might  b e  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o w a r d s  e x p l a i n i n g  how we come t o  have  knowledge 
o f  l a r g e  numbers,  t o o .  
O b j e c t i o n  # 3 :  I n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  Mi l l ' s  accoun t  o f  
how we know t h a t  ' 2  t 1 = 3 '  i s  t r u e ,  F rege  q u e s t i o n e d  
whether  it i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  o b s e r v e  " t h a t  c o l l e c t i o n s  o f  
o b j e c t s  e x i s t ,  which w h i l e  t h e y  i m p r e s s  t h e  s e n s e s  t h u s ,  
0 r, 
, may b e  s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  two p a r t s ,  t h u s ,  0 . ,168 
He n o t e d  t h a t  "If i t  were,  t h e  number 0 would be a p u z z l e ;  
f o r  up t o  now no one ,  I t a k e  i t ,  h a s  e v e r  s e e n  o r  touched  0 
pebbles.I1 ( p .  11). The o b j e c t i o n  Frege  r a i s e d  i n  t h i s  n o t e  can  
be r a i s e d  e q u a l l y  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t :  i t  
l e a v e s  knowledge o f  0 u n e x p l a i n e d .  Yet knowledge of 0 i s  
68. Founda t ions  o f  Ar i th rne t l c  57, 8 ,  pp.  9 ,  11. 
b a s i c  t o  knowledge of number; n o r  s h o u l d  we be  made t o  
w a i t  f o r  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  u n t i l  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  p u t s  f o r t h  some 
s o l u t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  has no s i m i l a r  problem. 
Response t o  #3:  It does  l e a v e  0 u n e x p l a i n e d .  And 
l e t  u s  assume t h a t  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  h a s  no p a r a l l e l  problem.  
Does t h i s  c o n s t i t u t e  a  s e r i o u s  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  epis temo-  
l o g i c a l  a c c o u n t  we are c o n s i d e r i n g ?  I d o n ' t  t h i n k  s o .  
It does  show t h a t  t h i s  a c c o u n t  d o e s  n o t  accoun t  f o r  our  
knowledge o f  0 ,  which a t  f i rs t  b l u s h  might a p p e a r  t o  b e  a 
s e r i o u s  l i a b i l i t y ,  But i f  t h e r e  i s  good independen t  
e v i d e n c e  t h a t  knowledge o f  0 i s  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n ,  
t h a t  even b e l i e f  i n  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  0 i s  n o t  a u t o m a t i c a i l y  
concomi tan t  w i t h  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  pf 1, 2 ,  3, e t c .  
t h e n  I t h i n k  t h a t  i n s t e a d  o f  t h i s  b e i n g  a  l i a b i l i t y ,  i t  
may w e l l  be  c o n f i r m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  accoun t  under  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
And i n d e e d  t h e r e  i s  such  e v i d e n c e .  I n  t h e  E n c j c l o p e d i a  
o f  Ph i losophy  under  t h e  h e a d i n g  Number, S t e p h e n  F .  Barker  
-
s t a t e s  t h a t  
t h e  numbers i n v o l v e d  i n  c o u n t i n g  -- 1, 2 ,  3 ,  
e t c .  -- are o f  c o u r s e  t h e  s i m p l e s t  and most 
fundamenta l  k i n d .  A t  l e a s t  s i n c e  l a t e  
c l a s s i c a l  times t h e s e  have been c a l l e d  t h e  I 
n a t u r a l  numbers,  t h e r e b y  b e i n g  c ~ n t r a s t e d ~ ~  
w i t h  t h e  l l a r t i f i c i a l l l  k i n d s  o f  numbers. .  . 
So i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  0  was n o t  co r i s ide red  a n a t u r a l  number, 
a t  l e a s t  n o t  i n  c l a s s i c a l  t i m e s .  But Barker  h a s t e n s  t o  
add : 
69. (New York: Macmillan, 1967)  V o l .  5 ,  p .  5 2 7 .  
A t r i f l i n g  ambigu i ty  i n  t h e  t e rm  I t n a t u r a l  
numberI1 a r i s e s  because  some w r i t e r s  choose  
t o  c a l l  z e r o  a n a t u r a l  number, whereas 
o t h e r s  do n o t .  ( Idem) .  
A s  a matter o f  f a c t ,  ~ r e ~ e ~ '  and ~ u s s e 1 1 ~ '  c l a s s i f i e d  
0  as  a n a t u r a l  number; ~ e d e k i n d ~ ~  and ~ e a n c ~ ~  do n o t .  But 
t h e s e  are modern writers. A s  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  even a  
numeral  co r r e spond ing  t o  o u r  ' O f ,  Morr i s  K l ine  t e l l s  u s :  
A t  f i rs t  t h e  Babylonians  had no symbol t o  
i n d i c a t e  t h e  absence  o f  a number i n  any one 
p o s i t i o n ,  and consequen t l y  t h e i r  numbers 
were ambiguous. Thus p<( cou ld  mean 
80 o r  3620, depending up whether  t h e  f i r s t  
symbol meant 60 o r  3600. 74 
I n  t i m e ,  K l i ne  t e l l s  u s ,  t h i s  d e f i c i t  was c o r r e c t e d :  
' a  
Greek p a p y r i  o f  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
Alexandr ian  p e r i o d  ( f i r s t  th r r ; e  c e n t u r i e s  
B . C . )  c o n t a i n  symbols f o r  z e r o  such  as 
The z e r o  o f  t h e  Greek Alexandr ian  p e r i o d  was 
used ,  as was t h e  z e r o  o f  t h e  S e l e u c i d  
Babylonian  p e r i o d ,  t o  i n d i c a t e  m l s s ing  
numbers. According t o  Byzan t ine  m a n u s c r i p t s ,  
which are a l l  we have o f  P to l emy l s  work, 
he  used 0  f o r  [ t h e  numeral ]  z e r o  bo th  i n  
70 .  Founda t ions  - o f  A r i t h m e t i c  574. 
7 1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  -- t o  Mathemat ica l  Phi losophy (New York: 
Simon and S c h u s t e r ,  1971) p.  13 .  
7 2 ,  " L e t t e r  t o  K e f e r s t e i n H  i n  From Frege  - t o Gzdel ,  p .  100 .  
73 .  "The P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Ar i thmet ic1!  i n  From Frege  - t o  Ggdel,  
P*  94. 
7 4 ,  Mathemat ica l  Thought from Ancient  t o  Modern Times (New 
York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  m p . T .  
t h e  middle and a t  t h e  end of a number. 
(P .  1 3 2 ) .  
I n  t r e a t i n g  t h e  numeral ' 0 '  as a mere p l a c e h o l d e r ,  i t  i s  
c l e a r  t ha t  t h e  Babylonians and Greeks d i d  no t  c o n s i d e r  ze ro  
a number. That t h i s  i s  s o  i s  borne ou t  by t h e  fo l lowing  
passage from P l a t o ' s  Parmenides: 
Now suppose we t a k e  a s e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e s e  
terms,  [say]  ' be ing '  and ' d i f f e r e n t 1 ,  o r  
' be ing1  and ' one1 ,  o r  ' one1  and ' d i f f e r e n t t .  
I n  each  c a s e  we are s e l e c t i n g  a p a i r  
which may be  spoken o f  as ' bo thv . . .And  a  
p a i r  t h a t  can p r o p e r l y  be c a l l e d  ' b o t h g  must 
be - two. And i f  a  p a i r  of  t h i n g s  a r e  two, 
each  o f  them must be one. T h i s  a p p l i e s  
t o  ou r  terms.  S ince  each  s e t  forms a couple ,  
each term must b e  one. And i f  s o ,  t h e n ,  
when any one i s  added t o  any p a i r ,  t h e  sum 
w i l l  be t h r e e .  And t h r e e  i s  odd, two even.  
Now i f  t h e r e  a r e  two, t h z r e  must a l s o  be 
tw ice  t imes ,  i f  t h r e e ,  t h r e e  t imes  s i n c e  two 
-. i s  tw ice  t imes  one and t h r e e  i s  t h r e e  t imes  
one ,  And i f  t h e r e  a r e  two and twice  t imes ,  
t h r e e  and t h r e e  t , imes,  t h e r e  must be tw ice  
times two and t h r e e  t i l7 ,es  t h r e e .  And, i f  
t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  ~ h i c h  occur  tw ice  and t v o  
which occu r  t h r e e  times, t h e r e  must be tw ice  
t imes  t h r e e  and t h r e e  t imes  - two. Thus t h e r e  
I w i l l  be even m u l t i p l e s  of  even s e t s ,  odd m u l t i p l e s  o f  odd s e t s ,  odd m u l t i p l e s  o f  
even s e t s ,  and even m u l t i p l e s  of odd s e t s .  
That be ing  s o ,  t h e r e  i s  no number l e f t ,  
which must no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  be.75 
The l a s t  l i n e  of t h e  passage i n  p a r t i c u l a r  sugges t s  
t h a t  P l a t o  d i d  not  t n i n k  0 a  number. 
Apparent ly ,  i t  was not  u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  yea r  600 t h a t  
7 5 .  T r a n s l a t e d  by F.M. Cornford i n  P l a t o :  The Co l l ec t ed  
Dialo  u e s ,  e d ,  by Ed i th  Hamilton and Huntington Cai rns  
: Pr ince ton  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1961) l i n e s  1 4 3 ~ -  
144a, pp,  936f .  
z e r o  came t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a number, by t h e  Hindus.  Kl ine  
t e l l s  u s  t h a t  
. . . t h e  z e r o ,  which t h e  Alexandr ian  Greeks 
had e a r l i e r  used o n l y  t o  d e n o t e  t h e  absence  
o f  a  number, was t r e a t e d  a s  a complete  number. 
~ Z h a v F r a  s a y s  t h a t  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  of a  number 
by 0 g i v e s  0 and t h a t  s u b t r a c t i n g  0 does  no t  
d i m i n i s h  a number. ( p .  185)  
H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  t h e n  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  0 was no t  cons ide r ed  
a number u n t i l  a f t e r  600;  and i t s  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  numbers 
seems t o  have  been mo t iva t ed  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  by c l o s u r e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  less  a b s t r a c t  s o r t s  o f  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  c o l l e c t i o n s  and  c o u n t i n g  t h a t  
Barker  h i n t s  a t ,  and Dedekind seems t o  have been mot iva ted  
by: 
I r e g a r d  t h e  whole o f  a r i t h m e t i c  as a n e c e s s a r y ,  
o r  a c  least n a t u r a l ,  consequence o f  t h e  
s i m p l e s t  a r i t h m e t i c  a c t ,  t h a t  o f  c o u n t i n g ,  
and c o u n t i n g  i t s e l f  as n o t h i n g  e l s e  t h a n  t h e  
s u c c e s s i v e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n f i n i t e  s e r i e s  o f  
p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r s  i n  which each  i n d i v i d u a l  i 
d e f i n e d  by t h e  one immedia te ly  p r e c e d i n g  ... 7 9  
It i s  no wonder t h e n  t h a t  Dedekind does  n o t  t r e a t  0 a s  a 
n a t u r a l  number, c l a i m i n g  t h a t  t h e  " c r e a t i o n  o f  z e ro f1  invoLves 
"an e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  number-conceptu ( p .  3 5 ) .  
And even though R u s s e l l  i n c l u d e s  0 i n  t h e  n a t u r a l  
n m b e r s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  from h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  (quo ted  d i r e c t l y  
below) t h a t  he n o t  o n l y  t h i n k s  0 i s  a more d i f f i c u l t  
number t o  d i s c o v e r  t h a n ,  s a y ,  2 ,  b u t  he e n d o r s e s  t h e  
76.  Essays  on t h e  Theory o f  Numbers, p .  4 ,  
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  a ccoun t  of number-knowledge ( a l b e i t  a  
p a r t i a l  one )  t h a t  we a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g .  
To t h e  ave r age  educa t ed  pe r son  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  
day ,  t h e  obv ious  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t  o f  mathemat ics  
would be t h e  s e r i e s  o f  whole numbers, 
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,  ... e t c .  
P robab ly  o n l y  a pe r son  w i t h  some mathemat ica l  
knowledge would t h i n k  o f  beg inn ing  w i t h  0 
i n s t e a d  o f  w i t h  1, b u t  we w i l l  presume t h i s  
deg ree  o f  knowledge; we w i l l  t a k e  as o u r  
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t  t h e  s e r i e s :  
and it  i s  t h i s  series t h a t  we s h a l l  mean when 
we speak o f  t h e  " s e r i e s  o f  n a t u r a l  numbersu.  
It i s  on ly  a t  a h i g h  s t a g e  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  
t h a t  we cou ld  t a k e  t h i s  series as o u r  
starting-point . It must have r e q u i r e d  
many a g e s  t o  d i s c o v e r  t h a t  a b r ace  o f  
p h e a s a n t s  and a coup l e  o f  days  were b o t h  
i n s t a n c e s  o f  t h e  number 2 :  t h e  deg ree  o f  
a b s t r a c t l o n  i nvo lved  i s  far  f rom e a s y .  And 
t h e  d i s c o v e r y  t h a t  one i s  a number must have 
been d i f f i c u l t .  A s  f a r  as 0, i t  i s  a  v e r y  
r e c e n t  a d d i t i o n .  p e  Greeks and Romans 
had no such  d i g i t .  
I n  view of t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t s ,  0 seems t o  r e q u i r e  
a d i f f e r e n t  e x p l a n a t i o n  from t h a t  o f  even t h e  o t h e r  non- 
l a r g e  n a t u r a l  numbers abou t  how we come t o  know abou t  i t ,  
So a l t hough  it i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  accoun t  under  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
does  n o t  e n t a i l  such  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  t h i s  a p p e a r s  t o  be 
a n  asset r a t h e r  t h a n  a l i a b i l i t y .  
Ob j ec t i on  # 4 :  We a r e  c o n s t r u i n g  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  a s  
s a y i n g  t h a t  even though o r  most o f  them, 
a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s ,  t h e y  a r e  a c c e s s i b l e  t o  us  because  we 
a r e  
' ( 1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  Mathemat ica l  Ph i losophy ,  p .  3 ,  
e x p e r i e n c e  t h e i r  t okens  which, a s  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  ( e . g .  
s p l o t c h e s  o f  i n k )  o r  e v e n t s  ( e . g .  a i r  d i s t u r b a n c e s )  a r e  
c o n c r e t e ,  a r e  p e r c e p t i b l e  p a r t i c u l a r s .  And you c l a im  t h a t  
u n i t s ,  p a i r s ,  twos ,  e t c .  -- p l u r a l i t i e s  l e t ' s  c a l l  them -- 
a r e  t h e  numer i ca l  a n a l o g s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n  t o k e n s ,  by means 
o f  which numbers are a c c e s s i b l e  t o  u s .  But t h e s e  p l u r a l i t i e s  
cannot  be mere heaps ,  o r  a g g r e g a t e s ,  f o r  t h e  same s o r t s  of 
r e a s o n s  t h a t  Frege  advanced t o  show t h a t  numbers a r e  n o t  
p r o p e r t i e s .  He wro te :  
I am a b l e  t o  t h i n k  o f  t h e  I l i ad  e i t h e r  a s  one 
poem, o r  as 24 Books, o r  a s  some l a r g e  Number 
o f  v e r s e s .  Is i t  n o t  i n  t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
s e n s e s  t h a t  w e  speak  of  a t r ee  a s  hav ing  1 0 0 0  
l e a v e s  and a g a i n  as hav ing  g r e e n  l e a v e s ?  The 
g r een  c o l o u r  w e  a s c r i b e  t o  e ach  s i n g l e  l e a f ,  
b u t  n o t  t h e  number 1000. If we c a l l ' a l l  t h e  
-----l e a v e s  - - -  o f  a  t ree  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r   i t s  f o l i a g e ,  
t h e n  t h e  f o l i a g e  t o o  i s  g r een ,  b u t  i t  i s  no t  
-7
1000, To what t h e n d o e s  t h e  p r o p e r t y   OF 
r e a l l y  be long?  It a lmos t  l o o k s  as though it 
be longs  n e i t h e r  t o  any s i n g l e  one o f  t h e  l e a v e s  
no r  t o  t h e  t o t a l i t y  o f  them a l l ;  i s  i t  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  i t  does  n o t  r e a l l y  b e l a n g  t o  t h i n g s  i n  
t h e  e x t e r n a l  world a t  a l l ?  I f  I g i v e  someone 
a s t o n e  w i t h  t h e  words: F ind  t h e  weight  of  
t h i s ,  I have g i v e n  him p r e c i s e l y  t h e  o b j e c t  
he i s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e .  But i f  I p l a c e  a 
p i l e  of  p l a y i n g  c a r d s  i n  h i s  hands w i t h  
t h e  words: F ind  t h e  number o f  t h e s e ,  t h i s  
does  n o t  t e l l  him whether  I wish t o  know t h e  
number o f  c a r d s ,  o r  o f  complate  packs  o f  
c a r d s ,  o r  even s a y  o f  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  game of  
s k a t .  To have g i v e n  bin t h e  p i l e  i n  h i s  
hands i s  no t  y e t  t o  have g i v e n  him comple t e ly  
t h e  o b j e c t  he  i s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e :  I must 
add some f u r t h e r  words -- c a r d s ,  o r  packs ,  
o r  p o i n t s .  Nor can  w e  s a y  t h a t  i n  t h i s  
c a s e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  numbers e x i s t  i n  t h e  same 
t h i n g  a i d e  by s i d e ,  as d i f f e r e n t  c o l o ~ r s  
do. I can  p o i n t  t o  t h e  p a t c h  o f  ea:h 
i n d i v i d u a l  c o l o u r  w i thou t  s a y i n g  a  word, 
bu t  I cannot  i n  t h e  same way p o i n t  t o  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  numbers. I f  I can  c a l l  t h e  s a n e  
o b j e c t  r e d  and g r e e n  w i t h  e q u a l  r i g h t ,  i t  i s  
a s u r e  s i g n  t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t  named Is n o t  
what r ea l ly  h a s  t h e  g r e e n  c o l o u r ;  f o r  t h a t  
we must f irst get a  s u r f a c e  which i s  g r e e n  
o n l y .  ~ i m i l a r i ~ ,  a n  o b j e c t  to which - -  f can  
a s c r i b e  d i f f e r e n t  numbers w i t h  e a u a l  r i a h t  i s  
n o t  what r e a l l y  h a s  5 number.10 
--
S i n c e  t h e  p l u r a l i t i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  a r e  n o t  mere h e a p s ,  
t h e y  must be  sets o r  c l a s s e s .  But s e t s  and c l a s s e s  a r e  
n o t  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ,  t h e y  a r e  a b s t r a c t .  I n  s u p p o r t  o f  
t h i s  p o i n t  w e  may l o o k  t o  Q u i n e ,  f o r  example,  who w r i t e s :  
C o n t i n e n t a l  Uni ted  S t a t e s  i s  a n  e x t e n s i v e  
p h y s i c a l  body (of  a r b i t r a r y  d e p t h )  h a v i n g  
t h e  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s  as p a r t s ;  a t  t h e  same t i m e  
it i s  a p h y s i c a l  body h a v i n g  t h e  s e v e r a l  
c o u n t i e s  a s  p a r t s .  It i s  t h e  same c o n c r e t e  
o b j e c t ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  
d i s s e c t i o n s  imposed; t h e  heap  o f  s t a t e s  and 
t h e  heap o f  c o u n t i e s  a r e  i d e n t i c a l .  The 
c l a s s  o f  s ta tes ,  however,  canno t  b e  
i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  c l a s s  o f  c o u n t i e s ;  f o r  
t h e r e  i s  much t h a t  we want t o  affirm o f  t h e  
one c l a s s  and  deny o f  t h e  o t h e r .  We 
want t o  s a y  e m g ,  t h a t  t h e  one c l a s s  h a s  
e x a c t l y  48 members, w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r  h a s  
3075, We want t o  s a y  t h a t  Delaware i s  a  
member o f  t h e  f i r s t  c l a s s  and n o t  o f  t h e  
second ,  and  t h a t  Nantucket  i s  a  member o f  
t h e  second c l a s s  and n o t  o f  t h e  f i r s t .  These 
c l a s s e s ,  u n l i k e  t h e  s i n g l e  c o n c r e t e  heaps  
which t h e i r  members compose, must be a c c e p t e d  
as  two e n t i t i e s  o f  a n o n - s p a t i a l  and a b s t r a c t  
k i n d .  79 
S i n c e  t h e y  a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s ,  t h e  p l u r a l i t i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  -- 
p a i r s ,  t r i o s ,  e t c .  -- a r e  h a r d l y  on a n  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  p a r  
w i t h  t o k e n s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  which a r e  c o n c r e t e .  
78. Founda t ions  o f  Ar ikhmet ic ,  522 pp .  2 8 f f  ( i t a l i c s  a d d e d ) ,  
79.  Mathemat ica l  Logic (Cambridge, Mass. :  Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  
P r e s s ,  1940)  p .  120 .  
Response t o  # 4 :  1 do n o t  t h i n k  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  
argument ,  a t  l e a s t  as I w i l l  c o n s t r u e  i t ,  even b e g i n s  t o  
show t h a t  t h e  p l u r a l i t i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  a r e  a b s t r a c t  r a t h e r  
t h a n  c o n c r e t e .  The s k e l e t o n  o f  t h e  argument  i s  t h i s :  
( 55 )  P l u r a l i t i e s  such  as  p a i r s ,  t r i o s ,  e t c . ,  a r e  e i t h e r  
a g g r e g a t e s  ( i n  t h e  ph i los .oph ica1  s e n s e  of' t l heap l t )  
o r  s e t s .  
( 5 6 )  P l u r a l i t i e s  a r e  n o t  a g g r e g a t e s .  
( 5 7 )  So p l u r a l i t i e s  are c l a s s e s .  
( 5 8 )  C l a s s e s  are a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  
( 59 )  So t h e  p l u r a l i t i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  
Of c o u r s e  I a g r e e  t h a t  ( 5 7 )  and  ( 5 9 )  are consequences  of  
p r e c e d i n g  s t a t e m e n t s ;  I o b j e c t  t o  ( 5 5 ) ,  ( 5 6 )  a n d  ( 5 8 )  
though.  To b e g i n  w i t h ,  no argument i s  g i v e n  f o r  ( 5 5 ) .  Why 
c a n ' t  t h e  p l u r a l i t i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  be n e i t h e r  a g g r e g a t e s ,  i n  
t h e  f u l l - b l o w n  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s e n s e  ( a c t u ~ l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  
more t h a n  o n e )  n o r  c l a s s e s ?  Why a r e n ' t  p a i r s  j u s t ,  w e l l ,  
p a i r s ?  Perhaps  t h e y  a r e  l i k e  a g g r e g a t e s  i n  some ways, 
c l a s s e s  i n  o t h e r  ways, b u t  do n o t  conform t o  e i t h e r  s e t  
t h e o r y  o r  t h e  c a l c u l u s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  
But even i f  ( 5 5 )  i s  t r u e ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  seem t o  m e  t h a t  
F r e g e l s  argument shows ( 5 6 ) .  Here i s  what I t a k e  t o  be  
t h e  e s s e n c e  of t h a t  a rgument ,  a p p l i e d  t o  p l u r a l i t i e s :  
( 6 0 )  Every p l u r a l i t y  c o n s i s t s  o f  some one d e f i n i t e  number 
of t h i n g s .  For  example,  a  t r i o  c o n s i s t s  o f  e x a c t l y  
3 t h i n g s .  
( 6 1 )  Aggregates  do  n o t  have  some one  d e f i n i t e  number o f  
t h i n g s .  To u s e  Q u i n e ' s  example, t h e  physica l .  body 
t h a t  i s  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  i s  b o t h  50 s t a t e s  and 3075 
c o u n t i e s .  
( 6 2 )  T h e r e f o r e ,  a g g r e g a t e s  a r e  n o t  p l u r a l i t i e s .  ( O r ,  
what comes t o  t h e  same t h i n g ,  ( 5 6 ) . ) .  
( 6 1 )  may be r i g h t ;  b u t  ( 6 0 ) ,  a l t h o u g h  prima f a c i e  
c o n v i n c i n g ,  i s  d u b i o u s .  For  one c a n  c o n s t r u c t  a p l a u s i b l e  
argument whose c o n c l u s i o n  c o n t r a d i c t s  ( 6 0 )  ( u n d e r  what 
I t h i n k  i t s  most s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  r e a d i n g  i s ) :  P a i r s  c o n s i s t  
o f  e x a c t l y  2 t h i n g s  o f  t h e  same s o r t ,  t r i o s  o f  3 ,  and i n  
g e n e r a l  n - t u p l e s  o f  e x a c t l y  n. ( I  have i n  mind h e r e  
- - 
v c o u n t a b l e "  s o r t s  l i k e  a p p l e s ,  s t a t e s  and c o u n t i e s ,  n o t  
w a t e r ,  o r  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  water.) .  Now t h e  p h y s i c a l  body t h a t  
i s  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  c o n s i s t s  o f ,  a t  one  and t h e  same t i m e ,  
50 s t a t e s  and 3075 c o u n t i e s .  So t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  i s  
b o t h  a 5 0 - t u p l e  and a 3075- tuple  a t  t h e  same t i m e .  
I t a k e  i t  th;t t h i s  l as t  s t a t e m e n t  c o n t r a d i c t s  ( 6 0 ) ,  
( 6 0 )  d e r i v e s  i t s  c r e d i b i l i t y ,  I b e l i e v e  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
i t  r e s e m b l e s  ( 6 3 ) ,  a s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  i s  p e r h a p s  vague,  b u t  
t r u e .  
( 6 3 )  A p l a r a l i t y  c o n s i s t s  o f  scrne one d e f i n i t e  nurnber o f  
t h i n g s  o f  a c e r t a i n  s o r t .  
- -  -
So even though a  p l u r a l i t y  ( o f  p i e  p i e c e s ,  s a y )  may c o n s i s t  
o f  some one d e f i n i t e  number ( 2 )  3f t h i n g s  o f  a  c e r t a i n  s a r t  
( h a l f - p i e s ) ,  i t  may a l s o  c o n s i s t  of  some one d e f i n i t e  ncmber 
( 4 )  o f  t h i n g s  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  s o r t  ( q u a r t e r - p i e s ) .  ( A  
p a i r  o f  h a l f - p i e s  c a n  compr i se  t h e  same p i e  a s  a q u a d r u p l e  
o f  q u a r t e ? - p i e s ) ,  
What t h i s  s u g g e s t s  i s  t h a t  b e i n g  a  p a i r ,  s a y ,  i s  
l i k e  b e i n g  a f a t h e r ,  i n  c e r t a i n  i m p o r t a n t  r e s p e c t s .  I f  
x i s  a f a t h e r  t h e n  x i s  t h e  f a t h e r  o f  someone. I f  x i s  
-
a  p a i r ,  t h e n  x i s  a p2j.r oP t h i n g s  o f  t h e  same s o r t  So 
----
F r e ~ e  was r i g h t  i n s o f a r  a s  b e i n g  a p a i r  i s  n o t  l i k e  b e i n g  
- 
g r e e n  because ,  vagueness  a s i d e ,  n o t n i n g  c a n  be b o t h  g r e e n  
and a d i f f e r e n t  c o l o r  liLke 17ed; whereas something can  b e ,  
s a y ,  b o t h  a p a i r  and a q u a d r u p l e  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  j u ~ t  a s  
someone can be a  f a t h e r  and 2. g r a n d f a t h e r  a t  t h e  same t i m e .  
But he  was wrong i n s o f a r  as he cc:ncluded t h a t  t h e r e l o r e  
b e i n g  - a p a i r  i s  n c t  a n  o b j e c t i v e  p r o p l - r t y  o f  e x t e r n a l  t h i n g s ,  
l o t  a p h y a l c a l  p r o p e r t y ,  
A number o f  writers have c r i t i c i z e d  Frege  on t h i s  and 
r e l s t c d  p o i n t s .  C h a r l e s  Lambros, f o r  example,  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  
0 
i n  t h e  Fsqsage  q u o t e d  frao~n 3 r e g e  above,  F r e g e  i s  c o n c l u d i n g  
t h a t  '1000 '  i s  n o t  a p r o ~ e r t y  word cn $he g r o u r d s  t h a t  i t s  
b e h a v i o r  i s  d i s t i n c t  fronl o r d i n a r y  p r e d i c a t e s  l i k e  ' g r e e n 1 ,  
b u t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  m i s t a k e  i n  view o f  I t the  now f a m i l i a r  
d i s t i n c t i o n  hetwe,en d i s t r i b u t i v e  and c o l l e c t i v e  p r e d i c a t e s t t .  80 
t 
' I s  11)001 m3y be s c o l l e c t i v e  . - e d i c a t e ,  a p p l y i n g  t o  t h e  
c ~ l l e c t i o n  of' l e a v e s  (which Lambros c o n s t r u e s  a s  a  c l a s s )  
80. '!Are Numbers P r o p e r t i e s  3f O b j e c t s ? " ,  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  
S tud. ies  2 9  (1976):  381-389. 
-- 
( p p .  231-282).  H e  a l s o  c o n s t r u e s  F r e g e  a s  a r g u i n g  t h e r e  
t h a t  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  o b j e c t s  o b j e c t i v e l y  ' r e s i d e 1  i n  t h e i r  
o b j e c t s ,  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  how we t h i n k  of o r  r e g a r d  such 
o b j e c t s ,  b u t  numbers canno t  be  p r o p e r t i e s  ( n o r  number words 
p r e d i c a t e s ,  t h e r e f o r e )  because  t h e y  do n o t  ( p .  3 8 4 ) .  ( I  
w i l l  c a l l  t h i s  " F r e g e l s  r e l a t i v i t y  a r g u m e n t u . ) .  Lambros 
p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  number words may be  s y n c a t e g o r e m a t i c  
p r e d i c a t e s  o f  m a t e r i a l  o b j e c t s  ( p .  3 8 5 ) .  
Glenn K e s s l e r  a l s o  comes t o  Mi l l ' s  d e f e n s e ,  i n  "Frege ,  
M i l l ,  and t h e  Formdation* o f  ~ r i t h m e t i c " . ~ ' ~  There  he 
c r i t i c i z e s  F r e g e l s  c o n c l u s i o n  i n  t h e  r e l a t i v i t y  a rgument ,  
t h a t  s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  numbers a r e  n o t  s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  
a g g r e g a t e s  o r  o b j e c t s .  He shows how numbers can  be c o n s t r u e d  
-
as a p p l y i n g  t o  a g g r e g a t e s ,  a l t h o u g h  o n l y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
some i n d i v i d u a t i n g  p r o p e r t y  (the r e f e r e n c e  of  a  s o r t ' a l  
p r e d i c a t e ) ,  Under h i s  cor is t rua l . ,  numbers t u r n  o u t  t o  be 
r e i a t i o n s  -between a p ~ r e q a t e s  and i n d i v i d u a t i n g  p r o p e r t i e s .  
I 
It i s  v e r y  l i k e l y  t h a t ,  by l e a n i n g  on K e s s l . e r l s  
accoun t  we c o u l d  a n a l y z e  & 3 p a i r  of a s  i n  lx  i s  i s  p a i r  
-
o f  A ' s 1  as a r e l a t i o n  between a n  a g g r e g a t e ,  x ,  and a n  
i n d i v i d u a t i n g  p r o p e r t y ,  b e i n g  a n  A. It s h o u l d  n o t  be though t  
-
however t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  a  p a i r  t u r n s  o u t  t o  be a n  o b s c u r e  
o b j e c t ,  anymore t h a n  a  f a t h e r  i s ,  Frege  c r i t i c i z e d  Mil l l s  
construal of number a s  " t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  nanner l '  i n  which 
a n  a g g l o m e r a t i o n  c a n  be s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  p o t s ,  on + n e  grounds  
- 
81 .  Journal .  - of Ph i losophy  77 (1980) :  65-79.  
t h a t  l l t h e r e  a r e  v e r y  v a r i o u s  manners i n  which a n  agg lomera t ion  
can  be s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  p a r t s 1 '  5 2 3 ,  p .  3 0 ) .  T h i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  
and i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t  amounts t o  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  o f t e n  o r  a lways  more t h a n  one i n d i v i d u a t i n g  p r o p e r t y  
t h a t  a p p l i e s  t o  a g i v e n  a g g r e g a t e .  Yet i t s  impor tance  
s h o u l d  n o t  be  e x a g g e r a t e d .  It may w e l l  be t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
v e r y  o f t e n  o n l y  one i n d i v i d u a t i n g  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  seems n a t u r a l  
and a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  a p p l y  ( l i k e  b e i n g  - a  r a b b i t ,  e . g . ,  a s  
opposed t o  b e i n g  - a - one -- c u b i c  - i n c h  unde tached  r a b b i t  p a r t . )  
~ e s i d e s  ,/ i f  F rege  s r e l a t i v i t y  argument showed t h a t  
b e i n g  - a p a i r  i s  no; s p r o p e r t y  o f  o b j e c t s  o r  a g g r e g a t e s ,  
t h e n  a s i m i l a r  argument would show t h a t  b e i n g  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  
-
t o k e n  i s  n o t  a p r o p e r t y  o f  o b j e c t s ,  e i t h e ~ .  Foil I1readl1 t h i s  
, 
p h o n e t i c  sequence  a l o u d :  
Ah 'key  ess 'oon ah  'may s a h ,  
I f  my s t u m b l i n g  a t t e m p t  a t  p h o n e t i z a t i o n  was s u c c e s s f u l ,  a  
S p a n i s h  l i s t e n e r  would u n d e r s t a n d  you t o  have s a i d  t h a t  h e r e  
i s  a t a b l e ,  b u t  a s p e a k e r - h e a r e r  o f  Yidd i sh  would u n d e r s t a n d  
you t o  have s a i d  t h a t  a cow e a t s  w i t h o u t  a k n i f e .  T h i s  shows, 
I t h i n k ,  t h a t  t h e  same p e r c e p t i b l e  p a r t i c u l a r  may be  a  
/ 
t o k e n  o f  t y p e  T r e l a t i v e  t o  l anguage  L ,  aod a  t o k e n  of  
t y p e  T1 r e l a t i v e  t o  l anguage  L 1 .  And hence t h a t  a n  o b j e c t  
i s  /i t o k e n  of a  t y p e  o n l y  r e l a t i v e  t o  a  l anguage .  
A c t u a l l y ,  P h i l i p  Hugly and C h a r l e s  Sayward a r g u e  
t h a t  
[ T l h i s  i s n l t  enough. Note t h a t  i t  i s  o n l y  because  
o f  t h e  Morse Code t h a t  o b j e c t s  made up o f  d o t s  
and  d a s h e s  a r e  t o k e n s  o f  E n g l i s h .  A p e r c e p t i b l e  
p a r t i c u l a r  i s  a  t o k e n  o f  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  a  l anguage  
L o n l y  r e l a t i v e  t o  some t o k e n i n g  sys tem.  Being a 
t o k e n  o f  i s  a  4-place r e l a t i o n  between p e r c e p t i b i e  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  e x p r e s s i o n ,  l anguage  and t o k e n i n g  
sys tem,  rwhere]A t o k e n i n g  sys tem i s  a  s e t  of  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  t e l l  how, f o r  any g i v e n  e x p r e s s i o n ,  
a s p e a k e r  o f  t h e  language cou ld  c o n s t r u c t  a 
p e r c e p t i b l e  p a r t i c u l a r  t h a t  t o k e n s  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n  
g i v e n  t h a t  t h e  s p e a . e r  had enough p h y s i c a l  and 
menta l  r e s o u r c e s . . .  If2 
The p o i n t  i s ,  t h a t  whe the r  a  3- o r  a  4-place  r e l a t i o n ,  b e i n g  
a  t o k e n  of, l i k e  o u r  K e s s l e r i a n  a n a l y s i s  of  b e i n g  a  p a i r  o f  
- - - 9  
i s  r e l a t i v e  t o  one o r  more o t h e r  t h i n g s . 8 3  But i f  F r e g e l s  
argument were c o r r e c t ,  t h i s  v e r y  f a c t  would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
b e i n g  - a t o k e n  of ' c a t ' ,  s a y ,  was n o t  a  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  " r e s i d e d f f  
-
i n  t h e  o b j e c t  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  n o t  a p h y s i c a l ' p r o p e r t y ,  o r  
p r o p e r t y  o f  e x t e r n z l  t h i n g s .  The " r e l a t i o n a l  a s p e c t 1 '  t o  
bein& a t o k e n  c a n  be o b s c u r e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c o n t e x t  
- - 
o f t e n  e n a b l e s  t h e  l i s t e n e r  t o  i n f e r  what t h e  l a i ~ g u a g e  and 
t o k e n i n g  sys tem a r e ;  b u t  s i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a t i n g  
I p r o p e r t y  t h a t  makes b e i n g  p a i r ,  f o r  example,  r e l a t i v e  i s  
# 
o f t e n  e q u a l l y  o b v i o u s .  
82. f f E x p r e s s i o n s  and Tokens", A n a l y s i s  4 1 ,  (1981):  181-187, 
p ,  186.  
83. Nor can  t h e  example b e  d i s m i s s e d  a s  s o  b i z a r r e  a s  n o t  
t o  w a r r a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  There  a r c  many l i k e  i t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
a t  t h e  l e v e l  of  i n d i v i d u a l  l e t t e r s  and phones -- a s  anyone 
who h a s  e v e r  s t r u g g l e d  t o  decode a h a n d w r i t i n g  sample o r  
u t t e r a n c e  i n  a r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  d i a l e c t  c a n  a t t e s t  t o .  
I do n o t  wi sh  t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e  p l u r a l i t i e s  i n  
q u e s t i o n  - a r e  a g g r e g a t e s .  I t  i s  j u s t  t h a t  ( 6 0 )  i s  tantamount  
t o  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  c l a s s e s  and n o t  a g g r e g a t e s .  T h i s  
may o r  may n o t  be t r u e ,  b u t  i t  i s n ' t  o b v i o u s l y  t r u e  -- a s  
ev idenced  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  of c o n s t r u i n g  
p l u r a l i t i e s  a s  a g g r e g a t e s  seems t o  have a  f a i r  d e g r e e  o f  
p l a u s i b i l i t y .  
O f  c o u r s e ,  i f  t h e y  - a r e  a g g r e g a t e s ,  p l u r a l i t i e s  ( o r ,  
r a t q e r ,  t h e  o n e s  t h a t  a r e  a g g r e g a t e s )  a r e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  
But what if t h e  most p l a u s i b l e  way t o  c o n s t r u e  pluralities 
i s  as c l a s s e s ;  i . e . ,  what if (57 )  i s  t r u e ?  Should  we 
c o n c l u d e  f o r t h w i t h  t h a t  ( 5 9 )  i s  t r u e ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  p l u r a l i t i e s  
a r e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s ?  I f  ( 5 8 )  i s  t r u e ,  y e s .  But ( 5 8 )  
seems t o  me false.  Some c l a s s e s  a r e  undoubtedly  a b s t r a c t  -- 
e . g . ,  t h e  c l a s s  of a l l  o r d i n a l s ,  o r  t h e  von Neumann t 'numberst t .  
O t h e r  c l a s s e s  seem p a t e n t l y  c o n c r e t e  &tough  -- e . g . ,  t b ~  
t h i r d  g r a d e  c l a s s  o f  P . S .  62 i n  New York C i t y  i n  June  1983.  
There  i s  a gap i n  Q u i n e l s  a rgument .  He s t a t e s ,  and a r g u e s  
f o r  ( 6 4 ) ,  t h e n  c o n c l u d e s  ( 6 5 )  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  ado .  
( 6 4 )  The c l a s s  o f  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  i s  n o t  
i d e n t i c a 1 , t o  t h e  c l a s s  of c o u n t i e s  o f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  
I 
( 6 5 )  These c l a s s e s  must be  a c c e p t e d  a s  two e n t i t i e s  o f  a 
n o n - s p a t i a l  and a b s t r a c t  k i n d .  
But I do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  he  i n t e n d s  t o  be assuming something 
a s  s t r a n g  as ( 5 8 ) ;  e l s e  why would he spend s o  much t ime  
/ a r g u i n g  f o r  ( 6 4 )  b e f o r e  c o n c l u d i n g  ( 6 5 ) ?  
I b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e m e n t s  more a d e q u a t e l y  
r e p r e s e n t  Q u i n e l s  s u p p r e s s e d  a s s u m p t i o n s .  
( 6 6 )  The o n l y  s p a t i a l ,  n o n - a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t  t h a t  t h e  c l a s s  
o f  s t a t e s  c o u l d  b e ,  i f  i t  i s  a c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t ,  i s  
t h e  p h y s i c a l  body t h a t  i s  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  
( 6 7 )  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  o n l y  s p a t i a l ,  n o n - a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t  
t h a t  t h e  c l a s s  o f  c o u n t i e s  c o u l d  b e ,  i f  it i s  a  
c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t ,  i s  t h e  p h y s i c a l  body t h ~ t  i s  t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s ,  
But t h e y  canno t  b o t h  be  t h e  p h y s i c a l  body t h a t  i s  t h e  TJnited 
S t a t e s ,  b e c a u s e  t h e n  t h e y  would be i d e n t i c a l  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  
( s i n c e  i d e n t i t y  i s  t r a n s i t i v e ) ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  ( 6 4 ) .  Presumably 
by t h e ,  o r  a ,  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  r e a s o n ,  t h e n ,  i t  
f o l l o w s  t h a t  n e i t h e r  i s  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  And a c c o r d i n g  
t o  ( 6 6 )  and ( 6 7 )  t h e r e  i s  no o t h e r  c o n c r e t e  s p a t i a l  o b j e c t  
t h e y  c o u l d  be ;  hence  Q u i n e  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  ( 6 5 ) .  
It i s  t h e  s u p p r e s s e d  assumpt ions  t h a t  b o t h e r  me. 
O f  c o u r s e ,  I am o n l y  s u r m i s i n g  as t o  what Q u i n e T s  s u p p r e s s e d  
a s s u m p t i o n s  are ,  and what t h e  i n t u i t i o n s  a r c  t h a t  s u p p o r t  
( 6 6 )  and ( 6 7 ) .  Quine  might  t e l l  a d i f f e r e n t  s t o r y .  But I 
t h i n k  a n y t h i n g  he s a i d  t h a t  had t h e  consequence t h a t  t h e  s o r t s  
of p l u r a l i t i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  ( t h e  s o r t s  t h h t  e n a b l e  u s ,  I am 
c l a i m i n g ,  t o  have knowledge o f  numbers)  a r e  n o t  c o n c r e t e  would 
-
be f a l s e ,  The n o t i o n  o f  l l c o n c r e t e u  i s  vague a t  b e s t .  84 
8 4 .  W e t s t e r l s  S e v e n t h  C o l l e g i a t e  D i c t i o n a r y -  i s  .lo h e l p ,  
a l t h o u g h  i t s  second d e f i n i t i o n  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g .  Here i s  .what 
i t  s a y s :  "1, formee by c o a l i t i o n  of  p a r t i c l e s  i n t o  one s o l i d  
mass; 2 :  naming a r e a l  t h i n g  o r  c l a s s  o f  t h i n g s ;  3a: c h a r a c -  
t e r i z e d  by o r  b e l o n g i n g  t o  immediate  e x p e r i e n c e  of  a c t u a l  
t h i n g s  o r  e v e n t s  b :  SPECIFIC, PARTICULAR c :  REAL TANGIBLE; 
4 :  r e l a t i n g  t o  o r  made of  c o n c r e t e H .  ( S p r i n g f i e l d , k s s .  G & C 
Merriam Co; 1969)  p .  172 .  
And p e r h a p s  b e i n g  c o n c r e t e  o r  b e i n g  a b s t r a c t  i s  a m a t t e r  
o f  d e g r e e .  But I s h o u l d  t h i n k  t h a t  a n y t h i n g  t h a t  can  be made, 
bough t ,  worn, worn o u t  and thrown away, and t h a t  comes i n  
v a r i o u s  c o l o r s ,  s i z e s ,  and s t y l e s  -- - -  l i k e  a p a i r  of' s h o e s  -- 
-
i s  c o n c r e t e ,  A b r a c e  o f  Old World p h e a s a n t s  may be more 
a t t r a c t i v e ,  o r  more d e l i c i o u s ,  o r  weigh more, t h a n  a  b r a c e  o f  
bobwhi tes ;  s u c h  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  e n t a i l  t h a t  t h e  b r a c e s  a r e  
c o n c r e t e ,  I b e l i e v e .  According t o  t h e  r u l e s  of p o k e r ,  
Mary 's  f o u r  o f  a k i n d ,  t h e  v e r y  one s h e  i s  h o l d i n g  i n  h e r  
hand,  b e a t s  J o h n ' s  t h r e e  o f  a k i n d .  So t h r e e  and f o u r  o f  
a k i n d s  a r e  c o n c r e t e .  Minor t r i a d s  can  be h e a r d ,  s o  t h e y  
a r e  t o o .  And s o  f o r t h .  
So i f  may be  t h a t  p a i r s ,  t r i o s ,  e t c ,  a r e  c l a s s e s  
-
( o r  are b e s t  a n a l y z e d  as c l a s s e s ) .  I f  s o ,  t h e n  i t  seems 
t o  me t h a t  we have  good e v i d e n c e  f o r  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  
d1.e c o n c r e t e  c l a s s 2 s  -- and hence  t h a t  (58)  and ( 5 9 )  a r e  
-
f a l s e .  
Soneone may b a l k  at  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  c o n c r e t e  c l a s s e s ,  
on t h e  grounds  t h a t  t k e n  a l l  b u t  t h e  p u r e s t  c l a s s e s  ( t h o s e  
u l t i m a t e l y  composed o f  t h e  n u l l  s e t )  t u r n  o u t  t o  be c o n c r e t e  
o b j e c t s ,  For  i f  any c l a s s  of  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  i s  i t s e l f  
a  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t ,  t h e n  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  a c l a s s  o f  c l a s s e s  
i 
o f  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  i s  c o n c r e t e ,  and so one .  But t h i s  i s  
n o t  a n e c e s s a r y  consequence o f  a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  scrne c l a s s e s  
a r e  c o n c r e t e .  We c o u l d  c o n s i d e r  c o n c r e t e  o n l y  t h o s e ;  
c l a s s e s  a l l  o f  whose members a r e  b o t h  c o n c r e t e  and n o n - c l a s s e s .  
(Or,  i f  we l i k e ,  w e  c o u l d  e x t e n d  i t  one l e v e l  up t o  c l a s s e s  
o f  such  c l a s s e s  -- o r  b e y o n d . ) .  
Another  r e a s o n  t h a t  might  be  g i v e n  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  
c o n c r e t e  c l a s s e s  i s  t h a t  t h e n  a  p a i r  o f  s h o e s  would be a  
c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t ;  s o  t h a t  i n  a room c o n t a i n i n g  n o t h i n g  b u t  
a r i g h t  shoe  and a match ing  l e f t  s h o e ,  t h e r e  would b e ,  n o t  
2 ,  b u t  - 3 c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s !  However, t h i s  i s  n o t  much o f  
a n  o b j e c t i o n ,  because  anyone,  even a n  a r d e n t  n o m i n a l i s t  l i k e  
Goodman, h a s  t o  swallow t h i s  consequence a l r e a d y  i n  v i r t u e  
o f  a d m i t t i n g  " f u s e d  i n d i v i d u a l s f f  -- such  a s  t h e  r i g h t  shoe  
l l f u s e d l l ,  as i t  were,  t o  t h e  l e f t  shoe  -- i n t o  h i s / h e r  
o n t o l o g y .  ( B e s i d e s ,  even i f  one d i d  n o t  admit  such  n f u s i m ~ n s v ,  
one would s t i l l  haye  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
f o u r  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s  i n  t h e  room: two shoes  and two 
s h o e l a c e s .  ) . 
Much more c o u l d  be s a i d ,  p r o  and con,  abouc c o n c r e t e  
c l a s s e s .  Much more c o u l d  a l s o  be s a i d  a b o u t  what i t  i s  
t h a t  p a i r s ,  t r i o s ,  e t c .  are:  aggrega.Les,  c l a s s e s ,  n o t  f u l l y  
e i t h e r ,  o r  something e l s e  e n t i r e l y .  But I hope enough h a s  
been s a i d  t o  r e n d e r  p l a u s i b l e  my r e s p o n s e  t o  o b j e c t i o n  #4, 
which charged  t h a t  t h e  p l u r a l i t i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  a r e  a b s t r a c t  
o b j e c t s ' t h e m s e l v e s .  I n  summary, my r e s p o n s e  was t o  a r g u e  
t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  d i d  n o t  show t h a t  pa i rs ,  t r i o s ,  e t c .  
were a b s t r a c t ,  because  t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  t o  doubt  ( i j  whether  
t h e  p l u r a l i t i e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  must be e i t h e r  a g g r e g a t e s  o r  
c l a s s e s ;  (ii) t h a t  t h e  argument  (which was b a s i c a l l y  F r e g e f s )  
t h a t  t h e y  canno t  be  a g g r e g a t e s  i s  sound;  and  (iii) t h a t ,  
( s i n c e  i h e y  s o  p a t e n t l y  a r e  c o n c r e t e ) ,  if t h e y  a r e  c l a s s e s ,  
t h e n  t h e y  a r e  n o t  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  
O b j e c t i o n  #5: The r e a s o n  why we c a n  corne t o  know L 
a b o u t  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  t o k e n s  i s  
because  t y p e s  are j u s t  l i k e  t h e i r  t o k e n s ,  exoep. :  t h a t  t h e y  
- -
a r e  a b s t r a c t  whereas  t o k e n s  a ~ ~ e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  For  example ,  
--- --- 
t h e  word ' c a t t ,  l i k e  i t s  t o k e n s ,  I s  composed o f  t h r e e  
l e t t e r s ,  i s  s p e l l e d  t c l - t a t - t t l ,  and i s  pronounced [ ' k a t  1. 
So e m p i r i c a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  c a n  g i v e  u s  knowledge o f  t h e  
--
word t y p e  ' c a t 1 .  Numbers on t h e  o t h e r  hand (assuming t h e y  
I do e x i s t )  a r e  n o t  j u s t  l i k e  what you a r e  c a l l i n g  t h e i r  
-
l l i n s t a n c e s " .  For  example,  p a i r s  a r e  composed o f  e x a c t l y  two 
t h i n g s  -- b u t  numbers a r e  n o t .  T h e r e f o r e  numbers and 
p l u r a l i t i e s  do  n o t  e x h i b i t  a n y t h i n g  s u f f i c i e n t l y  a k i n  t o  t h e  
type- token  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  e n a b l e  u s  t o  employ t h e  same 
s o r t  o f  e x p l a n a t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  "our  knowledge o f  
numberstt  . 
Response t o  #5:  I must concede t h a t ,  a s  t h e  example 
above s u g g e s t s ,  t h e r e  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  d . i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  
type- token  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and t h e  n u m b e r - p l u r a l i t y  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  -- which i s  why, a f t e r  a l l ,  I d i d  n o t  t r y  t o  subsume 
t h e  l a t t e r  under  t h e  h e a d i K g  of t h e  f o r m e r .  But I d o  n o t  
t h i n k  t h e  type- token  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  anywhere n e a r  3 s  cozy ,  
n o r  t h e  n u m b e r - p l u r a l i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  as d i s t a n t ,  a s  t h e  
o b j e c t i o n  seems t o  suppose .  That  i s ,  t h e  r e a s o n  s t a t e d  
above as t o  how we c a n  come t o  know a b o u t  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  
on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  t o k e n s  i s  n o t  p r e c i s e l y  c o r r e c t .  When 
s p e l l e d  o u t  i n  more d e t a i l ,  w e  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  s e e  t h a , t  
a l t h o u g h  n o t  t h a t  o f  t y p e  t o  t o k e n ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
a number and a p l u r a l i t y  h a v i n g  . t h a t  number i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
similar t o  b e g i n  t o  e x p l a i n  how we c a n  have  knowledge o f  
numbers on t h e  b a s i s  o f  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  p l u r a l i t i e s  
( c o n c r e t e  o n e s ,  a t  l e a s t ) .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  i s s u e  i n  a  d e f i n i t i v e  s o r t  
o f  way, we would need a n  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  type- token  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  t h a t  p r o v i d e s  c o r r e c t  and p r e c i s e  answers  t o  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s ,  among o t h e r s :  
( 6 8 )  What i s  a t o k e n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  t o k e n ?  
( 6 9 )  What i s  a t y p e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e ?  
I 
( 7 0 )  How do t y p e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  d i f f e r  from 
o t h e r  u g e n e r l c l t  e n t i t i e s ,  l i k e  u n i v e r s a l s ?  
( 7 1 )  Can something,  e s p e c i a l l y  a n  u t t e r a n c e  o r  i n s c r i p t i o n ,  
be a t o k e n  o f  more t h a n  one t y p e ?  
( 7 2 )  P r e c i s e l y  what s o r t s  o f  p r o p e r t i e s  do t y 7 e s  have ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  and  what s o r t s  do t o k e n s  halre? 
( 7 3 )  What i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  p r o p e r t l e s  t h e  
t y p e s  have  and t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  t h e  t o k e n s  have ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  as r e g a r d s  e x p r e s s i o r ~ s ?  
The t r o u b l e  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no one accoun t  t h a t  I 
know of t h a t  p r a v i d e s  answers  t o  a l l  o f  t h e  above q u e s t i o n s ,  
much l e s s  one t h a t  1s g e n e r a l l y  r e g a r d e d  as b e i n g  c o r r e c t .  
D i f f e r e n t  a u t h o r s  s a y  d i f f e r e n t  and o f t e n  c o n f l i c t i n g  t h i n g s  
( a s  we sha l l  soon s e e ) .  Hence i t  would t a k e  a d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  book l e n g t h  t o  do  j u s t i c e  t o  t h e  i s s u e ,  and t h i s  I do 
n o t  i n t e n d  t o  p r o v i d e  ( a t  l e a s t  n o t  i n  t h i s  work) .  So t h e  
discussion t h a t  f ~ l l o w s  w i l l  b e  s k e t c h y  and p r e l i r r d n a r y  i n  
many r e s p e c t s ,  a l t h o u g h  I hope n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  w i t h o u t  
v a l u e .  My o n l y  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  I b e l i e v e  enough can  
be  s a i d  i n  a s h o r t  s p a c e  t o  a t  l e a s t  make t h e  s u p p o s i t i o n s  
behind o b j e c t i o n  #5 d u b i o u s ,  and  r e n d e r  more p l a u s i b l e  
t h e  ana logy  between t y p e - t o k e n s ,  and n u m b e r - p l u r a l i t i e s .  
The l o g i c a l  p l a c e  t o  b e g i n  s e a r c h i n g  f o r  a c c h e r e n t  
answer  t o  t h e  above q u e s t i o n z  i s  i n  P e i r c e l s  w r i t i n g s .  One 
a u t h o r  r e f e r s  t o  h i s  a c c o u n t  o f  what t h e  t e r m l t y p e l  and 
' t o k e n 1  mean as " t h e  o n l y  a d e q u a t e  t h e o r y .  . . a n d  t h e  o n l y  
85 a c c o u n t  most a u t h o r s  c i t e 1 ' .  Nct u n l y  i s  h i s  theoxay o f  s i g n s  
v e r y  much b u i l t  a round  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  b u t  ( i n  t h e  passage  
on p. 126 above from h i s  w r i t i n g s )  P e i r c e  a p p a r e n t l y  
c o i n e d  t h e  t e rms  ' t y p e 1  and ' t o k e n 1  t o  d e n o t e  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n .  
What he says  t h e r e  a b o u t  t h e r e  b e i n g  two s e n s e s  o f  ' w o r d ' ,  
such  t h a t  i n  one s e n s e  t h e r e  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be abou t  twenty  
" t h e l s l '  on t h i s  page and  i n  a n o t h e r  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  on ly  one 
" the l l  i n  t h e  E n g l i s h  l a n g u a g e ,  i s  enough t o  g i v e  anyone 
v e r s e d  i n  E n g l i s h  a rough  f e e l  f o r  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  Fie i s  
f a i r l y  c l e a r ,  t o o ,  a b o u t  what t o k e n s  a r e :  one t i m e  happenings  
( e v e n t s )  o r  s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l  o b j e c t s .  8 6 
- 
85 .  Randal  R.  D i p e r t ,  llTypes and Tokens: A Reply t o  Sharpe l f ,  
Mind 89 (1980):  587-588, p .  588. 
-
86 .  C o l l e c t e d  P a p e r s  o f  C h a r l e s  Sanderb  P e i r c e ,  Vol .  4 ,  
p .  423.  F u t u r e  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  P e i r c e  w i l l '  c o n t a i n  mere ly  t h e  
volume number fo l lowed  by t h e  page number, 
Elsewhere  he  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  them ( u n d e r  :,he l a b e l  I s i n s i g n ' )  
as  " i n d i v i d u a l  o b j e c t s  o r  e v e n t s "  ( 8 . 3 3 4 ) .  T h i s  seems 
r e l a t i v e l y  u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l ,  and c o n c u r s  n i c e l y  w i t h  Baruch 
B r o d y t s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a token  i n  t h e  Encyc loped ia  o f  Ph i losophy  
-
as  I1a s p e c i f i e d  u t t e r a n c e  o f  a g i v e n  l i n g u i s t i c  e x p r e s s i o n  
o r  a w r i t t e n  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  itv1 (Vol .  5 ,  p .  6 ) .  
What P e i r c e  h a s  t o  s a y  a b o u t  t y p e s ,  however,  i s  q u i t e  
a n o t h e r  matter: t y p e s  Ifdo n o t  e x i s t v ,  y e t  t h e y  a r e  " d e f i n -  
i t e l y  S i g n i f i c a n t  Formsr1 t h a t  I fde termine  t h i n g s  t h a t  d o  
e x i s t u  ( 4 . 4 2 3 ) .  A t y p e ,  o r  u l e g i s i g r i u  as he  a l s o  c a l l s  i t ,  
Ifhas a d e f i n i t e  i d e n t i t y ,  though u s u a l l y  a d m i t t i n g  a  g r e a t  
v a r i e t y  o f  a p p e a r a n c e s .  Thus, &,  and and t h e  sound a r e  a l l  
-
one wordf1 ( 8 . 3 3 4 ) .  H e  a l s o  t e l l s  u s  t h a t  a t y p e  i s  "a  
g e n e r a l  law t h a t  i s  a s i g n .  T h i s  law i s  u s u a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  
by men. Evel-y c o n v e n t i o n 3 1  s i g n  i s  a  l e g i s i g n .  It i s  n o t  
a s i n g l e  o b j e c t ,  b u t  a  g e n e r a l  t y p e  w h i c h . . . s h a l l  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t .  . . e v e r y  L e g i s i g n  r e q u i r e s  S i n s i g n s t t  ( 2 . 2 4 6 )  
I f i n d  t h e s e  s t a t e m e n t s  c o n f u s i n g  a t  b e s t ,  f o r  I 
do n o t  kncw how something which h a s  a d e f i n i t e  i d e n t i t y ,  i s ,  
i n  f a c t ,  a g e n e r a l  law, c o u l d  a t  t h e  same t ime  n o t  e x i s t .  
Perhaps  a l l  P e i r c e  meant by s a y i n g  t h e y  do n o t  e x i s t  was 
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  "not  j .ndividua1 t h i n g s t 1  ( 8 . 3 3 4 ) ,  t h a t  t h e y  
a r e ,  i n s t e a d ,  I1genera l sn .  Yet what c o u l d  he mean by c a l l i n g  
- 
87 them g e n e r a l  laws? I n  P e i r c e v s  Concept o f  S i g n  , D. Green lee  
-- 
87. The Hague: Mouton, 1973.  
g i v e s  as a g l o s s  on  t h e  matter t h a t  
Every  s i g n  i s  e i t h e r  q u a l i f i e d  by a power 
[as t o k e n s ]  ... o r  c o n s i s t s  in a t y p i c a l  
power [as t y p e s ]  ... because  i t  i s  e i t h e r  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  o r  c o n s i s t s  i n  a h a b i t  o f  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The h a b i t ,  of  c o u r s e ,  
b e l o n g s  t o  t h e  i n t e r p r e t e r ,  t h e  power,  
l e t  u s  s a y  t o  t h e  s i g n  ... ( p p .  115-116) .  
Which s i g n ?  S u r e l y  n o t  t h e  t y p e  ( u n l e s s  someth ing  c a n  be  
a power o f  i t s e l f ) ,  s o  p e r h a p s  t h e  t y p e  i s  a power of 
some s o r t  p o s s e s s e d  by i t s  t o k e n s .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a r d ,  i t  
c o u l d  b e  a " h a b i t  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 1 '  b e c a u s e  G r e e n l e e  says 
t h a t  a t y p e  i s  a " g e n e r a l  t h a t  i s  a s i g n u ;  t h a t  ' ' g e n e r a l s  
which are  s i g n s  a r e  c a l l e d  by P e i r c e  ' h a b i t s 1 ,  i n  an 
e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a h a b i t u  ( P .  49 )  a n d ,  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  some t y p e s ,  "a h a b i t  c o n t r o l l i n g  a s p e c i f i c  way of 
r e s p o n d i n g  i n t e r p r e t a c i v e l y "  ( p .  1 3 7 ) .  The s u g g e s t i o n  h e r e  
seems t o  be  t h a t  a t y p e  i s  a h a b i t  o f  l l i n t e r p r e t e r s l l  t o  
r e s p o n d  I n  a c e r t a i n  way when expased  t o  t o k e n s  of t h e  
t y p e ,  These  two c o n s t r u a l s  o f  t y p e s  (as  powers o f  t o k e n s ,  
o r  i n t e r p r e t e r s t  h a b i t s  o f  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t o k e n s )  c a n n o t  b o t h  
b e  r i g h t ,  i t  seems t o  me. But e i t h e r  way o f  c o n s t r u i n g  
t y p e s  e n t a i l s ,  as P e i r c o  was quo ted  above as s a y i n g ,  t h a t  
" e v e r y  [ t y p e ]  r e q u i r e s  ( 2 . 2 4 6 )  (which  i s  why a  
t y p e  i s  a g e n e r a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  a u n i v e r s a l  f o r  P e i r c e ;  t h e  
l a t t e r  d o e s  n o t  r e q u i r e  i n s t a n c e s ) .  E i t h e r  c o n s t r u a l  t h e n  
i s  I n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  o u r  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t ,  wha teve r  t y p e s  
are, t h e r e  are i n f i n i t e l y  many o f  them. So we c a n n o t  u s e  
-- - -- 
P e i r c e ' s  n o t i o n ( s )  of  a  t y p e  as o u r s .  B e s i d e s ,  i t  i s  v e r y  
h a r d  t o  s e e  how, under  e i t h e r  c o n s t r u a l  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  any 
s e n s e  i n  which t y p e s  w i l l  be  j u s t  l i k e  t h e i r  t o k e n s ,  a s  t h e  
f o r m a l i s t  c l a i m s ;  how can  a  power o r  a  h a b i t  be t h r e e -  
l e t t e r e d ,  f o r  example? Also ,  under  t h e  c o n s t r u a l  a s  a  
" h a b i t  o f  i n t e r p r e t e r s f 1  t y p e s  s e e n  i n  d a n g e r  o f  b e i n g  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  o u r  o t h e r  p r o v i s o  t h a t  t h e y  be 
a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s .  ( T r u e ,  something c a n  be a n  a b s t r a c t  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  o b j e c t ,  l i k e  a t y p e  o f  h a b i t ,  b u t  t h e n  t h a t  
would seem t o  make t o k e n s  h a b i t s  t ~ o . )  
What e l s c  c s u l d  a  t y p e  b e ?  A c l a s s ?  I t h i n k  t h a t  
many t h i n k  s o ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  f a c t ,  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  
i t  canno t  be t h a t  a l l  t y p e s  a r e  s imply  c l a s s e s  o f  t h e i r  
t o k e n s  ( s i n c e  many d i f f e r e n t  o n e s  w i l l  t h e n  be i d e n t i c a l .  
i n  v i r t u e  o f  h a v i n g  no t o k e n s ) .  O f  c o u r s e ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  
o n l y  c l a s s  c o n s t r u a l  t y p e s  c a n  be g i v e n ,  For  example,  i n  
t h e  a r t i c l e  by them c i t e d  above,  Hugly and Sayward c o n s t r u e  
t y p e s  a s  c l a s s e s  i n  a way t h a t  e n s u r e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
i n f i n i t e l y  many. S t a r t i n g  w i t h  t h e  i n k  marks:  
(a )  x 
( b )  P 
( c )  ' 
( d )  N 
( e l  a 
t h e y  l e t  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  s i g n  ( t y p e s )  of  t h e  l anguage  be  t h e  
f i v e  sets:  
A = {x:  x i s  p h y s i c a l l y  similar i n  shape  t o  t h e  i n k  mark a t  
( a )  1 
B = {x: x  i s  p h y s i c a l l y  similar i n  shape  t o  t h e  I n k  mark a t  
( b ) ) ,  
and i n  t h e  same way, s e t s  C ,  D and E a r e  r e s p e c t i v e l y  d e f i n e d  
from t h e  i n k  marks a t  ( c ) ,  ( d )  and ( e ) .  V a r i a b l e s  a r e  
d e f i n e d  as f o l l o w s :  < A , C >  i s  a  v a r i a b l e ;  i f  a i s  a  v a r i a b l e  
s o  i s  <a, C>; n o t h i n g  e l s e  i s  a v a r i a b l e .  P r e d i c a t e s ,  
f o r m u l a s ,  and s e n t e n c e s  a r e  s i m i l a r l y  d e f i n e d ,  a s  o r d e r e d  
n - t u p l e s  o f  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  s i g n s  and e a c h  o t h e r .  88 SO, f o r  
example,  t h e  t y p e  t h a t  
( 7 4 )  a x '  Px' 
i s  a t o k e n  o f  i s  <E, cA,C>, c<B, C > ,  < A ,  C > > > .  
There  a r e  s e v e r a l  problems w i t h  c o n s t r u i n g  t y p e s  a s  
c l a s s e s  i n  t h i s  way. F i r s t  of a l l ,  w h i l e  n o t  an u n a t t r a c t i v e  
s e t - t h e o r e t i c  way o f  c o n s t r u i n g  t y p e s ,  i t  i s  f a i r l y  
a r b i t r a r y .  For example, why s h o u l d  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  s i g n s  
be  A ,  B,  C ,  D and E ?  Why n o t  l e t  them b e :  
A 1  = { x :  x = t h e  i n k  mark a t  ( a ) ) ;  
B 1  = { x :  x  = t h e  i n k  mark a t  ( b ) ) ,  
and  s o  f o r t h ?  O r ,  i f  t h e s e  a r e  t o o  l l c o n c r e t e l ' ,  t h e n  l e t  
them be A" = < t h e  o b j e c t  a t  ( a ) ,  O>; Bfl  = < t h e  o b j e c t  a t  
( b ) ,  $> e t c .  Pe rhaps ,  might  be  t h e  r e s p o n s e ,  because  t h e s e  
c o n s t r u a l s  s e v e r  a l l  t i e s  between t y p e s  and t o k e n s ,  e . g . ,  
t h e  seven  i n k  marks t h a t  compose ( 7 4 )  a r e  a c t u a l l y  members 
c i t  
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o f  E ,  A ,  C ,  B,  C ,  A and C ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  by d i n t  o f  b e i n g  
p h y s i c a l l y  similar i n  shape  t o  ( e l ,  ( a ) ,  ( c ) ,  ( b ) ,  ( c ) ,  ( a )  
and ( c ) ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  They a r e  (some o f )  t h e  u r -e lements  
o u t  o f  which t h e  t y p e s  a r e  c o n s t r u c t e d .  
T h i s  r e s p o n s e  seems a c c e p t a b l e ,  b u t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  t h e n  
a r i s e s :  why c o n s t r u e  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h a t  way? Why n o t  do  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  f i r s t ,  d e f i n e  a prime t u p l e :  C i s  a prime 
t u p l e ;  if a i s  a  pr ime t u p l e ,  s o  i s  < C ,  a > ;  n o t h i n g  e l s e  i s  
a  prime t u p l e .  Then d e f i n e  a  v a r i a b l e  a s :  any o r d e r e d  
p a i r  < A ,  B >  where B i s  a  prime t u p l e .  It seems a n  e q u a l l y  
a t t r a c t i v e  way. Pe rhaps  Hugly and Sayward c o u l d  j u s t i f y  
t h e i r  c h o i c e  as b e i n g  t h e  most n a t u r a l  and a t t r a c t i v e  
compared t o  t h i s  and a l l  t h e  o t h e r  c o n s t r u a l s  t h a t  e x i s t .  
But I doub t  i t .  The problem i s  t h a t  we, and t h e y ,  p u r p o r t  
t o  b e  answer ing  t h e  q u e s t i o n  "what k i n d  o f  an  a b s t r a c t  
e n t i t y  i s  [an e x p r e s ~ i o n ] ? ~  ( p .  1 8 4 ) .  I f  t h e r e  i s  more t h a n  
one e q u a l l y  a t t r a c t i v e  n o n - e x t e n s i o n a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t  accoun t  -- 
which seems t o  be t h e  c a s e  -- t h e n  none o f  them can  be t h e  
--- -
c o r r e c t  one .  ( I  have i n  mind h e r e  t h e  s o r t  o f  argument 
s o  common i n  c h a p t e r  one ,  above,  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  which I 
w i l l  s k i p . ) .  
So t h e  f i r s t  problem w i t h  t h e  accoun t  Hugly and Sayward 
p r o v i d e  i s  t h a t  i t  canno t  b e  t h e  c o r r e c t  one ,  a s  t h e r e  a r e  
--
e q u a l l y  a t t r a c t i v e  r i v a l  s e t - t h e o r e t i c  a c c o u n t s .  The second 
problem i s  t h a t  t h e  a c c o u n t  i s  of v e r y  l i m i t e d  v a l u e ,  a s  
i t  canno t  s e r v e  as a  model f o r  what e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  a  n a t u r a l  
l anguage  a r e  -- a t  l e a s t ,  n o t  i n  t h e  o b v i o u s  way, where 
we mere ly  s t a r t  o f f  w i t h  many more p r i m i t i v e  s i g n s  d e f i n e d  
i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e i r  p h y s i c a l  s i m i l a r i t y  i n  shape  t o  c e r t a i n  
g i v e n  s i g n s ,  and t h e n  employ t h e  p h r a s e  s t r u c t u r e  r u l e s ,  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l  r u l e s ,  e t  a1 t h a t  l i n g u i s t s  r e c o g n i z e .  
-- 
T h i s  i s  n o t  j u s t  b e c a u s e  by d e f i n i n g  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  s i g n s  
a s  se ts  of  o b j e c t s  p h y s i c a l l y  similar i n  shape  t o  (some 
g i v e n  s i g n )  o r a l  t o k e n s  a r e  r u l e d  o u t .  That  c o u l d  be  remedied 
( i f  - t h e  t e c h n i q u e  worked) by t a k i n g  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  s i g n s  t o  
be s e t s  o f  o b j e c t s  t h a t  a r e  p h y s i c a l l y  s i m i l a r  i n  sound t o  
f o r  example,  [ ' e k s ] .  ( O r ,  i f  t h i s  c o u l d  n o t  work because  
t h e  sound u n i t s  -- phones -- do n o t  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  w r i t t e n  
u n i t s  -- l e t t e r s  -- we c o u l d  g i v e  up t h e  i d e a  of d e f i n i n g  
something t h a t  c a n  be  e i t h e r  spoken o r  w r i t t e n ,  and jus t  
t r y  t o  s e p a r a t e l y  d e f i n e  a c o u s t i c a l  and shaped t y p e s . )  
The rea l  problem l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t  a l l u d e d  t o  on pages  151-152 
above,  t h a t  many i n s c r i p t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  l e t t e r s ,  t h a t  
we want t o  coun t  as b e i n g  t o k e n s  o f  t h e  same t y p e  a r e  i n  f a c t  
--- - --- --- 
more p h y s i c a l l y  similar i n  shape  t o  t o k e n s  o f  o t h e r  t y p e s  
- - - -
t h a n  t h e y  a r e  t o  t o k e n s  o f  t h e i r  own t y p e .  TO name j u s t  
- -- - -
one o f  many p o s s i b l e  examples :  on t h e  o r i g i n a l  copy o f  t h e  
D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  Independence ,  i t  seems t o  me t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  
l e t t e r  t o k e n  o f  Samuel Adams1 s i g n a t u r e  i s  much more 
' I p h y s i c a l l y  similar i n  shape1' ( i n  any r e m o t e l y  s t r a i g h t -  
f o r w a r d  s e n s e )  t o  t h e  f i r s t  l e t t e r  t o k e n  o f  John H a r t ' s  
s i g n a t u r e  t h a n  t o  t h a t  o f  Samuel C h a s e ' s .  O f  c o u r s e ,  Hugly 
and Sayward c o u l d  j u s t  a c c e p t  t h e  consequence t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  
s u c h  I f a b e r r a t i o n s " ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  a r e  many o f  them, w i l l  
i n  f a c t  b e  members of  p r i m i t i v e  s i g n s  (which a r e  s e t s ,  
r e c a l l )  t h e  o t h e r  members o f  which a r e  p redominan t ly  t o k e n s  
o f  a d i f f e r e n t  t y p e .  They might  s a y  t h a t  i t  d o e s  n o t  
f o l l o w  from t h i s  t h a t  t h e  f i rs t  l e t t e r  t o k e n  o f  Samuel 
Adams1 s i g n a t u r e  - i s  a  t o k e n  o f  ' J 1  j u s t  because  i t  i s  a  
member o f  t h e  t y p e  l J 1 .  And t h a t  i s  t r u e .  But t h e n  even t h e  
weak c o n n e c t i o n  between t o k e n  and t y p e  p o s t u l a t e d  two pages  
e a r l i e r  ( t h a t  a t o k e n ' s  a t o m i c  c o n s t i t u e n t s  would be (some 
o f )  t h e  u r -e lements  o u t  o f  which t h e  t y p e  was c o n s t i t u t e d )  
h a s  been s e v e r e d ,  So t h a t  what makes a n  o b j e c t  a  t o k e n  of  
one r a t h e r  t h a n  a n o t h e r  t y p e  becomes a t o t a l l y  m y s t e r i o u s  
matter. 
Pe rhaps  t h i s  problem c o u l d  be  e a s e d .  Pe rhaps  one 
c o u l d  s t a r t ,  f o r  example,  w i t h  sets  l i k e  { x :  x  i s  t h e  same 
phoneme as (some p a r t i c u l a r  [ P I ) ) ,  and depend upon t h e  
p h o n o l o g i s t s  t o  d e v e l o p  a d e q u a t e  c r i t e r i a  o f  i d e n t i t y  f o r  
phonemes ( i . e . ,  f o r  when two t h i n g s  a r e  " p h y s i c a l l y  s i m i l a r  
i n  s o u n d u ) .  (The c a s e  f o r  l e t t e r s  seems t o  me no e a s i e r ;  
g i v e n  t h e  way m e d i c a l  d o c t o r s  w r i t e ,  i t  may even be  h a r d e r . )  
Then a t  l e a s t  t h e r e  would be some s p e c i f i a b l e  c o n n e c t i o n  
between t y p e s  and t h e i r  t o k e n s .  But i s  i t  t h e  r i g h t  s o r t  o f  
---- -- 
c o n n e c t i o n ?  T h i s  b r i n g s  u s  t e  t h e  t h i r d  problem t h a t  comes 
o f  c o n s t r u i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s  a s  c l a s s e s  i n  a n y t h i n g  l i k e  t h e  
Hugly-Sayward manner.  Let  3 b e  t h e  s e t  o f  t o k e n s  o f  t h e  
l e t t e r  l c l .  Let  a be t h e  s e t  of t o k e n s  o f  t h e  l e t t e r  ' a 1 .  
Let  r be t h e  s e t  of  t o k e n s  of  t h e  l e t t e r  I t ' .  I t  seems t o  
me o b v i o u s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  
( 7 5 )  < a ,  <a, r > >  i s  a n  o r d e r e d  p a i r .  
and 
( 7 6 )  < a ,  < a ,  r > >  h a s  a member t h a t  i s  a n  o r d e r e d  p a i r ,  
a r e  t r u e ,  
( 7 7 )  < a ,  < a ,  T > >  i s  pronounced [ l k a t ] .  
( 7 8 )  < a ,  <a, r > >  i s  composed o f  3 l e t t e r s .  
and 
( 7 9 )  < a ,  <a, T > >  i s  s p e l l e d  l c l - l a l - t t l .  
a r e  f a l s e .  ( P e r h a p s  ' < a ,  <a,  T>>' h a s  a  p r o n u n c i a t i o n ,  
though n a t  [ l k a t ] ,  b u t  i t  d o e s n ' t  h e l p  w i t h  (77).) .  It a l s o  
seems t o  me obv ious  t h a t  most E n g l i s h  s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s  a r e  
familiar w i t h  some e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  -- e . g .  t h e  word ' c a t 1 .  
We may n o t  be  c o n f i d e n t  of p r e c i s e l y  what it i s  (which i s  
why we a r e  embarked upon t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n )  b u t  w e  do know 
-
some t h i n g s  abou t  i t ,  some t h i n g s  t h a t  need e x p l a i n i n g  i n  
view o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  as a n  a b s t : ? a c t  o b j e c t ,  a  word t y p e  
l i k e  ' c a t 1  canno t  be p e r c e i v e d .  For example,  a s  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  
assumed i n  h i s / h e r  o b j e c t i o n  #5 ,  we know t h a t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
a r e  t r u e :  
( 8 0 )  The word ' c a t  ' i s  pronounced [ l k a t  1. 
(81)  The word ' c a t 1  i s  composed of  3 l e t t e r s .  
( 8 2 )  The word ' c a t 1  i s  s p e l l e d  ' ~ ~ - ~ a l - l t ' .  
The f o r m a l i s t l s  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  how we know t h a t  ( 8 0 ) )  ( 8 1 )  
-
and ( 8 2 )  a r e  t r u e ,  i s  t h a t  we e x p e r i e n c e  t o k e n s  of  ' c a t f ;  
we h e a r  thi i2gs pronounced [ I k a t ] ,  and s e e  t h i n g s  composed o f  
t h e  3 l e t t e r s  ' c f ,  ' a f  and I t f .  S t i l l ,  why d o e s  t h i s  e n a b l e  
u s  t o  i n f e r  t h a t  ( 8 0 ) ,  ( 8 1 )  and ( 8 2 )  a r e  t r u e ?  A s  we saw, 
t h e  f o r m a l i s t f  s answer i s  t h a t  t y p e s  a r e  j l ~ s t  l i k e  t h e i r  
t o k e n s ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  a b s t r a c t ,  whereas  t o k e n s  a r e  
c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s .  (How we know t h i s  i s  a n o t h e r  s t o r y ,  one 
-
t h a t  s h a l l  be i g n o r e d  u n t i l  we g e t  t o  S y l v a i n  Bromberger f s  
a c c o u n t ;  f o r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s  i t  i s  enough t h a t  we know i t  
o r  something l i k e  i t . )  
Now w e  saw t h a t  i n  t h e  Hugly-Sayward c o n s t r u a l ,  t h e  
e x p r e s s i o n  a t  ( 7 4 )  was supposed t o  be a  t o k e n  o f  " t h e  
e x p r e s s i o n u  <E, < A , C > ,  <<B,C>, < A , C > > > .  So t h e  word ' c a t 1  
would p r o b a b l y  t u r n  o u t ,  u n d e r  one of  t h e i r  c o n s t r u a l s ,  t o  
be some set l i k e  < a ,  <a,  T>>. L e t f s  suppose  i t  d o e s ,  Then 
i t  would f o l l o w  t h a t  ( 7 7 ) ,  ( 7 8 )  and ( 7 9 )  a r e  t r u e .  But a s  
we remarked e a r l i e r ,  t h e y  are f a l s e .  Of c o u r s e  a n  ad hoc 
--
r e d e f i n i n g  of " is  pronounced,"  " is  composed o f , "  and " i s  
s p e l l e d "  might  g r a t u i t o u s l y  have t h e  consequence t h a t  ( 7 7 ) ,  
( 7 8 )  and ( 7 9 )  a r e  t r u e .  But I do n o t  t h i n k  we shou ld  be 
f o o l e d  by such  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i n t o  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  ( 7 7 ) ,  ( 7 8 )  
and ( 7 9 )  might  r e a l l y  be t r u e  -- anymore t h a n  a  dog would 
have f i v e  l e g s ,  i f  w e  r e d e f i n e d  ' l e g f  t o  i n c l u d e  t a i l s ,  
a s  t h e  o l d  j o k e  g o e s .  
What t h i s  p o i n t  comes t o  i s  t h a t  we may be i g n o r a n t  
a b o u t  p r e c i s e l y  what i t  i s  t h a t  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e ;  b u t  we 
a r e  n o t  s o  i g n o r a n t  as t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  c l a s s e s ,  
B e s i d e s ,  - a  f o r n i a l i s t  would n e v e r  go f o r  a  c l a s s  c o n s t r u a l  
- -  - 
anyway, f o r  two r e a s o n s :  f i r s t ,  i t  v i o l a t e s  t h e  common s e n s e  
b a s i s  f o r  h i s / h e r  o b j e c t i o n  #5 ( t h e  one we a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g ) ;  
and second ,  ( s ) h e  i s  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  be charmed by t h e  
commitment t o  s e t s  and n - t u p l e s  t h a t  i t  e n t a i l s .  
Not t h a t  we ough t  t o  c o n s t r u e  Hugly and Sayward a s  
mere ly  hav ing  made. some k ind  o f  fundamenta l  m e t a p h y s i c a l  
m i s t a k e .  There  a r e  c o n t e x t s  i n  which i t  c o u l d  be v e r y  
u s e f u l  t o  t r ea t  e x p r e s s i o n s  as i f  t h e y  were c l a s s e s ,  and 
Hugly and Sayward showed j u s t  what s o r t  of c l a s s e s  t h e y  
c o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  as s o  as t o  p r e s e r v e  c e r t a i n  i n p o r t a n t  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( l i k e  t h e i r  b e i n g  a b s t r a c t  and 
i n f i n i t e  i n  number) .  It i s  j u s t  t h a t  i n  d o i n g  s o  t h e y  
s a c r i f i c e d  c e r t a i n  o t h e r  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( l i k e  
t h e i r  h a v i n g  t h e  same shape  and s p e l l i n g  a s  t h e i r  t o k e n s ) ,  
p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  are  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  a r e n a .  
There  i s  one more d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t  I would l i k e  t o  
ment ion  w i t h  Hugly and Sayward1s  c o n s t r u a l .  One of  t h e  most 
u s e f u l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  type- token  d i s t i n c t i o n  h a s  been 
i n  a e s t h e t i c s .  R ichard  Wollheim, f o r  example,  whose views 
on t y p e s  we s h a l l  g e t  t o  s h o r t l y ,  c o n s t r u e s  many works o f  
a r t  as t y p e s ,  whose t o k e n s  a r e  t h e  v a r i o u s  c o p i e s  of  i t ,  
o r  i t s  pe r fo rmances ,  o r  what have  you. 89 I t h i n k  i t  i s  
d e s i r a b l e  t h a t  any accoun t  of what a n  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e  i s  
8 9 .  --- A r t  and I t s  O b j e c t s .  ( N e w  York: Harper  and Row, 1 9 6 8 ) .  
s h o u l d  be p a r t  o f  a g e n e r a l  accoun t  o f  t y p e s .  But it i s  
v e r y  h a r d  t o  s e e  how t o  g e n e r a l i z e  Hugly and Sayward1a a c c o u n t  
s o  as t o  e x p l a i n  what H a n d e l t s  Messiah i s ,  f o r  example.  
Is i t  t h e  s e t  o f  i t s  t o k e n s ?  Again,  t h i s  seems an i n -  
a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n s t r u a l  because  whereas t h e  Messiah i s  n o t a b l e  
f o r  i t s  many ~ H a l l e l u j a h f s t f  t h e  s e t  o f  i t s  t o k e n s  ( r e a l  
and  imagined pe r fo rmances ,  c o p i e s  o f  t h e  s c o r e ,  p e r h a p s )  
c o n t a i n s  - no ~ H a l l e l u j a h t s f f ,  o n l y  i t s  members d o .  
So l e t  u s  p u t  a s i d e  Hugly and Sayward1s  a c c o u n t ,  
and a l l  a c c o u n t s  t h a t  c o n s t r u e  t y p e s  as c l a s s e s ,  because  
most o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h e i r  a c c o u n t  f a c e s  s tem from t h i s  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  R ichard  Wollheim, whose a c c o u n t  we s h a l l  
now c o n s i d e r ,  l a b e l s  a t y p e  a n o n - p a r t i c u l a r ,  and c o n s t r a s t s  
i t  w i t h  o t h e r  k i n d s  of  " g e n e r i c  e n t i t i e s t f ,  o r  n o n - p a r t i c u l a r s  
l i k e  u n i v e r s a l s  (which a r e  s a i d  t o  have i n s t a n c e s )  b u t  
e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  c l a s s e s  (which a r e  s a i d  t o  have members).  
"An example o f  a  c l a s s  would be  t h e  c l a s s  o f  r e d  t h i n g s :  
a n  example o f  a u n i v e r s a l  would be r e d n e s s :  and examples o f  
a t y p e  would be t h e  word ' r e d l  and t h e  Red Flag.! '  ( p .  7 5 ) .  
Although s k e t c h y  (we d o  n o t  know, e . g . ,  where numbers f i t  
i n t o  t h i s  accoun t  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  above)  t h i s  a t  l e a s t  
b e g i n s  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a n  answer t o  ( 7 0 ) .  Wollhelm d i s c u s s e s  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s  between g e n e r i c  e n t i t i e s  and t h e i r  "element  s t f  , 
as he c a l l s  them -- t h e  t h i n g s  t h a t  ' I f a l l  under f f  them -- 
t h e r e b y  f u r t h e r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  t h e  g e n e r i c  e n t i t i e s  from 
e a c h  o t h e r :  
The v a r i o u s  g e n e r i c  e n t i t i e s  c a n  be  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  ways o r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
i n  which t h e y  s t a n d  t o  t h e i r  e l e m e n t s .  These 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  c a n  be e r r a n g e d  on a s c a l e  o f  
i n t i m a c y  o r  i n t r i n s i c a l i t y .  A t  one end o f  t h e  
s c a l e  we f i n d  c l a s s e s ,  where t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
i s  a t  i t s  most e x t e r n a l  o r  e x t r i n s i c :  f o r  a  
c l a s s  i s  mere ly  a mode o f ,  o r  c o n s t i t u t e d  by ,  
i t s  members which a r e  e x t e n s i o n a l l y  con. joined 
t o  form i t . . , I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  u n i v e r s a l s  t h e  
r e l a t i o n  i s  more i n t i m a t e :  i n  t h a t  a u n i v e r s a l  
i s  p r e s e n t  i n  a l l  i t s  i n s t a n c e s .  Redness i s  i n  
a l l  r e d  t h i n g s .  With t y p e s  we f i n d  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  g e n e r i c  e n t i t y  and 
i t s  e l e m e n t s  a t  i t s  most i n t i m a t e :  f o r  n o t  
mere ly  i s  t h e  t y p e  p r e s e n t  i n  a l l  i t s  t o k e n s  
l i k e  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  i n  a l l  i t s  i n s t a n c e s ,  bu t  
f o r  much of t h e  t i m e  we t h i n k  and t a l k  o f  t h e  
t y p e  a s  though i t  were i t s e l f  a kind of t o k e n ,  
though a  p e c u l i a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  o r  pre-eminent  
one .  ( P P .  75-76) .  
So fa r ,  Wol lhe imls  view may be t o o  p l a t o n i s t i c  f o r  
t h e  f o r m a l i s t ,  b u t  p e r h a p s  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  c a n  a g r e e  w i t h  
what Wollheim s a y s  a b o u t  t y p e s .  The q u e s t i o n  i s :  how do 
numbers f i t  i n t o  t h i s  p i c t u r e ?  The p i c t u r e  i s  r e a l l y  t o o  
vague and m e t a p h o r i c a l  f o r  a d e f i n i t i v e  answer t o  be g i v e n ,  
b u t  my own i m p r e s s i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between 2 ,  s a y ,  
and p a i r s  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  " e x t r i n s i ~ ~ ~ ,  l i k e  t h a t  o f  c l a s s e s  
t o  t h e i r  members; t h a t  i n s o f a r  a s  r e d n e s s  i s  " p r e s e n t "  i n  
r e d  t h i n g s  and t h e  word ' c a t r  i s  p r e s e n t  i n  t h i s  t o k e n .  
c a t  
t h e  number 2 can  be  s a i d  t o  be p r e s e n t  i n  pa i r s ;  t h a t  we 
c e r t a i n l y  - do t rea t  2 a s  a  k i n d  o f  p a r t i c u l a r ,  even a  
p e c u l i a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  one;  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  
i s  n o t  a t y p e ,  2 h a s  t o  be  r a t e d ,  s o  f a r ,  a s  b e i n g  r a t h e r  
s i m i l a r  t o  t y p e s .  
Wollheim t h e n  p r o c e e d s  t o  g i v e  v e r y  g e n e r a l  answers  
t o  q u e s t i o n s  ( 7 2 )  ,and ( 7 3 ) ,  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  had 
by t y p e s  and t o k e n s ,  as w e l l  as t h o s e  had by o t h e r  g e n e r i c  
e n t i t i e s  and t h e i r  e l e m e n t s .  An i m p o r t a n t  d i s t i n c t i o n  
emerges,  between s h a r i n g  p r o p e r t i e s  (when A and B a r e  b o t h  
f ,  f i s  s h a r e d )  and p r o p e r t i e s  b e i n g  t r a n s m i t t e d  (when A 
i s  f b e c a u s e  B i s  f ,  o r  v i c e  v e r s a ,  f i s  t r a n s m i t t e d  between 
A and B). ( p .  7 6 ) .  Wollheim c o n t e n d s  t h a t  
( 83 )  C l a s s e s  r a r e l y  s h a r e  p r o p e r t i e s  w i t h  t h e i r  members, 
and no p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  t r a n s m i t t e d .  
( 8 4 )  ( i)  There  a r e  t r a n s m i t t e d  p r o p e r t i e s  between u n i v e r s a l s  
and t h e i r  i n s t a n c e s ,  and between t y p e s  and t h e i r  
t o k e n s ,  b u t  (ii) t h e r e  a r e  fewer  t r a n s m i s s i o n s  f o r  
u n i v e r s a l s  t h a n  f o r  t y p e s ,  and (iii) no p r o p e r t y  t h a t  
a n  i n s t a n c e  o f  a u n i v e r s a l  h a s  i n  v i r t u e  o f  b e i n g  a n  
i n s t a n c e  ( l i k e  b e i n g  r e d )  can  be  t r a n s m i t t e d  t o  t h e  
-
u n i v e r s a l  ( r e d n e s s )  -- u n l i k e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  
t y p e s  ( l i k e  t h e  Red F l a g ) ,  which do have t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  
-
t h e i r  i n s t a n c e s  have i n  v i r t u e  o f  b e i n g  i n s t a n c e s  
( l i k e  t h e i r  b e i n g  r e d ) .  
Now bt might  a p p e a r  t h a t  t h e  f o r m a l i s t ' s  p o i n t  h a s  
been provzd.  I f  ( 8 4 )  i s  t r u e ,  t h e n  s i n c e ,  a s  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  
c h a r g e s ,  b e i n g  composed of e x a c t l y  t h i n g s  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
a p r o p e r t y  t h a t  a l l  p a i r s  have i n  v i r t u e  o f  b e i n g  p a i r s ,  
b u t  2 l a c k s  it, t h e n  by ( 8 4 )  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  number- 
p l u r a l i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  n o t  l i k e  t h e  type- token  one -- a t  
b e s t  i t  i s  l i k e  t h a t  of a u n i v e r s a l  t o  i t s  i n s t a n c e s  -- 
because  t h e r e  i s  a t  l e a s t  one n o n - t r a n s m i t t e d  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  
a l l  t h e  " i n s t a n c e s "  of 2 n e c e s s a r i l y  s h a r e .  So i f  ( 8 4 )  
were t r u e ,  t h e  f o r m a l i s t ' s  o b j e c t i o n  would have  r e c e i v e d  
t h e o r e t i c a l  u n d e r p i n n i n g  from Wollheim. However, I t h i n k  
t h a t  (84 )  i s  f a l s e  -- o r  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  ( 8 4 )  ( i i i )  i s  f a l s e  
when t h e  t y p e s  concerned  a r e  e x p r e s s i o n s .  E a r l i e r ,  we d i d  
n o t  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  f o r m a l i s t  t h a t  t y p e s  a r e  j u s t  l i k e  
t h e i r  t o k e n s ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  t h e y  a re  a b s t r a c t  whereas  t o k e n s  
a r e  c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t s ;  and t h a t  we know ( 8 0 ) ,  ( 8 1 ) ,  and ( 8 2 )  
a r e  t r u e  because  we h e a r  t h i n g s  pronourlced [ ' k a t ]  and s e e  
t h i n g s  composed o f  t h e  3 l e t t e r s  ' c ' ,  ' a '  and l t l .  A l l  o f  
t h i s  vague ly  s u g g e s t s  Wollheim i s  r i g h t  and ( 8 4 )  i s  t r u e .  
But what ,  p r e c i s e l y  - are t h e  t r a n s m i t t e d  p r o p e r t i e s  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  ' c a t 1 ?  A p a r t i c u l a r  u t t e r a n c e  o f  ' c a t 1  i s  a  sound 
e v e n t ,  is a p r o n u n c i a t i o n  o f  ' c a t 1 ,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  s o r t  
of t h i n g  t h a t ,  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g ,  h a s  - a p r o n u n c i a t i o n .  Yet 
t h e  word t y p e  ' c a t 1  h a s  a p r o n u n c i a t i o n ,  It i s  a l s o  
composed o f  3 l e t t e r  t y p e s :  t h e  l e t t e r  t y p e s  l c l ,  l a r  and 
t .  It i s  n o t  and canno t  be  composed of  l e t t e r  t o k e n s .  
Tokens o f  ' c a t 1 ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  a r e  composed o f  3 l e t t e r  
t o k e n s ,  t o k e n s  o f  t h e  l e t t e r s  ' c ' ,  ' a f  and I t ' .  O f  c o u r s e ,  
b o t h  ' c a t '  and i t s  t o k e n s  can  be spoken o f ,  a s  we d i d  e a r l i e r ,  
as "be ing  composed o r  3 l e t t e r s " ,  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a common t r a n s m i t t e d  p r o p e r t y .  But t o  t r e a t  b e i n g  
composed of 3 l e t t e r  t y p e s  as t h e  same p r o p e r t y  as b e i n g  
composed - -  o f  3 l e t t e r  t o k e n s  Is t o  j u s t  i g n o r e  t h e  type- token 
d i s t i n c t i o n  -- h a r d l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t ,  
when w e  are t r y i n g  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  what e a ~ h  i s ,  and how t h e y  
r e l a t e  t o  e a c h  o t h e r .  If "what we s a y u  were t h e  on ly  
c r i t e r i o n  f o r  when p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  s h a r e d ,  even i n  t h e  f a c e  
o f  r e a s o n a b l e  d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  t h e n  a  t r i o  would s h a r e  t h e  
i n a b i l i t y  t o  b e  h a l v e d  w i t h  3, b e c a u s e  we c o u l d  s a y  e i t h e r  
( 8 5 )  A t r i o  canno t  be  h a l v e d .  
o r  
( 8 6 )  3 canno t  be  h a l v e d .  
For  t h a t  m a t t e r ,  numbers would s h a r e  many p r o p e r t i e s  w i t h  
numera l s ,  b e c a u s e ,  l i k e  Kl ine  (above)  "what we sayf1  i s  o f t e n  
a t  odds w i t h  t h e  use-mention d i s t i n c t i o n .  
T h e r e f o r e  i t  seems t o  me t h a t  ( 8 4 )  (iii) i s  f a l s e  a s  
r e g a r d s  e x p r e s s i o n s .  T h i s  may n o t  m a t t e r  t o  Wollheim, 
s i n c e  he  was p r o b a b l y  t h i n k i r g  l e s s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  t h a n  o f  
works o f  a r t .  But I b e l i e v e  h i s  i n t e r e s t  i n  works o f  a r t  
l e d  him t o  over-emphasize t h e  . importance of "a s e t  o f  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  which we p o s t u l a t e  t y p e s t 1 ,  namely, t h o s e  
"where we can c o r r e l a t e  a c l a s s  of p a r t i c u l a r s  w i t h  a  p i e c e  
o f  human i n v e n t i o n :  t h e s e  p a r t i c u l a r s  may t h e n  be r e g a r d e d  
as t o k e n s  o f  a c e r t a i n  t y p e f f .  (F. 7 8 ) .  T h i s  i s  supposed 
t o  comprehend a  spect rum of  c a s e s :  " A t  t h e  one end we have 
t h e  c a s e  where t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  i s  p roduced ,  and i s  t h e n  
c o p i e d ;  a t  t h e  o t h e r  end,  we have  t h e  c a s e  where a  s e t  o f  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  i s  drawn up which,  i f  f o l l o w e d ,  g i v e s  r i s e  
t o  a n  i n d e f i n i t e  number o f  p a r t i c u l a r s I 1  ( p .  7 8 ) .  While 
u s e f u l  f o r  works of a r t ,  it seems t o  be  a l i t t l e  l e s s  
u s e f u l  t o  c o n s i d e r  a l l  e x p r e s s i o n s  " i n v e n t i o n s r r ,  and 
c o m p l e t e l y  wrong t o  c o n s i d e r  t y p e s  l i k e  The T i g e r  l r i n v e n t i o n s u ,  
b e c a u s e  i t s  t o k e n s  a r e  members of  a  v e r y  n a t u r a l  k i n d .  
Hence w h i l e  i t  has many a t t r a c t i v e  f e a t u r e s ,  
Wol lhe i rnfs  accoun t  o f  t y p e s  i s  t o o  r e s t r i c t i v e .  (Note ,  
however,  t h a t  what he d i d  s a y  t h a t  was r i g h t  dj.d n o t  i n t r o -  
duce any s e r i o u s  d i s a n a l o g i e s  between e x p r e s s i o n s  and n u m b e r s . ) .  
Let u s  move on t h e n  t o  o u r  l a s t  a c c o u n t  of e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ,  
t h a t  o f  S y l v a i n  B r o m b e r g e r l s ,  t o  s e e  i f  i t  s u p p l i e s  t h e  
f o r m a l i s t  w i t h  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  means f o r  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  t y p e s  
a r e  j u s t  l i k e  t h e i r  t o k e n s ,  o r  f o r  o t h e r w i s e  undermining t h e  
ana logy  between e x p r e s s i o n s  and numbers. Bromberger l s  a c c o u n t  
h a s  s e v e r a l  a d v a n t a g e s ,  f o r  o u r  p u r p o s e s ,  o v e r  t h a t  o f  
Wol lheimls .  Whereas Wollheim was p r i m a r i l y  concerned w i t h  
works o f  a r t ,  Bromberger i s  p r i m a r i l y  concerned w i t h  
e x p r e s s i o n , , t y p e s .  And b e s i d e s  n o t  hav ing  t h e  r e s t r i c t i v e  
view o f  t y p e s  as "human i n v e n t i o n s "  ( t h a t  r u l e s  o u t  The 
T i g e r )  B r o m b e r g e r f s  a c c o u n t  g o e s  f u r t h e r  towards  e x p l a i n i n g  
how we have knowledge o f  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s ,  by r e l a t i n g  such  
knowledge t o  o u r  knowledge of  n a t u r a l  k i n d s  g e n e r a l l y .  The 
a c c o u n t  i n  q u e s t i o n  i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  a n  u n p u b l i s h e d  p a p e r  
c a l l e d  "Mind, Language, and Knowledge: On Some P l a t o n i s t i c  
R e l a t i o n s h i p s  From An E r o t e t i c  P o s i t i o n "  t h a t  was f i r s t  
p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  APA m e e t i n g s  i n  December 1981.  Page 
r e f e r e n c e s  w i l l  be t o  a more r e c e n t  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  p a p e r .  
While a l l  o f  it i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  and 1rnportant;in what f o l l o w s  
o n l y  t h e  main p o i n t s  o f  t h e  p a p e r  t h a t  b e a r  upon o u r  t c p i c  
w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d .  And t h e y  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d ,  n o t  c r i t i c a l l y  
( b e c a u s e  t h a t  would t a k e  u s  a b i t  f a r  a f i e l d )  b u t  o n l y  w i t h  
a n  e y e  t o w a r d s  s e e i n g  how numbers s t a c k  up e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  
a g a i n s t  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  t h i s ,  t h e  b e s t  t h e o r y  o f  what 
e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  t h a t  I know o f .  
Bromberger s p e c i f i c a l l y  a s k s :  "what i s  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  
between t o k e n s  and t h e i r  t y p e s  by v i r t u e  o f  which i n f e r e n c e s  
f rom t o k e n s  t o  t y p e s  a r e  p o s s i b l e ? "  ( p .  6 ) .  His answer  
i s  sumqar i zed  i n  t h e s e  s i x  c o n j e c t u r e s  (which  I haverenum- 
b e r e d ) .  
( 8 7 )  "Toh.ens o f  a t y p e  make up a n a t u r a l  k i n d . l l  
( 8 8 )  "Tokens o f  a t y p e  make up a n a t u r a l  k i n d ,  t h a t  h a s  a n  
a r c h e t y p e . "  
( 8 9 )  l lArche types  o f  a n a t u r a l  k i n d  a r e  a b s t r a c t  e n t i t i e s .  
( 9 0 )  "(The P l a t o n i c  R e l a t i o n s h i p  P r i n c i p l e :  ) If A i s  a n  
a r c h e t y p e  o f  a n a t u r a l  k i n d  K ,  t h e n  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  A a r e  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  d e r i v a b l e  from some 
o f  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  s h a r e d  by a l l  t h e  members of t h e  
n a t u r a l  k i n d . "  
( 9 1 )  "Types are  t h e  a r c h e t y p e  of  t h e  n a t u r a l  k i n d  made up 
by t h e i r  members. l1 
( 9 2 )  l l I n f e s e n c e s  f rom t o k e n s  t o  t h e i r  t y p e s  are  based  on 
t h e  P l a t o n i c  R e l a t i o n s h i p  P r i n ~ i p l e . ~ '  ( p .  6 ) .  
I n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  ( 8 7 ) ,  Bromberger  s t r e s s e s  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  members o f  a n a t u r a l  k i n d  model e a c h  o t h e r ,  b e c a u s e  by 
f i n d i n g  o u t  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  a b o u t  one member, one can  a l s o  
f i n d  o u t  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  abou t  a n o t h e r  ( p p .  6 f ) .  (More 
s t r i c t l y ,  I'M i s  a  model o f  0 r e l a t i v e  t o  a se t  o f  t r i p l e s  
[Q,, Qo, A ]  i f  and o n l y  i f  i n  each  t r i p l e  Qm i s  a q u e s t i o n  
abou t  M, Qo i s  a q u e s t i o n  a b o u t  0 ,  and A i s  a n  a l g o r i t h m  
t h a t  t r a n s l a t e s  any answer  t o  i n t o  a n  answer t o  go ,  and 
c o r r e c t  answers  t o  Qm i n t o  c o r r e c t  answers  t o  Q o . l l  ( p  7 )  
So f o r  example,  f i n d i n g  a n  answer t o  ''What i s  i t s  b o i l i n g  
p o i n t  u n d e r  s t a n d a r d  c o n d i t i o n s ? l l  f o r  one sample o f  pure  
water g i v e s  a n  answer ,  t h e  same answer ,  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  asked  
o f  o t h e r  samples ;  o r  f o r  t i g e r s ,  "What i s  i t s  a n a t o m i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e ? "  
Bromberger a c t u a l l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h r e e  k i n d s  o f  
q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  n a t u r a l  k i n d s :  p r o j e c t i b l e ,  
q u a s i - p r o j e c t i b l e ,  and i n d i v i d u a t i n g  q u e s t i o n s  ( p .  9 ) .  
P r o j e c t i b l e  q u e s t i o n s  -- l i k e  t h e  examples i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  
p a r a g r a p h  -- ( a )  "can be asked  o f  e a c h  member o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  
k i n d ; "  ( b )  have  t h e  same answer f o r  e a c h  member; and ( c )  
"when t h e  a n s w e r , . . g i v e s  r i s e  t o  a why q u e s t i o n ,  t h e n  t h a t  
why-quest ion must i t s e l f  be  p r o j e c t i b l e l l  ( p ,  9 ) .  I n d i v i d u a t i n g  
q s e s t i o n s  -- l i k e  "Where was i t  on September 4 ,  1983 a t  
4 p.m. e . s . t ? I 1  f o r  samples  o f  w a t e r ,  o r  "On what day was i t  
born?I1 f o r  t i g e r s  -- ( a )  "can be asked  o f  e a c h  member o f  t h e  
n a t u r a l  1cfnd;'I b u t  ( b )  n o t  a l l  members r e c e i v e  t h e  same 
.answer ;  ( c )  " t h e  answers  need n o t  g i v e  r i s e  t o  why-ques t ions ;  
and ( d )  t h e s e  "need n o t  be  p r o j e c t i b l e l 1 .  Also,  ( e )  "answers 
t o  t h e  why-quest ions can be  grounded on d i f f e r e n t  nomological  
p r i n c i p l e s "  ( p .  1 0 ) .  What q u a s i - p r o j e c t i b l e  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  
w i l l  no t  m a t t e r  t o  u s  h e r e .  
Now of  c o u r s e  i t  i s  n o t  enough f o r  a  s e t  t o  be a  
n a t u r a l  k i n d  t h a t  t h e r e  be  p r o j  e c t i b l e ,  quas i -p ro j  e c t  i b l e  
and i n d i v i d u a t i n g  q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  can  be  asked  o f  i t s  m e m b e r s .  
But "what de t e rmines  whether  one i s  j u s t i f i e d  - i n  t h i n k i n g  o f  
a set of o b j e c t s  as c o n s t i t u t i n g  a  n a t u r a l  k ind r e l a t i v e  
t o  t h r e e  g roups  o f  q u e s t i o n s "  i s  IITheoryI1, s a y s  Bromberger.  
"The k i n d s  o f  t h e o r y  t h a t  a r e  r e l e v a n t  are t h e  s o r t  of  
t h e o r i e s  t h a t  group o b j e c t s  i n t o  c e r t a i n  h i e r a r c h i c a l  systems1'  
(p .  11) Bro rnbe rg~ r  t h e n  c l a i m s  t h a t  l f l i n g u i s t i c s  p rocedes  
on t h e  presumpt ion t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a set o f  q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i v e  
t o  which t o k e n s  o f  a t y p e  c o n s t i t u t e  a n a t u r a l  k ind"  ( p ,  1 4 ) .  
For  example, h e r e  are some p r o j e c t i b l e  q u e s t i o n s  f o r  t okens  
o f  t h e  word ' c a t a s t r o p h e ' :  
( 9 3 )  How many s y l l a b l e  ( t o k e n s )  compose i t ?  
( 9 4 )  What i s  t h e  phoneme t h a t  i t s  o n s e t  i s  a t o k e n  o f ?  
( 9 5 )  What i s  i t s  u n d e r l y i n g  phono log i ca l  s t r u c t u r e ?  
And h e r e  are some i n d i v i d u a t i n g  q u e s t i o n s :  
( 9 6 )  Who u t t e r e d  i t ?  
( 9 7 )  Where was i t  u t t e r e d ?  
It seems t o  me t h a t  it cou ld  w i t h  a lmos t  e q u a l  p l a u s i b i l i t y  
be s a i d  t h a t  a r i t h m e t i c  ( n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  o f  t h e  pu re  v a r i e t y )  
a l s o  p rocedes  on t h e  presumpt ion t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  s e t  o f  
q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i v e  t o  which p l u r a l i t i e s  o f  a  c e r t a i n  s i z e  
c o n s t i t u t e  a n a t u r a l  k i n d .  There  a r e  p r o j e c t i b l e  and 
i n d i v i d u a t i n g  q u e s t i o n s  f o r  p l u r a l i t i e s .  For  example,  f o r  
any p a i r  o f  t h i n g s  one can  a s k ,  and  g e t  t h e  same answer t o ,  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s :  
(98)  How many t h i n g s  i s  it composed o f ?  
( 9 9 )  Can i t  be ( n o n - f r a c t i o n a l l y )  d i v i d e d  3 ways? 
(100)  Why c a n ' t  it b e  d i v i d e d  3 ways? 
Examples o f  i n d i v i d u a t i n g  q u e s t i o n s ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  most 
u c o n c r e t e "  p a i r s ,  a r e :  
( 1 0 1 )  Where i s  i t ?  
( 1 0 2 )  What s o r t  o f  t h i n g  i s  i t  2  o f ?  
Nor d o e s  t h e  ana logy  b r e a k  down when i t  comes t o  t h e  
b u s i n e s s  o f  a r c h e t y p e s .  An a r c h e t y p e  o f  a  n a t u r a l  k ind  
( t h a t  h a s  a n  a r c h e t y p e )  i s ,  I t h i n k ,  a n  o b j e c t  f o r  which 
( a )  t h e r e  i s  a n  a l g o r i t h m  t h a t  i n d i c a t e s  i n  what r e l a t i v e l y  
s l i g h t  b u t  s y s t e m a t i c  way e v e r y  p r o j e c t i b l e  q u e s t i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  t h e  k i n d ,  c a n  b e  a l t e r e d  s o  as t o  be asked  o f  i t ;  ( b )  
t h e  c o r r e c t  answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s ,  e x c e p t  f o r  s i m i l a r  
a l t e r a t i o n s  g i v e n  by t h e  a l g o r i t h m ,  t h e  same as f o r  aach  
member of  t h e  n a t u r a l  k i n d ;  and ( c )  none o f  t h e  o t h e r  q u e s t i o n s  
( q u a s i - p r o j e c t i b l e  o r  i n d i v i d u a t i n g )  have a  r i g h t  answer 
( b e c a u s e  " i t s  s t a t u s  as  a r c h e t y p e  v i o l a t e s  t h e i r  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n "  
( p .  121.). Bromberger a r g u e s  t h a t  - a n  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e  2 an 
a r c h e t y p e  the n a t u r a l  k i n d  i t s  t o k e n s  compr i se .  One can  
a s k  o f  t h e  word t y p e  ' c a t a s t r o p h e f ,  e . g . ,  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  
(931,  ( 9 4 )  and  ( 9 5 ) :  
( 9 3 ' )  How many s y l l a b l e s  compose i t ?  
( 9 4 ' )  What i s  t h e  phoneme t h a t  compr i ses  i t s  o n s e t ?  
( 9 5 ' )  What i s  i t s  u n d e r l y i n g  p h o n o l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e ?  
And I t h i n k  i t  i s  obv ious  how t h e  answers  t o  ( 9 3 ) ,  ( 9 4 )  and 
( 9 5 ) ,  whatever  t h e y  are ,  w i l l  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h o s e  of  ( 9 3 ' ) ,  
( 9 4 ' )  and ( 9 5 ' ) .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  ( 9 8 ) ,  ( 9 9 )  and ( 1 0 0 )  
s u i t a b l y  and s l i g h t l y  a l t e r e d  c a n  be asked  of  - t h e  number - 2 :  
( 9 8 ' )  How many 1 ' s  i s  i t  composed o f ,  i . e . ,  add up t o  i t ?  
( 9 9 ' )  Can i t  b e  ( n o n - f r a c t i o n a l l y )  d i v i d e d  by 3? 
( 1 0 0 ' )  Why c a n ' t  i t  be d i v i d e d  by 3? 
Much more c o u l d  b e  s a i d  by way o f  e x p l o r i n g  Bromberger ' s  
c o n c e p t i o n  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  a s  a r c h e t y p e s  o f  n a t u r a l  k i n d s ,  
and t o  what e x t e n t  numbers can  a n a l o g o u s l y  be  c o n s t r u e d  a s  
a r c h e t y p e s  o f  p l u r a l i t i e s .  I admi t  t h a t  i t  seems t o  be 
t o  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  But t h i s  s u g g e s t s  t o  m e  mere ly  t h a t  
mathemat ics  g e t s  more a b s t r a c t ,  more q u i c k l y ,  t h a n  l i n g u i s t i c s  
d o e s ,  n o t  t h a t  i t  d o e s  n o t  have any e m p i r i c a l  b a s i s  
( e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y )  a t  a l l .  However I hope enough h a s  been 
s a i d  t o  meet t h e  f o r m a l i s t ' s  o b j e c t i o n  #5. That  o b j e c t i o n  
has  n o t  been w e l l  s u p p o r t e d  by sny  t h e o r y  o f  e x p r e s s i o n  t y p e s  
t h a t  we have looked a t .  I f  a n y t h i n g ,  i t  seems t o  me a t  
l e a s t ,  t h a t  Bromberger ' s  t h e o r y ,  t h e  b e s t  o f  them a l l ,  
s u p p o r t s  t h e  a n t i - f o r m a l i s t  c l a i m  t h a t  o u r  knowledge o f  t h e  
a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t s  o f  l i n g u i s t i c s  and mathemat ics  Reems p a r t l y  
dependen t ,  i n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  on o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  c o n c r e t e  t h i n g s  
t h a t  model e a c h  o t h e r  i n  c e r t a i n  r e s p e c t s ,  and which e n a b l e  
u s  t o  "g rasp"  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  a b s t r a c t  o b j e c t .  
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